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The Character and Structure of Myth

by William V. Rowe

Systematic reflection on the character and structure of myth began in the nineteenth century.[1] Since that time, each monolithic theory which successively dominated the discipline in its day was dismissed by the next, often through the exposure of Western scholars to another traditional society. Malinowski's theory that myths consist of social _charters_ for the institution of beliefs[2] was largely inspired by his study of the Trobriand islanders in the south-west Pacific. The structuralist theory of Claude Lévi-Strauss is supported by evidence drawn from the Amerindian societies of Brazil. Malinowski's theories had deposed a previous tradition in the scholarship whose primary representative was Andrew Lang.[3]

In Lang's view, all myths were aetiological in function. Thus he tended to view mythology as a "proto-science." Lang's theory of myth had in turn replaced the theory of Max Müller, that all myth is nature myth: a symbolic representation of natural events and forces. Behind Müller's theory lay the idea that the religions of traditional societies are animistic. The latter plays a role in the interpretations offered by H. and H.A. Frankfort, according to which myth addresses the world in terms of "Thou."[4]

There are also the striking theories of Mircea Eliade, which were worked out through a development of the charter-theory of the Malinowski school. According to this view myth consists of the recollection of the _creative era_, a rehearsal of the deeds performed by the ancestors, or by the gods, _in illo tempore_.[5] In the structure of myth, Eliade sees an existential drive to "overcome time" and history. The deeds performed in the creative era are paradigmatic for personal and social behaviour in "profane time."

The Cambridge School assumes that myth is rooted in ritual, where it finds its _raison d'être_. To this list we must add the "psychological" explanations, including the theories of Sigmund Freud,[6]

Karl Jung[7] and Ernst Cassirer.[8] Like Freud and Jung, Cassirer was an opponent of the idea of myth as proto-science. The human spirit, he believed, expresses itself culturally under certain "symbolic forms" including language, myth and science. By calling it symbolic, Cassirer did not mean, with Freud, that myths symbolise something, as if it could be interpreted allegorically. Rather, myth is a pure expression of reality directly perceived, which "overcomes a man in sheer immediacy."[9] But Cassirer, like Jung, remained faithful to the Freudian idea that there is a fixed correlation between certain symbols and certain feelings.[10] Here we find an anticipation of the structural theory of Lévi-Strauss. The issue in the latter concerns the (structural) similarity of the human mind (l'esprit) in every period and social context in history. In this respect, the structuralist theory is related to the psychological theories of Freud, Cassirer and Jung.[11]

There are other social explanations of myth, related to the Cambridge or Malinowski schools, which reflect the hermeneutics of Marxism. According to this approach the meaning of the myth must be sought in the social and economic class conditions of a given society. This treatment of Greek religion and myth is exemplified in the English-speaking community by George Thomson.

These theories, taken together, evidence a dialectic, according to which myth is analysed either as the product of mythopoesis (myth-making) or of mythopistis (myth-believing). Thus Freud analyses myth as the product of the spontaneous psychic fantasy; Jung sees it as a profound surrender by religious man to the Numinosum.[12] Cassirer defines mythical consciousness in terms of a single impression which drives the self to lose itself in it;[13] Lévi-Strauss sees it as an amateurish "science of the concrete" in which the fictive energies of lingual man are directed towards the formation of a meaningful syntax.[14] Müller saw myth arising from man's encounter with a natural "Other"; Malinowski attributed to it the function of maintaining order in human society.

Kirk feels that the antinomies in the scholarship are due to the mistaken belief that the word myth has a single referent. In fact, says Kirk, there are only "myths," which are traditional stories. He finds a limited validity in all these theories, but a universal application of any of them is out of the question. Kirk's statement of his view is perhaps too nominalistic. We believe the dialectic in the scholarship reflects something of the structural features of myth. But far from discouraging definition, it actually helps us discover the two modalities of myth which constitute its structural delineation: namely, its poetic (or fictive) aspect and its pistic (or confessional) aspect. The antinomies arise as myth is based upon one of these features either to the exclusion of the other or as the foundation of the other.

The most notorious antinomy arising from this habitual reduction is the idea of "mythical thinking." Kirk is very critical of this notion, which he sees as "the natural offspring of a psychological anachronism, an epistemological confusion and an historical red herring."[15] He objects to this idea because, he says, myths are the products, not of analysis, but of story-telling. There is no pre-logical, primitive mentality which produces myths. Myths are, says Kirk following Lévi-Strauss, quite logical in their own way. But Kirk himself is forced to appeal to what he calls "poetical thinking," a sort of combination of metaphor and reason,[16] in order to define the logic of myth.

Kirk's ambivalence as to where to place myth is like the difficulties underlying the definitions of Cassirer who (unlike Kirk) consigns myth to the realm of the non-rational. This is inspired by Cassirer's attachment to the idea that human thought takes its point of departure (arché) in its own immanent (a priori) laws; thought is "autonomous" (= Reason). This view is called by Dooyeweerd the "Immanence-standpoint," and on its basis, he argues, one cannot attain a satisfactory criterion, as Cassirer tries to do, for distinguishing between mythical and non-mythical consciousness.[17]

When thought is understood and defined in relation to itself, the relation between thought and the non-rational (in this case, the mythical) becomes problematic at the outset. Dooyeweerd argues, in opposition to the tradition of Immanence Philosophy, that thought is not autonomous. Maintaining the idea that theoretical (or practical) thought functions according to logical laws which are irreducible to any other law-sphere, Dooyeweerd insists that thought is intertwined in a coherent relation with all other facets of human experience. And, in the first place, it is related to and guided by the aspect of faith: the pistical or confessional sphere.[18] Thought, of course, has many relationships, such as a relation to the economic or the historical. Upon these relationships the reductionistic philosophies of historicism and Marxism are grounded. But by relating analytical thinking to the confessional aspect, Dooyeweerd does not wish to say that thinking is really confession in disguise.

What enables their connection without necessitating a mutual reduction is the insight that both analysis and human certitude (as well as economic and historical experience) are functions of an integral human nature whose root is a dynamic religious selfhood. From out of this central religious selfhood, man responds to different kinds of conditions (logical, historical, etc.). This root, which Dooyeweerd calls the heart, is the locus of religion which he carefully distinguishes from faith. Kirk clearly rejects the identification of myth and religion,[19] or the identification of myth with a kind of thought[20] and any "wild

oppositions" between rational and irrational thinking.[21] But his definition of the kind of thinking that underlies myth (poetical thinking) is still lost in the wilderness between the rational and the non- or ir-rational.

