

A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE

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April, 1978.

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INTRODUCTION

*'O Lord, our Lord, your greatness is seen in all the world!
When I look at the sky, which you have made,
at the moon and the stars, which you set in their places -
what is man, that you think of him; mere man that you care for him?'*

*Yet you made him inferior only to yourself,
you crowned him with glory and honour.
You appointed him ruler over everything you made;
You placed him over all creation.
O Lord, our Lord, your greatness is seen in all the world;*

'Honour the Lord and serve Him sincerely and faithfully. Get rid of the gods which your ancestors used to worship in Mesopotamia and in Egypt, and serve only the Lord'.

'For the Kingdom of God is not a matter of words but of power'.¹

My purpose is to set forward something of a Biblically-founded philosophy of culture. One of the main themes will be that of *power*. Two aspects of this theme have often been widely separated in the life and thought of God's people. I refer first to the *power* of the Holy Spirit to regenerate the hearts of those joined in the fellowship of Ekklesia and secondly the *power* given to man by God to exercise dominion over His creation. Much current charismatically evangelical Christianity lays great emphasis upon the former but generally is singularly lacking in insight with regard to the latter. Liberal Christianity has paid a great deal of attention to cultural activity but has seldom been motivated by the power of the Holy Spirit. Reformed Christianity has always had an appreciation of the cultural mandate; but very often this has been little more than mere doctrine.

Perhaps we should recall the word of the Anglican prayer book:

What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.

Think of the amazing way in which God has joined us to Christ as His bride. It is the same Holy Spirit who should motivate us in exercising our cultural power.

It is instructive to read from Exodus 35.30 - 36.1. It refers to the way in which the people of Israel were moved by the Lord to build the tent of meeting.

And Moses said to the people of Israel. 'See, the Lord has called by name Bezalel the son of Uri, son of Hur, of the tribe of Judah; and he has filled him with the Spirit of God, with ability, with intelligence, with knowledge, and with all craftsmanship, to devise artistic designs, to work in gold and silver and bronze, in cutting stones for setting, and in carving wood, for work in every skilled craft. And

he has in-spired him to teach, both him and Oholiab the son of Ahisamach of the tribe of Dan. He has filled them with nobility to do every sort of {2} work done by a craftsman or by a designer or by an embroiderer in blue and purple and scarlet stuff and fine twined linen, or by a weaver - or by any sort of workman or skilled designer. Bezalel and Oholiab and every able man in whom the Lord has put ability and intelligence to know how to do any work in the construction of the sanctuary shall work in accordance with all that the Lord has commanded.

Compare this with Plato's discussion of the Poet's inspiration by the Muse.

A poet is a light and winged thing, and holy, and never able to compose until he has become inspired, and is beside himself, and reason is no longer in him.... Herein lies the reason why the deity has bereft them of their senses, and uses them as ministers, along with soothsayers and godly seers; it is in order that we listeners may know that it is not they who utter these precious revelations while their mind is not within them, but that it is god himself who speaks, and through them becomes articulate to us.²

The notion that the Holy Spirit renders man a mere ignorant and passive instrument in cultural activity receives more sanction from Plato's dialogue than from the Scriptures. The filling of the Spirit is related to the giving of ability, of insight, of intelligence, of craftsmanship - to be employed in the cultivation of God's world.

The Biblical view recognises that all of man's cultivating activity arises from a religious commitment - whether to the Lord Yahweh or to an idol. Not only does the Holy Spirit free us from the power of idolatry and create in us a new heart, but also we are to live in Him. This is not a call to live in some occult ecstatic high. Rather it is a call to live out of the new religious commitment that has been wrought by Jesus Christ and made effective for us by the Holy Spirit.

We can link this with the first two commandments of the Decalogue. These forbid both the worship and the service of idols. They call for wholehearted service to Yahweh. In this connection, too, Joshua 24:1-15 speaks of the call to *serve* Yahweh rather than idols; Romans 1.25 speaks of man's condition in sin being one of choosing to worship and *serve* the creature rather than the creator.

Of course the power of sin is very great and we are by nature caught up in idolatry. It is only by the grace of God working through the Holy Spirit that our hearts are opened to Christ, who is the Truth. However, just as men cultivate in a spirit of idolatry, so men may work empowered by the Holy Spirit.

1. Man and Culture: The Power Given to Man

1.1 Man and Culture

There are two works by American philosophers that help to clarify the current notions of culture and identify some of the problems with these notions.

The first of these is entitled 'Man and Culture' and is an anthology of writing by a wide

range of philosophers who are considered by the editor, Donald P. Verene, to have 'significantly contributed to the modern philosophy of culture'. {3}

In the introduction to this anthology, the editor writes:

Man lives in two worlds. He is part of nature and he is part of the world he creates through his mind. This dual aspect of man is reflected in the classical definition 'man is a rational animal'. Man is at once part of the natural world and something apart from it; his capacity to reason causes man, unlike other animals, to live both in the natural world and in a distinctively human world of his own creation. He lives not only in a natural environment but also in an environment he constructs. A further part of the classical definition is 'man is a social animal'. Through his capacity to reason, man creates out of the natural conditions of his existence a social world. He divides land into countries, builds cities, and develops the patterns of acting that makes up human society. He creates a social net-work of political, economic and practical activities which overlie the natural environment and enable him to manage and transform it. Within this social world man develops spheres of artistic, religious and intellectual activity. These spheres constitute man's most sophisticated attempts to realize the potentialities of his own Nature. How is man to understand the world of his own creation? How is he to understand himself? (emphasis added)³.

He attempts to clarify the term *culture*,

Contemporary fields of knowledge are generally regarded as divisible into three major types the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. Of this division, the latter two contain concepts of culture. Among the social sciences, the fields of anthropology, sociology and social psychology have a particular relevance to the concept of culture. Among the humanities are frequently listed history, art, literature, religious studies and philosophy all of which are closely associated with the idea of culture.

Study of culture in the social sciences rests upon a fundamental, presupposition - that 'culture' can be regarded as a plural term, that it is meaningful to speak of a multiplicity of 'cultures'. For example, despite disagreement in anthropology concerning the meaning of culture, anthropology is not possible unless culture can be conceived as something plural. Anthropology is based on the idea that it is meaningful to speak of various kinds of cultures and that it is possible to make distinctions between preliterate and civilized cultures and between the dominant culture of a society and its subcultures. The aim of social science is to describe the various forms of man's social existence... Thus on the one hand the social sciences bring man to a better understanding of the social world, but on the other hand they leave him with such a relativity of values and points of view that there is no primary focus to his social nature.

The humanities embody a different concept of culture. The humanities in their essential standpoint hold before us the ideal that there is culture in a wholly singular sense. They presuppose that culture is some-thing that exists over and

above any given 'culture' which the social sciences would describe. The humanities embody the perspective that within any given culture there exists culture, which is an element that transcends it. This element is what is sought in the arts, literature, religion and history..... {4}

The humanistic activities of man are ways, in which he transcends the conditions of any particular culture. Through them he understands the meaning of human existence itself.

The social sciences aim at a description of the art, literature, religion, etc. of a given culture and they compare how these activities are carried on in one culture with another. The humanities involve a non relative and non descriptive view of these activities. They are means whereby man understands stands himself as having a universal nature that stands above his given culture. In contrast to the descriptive character of the social sciences, "the humanities can be thought of as normative - as concerned with creating ideals and values that are not relative to the culture in which they are realized.

In the categorization of knowledge, philosophy is generally associated with the humanities. It, like them, is regarded as an activity which is not directed toward describing culture but toward pursuing ideals of truth, goodness, beauty etc., which are transcendent of any particular culture. Philosophy, however, occupies a special place in this scheme, and so does the concept of culture associated with it.... Ultimately the goal of a philosophical concept of culture must be to show how the concept of culture taken in the plural, or scientific sense of a diversity of 'cultures' can be joined with the concept of culture taken in the singular or humanistic sense. (Emphasis added)⁴.

Although the second book *Philosophy and the Modern Mind* is written as a philosophical critique of modern Western Civilization, E. A. Adams makes much the same distinctions as Verene.

Rather than making a distinction between Nature and Mind, he makes it between *a structure of existence* and *a structure of meaning*. However, I think the same idea is involved.

The culture of a society is that structure of meaning, the spiritual climate and soil, on which people and institutions depend for their nourishment, health and vitality. Meaning is parallel with existence. We may describe a book, for example, by giving its physical dimensions: weight, colour, number of pages and the like. This is to approach it simply as a structure of existence. On the other hand, we may talk about what is semantically in the book the people, places, situations, issues, actions and the like. This is to deal with it as a structure of meaning. The focus is what is existentially in it... The book is an expression of the mind of the author and a way of communicating to others what was in his mind. We may speak of something being semantically in a mind in much the same sense in which we speak of something being semantically in a book. We may speak of the mind itself as a structure of meaning. (Emphasis added)⁵.

Although he does not say it quite so bluntly, Adams also believes that culture results from a creation of the human mind.

In the case of governments, and of organizations in general, we have constitutions. They are sets of normative principles which define the structure, power and ways of acting of their respective organizations. In the area of language, we have a normative structure, which may be formulated as grammatical and semantical rules, that determines the structure of sentences and makes linguistic sense. In a somewhat parallel way, we may speak {5} of the constitutional principles or logical grammar of the human mind by virtue of which we have the powers of experience, to think, to reason, to talk, and to act in the various ways we do.... The assumptions of a culture about these principles of the mind may be spoken of as a cultural mind, for they constitute the perspective of the culture on the world and define the forms and limits of the structure of meaning which they generate.⁶

Adams has a distinction between the social sciences and the humanities, similar to Verene's:

A culture as a complex structure of meaning may seem to be a very diffused thing, difficult to grasp and to understand its workings. Different ways of studying it yield quite different findings for each method of study can find only what it by its nature can locate. An empirical scientific approach in a behavioural mode, which is prominent in the social sciences, would reduce all that I am calling the structure of consciousness to dispositions to behave in publicly servable ways and all that I am calling culture to behavioural dispositions which manifest themselves in social structures and institutions, or, according to this view, observable patterns of behaviour. And for the more positivistically inclined who reject contrary to fact conditionals, even the dispositions drop out and we have only patterns of behaviour. This, I think, fails to delineate the subject matter in its own indigenous categories and, therefore, social science, in this mode, is condemned to systematic misrepresentation and falsification. It tells a lot of little truths from within its perspective in the interest of a big falsehood. This is but an aspect of the difficulty in modern culture which we have already intimated and are to probe more deeply. Only a humanistic approach, the proper approach of the humanities, can grasp a culture in terms of its own structure and thus not be distorting.⁷

SOME QUESTIONS

From this preliminary discussion, I would like to pose the following questions:

- (i) Are mathematics and the natural sciences a part of culture? If so, in what sense?
According to Adams, for example

A culture consists of the language, symbols, myths, rituals, pagers {?}, religion, art, skill, ethics, history, science, mathematics, theology, and philosophy a society has developed, or learned from others and is prepared to transmit to the new generation.⁸

If mathematics and natural science are considered part of culture then the distinction between the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities envisaged by Verene requires some modification, for his concept of culture excludes the natural sciences. {6}

(ii) Does man 'create' culture? Is man the ultimate source of ethical, aesthetic and jural norms? Do such societal structures as the State, the Family and the Church exist only by virtue of man's decree?

(iii) What is the role of man's mind in relation to the realities of culture? Both Verene and Adams suggest that man *creates* culture from his mind. Is this really the means by which reality is ordered?

(iv) In what sense does man transcend his cultural conditions and 'realize himself' in what Verene calls the humanities?

Adams, for example, writes that

Without language and symbols to deepen and structure his subjectivity, without beliefs, myths and theories to organise his consciousness into a unity and to form an image of the self and the world, one would not be an 'I', a person capable of moral, religious and artistic experiences and intellectual thought.⁹

This raises fundamental questions as to what it is that gives man his ultimate identity. Adams seems to be suggesting that it derives from man's en-counter with the cultural objects themselves. Verene, on the other hand, seems to suggest that it comes in man's quest for the universal.

iv) How is a world view to be judged right or wrong?

A culture with a distorted world view grounded in false assumptions about the constitutional principles of the human mind is 'deranged. Life lived from within it is like that of a mad man. One cannot through the exercise of his powers, structured by the internalised culture, know and cope with reality.¹⁰

Such a judgment can only validly be made in the light of a norm. However, Adams does not discuss how he can make such a judgment.

1.2 The Basic Problem for a Philosophy of Culture

In the discussion so far, it is apparent that there are a number of distinct ways in which the word 'culture' may be used:

- i) For different cultural totalities: e.g. Indian culture; Western culture; Anglo-Saxon culture; Maori Culture, etc.
- ii) For distinctive (or differentiated) cultural forms: e.g. art, science, politics, education, etc.

- iii) There is movement within some cultural totalities, but not in others. Moreover, there are varying levels of development in the different cultural spheres.
- iv) 'Culture' is sometimes used in reference to a mind, a structure of meaning or a world view. {7}

The basic problem for a philosophy of culture (as intimated by Verene) is to bring coherence to these various notions. Thus the questions we must give attention to are:

Why are there different cultural totalities? Do the differences in cultural totalities imply cultural relativism?

What characterises the differences of the various cultural spheres?

Why do some cultural totalities change, but not others?

1.3 The Development of the Philosophy of Culture

The philosophy of culture, as it exists today, is a development of modern philosophy. From its beginning in the Renaissance the history of modern philosophy shows two major tendencies: one is centred on a concern to understand the laws of nature, and the other on a concern to understand man.¹¹

The initiators were men such as Machiavelli, Grotius, Hobbes and Locke. Their account of human society was inspired by the scientific achievements of such figures as Galileo and Newton. The Italian thinker G. B. Vico (1668-1744) rejecting the mathematical pattern of thought that inspired the earlier thinkers, sought his starting point in the creative freedom of the human mind. In his 'New Science' he considered the 'civil world' to be created by men from eternal ideas, which the human mind was able to grasp and realize in culture.

There are two major problems with Vico's views. First: how can the widely differing forms of cultural totality all be considered as realizations of the same eternal ideas? The second: What is the explanation as to why some cultures show little or no tendency to develop, and how can 'eternal ideas' be capable of any kind of development on the part of man? Although Vico's views were developed considerably by Herder in his 'Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Mankind' (1784-1791), the two central problems remain. It proves very difficult to use the notion of eternal ideas as universals to account for the conflicting diversity of cultural phenomena. Subsequent attempts to deal with these problems can be divided into two categories:

- a) Explanations of cultural plurality and change in the terms of historical movement toward a *goal*, e.g. Kant, Hegel, Marx, Comte, Spencer.
- b) Explanations of cultural plurality in terms of different *forms* of life - each suitable for those who created them and each only capable of being assessed in their own terms, e.g. The 19th Century Historical School, Spengler, Dilthey, Toynbee, Levi-Strauss.

For instance, Hegel rejected the notion of eternal ideas. He saw the whole of reality as a process of the unfolding of Absolute Spirit in a schema of Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis, moving toward a goal of self-unification. In Hegel's view, therefore, the whole of reality is caught up in the process of movement; there is nothing outside of this dialectical movement of Spirit.

With Marx the dialectical movement is no longer seen as one of Absolute Spirit. Rather it is related to what he considered to be the economic basis of society: the relation between the economic means of production, the social organization of these means and the ideological superstructure erected by the ruling class to {8} protect their vested interests. For Marx the *goal* of this movement insofar as man is concerned, is the achievement of communism - the state of the classless society in which man's dream of Utopia would be realized.

With Comte, the way of thinking of man as to his position in the world is again primary. He considers this to be subject to the law of three stages: the religious phase, the metaphysical phase and the scientific phase. Modern man according to him is emerging into the latter phase, leading toward the goal of the New Humanity.

With Spengler man's cultural activity no longer has a universal *goal*. For him all cultural totalities are subject to a law of growth and decay. There are only individual cultural totalities; no history of mankind as a whole. Each culture can be understood only in its own terms; each rises and falls, and accordingly he predicts the fall of the West.

Ethnology and cultural anthropology as it developed toward the end of the last century was strongly influenced by Comte and Spencer. Frazer's systematic exploration of the mythology of the peoples of the world, for example, bears the influence of Comte's conviction that mankind has progressed from magic to religion and from religion to science. The thesis of Levy-Bruhl - that the primitive man is non-rational - is another example of this Comtean influence. For all its Comtean bias, Frazer's analysis of myth was based upon the assumption that mythology - as lore shared by all of mankind - was an attempt to enshrine general truths regarding existence. However, under the leadership of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, it was declared that myths, like ritual and economic and social institutions, performed a specific *function* in the society in which they were developed. Their meaning according to this *functionalist* interpretation could therefore be grasped only by an analysis that related them to such concrete social conditions. Under such assumptions it was deemed false to assume that myths reveal eternal truths about man, God and the cosmos.

