

32 Propositions on Who Man Is

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*"Dooyeweerd is the most original philosopher Holland has ever produced,
...even Spinoza not excepted."*

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Proposition I

In the development of Western thought, anthropological conceptions have been dominated by four religious ground-motives, which have been at the foundation of the entire development of the culture of the West. These four ground motives are:

- 1) the Greek form-matter motive [2];
- 2) The Scriptural ground motive of the Christian religion: creation, fall and redemption through Christ Jesus;
- 3) the Roman Catholic synthesis-motive of nature and grace, and
- 4) the modern humanistic motive of nature and freedom (the ideal of determination in the natural sciences and the ideal of personality of free autonomous self-determination <or: control by the natural sciences and autonomous self-determination of the free human personality.>

*** Proposition II**

All of these motives: the form-matter motive, the nature-grace motive [3] (in whose view of 'nature' the Greek motive was taken over in a revised form and then "adapted" to the Christian ground-motive) as well as the nature-freedom motive [4] (which tries to include all previous ground-motives, but understands them in a revised sense), have an internally dialectical character. That is, they are split by an internal dualism, which drives apart this way of thinking into polar directions.

*** Proposition III**

The basis for this polar dualism can be found in an internal fracture in the idea of the Origin of all things. The fracture is caused by an apostate direction of this Origin idea (either completely apostate, or only apostate in part as in the case of the Roman Catholic motive of nature and grace). Since self-knowledge is completely dependent on knowledge concerning God, all anthropological conceptions, which are orientated to this dualistic idea of the Origin, must necessarily also manifest the same dualistic polar character.

This polarity is expressed in the conception of "soul" and "body", and of their mutual relation.

*** Proposition IV**

The ground-motive of divine Word Revelation—the motive of creation, fall and redemption in Christ Jesus—radically excludes every polar dualism, whether in God's self-revelation as the Origin of all things, or in the revelation of man to himself. Scripture indeed discloses the radical fracture in the religious root of human existence caused by the fall into sin, but it also teaches the radical restoration of this fracture through Christ's redemptive work. <Under the rule of common

grace, Christ's redemptive work leads to a radical antithesis between the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of darkness, but it does not lead to a polar dualism in the structure of human temporal existence.>

Nowhere does Scripture teach a polar tension between an anima rationalis (as the rational, essential form of human nature) and a material body. It cannot teach this, because it discloses to us the supratemporal religious root, the integral center of temporal human existence. The temporal acts of thinking and willing are merely temporal branches, temporal expressions of this supratemporal religious root.

*** Proposition V**

Whenever Scripture speaks in its concise religious sense about the human soul or spirit, it always shows it as the heart of all temporal existence, from out of which are all the issues of temporal life. Nowhere does Scripture teach a dichotomy between a "rational soul" and a "material body" within temporal existence <nor does it teach a trichotomy between 'matter-soma,' 'psyche' and spirit [body, soul and spirit]>. Rather, it views the body as this temporal existence as a whole. And this temporal body is to be laid down at death. In contrast, according to Scriptural revelation, the human soul or spirit, as the religious root of the body, <or as the "inner man"> is not subject to temporal death, because the soul in fact transcends all temporal things (although outside of Christ, the soul <with the body> is subject to eternal death).

This revelation of the "soul" of man's existence as the integral center of the whole of his bodily existence, is completely in accord with God's Revelation of Himself as integral Creator of heaven and earth, who has no other autonomous counterpart <or: principle of origin> opposed to Himself.

This revelation concerning human nature cannot be characterized as an "anthropology" or scientific theory about human existence. Rather, it should serve as the religious pre-supposition, which should be made the foundation of every truly Christian anthropology.

*** Proposition VI**

Current philosophical anthropologies, orientated to one of the dialectical ground motives, repeatedly attempt to give us a metaphysical theory of the human soul <or "the human spirit">, at least, in so far as they are not driven by the "materialistic" pole of the Greek matter-principle, or by the modern humanistic science ideal <or: by the nature motive (the humanistic science ideal)>. Any such 'metaphysical psychology' must be radically rejected from a Scriptural-reformatory point of view.