Dooyeweerd understands myth as the product of pistical imagination; it is fashioned in an attitude of faith and is addressed to "those with ears to hear." Myth possesses marked features of a social, historical, lingual and aesthetic kind, but it is, in the first place, a "cultic" matter (cult = religion) and therefore is at home with liturgy, sacrament (rite) and prayer (incantation). Since the myth is addressed to faith it bears a certain authority structure.

> Every real myth has the (not necessarily deliberate) tendency to reveal a religious truth which is essentially related to the modal function of pistis. In this respect it is sharply to be distinguished from a tale and a legend.[22]

The other feature of myth which we identified in terms of "mythopoiesis" (μυθοποίησις) indicates that the myth, while it has authority as a revelation, nevertheless is always the product of a certain human activity. The myth is a revelation about the gods; but it has not been handed down to men from the gods. Religions which produce myths evidence a paradoxical state of affairs. For example, Hesiod receives the inspiration for his revelatory poem from the Muses of Helicon, the daughters of Zeus who, says Hesiod, "breathed into me their divine voice so that I might tell of things to come and things past." But Hesiod relates the coming-into-being of all the gods, including the Muses themselves. The Muses were born of Mnemosyne (memory). This is, at least, a compromise between the contribution of the Muses and of the poet. And if the reference to Mnemosyne is as baldly metaphorical as it appears, then the maker of the myth himself is the source of the revelation. Dooyeweerd speaks in this connection of "autonomous pistical fancy." As Vollenhoven expresses it:

> As a product of human activity [myth] is religiously conditioned. Here it ought to be observed that a religion which produces myths is always paganistic: where pistical phantasy pretends to be able to express an opinion about the genesis of the world of gods just as well as about the genesis of the cosmos, the boundary between God and cosmos has been utterly lost sight of.[23]

There is a certain paradox in the idea of myth-as-revelation because it is received as divine truth while at the same time is acknowledged as the work of human hands. Its divinity is an

attributed divinity; it possesses the character of an Idol. This feature which is viewed negatively by the Christian scholar has not been ignored by others who do not see it in a negative light. The dimension of creativity which is a necessary and essential feature of myth consists, according to Cassirer, of a spontaneous transfer of the subjective onto or into the objective.

> The focusing of all forces on a single point is the prerequisite for all mythical thinking and mythical formulation. When, on the one hand, the entire self is given up to a single impression, is "possessed" by it and, on the other hand, there is the utmost tension between the subject and its object, the outer world; when external reality is not merely viewed and contemplated, but overcomes a man in sheer immediacy, with emotions of fear or hope, têrror or wish fulfillment: then the spark jumps somehow across, the tension finds release as the subjective excitement becomes objectified, and confronts the mind as a god or a daemon.[24]

Myth is a humanly fabricated authority for faith. Nevertheless it retains a genuine pistical character and function in the cultic setting.

It is necessary to add "in the cultic setting" when we point out the pistical character of the myth because many myths which are known to us, including almost all of the Hellenic myths, have been removed from their cultic context. In antiquity such myths existed apart from ritual and the practise of the religion which produced them. And this development provided the historical conditions for a possible relation between myth and philosophy. Such distance between myth and cult is clearly the case with the Olympian tradition employed by Homer, who had little or no use for the cults of these gods. It is open to question whether the Olympian deities ever possessed cults.[25] But it is probably the case that these cults disappeared very early when Hellas emerged from the social chaos of the "heroic Age"[26] which the poems of Homer describe.

This period of migration (Völkerwanderung: 1400-1150 B.C.) experienced the submergence of an entire civilization under a human flood of European backwoodsmen including Achaeans and Dorians. In light of the discovery of this lost Atlantis by twentieth-century archaeologists, it is possible to detect in Hellenic literature faint memories of the pre-heroic (Minoan) "Golden Age." In the pessimistic poetry of Hesiod, there is a genuine sense of loss regarding the Golden Age and a sense of the tragedy and atrocity of the deeds committed by the "men of bronze."[27] But the experience of the Völkerwanderung provided an environment for the creation of a new religion by the invading peoples. This religion consisted of a pantheon of belicose deities who

were of one mind with their human votaries in waging constant warfare. This pantheon was a projection of the life of these barbarian war lords into objects of worship (or veneration).[28] But it also represented the overthrow of the primitive religion which was its precursor when the Greeks lived a relatively peaceful life as a traditional society in the European hinterlands.[29]

The new religion, qua cult and ritual, was only a going concern as long as there was a vital "heroic" ethos in its social environs. When the manic energy of the heroic age gradually dissipated and finally, with the advent of the polis (c. 850-750 B.C.), disappeared, all that remained were the magnificent creations of the oral tradition that had grown up with the new religion, but which had lost its association with the cult.[30] Then began the long process, described by Kirk,[31] of a re-working of the oral remains of this religious and aesthetic tradition.

These myths and religious views were still in circulation in the seventh and eighth centuries B.C. although under a modified form. The myths as found in Homer have a paradigmatic function: they serve as educational exemplars, which Kirk considers "an extension of the functional use of myths as charters."[32] There seems to be what Jaeger calls "an ethical design" to the Illiad[33] which transcends the values of the heroic age by virtue of Homer's (?) reflection upon this tradition, and which in turn laid the foundation for Greek tragedy.[34] This paradigmatic or exemplary use, not only of the legends about the Heroes, but of the divine myths concerning the gods, provides the earliest example of a modified use of Hellenic myth.[35]

Vollenhoven sees in Homer an abandonment of a confessional attachment to the myth.[36] Jaeger believes the epics of Homer contain "the germ of all Greek philosophy."[37] In terms of our structural considerations, a strict antithesis between myth and philosophy is out of the question. An antithesis here would ultimately entail an antithesis between pistis and analysis. Despite the modern enthusiasm for neutral science--human analysis denuded of "religious" beliefs--the thinking man does not stop believing what he thinks. If one cannot be certain of anything or attempts somehow to doubt everything (Descartes) then he cannot take even rudimentary steps in thought. Thinking is not automotive; like everything else, it requires an impetus and point of departure. This point of departure provides thought with an ἀρχή. Myth is quite capable, in its capacity as revelation, of providing thought with the required principle and beginning.