In recent years Levi-Strauss has advocated a new approach in this field - *Structuralism*. It assumes that there is a universal structure to the human mind that manifests itself in the mythologies of various peoples. It emphasises what so-called primitive and civilized peoples have in common seeing the differences as rather superficial. The human mind has, of course, none of the normative content of the Vico's eternal ideas. Rather it is presumed to embody the dialectical tensions present in human existence - such as that between Culture and Nature. In this however, Levi-Strauss continues to *assert* that culture is primarily the product of man's mind as he *creates* a new environment out of nature.

Each of these standpoints from which the philosophy of culture has been shaped cannot be considered to be neutral. They betray certain convictions that are of a religious nature, and these, if we are to be true to a Christian confession, must be subject to the critical scrutiny of the Scriptures.

1.4 The Cultural Factor

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came into being through Him; and apart from Him nothing came into being that has come into being. In Him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shines in the darkness and the darkness has not overcome it.¹²{9}

God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. And God blessed them, and God said to them, 'Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.

The Lord God took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to till it and keep it.

Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of the Lord.¹³

Basic to the Biblical view of things is the fact that we live in a creation that is everywhere upheld and structured by the Word of God. Man's place within creation is that of God's covenant partner, called as His steward, to exercise dominion over creation. He was placed in the garden to till it and keep it - to care for it and develop it; to cultivate it and look after it.

The Word of God - as the declared will of God for creation in Christ¹⁴ - sustains the various creatures within creation under the law for their existence. This is true of creation in its natural aspects, it is true of human society and it is true of the law relating to man's stewardship.

The ordering of creation is therefore not to be construed in terms of 'Reason', not even the Stoic view 'Cosmic Reason'.

We have seen how the concept of 'culture' as it has developed since Vico has been strongly influenced by the view that man's activity *creates* culture along the lines of the ideas in man's mind. Initially these ideas were considered to be eternal and not themselves the cultural creations of men. However, with the vanishing of this belief man's activity has been left without norms or goals to direct it; resulting in the threat of an unprincipled relativism which can provide no direction for future development.

How should Christians face this situation? Many, either explicitly or implicitly, seek to hold on to some notion of eternal ideas in the areas of morals and theology, believing that

such are given supra-culturally in the Scriptures. As there is usually little recognition of the debts to Aristotle and Kant in sustaining such views the philosophical nature of these problems are seldom recognised let alone given the attention they deserve. Moreover, the belief in eternal ideas has always provided problems for Christians. Justin Martyr, in his attempt to justify the eternal ideas in Plato and the Stoics thereby compromised Christianity in his effort to commend it to his contemporaries. The leaders of the French Revolution believed the ideas inspiring their action to be eternal and universally applicable and yet were vigorously anti-Christian. In our own time Levi-Strauss claims that the human mind has a universal structure that is revealed in all the myths of mankind - including Christian myths

I think that the answer to both cultural relativism and to the eternal ideas of rationalism lies in a rediscovery of the Word of God that abides for ever¹⁵, and in subjecting our traditions (including our traditional *ideas* of morals and theology) to its scrutiny. Here I am not using the phrase 'the Word of God' {10} to mean only the Scriptures, although I do not deny that the Scriptures are the Word of God written and that they have a reliable logical side. What I do deny is that we may identify the response of *our ideas* with the eternal character of the Word of God as it is given to us in Scripture. I do this for two reasons. In the first place our *response* to the Scriptures is always *culturally* formed. This does not make our response absolutely relative. On the contrary it so places our response continually under the judgment of the Word of God that we should always be subjecting ourselves to the critical scrutiny of the Scriptures. Secondly, I think that we need to recognise that the Scriptures give us guidance as to how to respond in obedience to the Word of God in *particular* circumstances; they do not give us a set of eternal ideas that may be formulated in terms that have a supra-cultural validity.¹⁶ I am not suggesting that the Scriptures are not clear and sufficient with regard to their basic message. The Scriptures speak reliably of God and His dealing with man. It is precisely because they do that we should take care to subject our basic views of life and work to their scrutiny.

Thus, I think we should question the assumption that 'culture' is a free creation of man's mind. In particular, let us scrutinise it with reference to the task given by God to man at creation.

In the beginning God gave his command to the creation to 'be fruitful and multiply'. To man he added the Word 'fill the earth and subdue it' and said that man was 'to cultivate the ground from which he was taken'¹⁷. Creation is not static. It is a dynamic, developing cosmos that is everywhere ordered by the Word of the Creator as its law and led by the community of mankind as the manager of this developing creation. Man is to shape it in new ways. So we find people cultivating plots of land, raising flowers, building houses, making clothes, cooking meals, creating works of art and in many other ways making new things from God's creation. In doing all this, man does not *add* anything *new* to the creation. Man is not God and cannot create something new out of nothing. Man's affect upon creation is therefore limited by the possibilities of the creation as it functions by the Word of God. Hence man's effect upon creation is one of 'tilling' and 'keeping' (Gen. 2:15) as he exercises dominion over creation in the capacity of steward. Man simply unfolds the potential of creation - either in obedience or disobedience to the Word of God.

Hence, the key words to describe man's effect on Creation are *fashioning, moulding,*

forming, shaping, cultivating, caring for, developing, unfolding. Accordingly, it is not so much the *results* of man's work that gives a Christian insight with regard to culture. Rather, it is *how* this effect comes about that is of importance. A thing of a purely cultural character cannot exist. A chair, a painting, a spoken word, a state, a school all function in 'nature'. They are not limited to the realm of 'culture'. Their typically *cultural* character results from man's activity, and this character is but one aspect amongst many in which things function within the rich fabric of God's creation.

Just as it is possible to identify the term *body* as it is used in Newton's first law of motion with the *concrete* reality of stones, pigs and people, so it is possible to identify the *cultural*, i.e. humanly formed aspect in the *concrete* realities of books, chairs, paintings, songs, marriages and religions. The truth is that just as the Newtonian use of the term *body* {11} is an abstraction referring to the physico-chemical functioning of all concrete things so too *culture* refers to *how* concrete things have been fashioned by man. In many ways the noun *culture* favours a misconception. For this reason it is probably better to use the adjective *cultural* to emphasise that the basic character of what *is* involved is a modal *how* of creation, not a concrete *what*.

Taken in this sense, the term *cultural* means nothing but a particular mode of formation or moulding that is fundamentally different from all the modes of formation found *in nature*, be they physico-chemical, biotic or physical. What characterises *cultural* formation is the exercise of *control* by man in freely elaborated projects.

With faultless precision spiders spin webs, birds make nests, beavers dams, bees honey-combs etc. However each of these does so after a fixed and uniform pattern prescribed by the *instinct* of the species. *Tradition* is what has been handed down from generation to generation, from ancestors to posterity. It can manifest itself in customs which are followed without any awareness of their origin and therefore appear to resemble instinct. However *tradition* is distinguished from *instinct* by its *original* cultural manner of formation. The natural mode of formation expressed in instinct lacks the free control over the material which is worked. The *cultural* mode of formation on the other hand receives its specific modal qualification through the freedom of *control, dominion or power*. This is why the great cultural commandment given to man is:

Subdue the earth and have dominion over it.

1.5 The Creational Context of Cultural Activity

While acknowledging that any attempt to analyse the state of affairs in which man's cultural activity takes place is itself but a fallible cultural response to the Word that upholds and structures the whole creation, I would none-the-less:

- a) like to suggest that the following have a mode of existence that may be distinguished from man's cultivation of them:
 - i) natural objects
 - ii) people
 - iii) societal structures
 - iv) non-cultural modal aspects

v) religion

and

b) like to briefly investigate the ways in which these are related to man's cultural activity, including the way in which they may have already been given a positive *form*. By positive form I mean the above realities insofar as they have already been cultivated by man. Within the present section, I shall limit myself to (i) - (iv), leaving the discussion of the relationship of religion to culture until the second part of the paper.

Let me first consider (a) above {12}

It is fairly obvious that natural objects and people may be distinguished from the cultivation of them, despite the fact that human beings come under the influence of man's technical activity from a very early age. It is a little more difficult in the cases of societal structures and the non-cultural modal aspects. It seems the root problem here has to do with the functioning of law over creation. Humanistic philosophy has led us to believe that laws may exist for natural creation, but has generally come to reject any such notion with regard to the structure of society and the realms of jural, aesthetic and ethical life. In all of these realms facts are supposed: to be separated from values, with both facts and values having their origin within man himself. Suffice to say that if we take seriously the Christian confession of the authority given to Christ over all creation these views must be rejected. It should not be considered that such a rejection involves some kind of departure from a genuinely empirical approach, involving some kind of mystical or theological metaphysics. The standpoint taken by humanistic philosophy on these matters is just as dependent upon faith as that which I am advocating. Both function in such a way as to 'see' the empirical states of affairs in a certain perspective. As an example of this we may consider the question of marriage. Both a humanistic and a Christian philosophy of culture will have to come to terms with the empirical reality of what all peoples know and experience as marriage. Moreover, it is impossible to do this outside of some normative assessment as to the character of marriage. Indeed, in this respect the law of a State can only distinguish between de facto and de jure marriage in the light of a normative judgment as to the character of marriage. How marriage is seen in relation to such norms is the religious question at issue. However, no standpoint can escape it, and it would be quite false to suggest that the Christian view that I advocate can be said to be 'introducing religion into it'. Religion is already in it, and I would suggest that any attempt 'to remove it' in an effort to gain an unprejudiced standpoint inevitably involves prejudice. Tolerance and understanding is achieved by the recognition of and tolerance of competing points of view in accounting for the empirical state of affairs.

Human society has a normative structure given by the creation ordering of the Word of God, and such aspects of life as the analytic, the lingual, that of social intercourse, the economic, the aesthetic, the jural, the ethical and the confessional possess a normative qualification that is given in the first instance by the Word of God, not by man's formative activity. Thus, we should distinguish between the normative structural principles of the creative law and the positive structural form that they take in the various societal structures as shaped by men. For example, during the period of the Russian Revolution,

the Tsarist positive structural form of the State collapsed and was eventually replaced by the Bolshevik form. This change was brought about by a complicated series of interlocking events in man's cultural formation. However, the normative structural principle (the basis upon which both the Tsarist State and the Bolshevik State may properly be called States) has a reality beyond human cultural formation, and indeed, as such, it stands in judgment over both those forms.

The normative-structural principle is closely bound up with the task of a particular societal structure, as this is to be realized together with other societal structures as they are all to realize their particular tasks in the shaping of the positive structural forms in which the whole complex of tasks is realized. Thus, as a tentative formulation, we may say that the task of the Institutional Church is to proclaim the Word of God and to celebrate the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; the task of the family is to love and nurture children; the task of the State is to secure and maintain a just ordering of {13} society as a whole etc. As a particular societal structure attempts in some way to exercise power beyond its normative-structural principle, an anormative state of affairs can be said to exist.

Similarly, the normative law prescribed for such non-cultural aspects of creation as the analytic, the economic, the jural, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the confessional, follow from the creation-ordering of the Word of God. By describing these aspects of creation as non-cultural, I am attempting to distinguish between the divine content they have by virtue of being part of the way in which the Word of God orders creation, and the way in which the positive form of these aspects function in human life as the result of cultural activity. In the latter sense there is indeed a cultural factor that is operative. My point in describing these aspects as non-cultural, however, is to draw attention to the fact that the cultural factor functions in a creation context in which there are important features that transcend the cultural factor. Again, I would refute many accusations that this view is somehow non-empirical. It is certainly not empiricist. However, the simple fact that such features as social, lingual, aesthetic, ethical, jural, economic and confessional occur in all cultures in a way in which most assume to apply in a trans-cultural manner, would suggest that an empirical approach would try to account for rather than to explain away this belief in a transcultural validity to the norms and laws that have been developed within a particular culture. In this connection, although the positive form of the norms in these various areas of life may differ sharply, this can only be taken as an indication of relativity if a view of norms transcending cultural forms is excluded in principle. The view espoused here is that the positive form of the content of divine law has been realized in ways that are only more or less obedient, thus yielding a wide diversity of positive norms and laws that do not add up to a universal positive norm being obtainable upon a statistical basis.

(b) I shall now attempt to give a brief account of the ways in which the aforementioned realms of reality are related to man's cultural activity.

(i) *Natural Objects*

Through man's cultural formation a stone may become a tool, a part of a building, a statue, a part of a rock garden etc. It may also become the object of scientific analysis.

A plant or animal may become the object of controlled breeding. It is thus that farm

animals and pets have been typically shaped or bred to certain of men's needs. Again, the differences between a wild cat and a tame one, a dingo and a sheep dog are fundamentally due to the way in which the cultural factor is operative. The difference between a park and a jungle is of a similar kind.

Wood, wool, ivory, cotton are just a few of the many natural materials used by men for the free formation of such objects as houses, chairs, pianos, carvings, clothes etc.

Animals and plants are treated for diseases through a control introduced by veterinary science. Moreover, veterinary science is distinguished from animal anatomy by virtue of the possibility of human control being introduced into the former. In respect to the ways in which physical theory and engineering theory may examine a phenomenon like elasticity, the fundamental difference arises because of the way in which human design and control enters that which is being subjected to analysis. {14}

In respect to Natural Objects, therefore, the cultural factor may or may not be present. When it is, it is characterised by a free formative control that may be directed to a wide-variety of ends. When the cultural factor is present, it functions within a creation context in which both the natural law aspects (number, space., movement, physical, biotic, psychical) of creation function in coherence with the normative law aspects (analytic, lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, jural, ethical and confessional). In the remaining examples that follow, the cultural factor is always present. As such, however, the things, events or aspects which are subject to man's formative control are not in the first instance themselves products of such formative control. In each case, the cultural factor is to be distinguished from the non-cultural by virtue of man's actual free formative control over creation, whether natural objects, human beings, societal structures or non-cultural modal aspects.

ii) Human Beings

As individual people, human beings are culturally formed in a wide variety of ways. In this, cultural tradition plays no mean part. It is inherited principally by means of a language and is passed on mainly through the institutions of family, church and school. However, that is not to say that all cultural formation of individual human beings through these institutions need to be tradition. Indeed, primacy should always be given to the normative character of the Word of God transcending cultural traditions, and allow this to be the judge of both tradition and innovation.

It should not be thought that the cultural formation of a person ceases with formal education. A person may go on developing throughout his or her life. In these respects the cultural formation of a person is typically disclosed in the traits of national character, of profession, of interests, of convictions, of habits, of education etc. A person may have been endowed with certain gifts. The cultural factor is displayed very clearly in the way those gifts are nurtured and developed, both by the person themselves and by the communal setting and its institutions, in which that person finds themselves.

The cultural factor also functions in respect to the biotic and psychical life of human beings. Just as animals may be treated for disease through the free formative control studied by veterinary science, so human beings can be moulded in their biotic and

psychical dimensions through the insights of medical, dental, and psychological science¹⁸.

The person themselves plays no mean part in his or her own formation, as do their friends and associates. Often, too, a parent, a teacher, or some other leading figure exercises significant formative influence upon their developments both for good and ill.

iii) Societal Structures

As I have already indicated above, we should view all human societal relationships as having a normative qualification. This normative qualification is related to the respective cultural tasks of various societal structures with the implications that the structural principles require a human shaping of a cultural mode, appropriate both to the cultural tradition and to its level of development. This applies both to the natural communities of family and marriage, and also to the organized communities of the state, the church, the university, the school, the enterprise etc. Each have typical normative structural principles that are built into the creation order as it is upheld {15} by the Word of God. The humanly formed societal entities as we experience them in concrete situations result from the positive human formation of these structural principles. The degree to which the form of any such societal entity faithfully realizes the normative structural principles is, of course, greatly dependent upon the insight of those holding office within it.