The human soul, in its concise religious Scriptural sense, transcends every scientific concept, because it is the presupposition of every concept <or: because [the scientific concept] is bound to time>. Knowledge about the human soul is religious self-knowledge, and true self-knowledge is only possible by way of true knowledge of God from divine Word Revelation.

*** Proposition VII**

Actual scientific knowledge about man remains limited in principle to the structure of the human body, in its broad sense of the temporal form of existence of human life. However, because philosophical inquiry is religiously determined, any such inquiry concerning man's temporal

existence should, from a scriptural standpoint, be directed by an Idea of the human soul which, in which God's revelation concerning the root of human existence—as religious presupposition—is focused on the basic problem of anthropology.

This fundamental theoretical problem [of anthropology] can be formulated as follows: How can man's temporal existence, which we theoretically split apart into its different aspects and individuality structures, nevertheless be grasped as a deeper whole and as a deeper unity? <The field of research of philosophical anthropology can therefore be described as a science of totality concerning man in his temporal existence.>

*** Proposition VIII**

Because of the radical, religious determination of theoretical thought, every philosophical anthropology has at its basis an Idea of the human soul. This Idea, by virtue of its transcendental character (i.e. that which first makes philosophical investigation possible), also determines one's whole philosophical view concerning the structure of the human body.

Thus the conception of the body as "material body" is clearly dependent on an Idea of the human soul that views the soul as an abstract complex of emotional, analytical and volitional functions, and which conceives the soul as *anima rationalis*, characterized by the logical function of thought.

<From the scriptural standpoint of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, neither the soul nor the body can be characterized as part of human nature. Similarly, the view that is an individual unity of soul and body must also be rejected from this scriptural standpoint, since that view—which proceeds from a polar dualism in its conception of man's temporal existence—tries to transcend this dualism in a formal way, without being able to demonstrate an essential unity above soul and body.>

*** Proposition IX**

The anthropology of the Philosophy of the Law Idea is founded on the Scriptural Idea of the human soul *as the integral religious root of the whole of man's temporal existence*. In this religious root, human life is still "undivided" (Cf. Kuyper, especially the Stone Lectures), because in this center all temporal functions are concentrated in the basic religious relation to the Origin of all things.

The human body, therefore, is not to be conceived as an abstract material body, but as the whole *of man's* temporal existence, which finds its deeper unity only by virtue of its relation to the "soul."

And thus the body can never be thought of as "something independent" or as a "substance", since the body is given over to dissolution when its tie to the soul has been severed (in temporal death).

In Dooyeweerd's draft, this is changed to:

<According to the scripturally determined anthropological basic idea of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, total human existence is concentrated in a spiritual unity in the human soul, whereas

in the body, this same total human existence is prismatically refracted by time into a diversity of functions and individuality structures. The soul is the “inner man” in Paul’s sense, just as we can see in the “body” the external revelation of man (“the outward man”). The “outward man” is nothing without the “inner man,” but the “inner man” cannot be subjected to temporal, i.e. bodily death, because the inner man transcends cosmic time.>

[(...: “cannot be subjected to temporal, i.e. bodily death”—Dy): BUT, only if in Christ the “inner man” is restored as one being, a “new creation,” or else Dy has reintroduced a new dualism by the back door! *I do not believe for a second that this is Dy’s intent. And the problem, of course, disappears if “inner man” is seen as our temporal Response(in our total “beingness”—not just in a volitional sense) to God’s WORD for Direction, within a new anthropological model of Structure (the Biblical notion encapsulated in the term “body”), Direction (Biblical notion of “spirit”) and Authority (Biblical notion of “soul”). —JPRH]*

* **Proposition X**

The human body is built up as an enkaptic whole of four individuality structures, of which the lower ones are morphologically bound in the higher structures. Thus the natural form of the body (lichaams-gestalte) is the nodal point of the intertwinements between the various structures.