Footnotes

1. A "Science of Mythology" was first spoken of by K.O. Müller in 1825, and more recently by C.G. Jung and C. Kerényi in their Essays on a Science of Mythology (New York, 1949).
2. See his Magic, Science and Religion (New York, 1948) and

Myth in Primitive Psychology (1926).

3. Andrew Lang, Custom and Myth (1884); Myth, Ritual and Religion (1857); Modern Mythology (1877).
4. See their important study Before Philosophy: The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man (Pelican, 1973). For our purposes see especially the concluding chapter entitled "The Emancipation of Thought from Myth."
5. See especially his The Myth of the Eternal Return (1954); Myths, Dreams and Mysteries (1961); The Sacred and the Profane (1959); and Myth and Reality (1963).
6. Freud was preceded in his treatment of myth--which was marked by, among other things, a close association of myth with dreams--by E.B. Taylor who, like Lucien Lévi-Bruhl (La pensée sauvage, Paris, 1962, and La mentalité primitive, Paris, 1922), held a theory of "primitivism": that there is a "pre-logical" primitive mentality, inscrutable to modern man, which lay behind the products of traditional societies. Freud's master work in this area was his The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) on which he laid the foundation for the interpretation of mythical (as well as dream) symbols according to his theory of the unconscious mind. According to Freud's followers, Karl Abraham (Dreams and Myths, 1909) and Otto Rank, dreams are the myths of the individual, while myths are the dreams of the race expressing "wish-fulfilment fantasies" derived from the infancy of the race.
7. In Man and his Symbols (1964), Jung criticized the Freudian preoccupation with the idea of racial infancy, but transformed this idea into his conception of the "Collective Unconscious." The latter is the source of myth as well as all human symbols which reveal the unconscious urges and phobias of society. For Jung, this function of myth held for all societies, modern, ancient or primitive. And no theory of the "infantile" character of myth could conceal the fact that moderns too possess myth, reflecting hidden collective realities.
8. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. II (New Haven, 1955) and Language and Myth (New York, 1946). Cassirer is followed in his interpretations by his student Susanne K. Langer.
9. Language and Myth, p. 33.
10. G.S. Kirk, The Nature of Greek Myths, p. 81. Part One of this excellent and lucid book contains a discussion of these "monolithic theories" concerning myths developed since the nineteenth century. My summary above of some of these traditions is based on Kirk's digest of the historical material.
11. Ibid., p. 81f.
12. C.G. Jung, Psychology and Religion (Yale University Press, 1938), pp. 5ff.
13. Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (New York, 1946), p. 33.
14. Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (University of Chicago, 1966), pp. 16ff.
15. G.S. Kirk, op. cit., p. 286.
16. Ibid., p. 282.
17. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1969), Vol. II, p. 325.
18. Like M. Polanyi (Personal Knowledge, New York, 1958), Dooye-

weerd believes that far from precluding faith and belief, theoretical thought is structurally dependent upon human commitment.

19. Kirk, op. cit., p. 80.
20. Ibid., pp. 280ff.
21. Ibid., pp. 288-289.
22. Op. cit., p. 326.
23. Translation of D.H.Th. Vollenhoven's Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte, by H. Evan Runner: Syllabus for Philosophy 220, The History of Ancient Philosophy (Grand Rapids, 1958-59), p. 39.
24. Language and Myth, p. 33.
25. See Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. I, pp. 92-103.
26. See Chadwick, The Heroic Age and Toynbee, Ibid., Vol. VIII.
27. Hesiod, perhaps paradoxically, feels a certain (Homeric) admiration for the "Heroes" who follow the Bronze men in the Theogony. But these two groups, in Toynbee's opinion (Vol. VIII, pp. 664ff), are really the same performers on the historical stage, portrayed as both protagonists and antagonists. In Toynbee's view, the "hero" is by necessity a Janus-faced persona (see Vol. VIII, p. 1-87).
28. This is seen in the fact that Homer's Olympians are universally subject to the impersonal ordinance of Destiny (Moira, Fortuna), as are all mortals from the greatest to the least. This fact is pointed out by Cornford (From Religion to Philosophy, p. 12) as a problem to which he proposes a sociological explanation (Ch. #2).
29. On the pacificity of "primitive" religion and society see Toynbee, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 230f.
30. A parallel to this period of Hellenic history is provided by the Scandinavian "Völkerwanderung" which took advantage of a collapsing Carolingian Empire in Western Europe and of the Khazar Kingdom in the east (Russia). Like the Greeks, the Vikings were known and feared as masters of the sea ("Russian" from Old Norse "Rothsmenn" = "seafarers").
31. Greek Myths, p. 279f and 291f. He observes: "Literacy entered the scene uniquely late in Greece in relation to the development of other cultural institutions. Pre-Homeric Greece was not a traditional society just because it was preliterate; it had lost many aspects of traditionality not only long before Homer, but long before the Mycenaean age with its highly sophisticated political, social and economic organization" (p. 279). The Mycenaean Age, I believe, belongs to another sphere of culture (Kulturkreise) than the Hellenic: namely, to the latter end of the Minoan history. The Heroic age itself should then be considered the final period of that society, during which it essentially vanished.
32. Plato speaks of Homer's reputation, among his "eulogists," as "The educator of Hellas" (Rep. 606E.). Plato's severe critique of the employment of the work of the poets, and above all of Homer, as examples of conduct, indicates that this approach to Homer was ancient tradition, ie, going back to Homer himself. See Chapter Three of Jaeger's Paideia Vol. 1, "Homer the Educator."
33. Ibid., p. 47f.
34. Though Aristotle carefully distinguished epic and tragedy

(perhaps because of considerations of literary "Form"), Plato considers Homer the greatest of the tragic poets. In his Tragedy and Philosophy (1968), Walter Kaufman argues (Ch. V) that "the birth of tragedy" is indeed Homer himself.

35. Admittedly it is the first real glimpse we get of their use at all, whether under modified forms and conditions or in their indigenous setting. Our argument is that this glimpse clearly reveals that the myths have already been subjected to a reworking by Homer (?) because their exemplary use has become their sole function, whereas in the original cultic setting we would expect to find this existing alongside other uses.