This insight should not, in the first instance, be considered to be of a theoretical kind, Social theory may deepen this insight, and thereby influence the positive development of human society in a wide variety of ways. However, there are two important points to be made in this connection. The first is that the normative structural principles of human society always transcend human attempts to realize them in concrete form and to formulate them in concrete form. The normative structural principle judges every human realization and formulation. The second is more specifically with regard to the attempts of man to formulate social principles. In the first instance such formulations very often form part of social theory and, as such, embody a cultural formation of an analytic or theoretical kind. As such, such principles have greatly influenced the actual development of the positive form of human society. However, whether such attempts may be described as Liberal, Socialistic, Communistic, Roman Catholic, Evangelical, Lutheran, Calvinistic, Reformational, or whatever, it is of great importance that we see them as continuing to stand under the judgment of the normative structural principles as these function in the creation ordering of the Word of God. In this respect we gain insight into these principles by examining the way in which human society actually functions in the light of the Word of God.

It is undeniable that these various positive social principles, as a part of cultural tradition, exercise a strong formative role in the development of human society. However, it is never these positive social principles which create the social order. The social order is an integral part of creation that is always upheld and sustained by the Word of God as this orders human society. In this respect the normative structural principles are active in creation, and, indeed should be seen in relation to the activity of Jesus Christ in bringing all things under His feet.

The Scriptures, for example, reveal that Jesus Christ is the legitimate heir of all authority in heaven and on earth¹⁹. They also reveal that now, as the White Horse, the Word of God,

He is active in confronting the power arrayed against Him²⁰, It is precisely in this way, I suggest, that we should view the activity of normative structural principles in directing the course of human affairs. The various social principles mentioned above (Liberal, Socialistic etc.) may play a very significant role in the cultural formation of the positive form of human society, but they do not create it. The Word of God has brought all things into being, and continues to be active in bringing all things to their fulfillment. Men have been given office within human society, under the authority of Jesus Christ, to form, mould and shape it in ways that are faithful to the requirements of what they perceive of the normative structural principles. This involves such men and women as the formers of human society; the creator, sustainer, redeemer of human society is none other than Jesus Christ. {16}

Hence, in all of this it is of some importance to appreciate that the cultural factor is not all-determinative. In the light of the fact that God has made man as his image-bearer and as such has given him the authority to be a steward caring for and developing human society within the wider context of creation, it is indeed of great significance. However, this significance should not be allowed to supplant the prime significance of the Word of God, as this actively directs the normative principles, judges and redeems the affairs of men.

Insight, Power and Authority

The cultural factor is operative in human society primarily through those who have been appointed to exercise authority - whether in the state, the church, the family, the university, the school, the enterprise, marriage, etc. Within the context of the actual form of these various societal structures, men have legitimate authority to exercise cultural power. The possessors of such authority gain both their task and their authority to execute it from Jesus Christ, and are responsible and accountable to Him for the way in which they carry it out. Those in such positions of cultural power in human society never possess it as a kind of personal property that they have at their subjective disposal for monetary gain or for personal prestige. They possess it as a normative task and mission in the development of human civilization - either to guard it or to mould it further in subjection to the normal structural principles of the Word of God as it upholds and structures creation.

In this sense the limitation of the sphere of such authority is of considerable significance. Power can be wielded in disobedience to the normative structural principles in all manner of ways, one of which is the attempt to manipulate the structure of an authority for ends over which it has no legitimate authority. Moreover, it is to the attempts at extending cultural power into domains in which it has no legitimacy that many of the roots of social conflict are to be traced, with the result that the cause of such conflict and its resolution can only be normatively resolved through the gaining of insight into the character and limitations of the normative structural principles for the various authority structures that exist within human society.

It is for this reason that appointment to positions of authority in human society should be upon the basis of such insight. Peter Schouls has discussed the relationship of power, insight and authority in a short monograph.²¹ I agree with the main lines of his analysis.

However, there is one major point of disagreement. I agree that to the degree that a person gains or possesses insight, to that extent do they possess authority²² - provided the authority possessed virtue of insight be limited to that of a prophet. From this office insight may be exercised with a prophetic power by virtue of the authority possessed. Beyond that the most we can say is that those who are appointed to authority to exercise cultural power should possess the requisite insight for the task. However, they don't exercise such power because of their insight, but because of their being appointed to a position of authority. It is, of course, highly desirable that authority be given to those with insight. The sad thing is, of course, that power becomes something which is treasured and grasped at for very dubious motives, with the result that authority is taken up by men and women without insight. The Christian point of view on these matters should, I suggest, always be above the power sought by party-lines. It should be concerned to find the people with the greatest insight to fulfill the tasks at hand. In other words we should appoint people {17} to authority who have insight, with the view to their exercising cultural power in obedience to the Word of God.²³

(iv) *Non Cultural Modal Aspects*

The cultural aspect of creation is only one of a number of such fundamental modes of experience. The fundamental characteristic of a mode or an aspect is that it is not a concrete what but a modal how or way in which the concrete things or events of creation function in a coherence. The numerical, spatial, kinematic, physical, biotic, psychical, analytic, lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, jural, ethical and confessional may all be distinguished as other modes in which creation functions. Again it should be emphasised that the cultural mode functions in coherence with all the other modes.

Again it needs to be affirmed that whilst such an attempt to specify how this order of creation functions is not bound to a subjectivistic cultural relativism, they are nevertheless a fallible, culturally-formed attempts to, examine the overall structure of creation as it functions under the creation-ordering of the Word of God. All attempts at an elucidation of this kind have to be kept under the scrutiny of our actual experience of creation seen in the light of the actual creation ordering activity of the Word of God²⁴.

A logical contradiction takes place when an argument contains two contradictory propositions. Such reasoning is called illogical in contrast to a logical sequence of thought. We recognise this contrast to be of a normative character since an illogical argument violates a fundamental norm of logical discourse. Now it is evident that this normative character of our experience occurs in all the aspects that come after the analytical²⁵. There are the contrasts between polite and impolite, decent and indecent which occur in the aspect of social intercourse; the contrast between grammatical and ungrammatical that occurs in the lingual aspect; the contrasts between frugal and wasteful; between aesthetic and unaesthetic; just and unjust; faithful and unfaithful; honest and dishonest; believing and unbelieving that occur in the economic, the aesthetic, the jural, the ethical and the confessional aspects respectively.

In the pre-analytic or 'natural' aspects of reality the various modal laws are realized in the facts of experience without cultural formation. However, it is an essential characteristic of genuine modal norms that they do not realize themselves in this way; the supra-cultural content given to them by the Word of God has been given only in principle, requiring

human cultural formation for its further specification. All forms of philosophic idealism and rationalism seek to identify normative principles only in terms of supra-temporal values, seeking perhaps to apply them in concrete cultural circumstances. In contrast to this the positivist strain of thought absolutizes {18} the formative human will in seeing the latter as the creator of the culturally positivised norms. As I have already intimated at an early stage of the present discussion, the great diversity of culturally positivised norms are to be understood as the more or less faithful positive responses to the supra-cultural modal norms. Over against both idealism and positivism, the supra-cultural content of the modal norms are given in a manner which requires their human positivisation in relation to the concrete circumstances of a particular human situation²⁶. Needless to say, all such human positivization stands under the judgment of the Word of God as a more or less faithful response to it.

Consider the following examples of what is involved with this.

- a) The mediaeval doctors insisted that money should be lent without interest in accordance with the apparent requirements of Exodus 22.25. John Calvin disagreed with this on the grounds that the economic ethical rule given in Exodus was given in an agrarian economy which did not require monetary capital to finance the enterprise. This position was fast changing with the growth of industry, whereupon Calvin argued that it was necessary, if the just requirement of the economic ethical norm were to be followed, that there be a fair interest offered for the loan of money given for the purpose of initiating the enterprise. It is obvious that in this new situation money is not to be treated simply as a measure of the value of goods and services. It is becoming part of the production process itself. Granted, that for those who followed Calvin, there were many ways in which they falsely interpreted his justification, with the abuses of Capitalism following. However, the approach of Calvin in the matter should be considered a sound one in the light of the analysis I have considered above. In this connection it should be noted that it was not a 'liberalizing' or a 'progressive' note that is struck here. Rather it is a different positivising of a modally given norm to be positivised in different cultural circumstances. This point is of some significance, because there remains a significant difference between the mode of formative cultural control and the positivising of non-cultural norms. In the former there is always a question of 'tilling' and 'keeping' - i.e. of conserving and/or developing - that very often leads to a conflict between a conservative guarding of-tradition and a progressive innovation of development. However, the positivising of non-cultural normative aspects, in the course of historical development, should not be couched in the terms of 'conservative' as opposed to 'progressive' or 'liberal'. Such terminology as the 'liberalising' of the law, for example, is at best meaningless and at worst harmful. This is the case because law-formation is not itself a matter that is qualified by the cultural aspect. It is qualified by the jural, being but the positivitation of the equitable and retributive meaning of this aspect to meet the continuing new circumstances of historical development.
- b) In a similar way the social norms of the way in which men should relate to women as they have surfaced in modern times should not be caught up in a flux of cultural change that lays claim to 'liberation'. They require obedient positivization in the circumstances in which we now live. In this {19} neither the positivization of a previous period nor the claims of 'liberated women' should be elevated above the place of the social norm. It is

the latter which requires positivization in a way that is obedient in the new circumstances in which we now live.

c)The confessional norm, too, requires positivization. This means that whilst a confession of faith should be basically qualified by the normative content of the Scriptures, it has a positivization which invariably bears the marks of the problems and heresies of the day and age in which it was to function. Thus the confessions of the Reformation period (including those of the Council of Trent) strongly bring out the attitudes to the issues of justification and the sovereignty of the grace of God that functioned centrally in the debates of those years. The doctrinal bases of such organizations as the I.V.P. in recent times bears the marks of the fundamentals of the faith in a way that was both posited against Liberalism and as a basis for Christians to engage in evangelism.

Confessional life today should be guided fundamentally by the Scriptural norm and be positivised in relation to the problems and heresies with which we have to deal. For this purpose, former confessions are relevant but not determinative.

d)Similar comments apply in respect to ethical and aesthetic norm positivization. In respect to aesthetic life, there have been very many possibilities of style introduced with the onslaught of the twentieth century. Concomitant with this, however, has been the predominance of perspectives of life which are singularly lacking in genuine Christian insight.

For a renewed obedience to take root in aesthetic life, there needs to be a grappling with the development of modern styles in a way that has insight into the original meaning of aesthetic life and thereby paves the way for a new positivization of an aesthetic norm that bespeaks a Christian view of life.²⁷

e)The relationship between the analytic and the cultural aspects is of some considerable interest when it comes to a consideration of the development of theory. Whilst thought is still captive to the fullness of life experience and has not shown a disposition to be deepened by an interest in analyzing the modal how of experience, the analytic aspect shows little or no tendency to develop in the cultural sense. However, once the analytic aspect is opened up in this way we do indeed see the actual cultural development of theory. However, although the latter is subject to cultural formation, it is always qualified by its analytic aspect, with the result that genuine cultural development in the area of theory is to be judged in the terms of an improvement in explanatory power.

There are two main issues of interest in respect to these issues. The first has to do with the interrelationship of science and religion within the context of culture and cultural development. The second has to do with the problems of history and philosophy of science in attempting to clarify what I have set out above as the norm of seeing scientific progress in the terms of an improvement in explanatory power. I will take up the issues of science (i.e. theory) and religion as they relate to the present topic in a later section. In regard to the second issue, I shall content myself by saying {20} that much of the contemporary debate in the philosophy of science has focussed upon the issue of scientific progress. In this respect the work of two men in particular has been very seminal. I refer to Karl Popper and to Thomas Kuhn.²⁸

(v) *Continuing Cultural Formation*

We are all familiar with the need to repaint, to redecorate or redesign an existing house. We are also familiar with the need to be reeducated and to have certain habits reformed. The New Zealand form of the State is, in the opinion of many, in need of being overhauled. It is in these terms that we can speak of a continuing cultural formation of a natural object, a person, a societal structure, a positive norm or a theory. In the sense that they are to be 'tilled' and 'kept' we can speak of their having a history. I will conclude this section by simply drawing attention to some examples of the continuing cultural formation involved with reality as it has already been culturally formed by man.

- a)A species of plant or animal subject to controlled breeding has a history. A house, a garden, a park, a zoo have histories.
- b)An individual person has a personal history - the sequence of developments in their general cultural formation. In this they cite the significant formative influences upon them. A person also has a medical history - the record of all the diseases they have diagnosed as having, together with the treatment to which they have been subject for these diseases.
- c)A family has a history. The New Zealand State has a history. The Anglican Church has a history. The University has a history. Trade Unions have a history.
- d)The English Language has a history. A particular word has a history. The social custom of a man doffing his hat to a lady has a history. The British Constitution has a history. Newtonian Theory has a history. {21}

2. Religion and Culture: The Power of God and of Idolatry

2.1 Religion and Culture

That there is a close relationship between religion and culture is a matter that is well appreciated and documented by scholars of widely differing view-points.

Religion is the substance of culture and culture of form of religion²⁹.

Religion is not one aspect or department of life beside others, as modern secular thought likes to believe; it consists rather in the orientation of all human life to the absolute³⁰.

Since faith is the ultimate and all-embracing power in the human soul, nothing whatever can remain untouched by it. The whole personality is, as it were, informed by one's faith³¹.

Religions are organs of psychosocial man concerned with human destiny and with experiences of sacredness and transcendence... General idea-systems are always concerned, consciously or unconsciously, with beliefs about human destiny, and always influence men's general attitude to life and approach to practical affairs³².

However, this verbal agreement disguises deep cleavages of viewpoint. Not only are there problems concerning the notion of 'culture'; there are problems with 'religion'. Consider the following statement:

I must make it clear that I am using the word 'religion' in a way which is widely accepted today in the study of religion but which is much broader than the popular understanding of the term. Many people think religion is necessarily concerned with God, miracles, prayers and a supernatural world which is the final destiny of our immortal souls. Such a view of religion is too narrow and reflects our western chauvinism. Men in the past have lived by religions, such as Theravada Buddhism and Confucianism, which do not fit such a definition.

It is nowadays common in the study of religion to use functional definitions of religion rather than essential ones. Religion has to do with those aspects of human life and experience which relates man to the ultimate conditions of his existence. 'Religion is that which concerns us ultimately', said Paul Tillich. 'Religion is a total mode of the interpreting and living of life', said Carlo Della Casa.

It is wrong to divide people into the religious and the non-religious. All men are either 'more' or less' religious, depending upon their sense of commitment to whatever they regard as being ultimately significant to them.³³ (emphasis added)

This statement makes two significant points.

- (i) It views religion as an orientation toward the whole of life in a way that gains its starting point from a sense of commitment to that which is ultimately significant. {22}

(ii) It holds to a 'functional' definition of religion as opposed to an 'essential' one in the belief that it can thereby escape taking a normative standpoint in religion. I appreciate that at least one of the concerns in taking this standpoint is that of preventing the kind of bigotry that has been and still is characteristic of much religious strife, not the least amongst those who call themselves Christians. It is the kind of strife that insists that 'I'm right' and 'you're wrong'. Whilst I am entirely agreed that this kind of bigotry and bias has no place in human life, especially within a discussion of the present kind, I am not convinced that the standpoint as set out above, is either accurate or free from bias.

With regard to (ii) above, for example, it is clear that the 'functional' approach to religion seeks its subject matter in the commitments of men to what they consider to be of ultimate importance, and believes that it is thereby able to avoid the problem of dealing with what is of ultimate importance in any normative sense. However, whilst this approach may have the appearance of providing an adequate account both of the faiths which men have traditionally called religion and also of many of the features of Marxism³⁴, and of Humanism as espoused by such men as Julian Huxley³⁵, it has some difficulties in being able to account for some other features of religion without making its disguised normative standpoint more explicit. When men base their lives upon making money; playing football, upon science or upon gaining political power - in a way that they consider to be of ultimate importance - does not this, in the terms of reference of the 'functionalist' definition of religion discussed above, make these features of money-making, football, science and politics worthy of inclusion in a course of religious studies? This is far from being a mere logical quip. The Nobel-winning scientist George Wald, for example, has described his science '*as the entirely secular religion of one scientist. It contains no supernatural elements, nature is enough for me, enough of awe, of beauty, of reason.*'³⁶

Of course, many people, including thinkers like Tillich and Geering, would want to claim that science; politics, money and football are not legitimate objects of ultimate significance, and that if they are included within a course on religious studies they should be included as examples of the abuse of that which is ultimate. To use Biblical jargon, it would be idolatrous. However to be able to say this is only possible in the light of some norm, and this would appear to be precluded by the definition of religion as that which men consider to be of ultimate importance. Actually, of course, there is a norm present in this definition: it is a humanistic norm in which every man is not only free to choose his own god, because of the absence of any other norm that is able to judge this choice, the choice of god is absolutised. Now, I'm not suggesting that those who have put forward this definition have wanted to imply this. My point is that there very real difficulties with regard to the accuracy and the unbiased character of the definition.