However, within their mutual intertwinement, these structures retain their own internal lawfulness and sphere sovereignty.

* **Proposition XI**

[Additional Dutch text not yet included here]

If we only consider the three lower structures in their internal peculiarity and their own lawfulness apart from their connection with the fourth and highest structure, we cannot really understand them as partial structures of the human body. Only by their successive connection to the fourth structure do they become real parts of the enkaptic structural whole called the ‘human body.’

The enkaptic construction of the body implies that the lower structures can manifest their typical lawfulness externally (e.g. temporary domination of instinctive drives (passions) in a situation where reasonable deliberation has been temporarily set aside). This happens when the highest structure (temporarily) ceases to play its leading role in the structured whole.

Proposition XII

The form (gestalte) of the body is the (nodal) point of all structure-intertwinement in the human body. It is impossible, therefore to classify particular organs or parts of the human body, in a morphological sense, as belonging exclusively to one of these structures. Morphologically the human body with all its parts necessarily functions equally in all four structures. The criterion for the distinction between separate body structures is internal in nature and can therefore never be linked up with the external form of the body.

The first and lowest [individuality] structure is qualified in a physico-chemical way. In and of itself this structure cannot be called a structure of the body. Only when it is bound in form with

higher the structures can it be designated a structure of the body. However, in the process of dissolution of the body at death, it becomes free [of this interwovenness], and its own typical lawfulness manifest itself.

The second structure is of a biotic, or 'vegetative' qualification. It is not until we come to this structure that living cells and other biologically qualified combinations make their appearance. This structure, with its internal sphere sovereignty, governs the vegetative body processes insofar as they fall outside of the guidance of the psychical or later functions. (These vegetative body processes include the whole of the 'autonomic (vegetative) nervous system' with the muscle tissues, bone tissue and glands, innervated by this autonomic system.)

This second structure is in turn enaptically bound in a third structure, which is qualified by the instinctive feeling function.

The sphere sovereignty of this third structure governs the psychical functions [6]. Within certain limitations, these functions are outside the control of human volition.

This third structure, together with the earlier structures, in turn functions enaptically in a fourth structure that is called the 'act-structure' of the human body, that is: the typical structure of human "acts."

* **Proposition XIV** [Ouweneel, pp. 224, 232).

By 'acts' the Philosophy of the Law Idea understands all activities (verrichtingen) which proceed from the soul (or spirit) but which function within the enaptically structured whole of the human body. By these activities, under the leadership of normative points of view, man directs himself intentionally (bedoelend) to states of affairs in <temporal> reality or in his world of imagination. By relating these (now) intentional states of affairs to his "I-ness" he makes them internally his own.

The act-life of man reveals itself in three fundamental directions: knowing, imagining, and willing. They must not however be isolated as three separate "faculties", because they are completely intertwined.

In the intentional character of the "acts" is hidden their "innerness" (innerlijkheid). It is only actions that that actualize (realize) the intention of the act. The acts of knowing, imagining, and of volition are all intertwined in the motivated process of decision making, which decision is then translated into deed. <In this way the still merely intentional subject-object relation which only has its existence innerly in the act, is actualized in the 'external world' by a causative operation of action.

* **Proposition XV** [Ouweneel pp. 226-227]

By viewing the typical structure of these "acts" as the act-structure of the human body, the Philosophy of the Law Idea opposes in principle the dominant view in current "act-psychology" and phenomenology (Husserl, Scheler), which holds that acts as such are incorporeal (onlichamelijk), (pure "psychonomic"), intentional experiences. <Scheler> believes that these acts proceed from the selfhood which, as a person's center, lives purely in its acts. <And according to Edmund Husserl, the selfhood is absolute consciousness, independent of all embodiment.> It is typical that in this conception the *intentional relatedness to a "Gegenstand"*

is repeatedly seen as the essential characteristic <or: as the guarantee for the pure ‘spiritual’ character’> of the acts. However, as the Philosophy of the Law Idea has shown, This “Gegenstand-relation” is exclusively a feature of acts of theoretical knowing. This intentional relation is based on a theoretical abstraction, by which the logical aspect of the act of knowing, having been abstracted from the actually existing coherence of the aspects, is placed over against the non-logical aspects of the fields of investigation.