36. Geschiedenis, p. 44. Cf. Runner's translation: "In the course of his many travels having come in contact with a large number of local cults, he pictures the world of gods--in his epic poems Iliad and Odyssey--as a family of active and brave gods living on Olympus, a mountain in the north of Greece. In this family Zeus, Athena and Apollon are in the foreground. But Homeros, even in the Iliad, no longer takes the gods, as the myth does, to be awe-inspiring, superhuman powers, but rather, when compared with the Greek heroes, as 'comfortably living' people, people who, in the Odyssey with its idealization of daring (pluck) and power of endurance by both man (Odysseus) and wife (Penelope), pale into all but decorative figures. In this way Homeros became the prophet of an attitude toward life which may be called 'non-mythologizing,' ie, not built upon faith in the myth" (p. 40).

37. Paideia I, p. 53: "In them we can clearly see the anthropocentric tendency of Greek thought, that tendency which contrasts so strongly with the theomorphic philosophy of the Oriental who sees God as the sole actor and man as merely the instrument or object of that divine activity. Homer definitely places man and his fate in the foreground, although he sees them sub specie aeternitatis, in the perspective of the loftiest general ideas and problems."

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A Perspective on Language and Language Learning

by Dan Hendriksen

1. To the extent that the form of language (sounds, syntax, words) is known by speakers of the language so that this knowledge is instrumental in producing and understanding messages (cf. M. Polanyi's subsidiary vs. focal awareness), we ought so to teach language (first, second, third, etc.)

that there is continual awareness that we are relating to a knowledge that is naively present. In so doing, all analyses serve to uncover this form rather than invent it for the student, who quite commonly is left completely in the dark as to his present involvement in what is being analyzed or taught. This "involvement" is also true of the person learning a language other than his/her native language, since the naive knowledge of his/her first language has important consequences for learning the new language. (One does not teach someone his/her first language (except trivially); one teaches about it (analysis), while languages after that one can be both taught and taught about.) The importance of understanding (analytically) more and more of what is understood (naively), as well as some ways of bringing these two "knowledges" together for classroom purposes, can be illustrated by the following:

(a) Correct mistakes, which include those of children (tiny ones) saying "taked," "gooder," etc., or the Dutchman saying, "Da odder day" and "I saw yesterday here your brodder" - in each case reflecting the pronunciation and grammar of his native language;

(b) Nonsense sentences like "The oggle woggled the diggle" provide clues to their grammar;

(c) Scrambled sentences like "jumped moon cow the over the" (or lesser known ones) can be grammatically organized by young children whether or not they have been exposed to the completed sentence before;

(d) Stale jokes like "'Call me a taxi.' 'Okay, you're a taxi'" illustrate the rapid subconscious application of alternative syntax and semantics for one who "catches on" - making conspicuous something of what we must be doing for every normal sentence (eg. not requiring double interpretation) when we understand or produce it.

2. It is here contended that all languages and dialects are well-formed, that change in language is basically ruled change, and that no language or dialect through time or space is intrinsically inferior to any other. Therefore, the need to learn a second language or dialect should be based on extralingual considerations. While this is quite readily admitted for a second language (eg. need of immigrants to communicate in a new culture, needs of those who wish to travel abroad, etc.), it is far less obvious to many in regard to a second dialect. Minority dialects are too seldom seen for the intricate language-defining structures that they manifest or the usages that they may have developed beyond the standard dialect. Too often the norm for well-formedness (correctness) is immediately relegated to what is grammatically or socially acceptable in educated circles, pluralism is consciously or unconsciously rejected (even where little effort is needed to attain clarity across

dialects), and the lingual dimension suffers from a one-sided reductionism to form-superiority of the prestige dialect. Legitimate attacks on unclear and ineffective language are joined by attacks on alternative forms to those in prestige dialects in overlapping varieties of the same language. Terms like "abuse" and "corruption" are then applied equally to highly jargonized, redundant or deceptive language _and_ to other-dialect usages. Not only self-made authorities like John Simon (_Paradigms Lost_) confuse these matters but so do a myriad of well-meaning religious people.

3. Yesterday's received forms (_lingually ruled_) may today be retained in the speech of "outsiders" only to be judged as incorrect or ungrammatical by the powers that be in favour of their replacements. But this allows language no individuality structures that are not revealed by received forms. As a consequence, norm for language is reduced to societal determinants of acceptable (cf. "correct") form - acceptable not in all societies, but only in those responsible for such reductions (cf. the not uncommon reduction of one interrelated law sphere to another in distorted thought). That we should be sensitive to such constraints on acceptability is here _not_ contested; that we should restrict norm for language to these constraints is; that we should think of the "outsider" as lingually incorrect is; and that we should consider ourselves or anyone else as not having a dialect is. Attributing a more or less "pronounced" dialect (or "accent" - the sound side of dialect) to others can now be seen for the ethnocentric bias that underlies it.

   We need to be reminded that Christ Himself spoke the low prestige dialect of Galilee, not that of Jerusalem. Undoubtedly for Him the time-bound forms of this dialect reflected timeless lingual law adequate to casually converse, to commend and condemn, to comfort and console, and to communicate timeless truth. Betrayed by the speech patterns of this dialect, the Apostle Peter was met with understandable scepticism when he denied his kinship with the Master.

4. "Improvement" of a person's language for social, economic, political or literary reasons should take into serious consideration what we know already about the "unimproved" language of that person, so that it can be used as an important springboard toward what is desired.

5. It is also here contended that the attempt to force the learning of standard forms on nonstandard speakers for reading purposes is often unnecessary even where their being able to read such forms _is_ necessary, and that the need for

learning received usages (pronunciation, syntax, word choice) for social, literary, political, economic, etc. reasons (where convincing!) should not cloud the need to develop counter attitudes in regard to rule for language (in its many varieties) among those who in the future will be responsible for others socially, politically, academically, occupationally, etc.

6. In the area of second language learning there is increasing recognition that non-integrational approaches are of limited effect. Contributions of the earlier empiricists (eg. Bloomfield) and the later rationalists (eg. Chomsky) to linguistics and applied linguistics in this century are now often seen as reductionistic. As such, they are of only partial and indirect use for developing proficiency in a new language. The new emphasis, however erroneously identifying source of lawfulness, can be happily received by those who believe in a law order of integrally related spheres.

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Augustine on "Substance"

by Herman Dooyeweerd

The Augustinian conception with respect to the prima materia and its significance for the conception of soul and body as two substances.

