WHOM SHALL WE SERVE? CLAMOUR IN THE MIDST OF SILENCE

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Joshua said to all the people:

Thus says the Lord, the God of Israel,

Your fathers lived of old beyond the Euphrates, Terah, the father of Abraham and of Nahor: and they served other gods. Then I took your father Abraham from beyond the River and Zed him through all the land of Canaan, and made your offspring many. I gave him Isaac; and to Isaac I gave Jacob and Esau. And I gave Esau the hill country of Seir to possess, but Jacob and his children went down to Egypt. And I sent Moses and Aaron, and I plagued Egypt with what I did in the midst of it; and afterwards brought you out…..

Now therefore fear the Lord, and serve him in sincerity and in faithfulness; put away the gods which your fathers served beyond the River, and in Egypt, and serve the Lord. And if you be unwilling to serve the Lord, choose this day:

WHOM SHALL WE SERVE?

Joshua 24:1-5, 14-15

CLAMOUR IN THE MIDST OF SILENCE

This material is a *draft* of a projected 4 volume work under the general title: 'Whom Shall We Serve?' Titles of the remaining volumes are:

>'In the Grip of the Gospel'
>'The Two Faces of Secularization'
>'The Scandal of Two Cities'

The overall purpose of the work is to try and give an evaluation of our present cultural condition, and to try to set forth the outline of an obedient Christian response for the present and future.

Critical comment upon this draft is welcome.

September, 1978. {1}

PREFACE

There is a question in the air, more sensed than seen, like the invisible approach of a distant storm, a question that I would hesitate to ask aloud did I not believe it existed unvoiced in the minds of many: "Is there hope for man?".

In another era such a question might have raised thoughts of man's ultimate salvation or damnation. But today the brooding doubts that it arouses have to do with life on earth, now, and in the relatively few generations that constitute the limit of our capacity to imagine the future. For the question asks whether we can imagine that future other than as a continuation of the darkness, cruelty, and disorder of the past; worse, whether we do not forsee in the human prospect a deterioration of things, even an impending catastrophe of fearful dimensions.[1]

Thus Robert L. Heilbroner touches upon the anxiety that hovers within us regarding the future of our civilization. Never before has Man had so much information about the world he lives in. Never before has he had so much power over his environment. Yet, in the face of unprecedented advances in many areas, ours is an age peculiarly haunted by uncertainty, anxiety and escape. If to some the solutions to our problems are the further applications of science and technology then to others the present seems pointless and the future hopeless. To others again, the present is a wilderness of crisis with hope to be sought in a return to ancient mystical occultisms. However most, although they show much excitement about the games they are playing aboard the great Cruiser of Life, appear quite unconcerned about its destination. The rumours that it carries nuclear weapons, that it is the victim of heroin habit, that it is involved in a black slave market, that there will be storms, mutiny and even privacy, may be good stuff for the movies; but in the world of the scientific dream, and the power of the dollar, such threats may be dismissed as problems that may soon be solved with a little more research and technology.

And what of the Christian Church?

Tell me what's a-happening, what's the buzz?, is the picture drawn of the Apostles of Christ in Rice and Webber's "Superstar". However inaccurately it may present the Apostles, I fear that it is an all too accurate picture of the Christian community in the current spiritual battles within our culture and society.

I cannot believe that Christianity will ever cope with the present world-wide mess, and I think such influence as it retains in modern society is due to the money behind it, rather than to its spiritual appeal. It was a spiritual force once, but the indwelling spirit will have to be restated if it is to calm the waters again.[2]

E.H. Forster wrote this in 1939, as a non-believer. Has our situation changed since then? Has the indwelling spirit been reinstated so that fresh vision is given to cultural and social life?

The permissive society; the juvenile crime increase; the race problem; inflation; the aimlessness of youth; the secular society; the pessimism and cynicism that pervades

films, drama and literature; pop music and the counterculture.... Where is the Christian cultural consciousness that produced a Luther, a Calvin, a Bach, a Rembrandt, a Wilberforce, a Shaftesbury, a Booth? {2}

Why do so many Christians say that cultural, social and political issues are 'worldly', and settle so wholeheartedly for the status-quo; or worse, profit from it materially in such a manner as to give all the outward signs of the same worldliness that they professed to condemn? Well did Harry Blamires write in the year of 'Honest to God' that -

Except over a very narrow field, of thinking, chiefly touching questions of strictly personal conduct, we Christians in the modern world accept, the purpose of mental activity, a frame of reference constructed by the secular mind and a set of criteria reflecting secular evaluations. There is no Christian mind; there is no shared field of discourse in which we can move at ease as thinking Christians by trodden ways and past established landmarks.[3]

Culturally, at least, Christianity, if not dead, is suffering so much from old age that, without a new lease of life, the non-believing world has every right to conclude with Nietzche, that the God of the Bible is dead. If there were not so many people who claimed to be Christian, then one could seek to exonerate the people of God and lay the blame for our present condition at the feet of the unbelieving world. But as this is not so 'the world' cannot be honestly used as a scapegoat for the cultural and social sins of omission.