“Act Psychology”, and, for that matter, every type of metaphysical psychology and phenomenology, elevates this theoretical, merely intentional abstraction to reality and, having done this, it assumes that the Gegenstand-relation proves the independence in principle of the intentional act of consciousness of the pre-logical or the pre-psychical aspects of the human body. <The ‘purely spiritual’ acts are then related to a ‘spiritual’ center, which Scheler—in sharp contrast to the selfhood which for him is bound to the psychical sphere—calls ‘person,’ but which itself is nothing other than “a monarchical ordering of acts.”

This view [act-psychology] neglects two things: 1) that the Gegenstand-relation is completely absent in non-theoretical acts, and 2) that even in the theoretical act of knowing, it is not the act itself, but merely its logical aspect that is placed over against the pre-logical aspects of the body, and that this Gegenstand-relation is only the result of an intentional abstraction out of the full, actual act of knowing. <It is not the act of thinking that stands in the Gegenstand-relation to the non-logical aspects of reality, but the Gegenstand-relation itself exists only within the structure of the real act, and this structure as such includes all aspects of reality without distinction.> In fact, the intentional Gegenstand-relation can only exist within the structure of the theoretical act of knowledge, and this structure is in turn determined by the act-structure of the human body.

* **Proposition XVI** [Ouweneel p. 294]

The mature Aristotelian conception of the anima rationalis as the “body in action” clearly shows that Aristotle must have recognized thinking and willing as conscious activities of the anima rationalis in the act structure of the body. However, he could not consistently develop this important insight, because the Greek form-matter motive required that at least the universal principle of thought-activity (as rational form principle) be conceived of as a substance (ousia), completely independent from the “material body.” Because of this, Aristotle could only understand the receptive human capacity of thought (i.e. thought as *dunamis*)—and not the actual activity of thought (the *nous poiètikos*) as a part of the human soul. And he understood the human soul as the “form of the body.”

According to him, “active thinking spirit” is ungenerated (*ongeworden*) and imperishable. It is the universal principle of all thought-acts, and it only enters into the human soul from outside (*thurathen*).

* **Proposition XVII** [Ouweneel p. 295]

Aristotle’s arguments for the substantiality of this active principle of thought, and the arguments given by Thomas Aquinas for the independence of the whole anima rationalis, are completely governed by the Greek form-matter motive.

The anima rationalis always appears to be the product of a theoretical abstraction from man's full, temporal (and therefore bodily) existence. This abstraction is then absolutized into a substance that is essentially independent from the material body.

Proposition XVIII

The act structure of the body as individuality structure necessarily spans all aspects of temporal reality. The total human body, therefore, with all its aspects (including the physico-chemical and the biotic) is always in action in every act of knowing, imagining or willing.

*** Proposition XIX**

(...)

In the act-structure of the body the so-called association fields of the cerebrum play an essential role.

The question concerning the "localization" of the acts has--if properly posited--nothing to do with the problem posed by materialism.

It has been shown that what are called 'centers of human act-life' in the cerebral cortex cannot be viewed as localization fields in the strict sense of the word, for when these centers are disturbed, neighboring parts of the associative brains can take over their function. There is no actual "center of ideas" or "moral center" in the frontal lobes of the cerebrum (contra Fleschig and his followers). In contrast, the sense and motor aspects of sensory awareness can be localized.

Proposition XX

All human acts have their origin in the soul as the spiritual center of man's existence. With respect to their temporal structure, however, they can only take place in the human body. It would be incorrect, therefore, to say that the soul or spirit thinks, imagines or wills, just as it would be incorrect to say that the body thinks, imagines or wills. The whole man as an integral unity of soul and body performs these acts. Outside of the body no acts are possible. In other words, acts should be thought of as neither purely spiritual, nor as purely bodily.