Paul Tillich

A similar approach to religion is provided by Paul Tillich. Religion is concerned with an orientation to the whole of life in a way that takes its starting point from what *is* of ultimate importance. With Tillich, however, there is a stronger attempt to spell out the character of the norm involved: Ultimate Concern. {23}

When we say that religion is an aspect of the human spirit, we are saying that if we look

at the human spirit from a special point of view, it presents itself to us as religious. What is this view? It is the point of view from which we can look into the depth of man's spiritual life. Religion is not a special function of man's spiritual life, but it is a dimension of depth in all of its functions. The assertion has far-reaching consequences for the interpretation of religion, and it needs comment on each of the terms used in it.

Religion is not a special function of the human spirit! History tells us the story of how religion goes from one spiritual function to the other to find a home, and is either rejected or swallowed by them. Religion comes to the moral function and knocks at its door, certain that it will be received. Is not the ethical the nearest relative of the religious? How could it be rejected? Indeed, it is not rejected; it is taken in. But it is taken in as a 'poor relation' and asked to earn its place in the moral realm by serving morality. It is admitted as long as it helps to create good citizens, good husbands and children, good employees, officials, and soldiers. But the moment in which religion makes claims of its own, it is either silenced or thrown out as superfluous or dangerous for morals.

So religion must look around for another function of man's spiritual life, and it is attracted by the cognitive function. Religion as a special way of knowledge, as mythological imagination or as mystical intuition - this seems to give a home to religion. Again religion is admitted, but as subordinate to pure knowledge, and only for a brief time, Pure knowledge, strengthened by the tremendous success of its scientific work, soon recants its half-hearted acceptance of religion and declares that religion has nothing whatsoever to do with knowledge.

Once more religion is without a home within man's spiritual life. It looks around for another spiritual function to join. And it finds one, namely, the aesthetic function. Why not try to find a place within the artistic creativity of man? Religion asks itself, through the mouths of the philosophers of religion. And the artistic realm answers, through the mouths of many artists, past and present, with an enthusiastic affirmative, and invites religion not only to join with it but also to acknowledge that art is religion. But now religion hesitates. Does not art express reality, while religion transforms reality? Is there not an element of unreality even in the greatest work of art? Religion remembers that it has old relations to the moral and the cognitive realms, to the good and to the true, and it resists the temptation to dissolve itself into art.

But now where shall religion turn? The whole field of man's spiritual life is taken, and no section of it is ready to give religion an adequate place. So religion turns to something that accompanies every activity of man and every function of man's spiritual life. We call it feeling. Religion is a feeling: this seems to be the end of the wanderings of religion, and this end is strongly acclaimed by all those who want to have the realms of knowledge and morals free from any religious interference. Religion, if banished to the realm of mere feeling, has ceased to be dangerous for any rational and practical human enterprise. But, we must add, it also has lost its seriousness, its truth, and its ultimate meaning. In the atmosphere of mere subjectivity of feeling without a definite object of emotion, without an ultimate content, religion dies. {24}

This also is not the answer to the question of religion as an aspect of the human spirit. In this situation, without a home, without a place in which to dwell, religion suddenly

realizes that it does not need such a place, that it does not need to seek for a home. It is at home everywhere, namely, in the depth of all functions of man's spiritual life. Religion is the dimension of depth in all of them. Religion is the aspect of depth in the totality of the human spirit.

What does the metaphor depth mean? It means that the religious aspect points to that which is ultimate, infinite, unconditional in man's spiritual life. Religion, in the largest and most basic sense of the word, is ultimate concern. And ultimate concern is manifest in all creative functions of the human spirit. It is manifest in the moral sphere as the unconditional seriousness of the moral demand.... Ultimate concern is manifest in the realm of knowledge as the passionate longing for ultimate reality.... Ultimate concern is in the aesthetic function of the human spirit as the infinite desire to express ultimate meaning. Religion is the substance, the ground, and the depth of man's spiritual life... This is the religious aspect of the human spirit.³⁷ (emphases added)

We could summarise Tillich's discussion of religion in the following points:

- i) Religion is concerned with the depth of human existence as this is brought to bear upon the whole of life, thereby giving it a distinctive orientation.
- ii) This depth to human existence is normative in the sense of Ultimate Concern.

There are therefore close similarities with the two standpoints that we have considered. The main difference between Geering and Tillich is on the question of the norm that is involved. Tillich takes a greater care to try to affirm that men may preoccupy themselves with matters that are not of ultimate concern. Indeed it is mainly in these terms that he offers his critique of orthodox Christianity. He touches upon this, for example, in the following passage when he talks about the relationship of 'God' to 'Ultimate Concern':

We cannot replace 'God' by 'ultimate concern', but we can and must understand that the term ultimate concern, like the German phrase of which it is a translation, is intentionally ambiguous. It indicates, on the one hand, our being ultimately concerned - the subjective side - and on the other hand, the object of our ultimate concern, for which of course there is no other word than 'ultimate'. Now, in this relationship, the history of religion can be described as the attempt to find what can with justification be called this object. And in all religions this object is called 'God'. Whether it's a little fetish, a tool used daily by a very primitive tribe, or the mana power that permeates all reality, or Olympus, with its Greek gods and every special god there, or the God of Israel, who, through prophetic criticism, finally became the word 'God', the object is always the same. The object of ultimate concern has many names. And we call all that is not concerned with the truly ultimate - that is something finite but worshipped as ultimate we call that idolatry. That is the idolizing danger of religion. I have also termed this the demonic danger of religion. There is a certain difference in nuances, but we can refer to the idolizing danger. And the decisive thing is that even monotheism can be idolatrous, which means that the God of monotheism, the theistic god, as {25} my term is in 'The Courage To Be', can become an idol like an animal god or the half animal gods of Egypt. And the henotheistic god of Old Israel was already an idol when the prophets fought against this misuse of the God of Israel³⁸

In this passage Tillich clearly brings out the point that ultimate concern is a matter between man as the subject of that concern in relation to the proper object of this concern. In this relation, Tillich himself acknowledges that the term 'ultimate concern' has an ambiguity because of the way in which it functions in relation to both its subject and object. I would suggest that this ambiguity is a prime source of confusion in respect to his discussion of idolatry.

In the first place, he does not answer the question: 'what is the proper object of man's ultimate attentions' in an unequivocal way. Doubtless he is motivated in this by genuine attempts to avoid the bigotry and biassedness that men stoop to in the name of religion. However, I would suggest that there is far more to his views than this. Thus, he goes on to say that '*this object has been called by many names*' and '*that the history of religion can be described as the attempt to find what can with justification be called this object*'. Bearing this in mind I would suggest that Tillich's approach to the matter of 'ultimate concern' can be analysed in the following steps:

- a) Men have always experienced a quest for the universal in the meaning of their existence.
- b) This experience of the quest of the universal is the subjective side of ultimate concern.
- c) This subjective experience of ultimate concern has a single object that is manifest in a variety of particular ways in the actual cultural conditions of the lives of men.
- d) The shift from this object of ultimate concern in the subjective experience of man is idolatry.

The crucial step in Tillich's position is that between (b) and (c). In this step he argues from the diversity of the subjective experience of ultimate concerns to 'a single object that has been called by many names'. This step has indeed the ring of Biblical norm about it. At the same time he seeks to develop a universal object in which non-Biblical traditions may more readily be able to participate. In other words, from the different particular norms of objective 'ultimate concern' as they have functioned in the history of religion, Tillich suggests that there is a universal 'ultimate concern', lying behind all of them in such a way that in each tradition it is both present in a genuine and in a distorted way. The difficulty with this position, of course, is in the equivocal character of the norm that is involved with this view of ultimate concern. It creates the illusion of universality by beginning from the subjective experience, thereby disguising the very real fact of different objective norms functioning in different religions.

This is of some importance when it comes down to the issue of idolatry. What is involved, for example, when Tillich describes the possibility of 'monotheism becoming idolatrous' I would suggest that the way to understand what Tillich means by this is to enquire whether idolatry functions on the subject or the object side of ultimate concern. Thus is monotheism envisaged as on the subject or the object side of ultimate concern? Tillich, no doubt, would want to {26} continue the ambiguity of his standpoint by replying 'both'. For my part I can only judge such an answer to be maintaining a confusion that is in the interests of sustaining a viewpoint, and in the face of such a bias I would like to press my point. If one were to understand monotheism as applying to the subject side of ultimate

concern, being the response of certain men to the service and worship of God expressed in a belief of monotheism, then idolatry could correctly be taken to imply a substituting of their cultural traditions for the Word of God. Jesus himself draws attention to this reality in the seventh chapter of Mark's gospel. However, He does this in reference to the norm of the Word of God that has an abiding character. However, if one were to understand the possible idolatry of monotheism as applying to the object of ultimate concern, then it would be difficult not to interpret Tillich as asserting that any claim to the normativity of Biblical revelation was tantamount to idolatry. It would be exceedingly difficult to take any unequivocal rendering of Tillich in respect to my first option. Doubtless, he would want to treat it as a particular case of the more general truth of ultimate concern. However, I suspect that in taking such an approach Tillich's ambiguous answer to the object of ultimate concern would continue to be a matter over which we would disagree. The problem as I see it would amount to this: is Tillich's idea of the object of ultimate concern an idol or is the God of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments an idol? This problem can only be resolved in the light of a norm. Moreover the fact of life is that people choose different norms and judge the choices of others in that light. To pretend that this is not the case is to fail to give serious attention to this empirical state of affairs. To be unbiased and tolerant is to recognise this fact in a self-critical way, allowing other people the freedom to work out the implications of their choice whilst disagreeing with them in the process.

Theodore Roszak

To take another example of this, we could consider the work of Theodore Roszak, one of the principle advocates of the 'New Consciousness' as this has developed through and since the eruption of the Counter-Culture. He has written three books contributing to the growth of these movements: 'The Making of a Counterculture' (1970), 'Where the Wasteland Ends' (1972) and 'Unfinished Animal' (1975).³⁹ His viewpoint is most clearly developed in the second of these, the purpose of which he explains in the following terms:

This book is about the religious dimension of political life. How else to talk of politics in an apocalyptic era?

The religion I refer to is not that of the churches; not the religion of Belief and Doctrine, which is, I think, the last fitful flicker of the divine fire before it sinks into darkness. Rather I mean religion in its perennial sense. The Old Gnosis. Vision born of transcendent knowledge. Mysticism, if you will - though that has become too flabby and unrefined a word to help us discriminate among those rhapsodic powers of the mind from which so many traditions of worship and philosophical reflection flow. My purpose is to discover how this, the essential religious impulse, was exiled from our culture, what effect this has had on the quality of our life and course of our politics, and what part the energies of transcendence must now{27} play in saving urban-industrial society from self-annihilation...

Little time is spent here on many hotly debated issues of the day; nor is there much I offer that will pass muster as orthodox sociology or economics. Instead, what follows is largely given over to the exploration of magic and dreams, science and

alchemy, idolatry and the sacramental awareness, visionary poetry and the tricks of perception...

For the Christian establishment, much of this is a whoring after alien, antinomian gods. For conventional humanism, it is an affront to Reason and a contemptible failure of nerve. For left-wing ideologues, it is a betrayal of social conscience, if not a sign of down-right bourgeois decadence⁴⁰

In developing his religious outlook Roszak is basically concerned to reverse the orders of the priority of what he calls the Sacred and Profane triangles. The Sacred triangle of Myth, Magic and Mystery has been exorcised from our culture at the expense of the Profane triangle of Reason, Technology and History⁴¹. He advocates a reversal, whereby the profane concerns of reason, history and technology would find their place in an outlook shaped by the 'sacred' realities of myth, magic and mystery. It is in such a light that he develops his views of idolatry. He writes that

As a phase in the history of consciousness, the building of the artificial environment may be best understood as an ever deepening condition of idolatry. Note that I do not say a form of idolatry, but idolatry itself, pure and simple; the term is used here in no metaphorical sense as, for example, when we speak of the 'idolatry' of nationalism. Nor is it employed as by a preacher in the pulpit when he castigates his flock for whoring after the false gods of money or material possessions. I intend no ethical usage. Rather, I refer to a state of consciousness, a condition of our powers of perception and intellection which has only an indirect, and far from obvious relationship to moral behaviour. (In fact, taking the word as it will be used here, many of the most hardened idolaters I know personally or by reputation, have led lives of exemplary moral character). It is in respect to the quality of our experience that we have become an idolatrous culture and in fact the only idolatrous culture in the history of mankind.

Now, this is paradoxical indeed. For no culture has been at greater pains to search out and eradicate the sin of idolatry than those touched by the Judeo-Christian heritage. As a category of religious thought, idolatry unfolds peculiarly out of the Jewish religious sensibility...

Yet - and here is the irony of the matter - it is doubtful that any such thing as idolatry has ever existed to any significant degree outside the perceptions - or misperceptions - of the Judeo-Christian cultures. What Jew, Christian, and Moslem saw and condemned in the worship of infidel peoples was not idolatry at all - not as they understood it. Rather the sin was in the eye of the beholders. And more than in the eye, in their heart eventually to emerge as a besetting vice. From this point of view, the centuries-long Judeo-Christian crusade against idolatry has in reality been not a struggle against a real evil in the world but a guilty anticipation of the strange destiny which the consciousness of western man was to realise in our own time!⁴² {28}

Roszak's viewpoint is that the truth of religion is to be found in the unleashing of the vision of the transcendent symbols of the imagination. This spells life in a way that can

enliven and vivify consciousness. Imagination not rationality; symbolic not literal reality is the true path. In this light he pronounces the concern with rationality, with science, with literal truth to be an idolatry of 'dead men's eyes'. For this trend in Western culture he considers that the Judeo-Christian tradition, especially in its Protestant form, is largely responsible. Over against all this, he affirms the life of true religion - transcendent symbolism.

'True symbols transcend intellectual deciphering, calling forth another level of consciousness which eludes words. They are, as it were, doors leading into dark chambers of reality, like the entranceways of the old mystery cults. We must take our whole life in with us and be prepared to be totally transformed. A true symbol must be lived into. That is how its meaning is found. Only then does its magic take effect. A symbol is a magical object. It is known (in Ananda Coomaraswamy's words) 'by seeing through material and sensible a formal likeness to spiritual prototypes of which the senses can give no direct report'. That is the essence of the matter. And the great artists are magicians, the best and truest we have left from the tradition of the Old Gnosis'.⁴³

Theodore Roszak is a modern Giordano Bruno seeking to establish a new foundation to Western culture upon the basis of a Gnostic Platonism that has severed all discernible links with Christianity.⁴⁴ The power of magic, of mystery and of myth are the redeeming forces that are able to herald a new enlightenment.