At the foundation of the traditional teachings of the Franciscan school lay the above-mentioned conception of prima materia, which diverges in principle from the Aristotelian-Thomistic one. We may now go into this point further, because this is connected also with another view of the concept of substance, which had already brought Augustine to the conception of the "material body" as a "substance" of its own (albeit incomplete), distinguished from the pure spiritual substance, the anima rationalis, which was united with this body.

This more severely dualistic construction regarding the relation of soul and body, which as we shall see was again adapted to the Aristotelian construction by Aquinas, is simply incomprehensible both from a purely Platonic and from an Aristotelian standpoint. It becomes intelligible only in terms of Augustine's concept of "prime matter." According to the great church father the "earth" mentioned in the first two verses of Genesis 1 was identical with

prima materia, which was created by God as still lacking any fixed form, while the creation of "heaven" is taken to refer to the purely spiritual world of the angels. From the start, however, God has implanted in "primeval matter" the seeds (rationes seminales) of bodily creatures, on whose development the order of the temporal cosmos rests. This thought is derived from the Stoic doctrine of the logoi spermatikoi. This primary matter then must also, in conformity with the Stoic teaching, possess as such an actual independent substance (ousia) and can not be understood as a mere "potential being" (dunamei on) as in Aristotle. It is equipped by God from the beginning with active germs of development, from which bodily forms arise through the working of natural agents. (**De Genesi ad litteram**, 2:11)

The Stoic conception with respect to prima materia as opposed to the Aristotelian.

This conception of the prima materia did diverge significantly from the Aristotelian one. According to the latter, "prime matter" (prote hule) as such never has actual being, but is only a principle of being, which as such is the absolute opposite of the form-principle. Actual being applies to matter only through form. Therefore Aristotle combatted the view, which he ascribes to the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, that the seed exists prior to plants, animals and humans. The seed comes from the developed living beings, not the reverse.

Early Stoicism, on the other hand, understood prime matter as a real substance (ousia) in which the "forms" were already potentially present as active germs of development (therefore not as already complete forms). These so-called logoi spermatikoi are thus themselves of a material nature; they are derivations of the material principle itself as active principle (poioun). As active principle, matter is divine, as Stoicism taught following Heraclitus; it is the "cause" and origin of the rise of individual formed things. As passive principle (paschon) matter is passive, inert, capable of receiving all possible forms. But the distinction between passive and active matter is only one of degree; the latter is only of a finer structure, it is a fiery pneuma that penetrates coarser matter as its "logos." And this fiery pneuma is the Stoic deity which was thus itself understood to be material. Active and passive matter, however, can not be separated. The deity dwells in passive matter as form-giving principle. Naturally this Stoic doctrine of prima materia had first to be thoroughly "accommodated" to the Church's doctrine of creation, and to be divested of its "materialistic" and pantheistic features, if it was to be tailored to "theological use." For that purpose the Stoic conception with respect to its "material" character and the material origin of the logoi spermatikoi had first to be eliminated.

The Neo-platonic concept of the logoi spermatikoi: no real connection between form and matter.

This had already happened in Neo-platonism, which had also taken over the doctrine of the logoi spermatikoi, but had eliminated in principle the Stoic conception of prima materia.

Plotinus adopts the Platonic concept of the "world-soul," which is called into existence by the Demiurge as the perfect image of the idea of the zoon, the prototype which encompasses every conceivable living being. For Plotinus this world-soul was the third "hypostasis" or the third principle of the deity.

Its first "hypostasis" is the absolute One (to Hen) which is exalted above the form of being and thus not to be understood as itself a "substance." Like a light, the One shines forth from its fulness the second hypostasis (which does exist as ousia or substance) and the nous with its fulness of the world of Ideas, which is comprised in the being of the logos.

Out of this second hypostasis the third emanates, the "soul," that is primarily the world-soul, in whose substance individual people, animals and plants participate, and of which they are only fragments. This "world-soul" is in its "being" the intelligible world of the nous itself, but more divided than the latter. It is the soul's appointed role to cause the infinite riches of the intelligible world, with its individual ideas, to shine forth in their turn, in attenuated measure, into "matter," and in this way to confer on the non-divine world of sense the emanation of the eternal forms of being, which are "delineated" transiently in the eternal stream of becoming, in dark matter. In the "soul," the "ideas" become the logoi, which immediately shine down on sensible things as their form principles. In this process no real or substantial union of "form" and "matter" takes place, as in Aristotelian metaphysics. Still less does the "form" here belong potentially to prime matter as a logos spermatikos which is itself material, as in the Stoic teaching on nature. There remains an absolute dualism between the two fundamental principles of the Greek form-matter motive: sensible things according to Plotinus are only a transitory reflection of the form in matter, which does not intrinsically affect hule, just as light does not affect the air which it fills. (**Enneads**, III, 6.6ff.; II, 4.6ff. See E. Brehier, **Histoire de la philosophie**, Tome I (1928) p. 461.)

On this point Neo-platonism remains in the line of Plato, which also does accept a substantial connection of essential form and matter in the sensible world, but conceives of ousia as absolutely transcendent above matter.

The Augustinian conception stands closer to the Stoic one and

assumes a combination of form-potency and matter in a semi-Aristotelian manner.

The Augustinian conception of the logoi spermatikoi is more closely allied to the Stoic concept of matter, in that it conceives of prime matter as being filled with rationes seminales, which in conformity with the archetype of creation-ideas in the Divine Logos, were from the start laid as active potencies by God in prime matter. In this sense Augustine can say that the earth is full of "seeds" not only of plants, but also of animals. (**De Trinitate**, 7.8.3. The entire third book of **De Genesi ad litteram** also discusses this.) The plant and animal souls (in contrast with the "rational soul" of Adam, which was created by God separately) are thus understood here as actual form-principles, which were created in prime matter by God as rationes seminales. They are nevertheless not themselves of a material nature, as Stoicism taught, but are laid in matter as immaterial active potencies which are dependent on the former. This immaterialisation of the logoi is unquestionably of a Neo-platonic inspiration. But Augustine accepts, in an Aristotelian manner, a substantial combination of form-potency and matter, and in this deviates in principle from Plato as well as from Neo-platonism.

And on this foundation the conception of prima materia developed in Augustinian scholasticism.

Excerpted from "De Idee der Individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip," Part III, Philosophia Reformata 10:4 (1945), pp. 39-42.