Proposition XXI

In contrast to the three earlier structures, the act-structure of the human body as such is undifferentiated. It is not typically qualified by any normative modal aspect. Human acts (in their three fundamental directions) can be qualified by any of the normative modal aspects. For instance, the scientific act of knowing is logically qualified, the imagining-act of the artist has a typical aesthetic qualification, and the act of praying (as an act of volition) of the believer is pistically qualified. But the act of knowing as well as the act of imagining and the act of volition can also take on completely other typical structures. This typical differentiation is closely related to the differentiated structures of human society, which intertwine with the act-structure of man's bodily existence. But these differentiated act types are only variability types of human act life. With respect to their inner structure, human acts are undifferentiated. The relatively undifferentiated character of the association fields of the cerebrum is in complete [accord] with this state of affairs.

Proposition XXII

The undifferentiated character of the act-structure of the human body is inseparably related to its function as field of expression or the human spirit in its Scriptural, religious sense. Since the spirit transcends all temporal structures of life, it must be able to express itself bodily in all possible differentiated structures. Because each differentiated individuality structure gives a typical, fixed character to the activity performed within that structure. The human spirit, however, can in religious freedom express itself in the entire field of human act life, which must therefore possess the greatest degree of flexibility. Through this activity of man's soul, the human body (which only takes on a typical, human character in the act-structure) receives its spiritual character. The animal body, limited by its psychically qualified structure, lacks this spiritual character.

*** Proposition XXIII [Ouweneel p. 237]**

<In animals (...) we cannot talk of a real act-structure, because an animal is not a subject in the normative aspects of reality and furthermore, because the animal has no spiritual act-center. Its associative brain processes remain enclosed primarily in a psychically qualified bodily structure. Animals have no language and no logical concept, no culture, and not any other normative subject function.

It is undeniable that the more highly developed animals have <a certain> sensory intelligence. Especially Kohler's experiments with chimpanzees have irrefutably shown that these animals are capable of apprehending (praesentire), in their dynamic sensory imagination, an individual causal relation between sensorily perceived things (e.g. between a stick and a banana), and without preceding trial attempts, they can react appropriately to a completely new situation <or: according to a appropriate plan, which cannot be explained either from the instinctive consolidation of the life forces of the species [perceptive], nor out of pure associations of feeling [sensitive].>

In these cases, however, we cannot speak of acts of knowing, imagining, and willing, since the animal has no spiritual act-center and it cannot function as a subject in the normative aspects. <the dynamic imagination that appears (...) is a psychical function, which we can call 'sensory intelligence,' insofar as it is a productive imagination, which in the sensory representation reaches out towards a new complex of facts that has not yet been experienced. It is a kind of feeling, 'prudence' and a 'providence', a conscious looking ahead, based on feeling, to an appropriate causal coherence of two given things, it is what Max Scheler calls 'cunning.'>

Animal "insight", just like "instinct", even in its highest development, remains rigidly bound to the immediate life environment and does not rise above the sensory feeling-function. <The 'sensory intelligence' (...) is based on feeling fantasy, which feels in advance the appropriate causal relation between two things in sensory imagination. It lacks the sensorily bound conceptual representation of the causal relation, as it is formed in pre-scientific thought.

*** Proposition XXIV [Ouweneel pp. 243-44]**

This act-structure reveals itself in a closely related <harmonic> coordination of all <temporal> act functions, <both in the normative as well as in the non-normative aspects,> which by means of this coordination are brought into harmony, and which are concentrated on the selfhood as

individual spiritual act center. And it further reveals itself in the hierarchical <normative> subordination of the unconscious substratum of the act-life to the conscious superstratum. Whenever this structure breaks up, as happens in schizophrenia; symptoms of a pathological split appear. In such situations the unconscious act-life <gradually loses its structure of normative coordination and concentration—the functions of consciousness are over-simplified and as it were fall apart and> severs its hierarchical subordination to the conscious act-life, <the act structure as it were falls apart [note: This of course means: the act-structure in its subjective actualization. As structural principle or normative law, it of course remains unaffected] and through this, the patient sees his personality as in a “broken mirror”-> and the patient is no longer capable of relating his disintegrated act-life to his I or selfhood <or: to his spiritual center of human personality>.