The Biblical Norm

In the light of all this it is time we listened once again to the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments:

*Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth;
for the Lord has spoken:
'Sons have I reared and brought up,
but they have rebelled against me.
The ox knows its owner,
and the ass its master's crib;
but Israel does not know,
my people does not understand.
Ah, sinful nation,
a people laden with iniquity,
offspring of evildoers,
sons who deal corruptly!
They have forsaken the Lord,
they have despised the Holy One of Israel,
they are utterly estranged.
Hear the word of the Lord,
you rulers of Sodom!
Give ear to the teaching of our God,
you people of Gomorrah! {29}
'What to me is the multitude of your sacrifices?'*

*says the Lord
 I have had enough of burnt offerings of rams
 and the fat of fed beasts!
 I do not delight in the blood of bulls,
 or of lambs, or of he-goats.'
 Bring no more vain offerings
 incense is an abomination to me.
 Wash yourselves; make yourselves clean;
 remove the evil of your doings from before my eyes;
 cease to do evil, learn to do good;
 seek justice, correct oppression;
 defend the fatherless, plead for the widow.⁴⁵*

This quite clearly discloses that the religion of the Hebrews should have been a whole-of-life matter, and not just a matter for the sanctuary. Indeed this whole-of-life character of religion is fundamental in the Scriptures. All creation owes its existence to Yahweh, the Lord of heaven and earth. Nothing was brought into existence apart from Him⁴⁶. Man is called to worship and serve the Lord in the whole of his creaturely calling to exercise dominion over God's creation. In other words, with respect to the first point regarding the character of religion as it has been discussed by both Goering and Tillich, there is a measure of basic agreement: religion is an orientation toward the whole of life that gains its starting point from a sense of commitment to that which is the origin and significance of all things. However, there is not the same measure of agreement on the second point. Moreover, this difference arises fundamentally because of the different norm involved. Consider the following two passages:

*'Joshua said to all the people:
 Thus says the Lord, the God of Israel,
 'Your fathers lived of old beyond the Euphrates, Terah, the father of Abraham and of Nahor; and they served other gods. Then I took your father Abraham from beyond the River and led him through all the land of Canaan, and made your offspring many. I gave him Isaac; and to Isaac I gave Jacob and Esau. And I gave Esau the hill country of Seir to possess, but Jacob and his children went down to Egypt. And I sent Moses and Aaron, and I plagued Egypt with what I did in the midst of it; and afterwards brought you out.....*

Now therefore fear the Lord, and serve Him in sincerity and in faithfulness; put away the gods which your fathers served beyond the River, and in Egypt, and serve the Lord. And if you be unwilling to serve the Lord, choose this day whom you will serve'.⁴⁷

For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of men who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For, what can be known of God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse; for although they knew God they did not honour him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened. {30}

Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles. Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the dishonouring of their bodies among themselves, because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever! Amen. (Emphases added)⁴⁸

Here the Biblical norm of religion is wholehearted worship and service of the Lord Yahweh. As such it is opposed to an idolatry that involves the worship and service of something created. In the Scriptures, Yahweh calls man to a full relationship of worship and service before His face, as the creator, sustainer and saviour of the world. This is not a matter of doctrines and beliefs in the first instance. It is a matter of heartrootedness, of who it is that men enthroned in their hearts, of who it is they are committed to, of who they yield their lives to, of who they worship and serve.⁴⁹ In this sense the Scriptures speak of the issues of life flowing from the commitment of their hearts⁵⁰.

For all these reasons, monolatry (as the worship and service of Yahweh) is more fundamental to Biblical religion than monotheism (as the belief in the existence of one God). Indeed, I would suggest that there is a strong case to be made for a mode of existence of other gods. Creatures (whether stones, trees, ideas, organizations, men etc.) once allowed to occupy a place in the lives of men that the Lord Yahweh alone should have, assume a very definite power over men that can only be described as religious. Creatures imbued with such power by men may indeed be said to be gods. Moreover, I am inclined to think that the affirmation made by Jesus in respect to the oneness of God in Mark 12:29-30 is to be understood in this sense. These verses call for a whole-hearted worship and service of the Lord Yahweh that shuns the power of other gods and is expressed concretely by a love of God and man.

From the Biblical point of view, then, religion is the totality of man's life realized in the worship and service of God or of an idol. As such it is the realization of the covenantal setting of man's life within creation before God. The antithesis in religious root, however, does not imply that obedience to the Word of God in respect to the covenantal responsibilities need necessarily belong to those who name the Lord Yahweh as their God. The Old Testament Scriptures in particular reveal that other spiritual communities may show a greater partial obedience, whilst those who name the Lord Yahweh may fail in their calling. This situation notwithstanding, however, the religious antithesis remains. As such it functions as a rootedness that gives the whole of life a distinctive orientation, findings its origin in the way in which man is oriented toward the true or towards a pretended absolute origin of all created meaning and reality. From our considerations in the present section, it is evident that the choice of true origin presumes a normative stance in this matter. Hence the Biblical norm cannot be accused of being more biased than any other. On the contrary it places the bias away from man as the subject, placing it upon the testimonial witness of the covenant. {31}

2.2 The Spiritual Dynamic of Cultural Formation

In the previous section, whilst its relation to culture has been borne in mind, the primary

focus has been upon religion. In the present section I wish to examine the relationship between religion and culture more directly, viewing it as a relationship in which different religious starting points envision, lead and direct man's cultural formation. I shall examine this in three ways, discussing it via world and life views, religious ground motives and cultural ideals. Finally in this section, I shall give brief attention to the question of science and religion in history.

World and Life View

A world and life view is not a theory about life and the world. It does not have the character of a 'framework' or a 'system'. Nor is it something that men possess merely as individuals. A world and life view is a vision of the totality of man's life and of the world in which he finds himself. It is something which human beings hold in common and which gives meaning to their hopes and their activities. Although a world and life view is not the same as religion - which has a focus upon man's relation to God - it is nevertheless closely bound up with religion. However, a world and life view is also influenced by other factors - such as climate, geography, ethnicity, social position, political climate. Finally a world and life view is to be distinguished from an ideology by the fuller detail, the wholesale plans for a concrete plan of action that belong to the latter but not the former.

A world and life view is a total vision of man in the world that focusses upon the interrelationship of man's relation to what is considered divine, to his relationship to the world and to his relationship to other men in human society. These relationships are not independent, and religion is the crucial factor in giving the unifying direction to their interdependence. Thus, a world and life view that takes its religious starting point in finding the divine within the creature (as with animism, polytheism, monism) invariably sees nature as divine and sacred; man as beholden and submissive to her designs; and social leaders as divine or semi-divine figures commanding an allegiance that is absolute, resulting in power that is wielded without challenge to its propriety or limitation. There are indeed great variations in the dominant world and life views of ancient Greece, Mesopotamia, Egypt and the animism which continues in many parts of the world to this day. Nonetheless these broadly common features arise fundamentally because of the common religious roots shaping the world and life views.

Humanistic world and life views take their orientation from the attempts of men to see their affairs as under their controlling power in a way that withdraws them from the divine. As such they may be atheistic or agnostic. However, their religious character arises from their attempts to develop human affairs in the spirit of the Promethean Man who would be answerable to no one but himself. It immediately implies an attitude of absolute mastery over nature in the effort to dominate; moreover it shows a tendency to develop a tension between anarchistic freedom and totalitarian submission within human society.

The religious roots of an Islamic world view is characterised by an anti-pagan ideal that would cut off almost all contact between God and creature in order to avoid any commingling between creature and divine. This vantage point in turn influences the view of man's place in the world and the way in which society should be ordered.⁵¹ {32}

Christian world and life views have, throughout history, been wrought with problems and

differences. Many of these have resulted from a spirit of religious synthesis, wherein elements of others views of life have been incorporated without the necessary reforming power of the Word of God being brought to bear upon them.⁵² That this approach was to be rejected is made abundantly clear within the pages of the Old Testament. In this respect, Kingship is a good example of what is involved. Deuteronomy 17:14-20, for example, clearly sets out a warning that Israel may indeed choose a king to rule over them, provided that the mode of kingship was significantly different from the ideal followed by the surrounding Ancient Near Eastern nations. This ideal viewed kingship as the office of a god amongst men, resulting in an accumulation of wealth, privilege and power in a celebration of the ideal. The Scriptural warning was specifically against the build-up of wealth and power in this way, directing that the kingly office be one of humility, one that was 'not lifted above his brethren', the one bearing it to fear God through the exercise of his task to maintain just law. These issues are of considerable importance in attempting to understand many of the political issues during the history of Europe. The way, for example, in which Eusebius in his 'Ecclesiastical History' wrote of the conversion of Constantine and acclaimed the 'Christianization' of the late Roman vision of Emperorship is of great significance for the history of Eastern Europe, for Tsarism and the turn of events in modern Russia. Again the contrasts between the ideals of Kingship espoused by the Stuart Monarchs, and French Absolutism in the seventeenth century with the Puritans and Huguenots finds its origin in the differing world and life views that flowed from an accommodational to a more reformational style of Christianity. In this latter respect, for all its failings, the clearest example in recent history of a Biblical world and life view gaining a footing in the life of the West is provided by the Reformation in its Calvinistic form. As such it lent a strong sense of man's vocational calling in all areas of life and set a strong emphasis upon a constitutional limitation in the legitimate exercise of power in various social spheres.⁵³ In this regard, it is a sad thing that the heritage of Calvinism in the modern world has come to mean little more than an ecclesiastical or theological system. The radical Biblical world and life view that was its initial life-blood has, particularly within Anglo-Saxon countries, been replaced by a narrowly defined concern for creedal and theological orthodoxy that would appear to have very little appreciation for its own historical roots⁵⁴

Religious Ground Motives

A world and life view is fundamentally the way in which a people see their position and task within life, in the terms of the fundamental relationships of man to God, man to the world and of man in human society. As such it envisions the way in which a people lives and exercises a formative function upon creation. Although I have already briefly examined the way in which religion shapes a world and life view, I shall now attempt to discuss the way in which religion functions in regard to cultural formation as it has been developed by H. Dooyeweerd in his 'New Critique of Theoretical Thought'. {33}

The deep, thoroughgoing religious commitment of man either to the True God or to an idol - generates a spirit that powerfully leads and directs his activities. This moving power I shall call, following Dooyeweerd, the religious ground motive. Calvin Seerveld, in his essay 'Dooyeweerd's Contribution to the Historiography of Philosophy' describes the religious ground-motives in the following terms:

'The religious ground-motive is the actual transcendent dynamis which takes: a

hold of a person's heart, fills and dominates consciously or unconsciously his every action... It is the moving power, the dynamic working of God's spirit or an idolatrous spirit at the very roots of man, who, so captured, works it out with fear and trembling⁵⁵

Hence in the history of mankind there are basically two ground-motives operative, corresponding to the antithesis between the Kingdom of Light and the Kingdom of Darkness. However, it is necessary to try to identify the actual driving impulses that have led cultural development somewhat more closely. Dooyeweerd has attempted to specify the basic ones in Western civilization as:

- (i) The Greek Form/Matter Motive. This characterised classical antiquity and was characteristic of the dialectical tension within the mythological background of Greek civilization.

During the early period of Greek culture worship centred on natural powers. Greek religion, in this sense was a 'nature religion'. These early Greeks worshipped a formless stream of life out of which generations of beings periodically emerged - all subject to death, fate and decay. Things were brought into being by this ever ongoing stream of life and were swallowed up again. There was thus a continuous process of coming-into-being and passing-away. The stream of life could continue only if individuals at the end of their allotted time were absorbed again. Hence individual men and things are doomed to die and decay in order that the cycle may continue. The rulers of it all are blind unpredictable forces such as anangke - necessity, and moira - fate. At a later stage a new type of religion arose a 'culture religion' - represented by the Homeric gods dwelling on Mount Olympus. These gods left 'mother earth' with her eternal cycle of life and death, and acquired a personal and immortal form of splendid beauty. They were the gods of abiding form, measure and harmony.

These two religions combined to give rise to the inner dialectic of the Greek matter/form motive that manifests itself in a variety of ways in Greek culture. One such example is that between the Dionysiac and the Apollonian strains in Greek art, the 'matter' principle being the Dionysiac and the 'form' principle the Apollonian. These are generally recognised as being in dialectical tension. In his 'The Rise of the West' for example, William McNeil writes of this tension in the following terms with specific reference to two works of art: a vase showing 'The Maenad' and a statue of 'Hermes'.

'The Maenad, dancing in ecstasy to honour Dionysias, suggests a side of classical Greek civilization persistently in tension with the Olympian ideal here expressed by Praxiteles' famous Hermes. For a short while, as classical civilization reached its creative apogee, the polis was able {34} to hold both these aspects of Greek culture together. But when the vase was painted, soon after 500 B.C., the success of the polis in taming the raw emotional outbursts of Dionysiac worship was still unsure, whereas by the time Praxiteles carved his statue of Hermes (ca. 350 B.C.), any real belief in the Gods of Olympus had evaporated among the cultivated classes of Greece. The two photographs therefore also reflect Greek cultural evolution from an undisciplined intensity toward a genteel, lovely and just a bit effete style of life'.⁵⁶

In philosophy, the nature religion contributed the principle of 'matter' - of mortality, change, the unpredictable, the formless; whilst the culture religion contributed the principle of 'form' - immortality, abiding being, light, reason, heavenly splendour. The differing ways in which these two motives function in Greek philosophy is well illustrated in the picture 'The School of Athens' by Raphael. Plato is pictured pointing upwards whilst Aristotle is pointing down. For Plato the world of forms transcended the flux of matter whereas for Aristotle the forms were immanent in matter.

ii) The Christian Creation-Fall-Redemption motive.

Into the Graeco-Roman world, the preaching of the gospel injected a radically new spiritual dynamic. Identified as a ground-motive this is the motive of creation-fall-redemption, wherein all things are seen as having their origin and meaning in the Lord Yahweh, are fallen as the result of man's idolatry and disobedience, and renewed in a radical and total way by the grace of God in Jesus Christ.⁵⁷ This new spiritual dynamic had a profound impact upon the Graeco-Roman world, bringing with it an entirely new orientation toward life.

iii) The Nature/Grace Motive

Once the single-hearted motivating power of the gospel is blunted, it becomes but one of two motivating powers operating on the human heart in such a way to provide the spiritual roots of synthesis - Nature and Grace. The Nature and Grace motive can take upon it a wide variety of forms, depending upon the precise way in which the two are seen in relation to each other. The basic four possibilities are well illustrated in the study of Richard Niebuhr, entitled 'Christ and Culture'. This book distinguishes five typical answers to what Niebuhr calls the enduring problem of Christ and Culture. One of these answers is distinguished by Niebuhr as 'the transformational answer' and, as such is founded upon the motive of creation-fall-redemption. I have suggested that this is the basic Biblical motive and have treated it as such in the discussion above. The other four answers are distinguished by Niebuhr as 'Christ against Culture', 'The Christ of Culture', 'Christ above Culture' and 'Christ and Culture in Paradox'. In the sense of the Nature and Grace motive discussed here, the first and the last of these two solutions arise from the attempt to keep Nature and Grace separate and then bring them together in a way that keeps the Grace motive 'pure'. The second and third solutions, on the other hand, arise from an attempt to bring Nature and Grace together into a genuine whole synthesis. All four solutions, however, suffer because of the dialectical tensions involved with the lack of radicality in the Nature-Grace motive⁵⁸ {35}

(iv) The Humanistic Nature/Freedom motive.

A fourth ground-motive made its appearance at the end of the mediaeval period. This had its spiritual roots in the humanistic freedom which saw the possibilities of a renewal of life from within man himself to effect a new freely-formed future for mankind.⁵⁹ Under this freedom motive the future of mankind lay in the understanding and control of the mechanical processes of the physical universe, with such control requiring the free autonomous form-giving ability of man. Thus the 'freedom' motive give impetus to the 'nature' motive with the latter being the basis of the mechanically determined nature

brought under the scrutiny of mathematics.⁶⁰ However, these two motives - autonomous freedom and mechanically determined nature - are in dialectical conflict. The freedom motive threatens the 'objectivity' of the nature motive and the nature motive threatens the 'humanity' of the freedom motive. It is for this reason that the motive of humanism exhibits dialectical polar tensions that have no fundamental resolution, and it is such terms that many of the basic religious problems of much of modern life - whether in technology, science, art, politics, education - find their root.

Cultural Ideals

Religious ground-motives work at the roots of the lives of men and women in such a way as to direct the way in which they engage in the task of giving form to creation. A world and life view is thus formed from the religious power of ground-motives. However, neither a world and life view nor a ground-motive is itself something primarily cultural. They arise within the context of cultural formation, but reflect religious standpoints and spiritual powers that transcend the process of cultural formation. A person or a group within a certain cultural tradition may change their religious point of departure with profound consequences for the spiritual course of the development of that culture. However, the religious points of departure themselves, as I have been discussing them here, are not caught up within the course of cultural change. They are rather starting points of a religious character in which men and women stand in the exercising of their cultural power.

A cultural ideal is a goal or example that serves to focus the common life of a people toward its basic aspirations. Thus, whereas a ground-motive is a driving power working at the roots of human life, a cultural ideal is more like a 'guiding light' either sanctioning a way of life or else beckoning a civilization toward the achievement of some goal. Thus the varying forms of mediaeval 'Corpus Christianum' sustained by 'the spiritual and temporal powers' acting together functioned in such a way to justify an existing pattern of life amongst the people, whereas 'the classless utopia of communistic co-operation' is an ideal that functions in such a way as to draw cultural activity toward a goal.