Translated by Chris Gousmett, a junior member in biblical studies at ICS.

Mammon and Monetary Policy—A reply to Mr. Schlossberg

by Peter Simons

I am very grateful to Mr. Schlossberg for his extensive response to my article on **Mammon and Monetary policy**, (Anakainosis, December 1981, pp. 3-8). I should like to reassure him that I wholeheartedly share his view that economic problems are not merely economic in character, thus capable of purely technical solutions, but result in various ways from a wrongly directed religion.

I am somewhat disappointed, however, that Mr. Schlossberg has apparently failed to appreciate my recommendations for a central bank policy as a first attempt on my part to indicate how a central bank could promote the responsible use of money. By responsible I mean a response which honours our Creator God. In my

opinion, it is very important that policymakers approach their task from this angle. It would seem to me that at present monetary authorities are thinking fairly mechanistically in terms of controlling either the money supply (however defined) or interest rates. In addition, as Mr. Schlossberg rightly observes, political considerations tend to have an important bearing on central bank policy formation in certain countries.

By contrast, if policymakers were primarily concerned to foster a responsible use of money in its distinct functions, then they would attempt, for example, to influence the decisions of key economic decision-makers in society. That is why I suggested a consultative framework. A proper and open consultation might serve, for instance, to overcome the so-called prisoners' dilemma which arises when economic subjects are not prepared to do what is in the interests of all, because they suspect that others will only look after their own interests, so that they would be disadvantaged by their caring attitude. Similarly, a central bank cannot discharge its responsibility for a proper use of money, unless it knows what is going on. Monetary economists would also benefit from this, of course. Mammon cannot be slain, unless we know its tricks.

A point which is not often discussed in the literature is on what basis a central bank should be concerned with the financial affairs of others. In my view, a central bank should be considered as an arm of government and hence its actions should be confined to ensuring that public justice is maintained in the nation's monetary affairs. An example might illustrate this point. If a central bank were simply given the sole task of controlling the monetary base (i.e. currency in circulation plus the central bank's liabilities to the banking system), then inflation might well be prevented, but all sorts of injustices involved in the way financial institutions were conducting their lending policies would not be redressed. Nor would trade unions and employers' organisations be prevented from driving up wages and prices. Such policies would tend to result in unemployment, assuming the central bank controlled the monetary base effectively. It is quite possible that such a monetary policy would lead to the economically powerful gaining at the expense of the economically weak, in spite of the economy being a free market one. It is not without interest in this context that proponents of sound money and free markets like F.A. Von Hayek and W. Ropke are at the same time in favour of sometimes pretty drastic government actions to fight monopolies.

A central bank should not merely confine itself to stabilising the price level, necessary though that is. A stable price level could well be an unjust one. Now some interest groups are far too powerful to allow their privileged positions to be undermined by a central bank's attempt to control certain monetary aggre-

gates. What these groups might attempt to do is to seek how they could get a grip on the power of the government. As Prof. J.P.A. Mekkes used to point out, this is one of the most vicious threats to the life of the state.

Underlying the current debate about monetary policy is really the issue of control versus freedom. I have tried to frame my suggestions in such a way that the proper responsibilities of both government and other societal structures could be fulfilled in harmony. In view of the current trends in the relationship between the state and other societal structures, there is not likely to be much sympathy for this. In addition, if there is a polarisation between interest groups, then the chances for success are dim too.

Finally, Mr Schlossberg has raised the problem of redistribution. It would seem to me that the biblical teaching about the year of Jubilee and the Sabbath years indicates that the distribution of economic wealth thrown up by the free interplay of demand and supply is not automatically a just distribution. Ideally, economic subjects (other than the government) should be able to organise institutions which would counter any unjust tendencies in this regard. The history of the Christian social movement in the Netherlands offers interesting examples in this respect. It also indicates how the government could be involved in this, without taking over the responsibilities of employers and employees.

Peter Simons is an economist with the Employers Federation, Wellington, New Zealand. Mr. Schlossberg's letter, responding to Mr. Simons article "Mammon and Monetary Policy," appeared in the June 1982 issue of Anakainosis, Volume 4, No. 4.

Book Reviews

Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books, 1983. 345pp.

Reviewed by Paul Marshall, Institute for Christian Studies.

Michael Walzer is Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and is one of North America's better known political theorists. His previous books include The Revolution of the Saints, Obligations, Political Action, Regicide and Revolution, Just and Unjust Wars, and Radical Principles. As is shown by his frequent articles in Dissent, he can be described in current American political jargon as a left-liberal or, in a more European vein, as a social democrat with a strong streak of individualism and a stress on civil liberties.

Yet, while these labels tell us something about Walzer, he has always been intelligent and critical enough to break out of currently accepted modes of political thought. The Revolution of the Saints investigated Calvinist, specifically Puritan, political activity and, while initially he found Puritans to be "strange and disturbing," Walzer concluded that they were in fact "the first of those self-disciplined agents of social and political reconstruction who have appeared so frequently in modern history" and were "extraordinarily bold, inventive and ruthless politicians" (p. 1). Amongst non-theologians, this book has become perhaps the most widely read work on Calvinism in the English language (cf. Nicholas Wolterstorff's Kuyper Lectures).

Walzer was also an early, active and persistent critic of the Vietnam war. At that time he "found a moral doctrine ready at hand, a connected set of names and concepts that we all knew--and that everyone else knew." However, he and others "had never explored their meanings and connections" and "were drawing upon the work of many generations of men and women, most of whom we had never heard of." Furthermore, these words and concepts were at odds with an "education which taught us that these words had no proper descriptive use and no objective meaning" (p. 1). Consequently he decided to lay out moral arguments on war in a reflective way and so both provide guidelines for war and vindicate the idea of "moral" argument about such matters. The result, in 1977, was Just and Unjust Wars, a major and excellent exploration of justice and war, not to mention being an unusual sort of book for an American political theorist to write.

At the present time most North American political theory is bogged down in a sophisticated reworking of liberal social-contract and human rights views. Here the names of Robert Nozick, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin are prominent. In 1970-71 Walzer co-taught a course with Robert Nozick on "Capitalism and Socialism." Much of Nozick's half of that course appears in his acclaimed libertarian polemic Anarchy, State and Utopia. Spheres of Justice is the half that Walzer gave. As might be expected from what I have said about Walzer so far, this work does not fit easily in the categories of liberal, or socialist, thought. Even allowing for the provincial mentality of American political thought, the work is original and provocative.