*** Proposition XXV** [Ouweneel pp. 245-46]

The discovery of what is called the ‘unconscious’ has dealt another blow to the traditional dichotomistic conception of human temporal existence.

For it became apparent that the relation between the pre-psychical, the psychical and the post-psychical functions of human life is even closer in the sphere of the unconscious than it is in the conscious superstratum.[8]

Messer’s argument (Psychologie, 5th edition 1934, p. 345 ff.) that the unconscious has no demonstrable existence apart from the human soul as “substance”, and that the unconscious exhibits no bodily character is based on an obvious *petitio principii*.

*** Proposition XXVI** [Ouweneel pp. 249-250]

The act-structure of the human body, like all other individuality structures [of the body], exhibits a whole series of types (human radical type, genotypes descending into race, tribe, sex, family, and variability types: national, political, ecclesiastical, scientific, occupational, etc. etc.) [9] These types form the field of investigation of “characterology” (personality structure).

Character, is the typical temporal expression of the individuality of the human spirit in the act-structure or boundary-structure of the human body <or: is the bodily expression-structure of the full religious individuality of the spirit or the soul>.

Character, as a temporal individuality type, must be sharply distinguished from the “heart” as the spiritual center of human existence. As such it is not of a spiritual but of a bodily nature. This bodily nature is also evident from the somatic heredity of the dispositions of character in their genetic or genotypes. The said dispositions are transmitted by the genes of the sexual cells (gametes).

However, such heredity only pertains to potentialities or dispositions; the heredity of acquired characteristics has never been demonstrated. The nativistic conception, which appeals in particular to studies dealing with the character traits of identical twins, is in conflict with the facts.

* **Proposition XXVII** [Ouweneel p. 252]

The voluntaristic [absolutizing of the will] character-theory (Stern, Messer and many others) is to be rejected insofar as they seek the center of human personality in the what they call ‘directional-dispositions’ <or ‘dispositions of the will’>. <The deepest root and driving force of human life cannot really be found either in the will or in the intellectual dispositions of his character, but in the “heart,” in the “spirit” in its religious scriptural sense.>

* **Proposition XXVIII** [Ouweneel p. 252]

Man’s character as such is of a normative nature. This character is enkaptically bound with man’s psychically qualified temperament <as the whole of the psychically qualified (qualified by emotional factors of feeling) dispositions>.

Temperament is in turn enkaptically bound with the typically biotically qualified dispositions (especially those of sex <or: those in the area of sexual life> and the typically physically qualified dispositions (the dispositions of movement, and of the ‘tempo’ of a person). <Character thus also functions in the pre-psychical aspects of the body.>

The sharp separation made in Kant’s anthropology between temperament (“natural aptitude” or “natural”) and normative character is a distinction that has been entirely inspired by the dualistic ground-motive of “nature” and “freedom,” and is not in agreement with the structure of man’s bodily existence.

* **Proposition XXIX** [Ouweneel p. 314]

The Scriptural ground-motive basic to the Philosophy of the Law Idea should also be set at the foundation of the study of anthropology’s basic problem of genesis, namely the question concerning man’s temporal becoming. A sharp distinction must be made between the creation of man and his temporal becoming. For the creative act of God is not subject to time; in contrast, the creature’s bodily becoming is subject to time [12]. The days of creation must be understood in terms of faith time, not in human terms of the [physical] time measure of the earth’s rotation. Unlike Gen. 1:27, Genesis 2:7 does not deal with the creation of man, but rather it clearly deals with the temporal process of becoming.