In the first instance a cultural ideal functions in the imaginative life of the people. As such it may receive concrete expression in myths, sagas, parables, legends or works of art in the more conventional sense. However, the latter are not to be identified as cultural ideals. Rather they may be said to embody or reflect such ideals. It is in this sense, for example, that we may say that Michelangelo's 'David' reflects the Renaissance ideal of the perfectibility of man that the Marseillaise {?} embodies the French Revolutionary ideals of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity; or that 'Tin Feste Burg' reflects the ideals of the Lutheran Reformation. {36}

There are two important points to be made about the embodiments of cultural ideals that have some significance for the way we should interpret them. The first is that they imaginatively universalize some features of the actual experience of a people; the second is that they are of profound significance, dealing with the dilemmas, problems and points of view in a way that reflects the standpoint of a world and life view. Thus a myth or work of art reflecting a cultural ideal should be appreciated as having some actual basis in the experience of the people yet imaginatively elaborated in a way that reflects the ideals of

the people. The latter should be appreciated as grappling with the fundamental issues of human existence seen from the vantage point of a certain world and life view. In this connection, for example, mythic thought is neither primitive, pre-rational, pre-scientific or irrational; neither is it somehow reflective of some hidden 'universal structure' of the human mind that discounts the religious roots of different world and life views. It is an imaginative elaboration of actual experience reflecting certain ideals from the vantage point of a particular world and life view.

The Relationship of Science to Religion in History

What we might call the current 'orthodox' account of this subject is strongly influenced by the so-called Comtean 'Law of three stages'. According to this view man has progressed through three phases of knowledge. The first is the religious phase in which man interpreted the activity of the universe around him very much in the terms of the action of beings very like himself, but at the same time more powerful and thus able to destroy or help him. The second phase is the metaphysical phase, a phase in which man tried to penetrate to the essence of reality through the exercise of his reasoning faculties. Religion may have continued to play a part during this phase but it was very largely the religion of theological speculation, a mode of thinking that was already beginning to discard superstitions and the like. The third and final phase of man's knowledge is the scientific phase, the phase in which man contents himself with the attempt to observe, explain and control the concrete phenomena of his experience. Metaphysics may continue to play some sort of initial role in this development, but it is increasingly seen as a highly questionable activity, to be wholly replaced by the positive sciences examining the concrete phenomena of man's experience.

This view has gained wide acceptance within our culture. It reached its apogee during the middle part of this century, when Logical Positivism was a vigorous philosophical creed. Moreover, the Comtean Law of three stages was vigorously advocated under the Christian garb of a rather doubtful Biblical sanction in Harvey Cox's 'Secular City'⁶¹. However, two important developments have contributed much to the shaking of this cultural ideal: First, much recent scholarship in the history and philosophy of science has run quite counter to these views; second there have been many movements over the last fifteen years that have shaken the confidence in the humanistic view of science as the salvation of mankind. For these reasons I do not intend trying to give a reasoned refutation of the above views. I shall be content to set forth a sketch of the relationship between science, as a particular cultural activity, in relation to religion in a way that is in general accord with the philosophy of culture being developed here.

To begin with, of course, it is worth observing that the Comtean positivistic view of the relationship of religion and philosophy to science traces them {37} all back to the one historical source. Since this is an area of broad agreement, it is a good place to begin. Thanks to the labours of many archeologists and anthropologists over the last century, a great deal has been learnt about the ways of thinking and living, the ideals, and the world and life views of different peoples both past and present. For the present purpose, one of the more significant contributions, in this respect, is the little book entitled 'The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man' by H. Frankfort and other contributing authors.⁶² The book first attempts to examine the world and life view of the Ancient Near East,

giving special attention to Egypt and Mesopotamia. The authors describe the mode of thinking of these peoples as mythopoeic. As such it illustrates the view of cultural ideal as myth discussed above. The concrete experience of the people is imaginatively universalized in a way that gives expression to a world and life view in which nature is divinized and the whole of human society is seen as embedded within the pale of a divine nature. However, the last chapter of the book is devoted to an investigation of the question of the ways in which the pattern of man's thought was emancipated from this mythopoeic standpoint. In this respect two important contributions are cited: the Hebraic world and life view and the development of Greek theory.

The differences between the Egyptian and Mesopotamian manners of viewing the world are far reaching. Yet the two peoples agreed in the fundamental assumptions that the individual is part of society, that society is embedded in nature, and that nature is but the manifestation of the divine. This doctrine was, in fact, universally accepted by the peoples of the ancient world with the single exception of the Hebrews.

The Hebrews arrived late upon the scene and settled in a country pervaded by influences from the two superior adjacent cultures. One would expect the newcomers to have assimilated alien modes of thought... But assimilation was not characteristic of Hebrew thought. On the contrary, it held out with a peculiar stubbornness and insolence against the wisdom of Israel's neighbours. It is possible to detect the reflection of Egyptian and Mesopotamian beliefs in many episodes of the Old Testament; but the overwhelming impression left by that document is one, not of derivation, but of originality.

The dominant tenet of Hebrew thought is the absolute transcendence of God. Yahweh is not in nature. Neither earth, nor sun nor heaven is divine; even the most potent natural phenomena are but reflections of God's greatness¹³

The Biblical world and life view therefore stood in radical opposition to the polytheistic world and life views of the Ancient Near East. The contribution of the Greeks in the emancipation from the mythopoeic outlook was of a different nature.

They were moved by their own desire for an understanding of nature; and they did not hesitate to publish their findings, although they were not professional seers. Like Hesiod, the Ionian philosophers gave their attention to the problem of origins; but for them it assumed an entirely new character. The origin, the arche, which they sought was not understood in the terms of myth. They did not de-scribe an ancestral divinity or a progenitor. They did not even look {38} for an 'origin' in the sense of an initial condition which was superseded by subsequent states of being. The Ionians asked for an immanent and lasting ground of existence. Arche means 'origin', not as 'beginning', but as sustaining principle' or 'first cause'.

This change of viewpoint is breath-taking. It transfers the problems of man in nature from the realm of faith and poetic intuition to the intellectual sphere. A critical appraisal of each theory, and hence a continuous inquiry into the nature of reality, became possible... In actual fact the Ionians moved in a curious

borderland. They forfeit the possibility of establishing an intelligible coherence in the phenomenal world; yet they were still under the spell of an undissolved relationship between man and nature. And so we remain somewhat uncertain of the exact connotations of the Ionian sayings which have been preserved. Thales, for instance, said that water was the Arche, the first principle or cause of all things; but he also said; 'All things are full of gods. The magnet is alive for it has the power of moving iron'. Anaximenes said: 'Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world'⁶⁴

Thus the beginnings of scientific and philosophic theorizing in the Western tradition is found with the Ionians. However, the above comments make it clear that this development did not in the first instance involve a critique of the gods. Rather it marks the beginning of a different attitude of thought-one that is marked by the intention to engage in an abstract analysis of the cosmos in the desire to come to an exact knowledge. The Greek philosophers in pioneering this path of theoria over against the doxa of sensory and examaginative experience believed, in the words of Plato, that it was exclusively destined for philosophers to approach the race of the gods. It is from this background, therefore, that the inherent superiority of the knowledge obtained by means of theorizing had inherent superiority over other ways in which man knew the world and their task within it.

The Development of the West

In many respects, the development of the West can be appreciated in the terms of the interaction of the Biblical world and life view with the attitude of theorizing developed by the early Greek philosophers. In this respect there have been three dominant ways in which this interaction has taken place: the path of synthesis, seeking to bring the two together into a greater unity. This way is typified by Aquinas, with his scholastic synthesising of Aristotle to the dogma of the Church; the path of enmity, a path that has been pursued by both Christians and non-Christians. The former are typified by Tertullian when he said '*What has Jerusalem to do with Athens*'. The latter have very often used science and philosophy in an effort to discredit a Biblical world-and-life view. Finally, there is the path of re-formation, in which the character and task of theorising is brought under the scrutiny of religious starting point in the attempt to expose the falsity of its claims to an inherent and unbiassed superiority. {39}

In this regard the dominant stance within Western culture toward the relation-ship between theory and world and life view has been characterised both by a scepticism in respect to the non-theoretical knowledge of the latter and an unparalleled confidence in the possibilities of science providing a certainty of knowledge to live by. Although this attitude toward theory was that which in part characterised the Greek philosophers, it has taken upon a new character in modern times - due to power of the humanistic ground motive of nature and freedom. There are many facets to these issues and a wide-ranging discussion is taking place upon them in our contemporary context⁶⁵. Although I cannot hope to do justice to this debate here, it suffices to say that the main point at issue has to do with the hoped for certainty in scientific theory. Suffice to say that the certainty that has often been claimed for scientific theories over against the non-theoretical knowledge of a world and life view is a matter that has difficulty in commanding the 'rational' support that it was once supposed to have. The history of science has been marked by the rejection

of many theories which would appear to have provided such certainty, with the most spectacular examples being that of Ptolemaic astronomy and Newtonian physics. In view of this it is apparent that a plurality of theories over the same subject area need not be bad for science. On the contrary it dispels the false sense of finality in a tentative theory and can provide a fruitful means of the growth of science in the sense of an increase in explanatory power. However, this situation is leading to a breakdown of intellectual standards in many quarters, described by some authors as an increase in 'subjectivism'. This is arising because of the re-surgence of the freedom side of the humanistic ground-motive, and should not be characteristic of a Christian approach any more than one dominated by the ideal of 'scientific certainty'.

The overall situation therefore exposes the religious character of the search for certainty in science in a way that is only beginning to receive the attention that it has long deserved. It is a situation in which those Christians still under the influence of some form of the Liberalism so strongly evident in W.H. Lecky's 'The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe'⁶⁶ would do well to reflect upon the religious character of their synthetic approach to this whole matter. It is a matter of some urgency that Christians recover in the first instance the character of a non-theoretical, integral Biblical world and life view, and in the second instance seek for a re-formation of scientific along with other fields of cultural endeavour. {40}

3. CULTURE AND HISTORY: THE POWER OF MAN IN THE POWER OF SPIRITS

3.1 THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF A PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE

In section 1.2 an attempt was made to formulate the basic problem for a philosophy of culture. This was identified as needing to bring some coherence to the diversity of cultural totalities, the characterisation of different cultural spheres within any such totality, the relationship of world-and-life-view to culture; and the problem of movement within culture. More specifically, I framed three questions:

- i) Why are there different cultural totalities?
- ii) What characterises the differences between the various cultural spheres?
- iii) Why do some cultures change but not others?

The coherence that we seek is found in the way in which the power of spirits directs the power of man as he cares for and gives form to God's creation. This activity is always subject to the Word of God as His light shines even in the darkness⁶⁷.

(i) Why are there different cultural totalities?

By a cultural totality I shall mean that assemblage that includes language, social custom, social and legal institutions, artistic forms, patterns of thought and worship etc., which taken together form the way a group of people share a common life. Such totalities may be identified in a variety of ways which relate in a complicated way. Of these the following four are the most important:

<i>the geographical</i>	(e.g. Australian as opposed to New Zealand culture)
<i>the linguistic</i>	(e.g. Anglo-Saxon as opposed to Spanish culture)
<i>the religious</i>	(e.g. Animistic as opposed to Islamic culture)
<i>the ethnic</i>	(e.g. European as opposed to Polynesian culture).

God's creation is diverse as it witnessed by the great variety in the geography of the earth and of the peoples upon it. The normative character of God's Word for man's cultivating activity is given in principle only and requires positivization on the part of man⁶⁸.

Consequently it is to be expected that even faithful obedience to God's Word would lead to a rich diversity in the way that men give form to God's creation. Indeed I believe that it is for this reason that the Decalogue consists largely of negatives - forbidding what we should *not* do. The positive commands - to love and serve the Lord God in the loving fellowship of other men - require that we give positive form to the Word of God. If it was spelt out in detail, then man's task would become merely mechanical.⁶⁹ Rather the Decalogue spells out bounds that if we transgress, we know that we are not living in obedience to the Word of the Lord. For the same reason I do not think that the Word of the Lord is to be interpreted as prescribing a given cultural pattern which we should strive to adhere to. That does not mean that cultural patterns are merely relative in some sense. Rather it implies that they are all to be viewed as more or less faithful responses to the requirements of God's Word. That this is true {41} for the people of God as for other spiritual communities should be plain from a study of the prophets of the Old Testament. Both Israel and the surrounding nations are judged for failing to respond faithfully to the

Word of the Lord⁷⁰.

In this fallen world *all* man's cultivating activity will therefore be only a more or less faithful response to the requirement of God's Word. There will never be any such thing as a 'Christian' culture if by this we mean something which is in perfect conformity with the Word of God. However, we can speak of a Christian culture in the sense that men and women are powerfully motivated by the Spirit of God to develop a way of life that struggles against idolatry and disobedience to the Word of God and so to strive to erect signs of the coming of God's Kingly rule over a lost and rebellious world. In other words, we can distinguish a Christian culture in the sense of a *religious* cultural totality. However, it is again clear from the Old Testament⁷¹ that a Christian culture stands under the judgment of the Word of God as much as a non-Christian one.

The work of God's people must always be one of re-forming their cultural heritage one that appreciates its positive features but is also radical in its critique of the spiritual roots that have shaped it.

To summarise:

- a) The Word of God is both above man's cultivating of God's creation whilst being concretised in written form within it. Moreover, the anchor of man's life is to be found not within creation, but in the God whose Word abides for ever.
- b) Whether or not men obediently care for God's creation, the Word of God continues to judge their management of it. For this reason, even a cultural totality that has been largely shaped in idolatry can, by God's grace, show a degree of obedience to the normative requirements of the Word of God.
- c) While cultural diversity is a feature of God's creation, the actual situation is greatly complicated by the manner in which man's positive cultural formation has been wrought with varying degrees of obedience. Thus, while it is desirable to preserve the geographical, linguistic and ethnic diversity, this does not detract from the reforming to be undertaken.

(ii) What characterises the differences between the various cultural spheres?

In section 1.1 I discussed the ways D. Verene distinguished between the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities. His comment that '*the latter two contain concepts of culture*' is fundamentally ambiguous. The social sciences and the humanities do differ from the natural sciences in that they focus on man's activity, nevertheless all three are part of man's formative activity, and thus properly qualify as cultural. In other words, while 'nature' is not directly dependent upon man and thus can be distinguished from 'culture', the same thing can not be said for the distinction between 'natural science') over against 'social science' and 'the humanities'. This well illustrates the need to be able to characterise the differences between cultural spheres without resorting to theoretical/practical, natural/social types of distinctions. {42}

I shall try to give a sketch of this in the terms of Dooyeweerd's theory of modal aspects and structures of society discussed in section 1.4. Scientific, scholarly or theoretical

culture is qualified by the analytical aspect of reality. This does not mean that the other aspects of reality do not function in such activity. What it does mean is that they function in a way which reflects the focus upon the analytic aspect in this kind of cultural activity. Thus, whilst the aesthetic side, the social side, the ethical side, as well as the jural and confessional side are all present in ways that are cultivated either obediently or disobediently, they gain their particular character in scholarly life from the way in which they are qualified by the analytic focus of scholarly life. It is for this reason that theories, journals, universities and learned societies are typical products of this kind of culture. Technology is a form of culture that is qualified by the cultural aspect itself. It is concerned with the transformation of natural objects into typical cultural objects that find their place in various aspects of man's ongoing cultural activity. In this respect technology is not an end but a means - something which is as true for a garden spade as for an electronic computer. The cultural qualification of technology again does not mean that other aspects of reality do not function in such activity. The aesthetic, social, ethical, jural and confessional side all function either obediently or disobediently in relation to their focus upon technological transformation⁷² Technological culture is often confusedly referred to as 'applied science'. The truth is that science and technology are interdependent. A complicated experiment in physical or biochemical theory is very much a matter of technology. However, it is an analytically qualified activity because of the way in which it functions in developing theoretical explanations of reality. On the other hand theoretical engineers are concerned with analysing all that is involved with technology, with a view to improving and developing it further. The latter should therefore be called 'technological' or 'engineering theory' rather than 'applied science'.

Similarly, we may identify the fields of economic, social, artistic, ethical, political, and confessional culture together with their institutions. In each of them a particular aspect of reality qualifies it in the sense of providing a normative focus for directing the cultural activity of man. This qualification is always one that provides a focus for the other aspects; it never excludes their functioning. Whenever insight is lost with regard to this matter, the other aspects generally function anormatively in the cultivating activity of man.

It is perhaps also appropriate to look at the difference between the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities:

The natural sciences focus both upon natural things (individually and collectively in their "Umwelt") and upon the numerical, spatial, movement, physical, biotic, and psychical modal aspects of reality. Analytical insight is culturally formed, with progress being in terms of whether or not there is an advance in explanatory power.