Walzer takes off from the idea that any political criterion of equality is necessarily complex--that is, it includes different types of equalities and of things about which to be equal. From a discussion of such matters he elaborates a principle that "No social good **x** should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good **y** merely because they possess **y** and without regard to the meaning of **x**." This principle directs him "to study the meaning of social goods, to examine the different distributive spheres from the inside" (p. 20). Consequently he

maintains that there is a variety of proper distributive principles and that these principles properly operate in different "spheres" of society. So he seeks to outline what these spheres are, what their internal meaning is, what the criteria of distribution are, and how these spheres relate to one another.

Walzer describes eleven such spheres of justice, each of them described as autonomous. These are: (1) "Membership"--which politically must be <u>inclusive</u>, and at the level of voluntary associations have a limited "right of closure"; (2) "Security and Welfare" which is determined on the basis of need coupled with the level of welfare chosen by the community; (3) "Money and Commodities" distributed on the basis of skill and luck; (4) "Office" distributed, for skilled work, on the basis of talent; (5) "Hard Work" to be distributed on the basis of worker participation, higher remuneration for those so engaged, or national conscription to effect an equal chance; (6) "Free Time," whose distributive criteria are unclear, but which vary according to need and social patterns; (7) "Education" on the basis of "simple equality" for what is needed for proper citizenship and, for higher education, on the basis of talent and interest; (8) "Kinship and Love," according to internal "prescriptive altruism" with some protection from external interference; (9) "Divine Grace" on the basis of individual choice, family and ecclesiastical ties, with minimal political interference; (10) "Recognition" distributed by juries on the basis of objective review of performance; and (11) "Political Power" distributed through elections of those with requisite abilities.

The sphere of political power is the forum to decide the distributive criteria of other spheres, although with self-limitation via constitutional restrictions, particularly in church/state and familial matters. Justice involves the proper distribution of benefits appropriate to each sphere and consequently justice is multi-modal and many-aspected. Tyrannies, whether of the state or of capital, occur when one sphere overrides another or, more precisely, the criteria of distribution of one sphere are imposed on another.

There are many criticisms that can be levelled at this work. Several points appear to be argued backwards. The question of justice is approached via equality while his whole work seems to illustrate the point that, as equality is a moment of justice, it should be the other way around. The spheres are, in principle, outlined in terms of the distributive criteria of types of social goods which might operate in them, whereas the text outlines the nature of various social spheres and <u>then</u> seeks to determine the appropriate distributive principle. Both of these modes of argument tend to result in some confusion: we are not clear what is basic and what is derived from that basis. Apart from these problems there seems to be a neglect of certain possible spheres,

such as science and the arts. These are swallowed up in education, recognition and free time.

The two major problems with the book concern the role of politics and the place of convention. Walzer clearly wants to recognize the autonomy of certain spheres and is aware that they would be destroyed if left subject to political criteria. At the same time he wants a means to correct manifest injustice in certain spheres. This makes it difficult for him to give any precise limits to political power. This situation is made worse when we consider the bases of the social spheres. According to Walzer, these spheres exist because of convention--social choice or social habit. He is clear that such convention is much more than social whim--that such spheres exist in many societies, albeit manifesting themselves in different ways. However he does not really suggest, and probably does not want to suggest, that such spheres reflect something deeper about the way the world is. This gives a fragility to the whole exercise--in terms of determining what is a sphere, what its distinctive features are, what the mutual protection of spheres should be, how to recognize malformed spheres and in terms of outlining a proper political role.

Most of these defects can be traced back to Walzer's continuing attachment to the socialist/liberal dialectic. Underlying this diversity he still wants free individuals gathered in a political community to have the last say on all within its boundaries. But, notwithstanding this particular root, several of his problems would doubtless remain anyway. After all, the proponents, of whom I am one, of a sphere sovereignty based on creational norms still have intense difficultly in outlining criteria for what constitutes an independent sphere and what the role of the state (or of other spheres) is when there is clear internal corruption.

But for all these criticisms, what is most remarkable about Spheres of Justice is that it is the type of work it is. Coming out of American contractarianism we have a scheme approximating that of sphere sovereignty: with a diversity of norms, a wealth of historical and cross-cultural examples, an outline of qualifying functions, and an incipient elaboration of the modalities of justice. This is all the more remarkable if we scrutinize Walzer's acknowledgements, index and notes. There is no mention of Althusius, or Kuyper, or Dooyeweerd, or of any work within that tradition of "sphere sovereignty," or even of its bastardized form in some modern discussions of "consociationalism." Unless Walzer is burying sources, something he is not prone to do, he has come up with a parallel scheme more or less independently.

It is tempting to speculate on whether Walzer's early scholarly association with Calvinism has had an influence on him which he has not yet recognized. Or, considering his Dedication to Joseph P. Walzer (1906-1981), "The memory of the righteous is a bles-

sing"-- whether his own religious tradition has provided political roots that transcend liberalism. Be that as it may, readers of this journal with an interest in politics would do well to acquaint themselves with Spheres of Justice, and Walzer would do well to acquaint himself with the theory of sphere sovereignty.

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John L. Paterson, David Harvey's Geography. London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1984. Available in North America from Barnes and Noble Books, 81 Adams Drive, Totawa, New Jersey 07512.

Reviewed by Bruce Wearne, Melbourne, Australia.

David Harvey has something to say for all the social sciences. In his 1973 volume, Social Justice and the City, Harvey argued that one of the major obstacles to developing a comprehensive and critical analysis of urban living is the way in which sociology and geography have little, if any, interpenetration. Harvey, the philosopher of geographical science, argued for a Marxist alternative in geography. But he developed his Marxist prespective as one who knew that he hadn't always theorized with such enlightenment. Social Justice and the City is also a chronicle by Harvey of his own theoretical development. The first half of that book is his "liberal formulations" and the second half contains his first attempts at "socialist formulations." His is an evolving framework in which the earlier material is incorporated and given new meaning in his later (Marxist) essays. Harvey sees his own theoretical development on a course of "convergence" with Marx and Piaget (with no apparent debt to Talcott Parsons). For this he is dependent on both for his operational structuralist ontology and his constructivist epistemology. The "synthesis" enables Harvey to set forth his own position as his own, whilst coming to terms with the fact that his position, at any particular point, is shared with others as a result of a process of critical reflection. Admittedly, this account by Harvey of the evolution of his "leading ideas" is his 1973 analysis (see Social Justice and the City, chapter 7) of how he moved from logical empiricism in geography to an operational structuralism which is concerned with constructing a revolutionary theory of the human totality.