* **Proposition XXX** [Ouweneel p. 312]

Evolutionism, or the teaching concerning [man’s] descent, denies the reality of individuality structures, within which the temporal becoming of creatures takes place on the basis of the divine creation order. It is based on a nominalistic concept of species, and focuses entirely on the variability of form types. Neither paleontology, comparative anatomy and embryology, nor modern genetics (Mendel, Johanssen), or even modern serology have presented any proof for the evolution of man’s body from animal ancestors. In Roman Catholic science, various scientists have taken the position that evolutionism is acceptable with respect to the human “material body”, but that the “human soul” in the sense of anima rationalis is called into being by an immediate creative act of God. From a Reformational point of view, such a conception must be rejected.

* **Proposition XXXI** [Ouweneel p. 308]

Both ‘psycho-creationism’ and ‘traducianism’ (which is favored in Lutheran circles) are contrary to the ground-motive of Divine Word revelation. Both conceptions are dominated, at least in part, by the Greek form-matter motive.

Psycho-creationism is not only in conflict with the Scriptural teaching concerning original sin but it is also in conflict with the creation story itself. Gen. 2:1 tells us emphatically that the entire creation has been completed.

* **Proposition XXXII** [Ouweneel pp. 318-319]

The creation of man (both body and soul), which, according to the Scriptures, has been totally completed, works itself out in a creaturely way by means of generation <which is set in the order of creation>. This generation has <in the order of creation> both a bodily as well as a spiritual (religious) side. With respect to its bodily side, which takes place in cosmic time, humanity is generated of one blood [Acts 17:26 K.J.V.]. With respect to our religious side (which does not take place in time) we are the “spiritual seed” of Adam and as a result of this, we share in his fall into sin. The regeneration by the Holy Spirit really breaks through this natural line of spiritual generation. The natural line of spiritual generation from Adam is really the condition for (but not the guideline for) this regeneration by the Holy Spirit. The “natural” man, the anthropos psychikos, is first, after that comes the “spiritual” man, the anthropos pneumatikos.

Endnotes

[1] Dit thema dankt zijn ontstaan aan het onverzoend conflict tussen de oudere Griekse natuurgodsdiensten, waarin de godheid nog vormloos als een altijd vloeiend levenscontinuüm, of een chaotische baaierd werd gevat, en de nieuwere cultuur-religie van vorm, maat en harmonie, waarin de godheid boven de levensstroom en de chaos werd uitgeheven en als onsterfelijk redelijk vormprincipe werd vereerd.

[2] This theme (or motive) came into being as a result of an unreconciled conflict between the older Greek nature religion—wherein the godhead had still been conceived of as formless, as an everflowing continuum of life or as an unformed chaos—and the newer culture religion of form, measure and harmony, wherein the godhead was elevated above the stream of life, above the chaos, and worshipped as immortal rational principle of form.

[3] In this motive, its view of ‘nature’ took over the Greek motive in a revised form and then “adapted” it to the Christian ground-motive.

[4] This motive attempts to incorporate all earlier ground motives, but understands them in a fundamentally altered way.

[5] JGF: Ouweneel refers to Abraham Kuyper: Honig uit den rotssteen II (Amsterdam, 1883), 35. The same idea is also found in Kuyper’s Stone Lectures, which Dooyeweerd cites with approval.

[6] These are the functions of the (sensible) central nervous system (more particularly those of the senses, brain, spinal cord and glandular system) and the muscle tissues (most striated muscle) innervated thereby.

[7] Ouweneel refers to W. Köhler: Gestaltpsychology (New York 1947).

[8] Cf. the appearance of blisters by means of suggestion, the so-called stigmatization phenomena, etc

[9] Note from mimeo: Radical types of a secondary nature: male or female; races with their different primary and sub-types. Variability types: related to different nationalities, characteristics associated with various occupations, etc.

[10] Ouweneel refers to W. Stern: Die menschliche Persönlichkeit (Leipzig, 1919).

[11] Ouweneel refers to A. Messer: Psychologie (Stuttgart, 1934), 31.

[12] Mimeo note: Cf. Christian Perspectives 1962.
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