The social sciences focus upon actual human societies and upon the post analytical aspects of reality as these relate to them. Again the analytical insight is culturally formed, with progress being an advance in explanatory power. {43}

The humanities. History, philosophy, religious studies, literature, music, art, etc. focus on the universality of the human condition. It is perhaps for this reason that questions of religion and world-and-life view most readily rear their head here. History is the totality of man's formative activity in relation to the goal of the victory of the Kingdom of God.

Philosophy is an attempt to give a theoretical overview of the created cosmos. Religious Studies looks at the ways in which men have worked out the foundations of man's position before God, whilst literature, music and art are different forms of aesthetically qualified culture embodying cultural ideals. Neither history, religion nor aesthetically qualified culture are themselves analytical in character. This marks them off from philosophy. However, the *study* of history, religion, literature, art and music is as much analytically qualified as philosophy.

However, although we may be able to give an account of the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities in this way, it does not follow that these divisions are the best way of organizing human knowledge.

(iii) Why do some cultures change but not others?

Missionaries and anthropologists quite often find communities of people - variously described as 'primitive' or 'stone-age' - whose culture is not only at an early stage of development, but also incorporates customs and practices that are jealously guarded, and passed on from one generation to the next. Moreover, such people are usually in the strong grip of some animist religious faith. Comparing these cultures with the modern West, the situation couldn't be more different. As Alvin Toffler writes with regard to the latter:

Western society for the past 300 years has been caught up in a fire storm of change. This storm, far from abating, now appears to be gathering force. Change sweeps through the highly industrialized countries with waves of ever accelerating speed and unprecedented impact. It spawns in its wake all sorts of curious social flora - from psychedelic churches and 'free universities' to science cities in the Arctic and wife-swap clubs in California.⁷³

Why is it that some cultures show such movement and yet others remain virtually stationary from one generation to the next? The link between culture and religion is particularly relevant to this. People in the grip of animism see the whole of life caught up within the cycles of nature. Their insight into the post-analytic aspects of reality - the logical, lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, jural, ethical and confessional - is very much bound to the natural substrata of these aspects, with the result that these aspects are bound in their positive form to a manner of development that is also *natural*, i.e. there is little or no appreciation of the peculiarly *cultural* mode of development. As nature moves in cycles of the birth, growth and decay of different individuals amidst the comparatively static reproduction of species, so human culture demonstrates a similar pattern - with cultural *tradition* having a firm hold on the lives of the people. For such isolated communities the only ways of breaking with tradition are either the coming into contact with a more developing culture or else through the spiritual renewal which breaks the power of animism. With missionary activity both {44} of these things occur somewhat simultaneously, with the consequence that they have often been confused so as to destroy the 'primitive' culture through the sincere attempt to bring 'civilization'. I would suggest that a 'primitive' culture should neither be destroyed through such contact, nor should it be expected to remain in the 'pristine purity of its primitive condition'. Such a culture should be encouraged to open up or develop so that its integrity is preserved, whilst incorporating

features from more highly developed cultures. Spiritually, of course, there is always a great battle between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Darkness, which should result in the opening up of the culture in a spirit of reformation.

Modern culture, too, is led by faith. As such it has become increasingly driven by the spirit of the Promethean man who seeks to dominate nature through a technical control that has all but lost insight into the normative character of the post-analytic aspects of reality. Jacques Ellul and Hendrik van Riessen are examples of two Christian authors who have given attention to this⁷⁴. Modern scientised man, in contrast to primitive man, is led by faith in the conquering power of scientific reason. However, in common with 'primitive' man, the vision of life which shapes the wisdom by which he exercises his formative activity is restricted to the natural aspects of reality. The post-analytical aspects, rather than imprisoned by an animistic nature mysticism in which the faculty of the imagination is dominant, are viewed almost entirely as technological analysis yielding a plethora of technique which have as their objective a naked lust for power. This is no more clearly apparent than in the behavioural approach to *cultural engineering*⁷⁵. These latter aspects are 'subjectivised' with serious consequences for human life on all manner of fronts.

There have been numerous authors who have sought to lay the blame for the development of Promethean man squarely at the foot of the Reformation, especially in its Calvinistic form⁷⁶. It cannot be denied that the Calvinistic Reformation in particular did give a much more positive approach to culture than had been the case with mediaeval Christianity. However, to conclude from this that there is a direct cause between this and modern Promethean man is far too simplistic. Undoubtedly there is a connection between Puritanism and Calvinism; undoubtedly there is a connection between Puritanism and the rise of capitalism, democracy, liberalism, science, and technology. However just as it is a fallacy to suppose that it was the Reformation as *such* that brought about the growth of freedom in the West, so it is a fallacy to suppose that a direct causal link exists between the Reformation and these features of modernity⁷⁷.

It suffices to say that the spectre of Promethean man is far-removed from the Biblical view of man. The latter should be concerned for the caring for and the opening-up of the potential of God's creation in a manner consistent with his creaturely calling as steward and as manager. Cultural change as *such* does not of itself imply development. The modern West, as Alvin Toffler, has ably demonstrated, is caught up in an increasing rate of change. However for such change to qualify as development would require a genuine insight and wisdom that far exceeds the technical knowledge that lies behind this accelerating pace of change; it would moreover require a genuine building upon what has gone before. For these reasons a Christian approach to the technology and other manifestations of modern culture must not only reject the {45} pragmatic and materialist Marxist approaches characteristic of the superpowers of our age, it must also reject the 'primitivist, back to nature' approaches that are being advocated by such influential figures as Theodore Roszak⁷⁸. No doubt we can learn from all these dominant attitudes of our time; nevertheless we cannot follow in the directions in which they would seek to take us. A Christian approach should seek a genuine cultural unfolding in a spirit of reformation that gives due attention to the whole counsel of God in a way that does not give a distorted place either to science, technology, art, politics, or ecclesiastical culture.

3.2 The Relationship between a Philosophy of Culture and a Philosophy of History

There is a distinction between *culture* and *history* that is worth preserving. Whereas the focus of the former is upon the cultural aspect of reality with its nucleus - *cultural formation* -- the focus of the latter is upon cultural *development* - either in the small or in the large. Within a *closed culture* - one that is rigidly bound to tradition - the tradition is something which has cultural qualification and is also culturally formative upon the people born into it. Although individuals within such a cultural setting may have a *personal history* it will seldom be one that is culturally distinctive. Moreover, the cultural totality as such, will have very little by way of genuine history.

In this light therefore, I suggest that a *philosophy of culture* will typically be concerned with

- i) the cultural aspect of reality as that of *form giving* and the identification of the boundary between that which is and that which is not qualified in this way.
- ii) the ways in which different areas of creation are subject to man's form giving.
- iii) the normative issues involved with cultural form-giving and positivization.
- iv) giving an account of the reasons for the observed differences between cultural totalities, differentiated cultural spheres, and open and closed cultures.

On the other hand a philosophy of history will be concerned with

- (i) the process of cultural development. As such it should give attention
 - a) to what is involved with development as it is culturally qualified and
 - b) how cultural form-giving is related to the movement towards an eschatological goal. Augustine, for example, saw the latter as the continuing battle between Civitas Terrena and Civitas Dei, culminating in the victory of the latter. The goal orientated views of Kant, Comte, Hegel and Marx are, in many ways but a secularization of Augustine. Fundamental to this whole discussion is the question of the extent to which the future may be known⁷⁹
- {46}
 - (ii) the relationship of history to time, and how the unfolding of the cultural aspect of reality relates to the genesis of non-culturally qualified creation.
 - (iii) the question of *historical causation*, involving such issues as how the exercise of cultural power on the part of one person, social structure or cultural movement functions in relation to others, so as to produce the causal nexus of history. This matter is closely bound up with the distinction between history and historiography. The latter, is particularly concerned with the writing of history must pay attention to the problems of historical causation. To discover the proper relationship between Puritanism and the growth of capitalism, democracy, and technology is a good case in point.

The question of historical causation also must take into account the way in which the pursuance of a cultural or social ideal relates to the actual process of historical formation. This is particularly relevant to such ideals as 'the Holy Commonwealth', 'the classless society' and the power of technology to produce a 'New Atlantis'⁸⁰.

(iv) the fullness of the 'opening up' of creation under the cultivating hand of man. For example, can we speak of *History* in the singular? Is there indeed a universal history of mankind or are there only histories of particular cultural totalities? In the light of the Christian view of the divided unity of man in Adam we should be able to speak of a universal history which finds its culmination in the coming of the Kingdom of God.

It is in accord with the above distinction between a philosophy of culture and a philosophy of history that I have by and large concerned myself with the former. It would need to be emphasised that the distinction between culture and history discussed here is again one of focus. There is obviously a great deal of overlap. The focus of history for example may be man's cultivating activity with an eye to that which is innovative. However, to be able to examine what is innovative, it must be seen against the broad background of cultural tradition.

3.3 Cultural Norms for Historical Development

In section 1.5 mention was made of the role of positive social principles in the development of human society. It was emphasised there that although the latter to not *create* the form of human society, they are nevertheless very influential in the shaping of it. Such principles themselves have a certain history. Since the positive form of the norms for cultural development that I propose to outline is linked with the history of certain positive principles, it is perhaps important that I should briefly outline their history.

Augustine, as has already been mentioned, described the present struggle of history as one between *Civitas Dei* and *Civitas Terrena*. However there is considerable ambiguity in what he meant. Did he mean the spiritual struggle between Light and Darkness that cuts right through all of man's life, including all his cultural formation? Did he mean the distinction between the community of the people of God as opposed to the community of the world? Did he mean the Church as opposed to the State? Charlemagne, for example, was an avid reader of Augustine. He took the second of these possible meanings so that he identified the people of God as 'Christendom'. In this light and in {47} conjunction with the *Two Swords* doctrine of Church and State of Pope Gelasius, he proceeded to try to extend *Civitas Dei* by military conquest. There was, during the middle and later part of the Mediaeval period, a great struggle for power between the Pope and the Emperor, which resulted in the triumphant supremacy of the Papacy in and around the thirteenth century. This struggle was initiated by a group of concerned people, at one time under the leadership of Hildebrand (later himself Pope Gregory), greatly desirous of seeing a reform in the life of the Church. Through its thorough involvement with property and government, the church had itself fallen under the effective power of Feudal Lords. In the struggle between Pope and Emperor, each considered themselves to be the rightful overall ruler of Christendom and each appealed to Augustine for a justification of their views. The distinction between Church and State, and the proper bounds of authority belonging to

each, was poorly appreciated. Thomas Aquinas set forth his social thinking in a situation in which the supremacy of the Mediaeval Church over life was an accomplished fact. His theoretical view of society drew heavily upon Aristotle and effectively justified the status quo, with the church delegating its temporal authority to the State. Aquinas' view of society was fundamentally hierarchical, and this has been the official Catholic teaching ever since. Modern times have seen a very significant updating of this teaching so as to incorporate Democratic ideals. Nevertheless, the notion of *subsidiarity* continues to exercise the controlling view.⁸¹ Although authority is differentiated it is a differentiation based upon a human delegation from a higher level of society to a lower. In practice this has often meant that there has been no clear delineation of a realm of legitimate authority, leading to conflict.

Calvin placed great importance upon the separation of the authority of the institutional Church from that of the State. In this way he avoided the threat of Erastianism that later plagued the Lutheran Church. However, Calvin still expected the State to protect the Church in the way that the mediaeval Popes had done. Indeed it was this feature of his social teaching that lay at the basis of his advocating that Servetus should be burned at the stake for heresy. In this Calvin lacked the sense of the proper differentiated authority of the State. Within the tradition which owes most to him, these political principles were developed first by Althusius and later taken up by van Prinsterer and Kuyper. Kuyper, for example, developed his social thinking in the light of the principle of *sphere-sovereignty* - the view that the different spheres of social life: state, church, family, etc. each gained their authority from God alone. Following the Old Testament view of society, there was no human delegation from a higher to a lower sphere of social life.

Unfortunately, many within the tradition that has embraced these principles have held them in a very static manner. They have not appreciated that they embody norms for cultural development and, as such, are to be held in a dynamic way. Consider the way in which the *social* character of the life of the people of Israel developed from the time of Abraham to the time of Joshua. Under Abraham, life was patriarchal and *undifferentiated*. Family, work, worship, political and military life were intertwined in relation to the single authority of the patriarch. Its undifferentiated character is precisely that which is characterised by tribal communities. However, as Israel lived in Palestine this undifferentiated pattern broke up into four recognisably distinct spheres of social authority: Priests, Family, Elders (later a King) and Prophets. Moreover, it is quite clear that this differentiated authority was not one which involved delegation from a higher to a lower form of social life. The Prophet, for example, had an authority which enabled him to rebuke {48} the King and the Priests without involving him (or her) as their superior. Each of the Family, Priesthood, Elders (or King) and Prophets had a sphere in which they executed a legitimate authority to which they were accountable to God alone. In this sense the pattern of life of Israel after Joshua does exhibit the principle of sphere sovereignty. However there are two ways in which this principle may be understood. The first is to view the actual forms of authority given by Moses as binding for the rest of history. This approach tries to see every form of social authority as somehow subsumed under those of Church, State and Family. This obviously has problems with trade unions, schools and universities in the modern setting. The second approach is to view the process of differentiation itself as normative - so that the patriarchal form of society gives way to a form of society in which authority is diversified in a nonhierarchical manner. According to

this approach, such positive social forms as trade unions, universities and schools have a certain legitimate sphere of authority which is beholden to God alone, and is not received by means of a delegation from a 'higher' sphere, be it family, church or state. The actual character of this legitimacy, however, is a complicated matter, for the influence of sin in their development must be given serious consideration with regard to the actual social forms as we now know them.

It is clear from the Biblical example that the process of differentiation - should not result in fragmentation. The life of Israel was to be a national unity of twelve tribes differentiated according to the social spheres of family, priest, king and prophet. This implied that the life of Israel should be shaped in such a way that it was *culturally integrated* so as to allow the diversity of social forms developing in the process of differentiation to assume their own *distinctive character*. Finally, the process of cultural development should take place without a violent or radical rejection of the past: cultural development should take place in *continuity* with the past.

We may therefore attempt to formulate the positive content of these cultural norms for historical development in the following manner.

- i) *Cultural differentiation.* In the course of man's shaping and unfolding of God's creation, various positive forms of social and cultural life come into existence. As the complexity increases so a variety of institutions develop. These should be allowed to be developed and controlled by a form of authority that is beholden to God alone, and in this sense exemplify the principle of sphere sovereignty.
- ii) *Cultural integration.* The various spheres of social and cultural life that come into existence as a result of cultural differentiation need to be able to work together harmoniously. In this sense sphere-sovereignty never means sphere-autonomy; nor does it mean that there is some intrinsic conflict between the spheres. The tendencies for the differentiated forms of society to try to control life beyond their legitimate bounds of authority, or to fail to fulfil their proper task is sin and as such is the root of social conflict. Thus, church, state, family, school, university, trade union, artistic community should work together in a culturally integrated manner, with none seeking to predominate.