What John Paterson has now done in his secondary study, David Harvey's Geography, is to critically investigate the evolution of Harvey's thought from 1961-1981. It is a thought-provoking and carefully researched book. It is also an important contribution to social science because it suggests a mode of critical engagement that can help to emphasize the human character of theoretical thought, and the basis thereof, in often complex motivation. Maybe Harvey himself will be at a disadvantage in reading this book. He, the writer, has never read his books in the same way that his readers have. However, it does appear that Paterson has

sympathetically followed the twists and turns in Harvey's often hard-to-fathom prose.

In his initial chapter, Paterson delves deep within the parameters of theoretical geography to outline some of the key philosophical debates in that discipline. "Spatial science geography" has been criticized within the discipline since at least the late 1960s. Behaviouralism sought to develop an alternative, keeping the discipline free from the assumptions of neo-classical economics. Aggregative spatial behaviour and decision-making were emphasized. The AREA debates in Britain (1971-1975) concerned the social responsibility of geography, which coincided with the North American radicalism of ANTIPODE. Harvey was a pioneer in breaking with the liberal paradigm at a time when the discipline was becoming subject to a new pluralism of humanistic approaches; phenomenology, existentialism, neo-Kantianism, Marxism, idealism and critical-idealism were some of the new approaches surfacing at the time of Harvey's breakthrough to a Marxist geography.

Paterson takes his point of departure for his critique of Harvey from the "presuppositional hierarchy" of Harrison and Livingstone (AREA 1980, 12, pp. 25-31) which is "a fruitful approach to analysing the relationship between philosophy, methodology and geography" (p. 10). This involves a hierarchy of cosmology, ontology, epistemology, methodology and research findings, with disciplinary divisions coming in somewhere "between" epistemology and ontology. Paterson's discussion of the reassessment of Kant in geography, though brief, is to the point. He raises general questions about the place of presuppositions in science: are they conscious? empirically verifiable? and so on. He raises these questions not so much to present his own systematic answers, but to help in his re-presentation of Harvey's theory and to show how Harvey has based his own theoretical reflection on cosmological and ontological assumptions. Later in the work he argues that Harvey has taken over Marx's cosmology, a faith in man's self-creating ability, at least in the latter part of his development. Harvey's abiding faith (i.e., his cosmology) is in the power of rational analysis.

The work is also set in the context of the history of geography and the history of science. But as an "internal history" of Harvey's thought, limited to his writings, it is only a "partial" explanation of how and why Harvey turned to Marxism (pp. 12-13). Paterson discusses the continuities in Harvey's odyssey, contrasting these with the discontinuities. The most fundamental continuity is Harvey's belief in the power of rational anaylsis, whilst the relationship between form and process occurs in both the liberal and Marxist phases; the importance of "general theory" was an ongoing concern; and the need to transcend the artificiality of disciplinary divisions was also a pre-Marxist preoccupation.

As Harvey's Marxism developed, his writings turned away from abstract spatial science analysis to a concern for cities, ghettos and urban housing markets. The Marxist "revolution" in Harvey's thought is analyzed as triumphant, in the sense that the various continuities take on a new meaning under the revolutionary paradigm.

This is not a long book. It is a carefully documented account which deserves careful reading by those interested in the Marxist philosophical transformation of one discipline. Paterson unravels the strengths and weaknesses of Harvey's "constructivist transformation." In general, it is a serious attempt to critically evaluate the contribution of this foremost Marxist geographer-cum-scientist of the human realm.

John L. Paterson, a New Zealander, received his M.Phil. from the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand. He is currently engaged in doctoral research in the Department of Geography at the University of British Columbia. This is a valuable work and suggestive of important lines of critique for any Christian response to the Marxist gauntlet thrown down by Harvey. Paterson has rendered an important service by offering this sensitive and sympathetic analysis. It is worthy of its place alongside other "secondary literature" in the reformational tradition.

Bruce Wearne lives in Windsor, Victoria, Australia, and is currently researching the history of American sociology.

Short Reviews by Robert VanderVennen

Understanding Our World: An Integral Ontology, by Hendrik Hart University Press of America, 1984.

This long-awaited book is one of the fruits of Hart's many years of study of the nature of reality. It is a major academic treatise carrying forward some of the themes of A New Critique of Theoretical Thought by Herman Dooyeweerd.

It covers all the major themes in the area of ontology. A significant feature of this book is the forthright way the author spells out his understanding of the way that faith is inescapably part of one's philosophical thinking about ontology. In a very substantial Appendix Hart lays out his perception of how his own faith commitment affects his philosophising.

The book is a notable contribution to systematic philosophy in the Amsterdam school. Yet it is not a sectarian study. It seriously grapples with major problematic issues in contemporary

philosophy, such as rationality, and offers an alternative that needs to be noted by philosophers of every school.

This 474-page book can be purchased from ICS for $24.95 in Canadian funds or $18.50 US, plus $1.50 for mailing.

The Transforming Vision: Shaping a Christian Worldview, by Brian J. Walsh and J. Richard Middleton. Published by InterVarsity Press, 1984. Foreword by Nicholas Wolterstorff.

This very readable 214-page book aims to help people think about their worldview, and then to consider change as needed to bring it into closer conformity to God's Word and the call for effective witness in all areas of life. The book arises from the experience Walsh and Middleton gained teaching Christian worldview courses at secular colleges and universities under the auspices of ICS and Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship.

The book starts by describing the nature of a worldview, using a number of concrete examples. The authors then develop their understanding of the biblical worldview based on a cosmic understanding of creation, the fall into sin, and redemption in Christ. In our day the biblical worldview competes with various non-Christian and half-Christian worldviews, all of which deny or limit the power of the Gospel. The final section shows how the biblical worldview can be applied in various areas of life, including scholarship and philosophy.

The book can be purchased from christian bookstores, or from ICS for $9.25 in Canadian funds, $6.95 in US funds, plus $1.00 for mailing costs.

Robert VanderVennen is Director of Educational Services at ICS.

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