There are four significant integrating elements within the developing life of mankind: world-and-life view, cultural tradition, the societal structure of the State, and the ties of ethnicity. At one time these four elements {49} were virtually synonymous consider the example of the people of God in the Old Testament. In such a situation a *nation* was a group of people bound together by ethnic ties possessing a common cultural tradition envisioned by a common world and *life* view, and its way of life was sanctioned by a form of authority that was invested in the State. However, the process of cultural differentiation accompanied by the growth of diversity of world-and-life views has brought about a situation in which the differences between them must be clearly recognised if mankind is to develop in a normative fashion. Thus Switzerland is a country which has a diversity of cultural traditions (German, French and Italian) and a diversity of world and life views (various shades of Christian and Humanistic) that lead the future development of those traditions. Moreover, the integrating bonds are recognised by the State. Moreover,

although the bonds of state, cultural tradition and world and life view are not unrelated to the question of ethnicity in this case, the latter is no longer a basis upon which individuals need gain their cultural identity. Intermarriage and freedom of choice have done a great deal to bring this about. Indeed this is quite normative, for the *nation* is not a grouping that is *ethnically* qualified, but rather one which is *culturally* qualified, open to the free formation of man. In this the State does undoubtedly have an *integrating* role. However this role should be qualified by its task of maintaining a just legal public order which duly recognises a diversity of cultural traditions and world and life views, permitting the organization of society in accordance with them. The integrating role which the State sets itself in a country like *Russia* - seeking to organize the whole population in accord with a single ideology is clearly anormative.

iii) *Cultural individuation*. Each social or cultural sphere as it comes into existence as the result of cultural differentiation should be free to develop in accordance with the norm for its inner character. Thus marriage should not be subject to the dictates of business or political settlements; the church should not be dictated by the state or be itself an active political force. At the same time the individual person within each social form should be able to develop as individual human beings before the face of God. Slavery, for example, is a clear violation of this norm. However, so is the assembly-line in the modern factory.

iv) *Continuity*. There are no radical breaks in history. Man cannot start from scratch in cultural development. The old is carried over into the new by the power of tradition. In this sense it is normative that all progress be such as to conserve what is good from the past. Thus man is to dress and keep the garden of his cultivation. However, the vision and direction which he is to follow in this task should be nothing other than the Word of God in all its fullness. Progressivism, Radicalism, Reaction, Conservatism etc. all seek to deal with a cultural tradition in a way that falsely absolutises it - variously wanting either to reject it, return to it or hold on to it.

v) *Cultural features anticipated in post-cultural aspects of reality*. The opening up of God's creation under the cultivating hand of man is a matter having universal character: cultural development should not take place in isolated cultural totalities. The norm of social intercourse operates in the cultural aspect of reality: every particular cultural totality may be enriched through the mutual contact and exchange with other cultural traditions. It is in this way that man is truly caught up in a universal history. Judged in this light, therefore, attempts on the part of certain governments to prevent such contact are clearly anormative. {50}

Since the process of cultural differentiation leads to an increasing diversity of cultural spheres there is the constant danger of one sphere trying to expand at the expense of others. The power of the state, the power of big business, the power of science, the power of technology are obvious examples of this in the modern world. Such cultural development is anormative with respect to cultural economy and cultural harmony. Cultural blessing and cultural crisis are the ways in which the jural aspect of reality is manifest within the course of cultural development. The love of doing one's task with integrity is the way in which the ethical aspect of reality is manifest in cultural activity. Finally, the integral meaning of cultural development is disclosed in the confessional aspect. The Scriptural revelation enables us to see man as the creature made in God's

image with the calling to care for and open up creation in loving service to God. It reveals too, how man has rebelled with idolatry; yet God in His grace and mercy has redeemed this world and man within it in Jesus Christ. The conflict that we presently experience in the course of history is that between *Civitas Terrena* and *Civitas Dei*.

3.4 A Glance at Some Contemporary Issues

In the light of the above, a contemporary *kulturkritik* could occupy many volumes. Without even trying to write the prolegomena to such a project, I would like to glance at some contemporary issues:

- i) Our culture shows the threat of both totalitarianism and atomization. The norms of integration, differentiation and individuation have been powerfully frustrated by the spirits of scientism, technicism, socialism and capitalism. The integrity of the family, voluntary associations and minority groups of various kinds have their integrity threatened by these powerful forces.
- ii) Many young people in particular are alienated and spiritually uprooted because of the failure of our cultural leaders to give sufficient attention to the matters of world and life view. This coupled with the ugly face of technocracy is driving many to search for a New Consciousness in a variety of Occult Wisdoms expressed in the Counter Culture⁸².
- (iii) The university (from *universitas*, meaning a whole) deserves the title of a *multiversity*, simply because there is no *integrating* discipline. The analytically qualified life of the university has not only claimed for itself a secular autonomy, it has also shown an increasing pace of differentiation that has not been accompanied by an integration and individuation of the various disciplines. It has resulted in a situation in which the search for knowledge has become like hunting for nuggets in a gold rush.
- (iv) In the various integrating elements in the life of mankind a great deal is amiss. Particularly it is the State that is to blame. It has generally sought to encourage an organization of life that would stamp out diversity in the interests of unity. In the process we have developed a secularism and discouraged minority 'primitive' cultures to grow and develop from within their own cultural tradition. In the case of South Africa, although a recognition of differences is the basis of their Apartheid policy it has not developed into a policy which advocated the separate development {51} of the different *nations* understood as ethnic or biotically qualified groupings. If it were to be a policy that was based upon the differences of *cultural* tradition developed in such a way as to encourage greater participation on the part of all the peoples involved it would be a different matter. If the latter policy were adopted it would mean for example that the coloureds would be grouped with the whites because they share the same cultural tradition.

By the same token there are an increasing number of alienated Maoris in New Zealand who do not want to be brown Pakehas. Again there needs to be an option open to the Maori people which would enable them to genuinely open up and develop their own cultural heritage in a way that, whilst learning from European developments, did not imply the rendering of their own culture as a museum piece. I believe that the State should

offer to assist some kind of Maori Educational Foundation toward that end. However, it should be emphasised that it would be based upon *a cultural* distinction not an *ethnic* one. Europeans would be welcome to participate if they were willing to come into it on the terms of Maori culture.

v) In recent times the State has lost the basic insight of its normative calling to establish and maintain public justice. It has suffered an over-reaction from the era of *Laissez-Faire* and has taken upon itself the supreme task of Economic Manager. The relationship of political life to economic life in this connection is one that is in need of urgent principled attention.

vi) We lack a meaningful *cultural ideal* to direct our day to day activity. The collapse of the liberal ideal of inevitable progress has given way almost to a general anticipation of the opposite. Marxists however can continue to offer a hope of a socialist society after the revolution. A Christian approach to this whole matter should neither be some attempt to rework the liberal model, nor simply to point to the hope of Christ's return. It should truly recognise that all cultural formation takes place between *Civitas Terrena* and *Civitas Dei*, recognising that there is the hope of winning a few battles in a war that looks so largely to be in the hands of the Enemy, and looking forward to the ultimate return of the King.

*It has been testified somewhere,
'What is man that thou art mindful of him,
or the son of man, that thou carest for him?
Thou didst make him for a little while lower than the angels,
Thou has crowned him with glory and honour,
putting everything in subjection under his feet'
Now in putting everything in subjection to man,
He left nothing outside His control. As it is, we do not yet
see everything in subjection to Him. But we see Jesus,
who for a little while was made lower than the angels,
crowned with glory and honour because of the suffering of death,
so that by the grace of God He might taste
death for everyone.⁸³*

{52}

Footnotes

1 Psalm 8:1, 3-6, 9; Joshua 24:14; I Cor. 4:20, Good News Bible.

2 Ion, Plato. pp. 219-220. Plato, Collected Works, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns.

Princeton University Press (1961). I have elaborated on the more specially Biblical features of these issues in my paper entitled 'On Power and Spirituality' in 'Biblical Foundation for Radical Discipleship' FCS Publication, P.O. Box 25026, Hataitai, Wellington. N.Z.

3 'Man and Culture': a Philosophical Anthology. Edited by D. P. Verene. Dell PublishingCo. New York (1970). pp.1-2

4 'Men and Culture' pp. 4-6

5 'Philosophy and the Modern Mind': A philosophical critique of Modern Western Civilization by E.A. Adams. The University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill (1975) pp. 5-6

6 Ibid. p.10

7 Ibid. pp. 9-10

8 Ibid. p.7

9 Ibid. p.8

10 Ibid. p.12

11 'Man and Culture' p.55

12 John 1:1-5

13 Gen. 1:27-28; Gen. 2:15; Deut. 8:3, Matt. 4:4.

14 Col. 1:15-20; John 1:1-5; Het). 1:3; Rom. 11.36

15 I Peter 1.23-25; Isaiah 40.6-9

16 I have attempted to discuss the more specifically Biblical features of these matters in my 'Biblical Foundations for Radical Discipleship, Seminars V & VI. FCS Publication, PO Box 25026, Hataitai, Wellington.

17 Genesis 1.22, 27, 28; 3.23

18 I have limited attention here to the cultural factor being administered by someone else. However, although the possibilities of self-control opened up by such phenomena as bio-feedback are relevant here, they raise too many other issues to warrant a detailed discussion here

19 Matt. 28.18; Col. 1.15-20

20 Revelation 6.1-17; 19.11-16

21 'Insight, Authority and Power' Peter Schouls. Wedge (1972). ' Ibid. pp. 2-3

22 Ibid. pp.2-3

23 It is in such terms, for example, that the virtues of democracy should be discussed.

24 For the present, I shall follow the theory of the modal aspects largely as it has been developed by H. Dooyeweerd in 'The New Critique of Theoretical Thought' Vols. I-IV. Presb. & Ref. Pub. Co. (1953-1955). In this work, the modal aspects have a certain order: numerical, spatial, kinematic, physical, biotic, psychical, analytic, CULTURAL, lingual, social, economic, aesthetic, jural, ethical, confessional. I have here emphasised the position of the cultural in respect to the non-cultural aspects.

25 In the sense of the previous footnote.

26 I have discussed the more specially Biblical features of what is involved with this in my 'Biblical Foundations for Radical Discipleship', especially Seminars V and VI, entitled 'Scripture - Our Sheathed Sword' and 'Laws, Rules and the Word of God'. FCS Publication, PO Box 25026, Hataitai, Wellington, N.Z.)

27 I have written elsewhere on this subject. Refer to 'The Christian Task in the Arts' and to 'Wanted: A New Song Unto the Lord' both published by F.C.S. P.O. Box 25026, Hataitai, Wellington, N.Z.

28 Refer to 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery', 'Conjectures and Refutations' and 'Objective Knowledge' by K. R. Popper and 'The Copernican Revolution' and 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by T. Kuhn. Moreover, the collection of essays in 'Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge' ed. by A. Musgrave and I. Lakatos, C.U.P. (1970), is indicative of the continuing debate of the point at issue.

29 'The Protestant Era', P. Tillich, Chicago (1948), p.57

30 'Faith, Reason and Existence' J.A. Hutchinson, New York (1956) p.210

31 'Culture and Faith' R. Kroner, Chicago (1951), pp. 209-210

32 'The Humanist Frame', J. Huxley, George Allen and Unwin (1961) p.18, 13

33 'The Religion of the Individual and the Modern World' L. Geering, Whitcoulls, Wellington. N.Z. (1975), pp. 1-2.

34 Refer, for example; to the treatment of Marxism in 'Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx' by Robert Tucker. Cambridge University Press (1965).

35 Refer to the essay 'The Humanist Frame' in the book of the same name pp. 13-48. George Allen and Unwin (1961).

36 'Therefore, Choose Life'. 1971 Massey Lectures. George Wald.

37 'Theology of Culture' P. Tillich, Oxford University Press (1959) pp.7-8

38 'Ultimate Concern: Dialogues with Students' edited by D. McKenzie Brown, SCM Press (1965) pp.11-12

39 All published by Faber and Faber

40 'Where the Wasteland Ends' Faber & Faber (1972) pp. xx-xxii.

41 Refer 'The Unfinished Animal' Faber & Faber (1975) pp. 152-181.

42 'Where the Wasteland Ends' pp. 109-111

43 'Where the Wasteland Ends' p. 139.

44 Refer to 'Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition' by Frances Yates. Routledge and Kegan Paul (1964).

45 Isaiah 1:2-4; 10-11; 13; 16-17

46 John 1:3

47 Joshua 24:1-5; 14-15

48 Romans 1:18-25

49 Ex. 20:1-3; Matt. 4:10; Rom. 1:25; Josh. 24

50 Prov. 4:23

51 For a very valuable discussion of these matters, refer to the chapters on Islam in 'Christianity in World History' by T. van Leeuwen. Sibers (1963).

52 Refer to my 'Biblical Foundations for Radical Discipleship', Chapters III-VIII for a more detailed discussion of these matters.

53 Refer to A. Kuyper's 'Stone Lectures' Eerdmans (1931) for a lucid discussion of the historical impact of this form of the Biblical world and life view.

54 it is of some interest to note the growing body of historical study that has been devoted to an examination of the contrast between the thought of Calvin and of that of his immediate successors. For example; 'Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy' by B. Armstrong, University of Wisconsin Press (1969). 'Theodore Beza's Doctrine of Predestination' J. Bray, Nieuwkoop (1976).

55 'Philosophy and Christianity': Philosophical Essays dedicated to Prof. Dr. H. Dooyeweerd. Amsterdam, North Holland; Kampen. J. H. Kok (1965) p.194.

56 'The Rise of the West' W. McNeil. Chicago (1963).

57 I have attempted to examine something of the scope and character of this ground-motive in my seminar paper 'The Radicalism that is Left Right Out' in 'Biblical Foundations for Radical Discipleship'.

58 Harper Torchbook (1951).

59 The relation of the Hermetic and Kabbalistic magic of the Renaissance to the rise of modern science in this particular sense has been discussed to some extent in 'Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition', by Frances Yates. Routledge and Kegan Paul (1964).

60 Refer to, 'The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science' by E.A. Burt, Routledge and Kegan Paul (1924) for a lucid discussion of the actual development of these ideas at the hands of Galileo, Descartes and Hobbes

61 SCM (1965)

62 University of Chicago (1946): Also published in Penguin as 'Before Philosophy' (1949)

63 'Before Philosophy' Penguin (1963) p. 241

64 'Before Philosophy' pp. 251-252

65 Some of the more important contributors to this discussion include E.A. Burtt in 'Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science' Routledge and Kegan Paul (1924); R. Hooykaas in 'Religion and the Rise of Modern Science' Scottish Academic Press (1972), A.N. Whitehead in 'Science and the Modern World' McMillan (1925), T. Kuhn in 'The Copernican Revolution' Harvard Un. Press (1957) and 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions', Int. Encycl. of United Science (1962), M. Polanyi in 'Personal Knowledge' Routledge and Kegan Paul (1958), K. Popper in 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery' Hutchinson (1959), 'Conjectures and Refutations', Routledge and Kegan Paul (1963), 'Objective Knowledge', Oxford Un. Press (1972), I. Lakatos in 'Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge' Cambridge Un. Press (1970), P. Feyerabend in 'Against Method' New Left Books (1975) and N. Wolterstorff in 'Reason within the Bounds of Religion', Eerdmans (1976). From the standpoint taken here the work of the Dutch philosopher H. Dooyeweerd in his 'New Critique of Theoretical Thought' Pres. & Ref. Publ. Co. (1955-58) has not yet made the impact upon the discussion on these matters within Anglo-Saxon circles that it deserves.

66 Longmans (1897)

67 John 1:1-5; Heb. 1:1-4

68 Refer section 1.5

69 In many ways this was precisely where the Pharisees made their biggest error. They demonstrated a real desire to be faithful to the law of God. However, in their attempts to see that the divine content was given in positive detail, they became captive to their on positivization of the Word of God, thereby incurring the judgment of Jesus that they had substituted their tradition for the Word of God'. (Mark 7:8).

70 {??} Refer, for example, to Deuteronomy 28-30

71 {??} Refer, for example, to Deuteronomy 28-30

72 The ways in which modern Technology has been cultivated disregarding the ways in which it functions within this full life context have been scrutinised in E. Schuurman's 'Reflections on the Technological Society' Wedge (1977) and in his 'Techniek en Toekomst' Van Gorcum (1973), shortly to be translated into English. They have also been examined from a somewhat different standpoint by J. Ellul in his 'Technological Society'.

73 'Future Shock' A. Toffler. Bodley Head (1970) p.11

74 'The Technological Society' J. Ellul. Jonathan Cape (1965). 'The Society of the Future' H. van Riessen. Pres. & Ref. Publ. Co.(1953)

75 Refer, for example, to 'Beyond Freedom and Dignity' by B.F. Skinner

76 Max Weber and R. H. Tawney in respect to the rise of Capitalism. Lynn White Jr. in respect to the Ecologic Crisis etc.

77 Refer to H. Butterfield 'The Whig Interpretation of History' for discussion of this matter.

78 'Making of a Counterculture', 'Where the Wasteland Ends' and 'The Unfinished Animal' all published by Faber and Faber.

79 Refer to 'The Poverty of Historicism' by K. Popper for a critique of the claims of those who would pretend to know the outcome of the future in advance. The Scriptures reveal the goal and the context of its realization. They do not give details.

80 Refer to 'The Image of the Future' by F. L. Polak for a discussion of this whole subject.

81 Refer to 'Christian Democracy in Western Europe: 1820 - 1953' M. P. Fogarty. Routledge and Kegan Paul (1957) p.41 for a Roman Catholic assessment of this matter.

82 Refer to T. Roszak 'The Making of a Counter Culture', 'Unfinished Animal'; to O. Guinness 'Dust of Death' IVP (1972)- and to 'Youthquake' K. Leech

Sheldon Press (1973)

83 Heb. 2:6-9