That the situation as it is should not and need not remain with us and our children is the fundamental contention of this book. It is written out of the sincere desire that I and all of God's people might make a compassionate and intelligent response to the Word of God so desperately needed for the reconciliation of man to God, of man to man, of man to himself and of man to his natural and social environment. It is written not only out of an awareness of woe, but also in the midst of some encouraging developments within diverse quarters of Christendom. I need only make mention of such contributions as those of Harry Blamire's 'The Christian Mind''- a book which was obscured in its significance by the sensationalism of 'Honest to God'; the work of Francis Schaeffer; the work of A.A.C.S., C.J.L. and C.L.A.C. in Canada; and of the concern for Biblical renewal that is being expressed in certain Roman Catholic and Evangelical circles. However, the Third Way called for by Os Guinness in 'Dust of Death'[4] needs to be more clearly articulated - both in the terms of a full appreciation of a Biblical World and Life View and in the terms of an understanding of the historically developed social organizations of the Ekklesia; and their need for future reformation. It is my intention to try to make some contribution toward this end. {3}

(I) THE SPIRIT OP THE SECULAR

We are the hollow men, we are the stuffed men.[5]

The central fact of modern history in the West – by which we mean the long period from the end of the Middle Ages to the present – is unquestionably the decline of religion.[6]

Where belief has prevailed for 1000 years, doubt now prevails. All the world says: "Yes that's written in books, but now let us see for ourselves?" The most solemn truths are being tapped on the shoulder; what ever was never doubted is now in doubt.[7]

God is dead. And we have killed Him. How shall we, the murderers, comfort ourselves?.... Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it? There has never been a greater deeds and whoever will be born after us - for the sake of this deed he will be part of a higher history than all history hitherto. I came too early, my time has not yet come. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering - it has not yet reached the ears of man... This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars - and yet they have done it themselves.[8]

Every age has its problems, but the sickness of spirit which characterises our own should cause us to carefully reflect upon the basic realities that promote and direct. Brought up as we are upon the secular ethos, the scientific worldview and the welfare state this reflection is all the more necessary because we have almost totally lost the ability to see the spiritual depths that promote and direct both the general course of social and cultural life, and also our own particular tasks within it. Saying that modern life is secular is all too often limited to commenting upon a falling off in church attendance. But there is a much more significant way in which we can describe our modern way of life as secular. The spirit that pervades our social and cultural life has lost all contact with both the transcendent realm of being and the inner depths of the spirit of man. Questions of meaning and purpose, fundamental norms, matters that deal with the inner spiritual condition of man the individual, and man in community, have all but disappeared from our sphere of discourse. It's not that, man has ceased to be a spiritual being. His spiritual reality has simply become that of the consumer, the functionary, the bureaucrat, fed upon the theoretical and upon the sensate. He has become a machine, to be kept in working order, a naughty child to he kept amused, an object among many objects in a consumer society. It is no accident that a great part of our artistic activity goes into advertising. Advertising is the secular preaching of a consumer society.

The reduction of religion to Sunday church going, to mere personal views about the significance of life and morals, a merely intellectual stance regarding the existence of God and the deity of Christ is a product of the secular ethos itself. On the contrary religion is a way of life. It is spiritually anchored - promoting goals, values, beliefs, that are held in common, giving shape to the society and culture of the men who share its commitment. The spirit that promotes and directs our way of life is indeed a secular spirit. We could say that 'secular' is a 'spiritual' and not a secular term. It is this spiritual quality of secularism that I believe is a much more central issue in coming to terms with our way of life than the one of a decline in church attendance. {4}

Now, it is possible for men to continue to follow certain patterns of behaviour and belief in any cultural or social sphere with no authenticity of spirit whatever. It is not that the men are insincere or immoral. It is simply that the spiritual drive that should give life its purpose and meaning has gone, and we are left with a continuing social performance in which men may contribute - on the one hand with sincerity and moral uprightness; on the other with the intent to intrigue. Political life, academic life, family life school life, church life, artistic life may all become a ritual which is spiritually empty. Such a loss of spirit may occur either in particular spheres of cultural and social life, or in a whole culture. The latter case is indicative of a major religious crisis in a civilization. In such a situation the problem for the simple and guileless individual is similar to that of the boy in the fairy tale in which the King parades the streets naked under the illusion that he is wearing clothes that can only be seen by men of intelligence. Either one joins in the performance, or simply states the truth.

In the Europe of the 19th century, Nietzsche discerned that although much lip-service was paid to its outward forms, in reality Christianity had lost its grip upon Western Civilization. Not only this, he realized that the rather naive confidence in humanistic progress also lacked spiritual depth and reality, requiring the birth of the 'superman' if it was to press on beyond the point of crisis seen by Nietzsche. The people had 'killed' God and made Him effectively irrelevant for their lives. Whether Nietzsche meant the death of the transcendent God (i.e. an affirmation of atheism) or the cultural death of God - I think both are involved - he certainly had the insight to see that a culture cut from its moorings was in trouble. Sören Kierkegaard, another major 19th century thinker to see the spirit shaping his times, poured out his soul in respect to the lack of reality in the Christianity of his day. That this sickness of spirit has spread like cancer and been compounded by the future of optimistic humanism to bring about its promised millennium, is nowhere more effectively summarised than in the following words:

We have generated a view of man which poses entirely new problems for man's emotional and rational life and compounds all the old ones inherent in human existence. It is not only that life in our time seems to have lost its flavour and everything seems flat and meaningless; all our seasoning has lost its savour. The materialistic values of our culture prove to be fool's gold. Our higher moral and spiritual values have been eroded. Erotic episodes, drugs, compulsive relating, temporary causes, false primitivism and make-believe cults provide no real seasoning of life. The form of our intellectual grasp of things squeezes out all the life supporting juices of value and meaning, leaving everything including man himself trivialized. Thus the desperate concern of the young, schooled in the best we have to offer, is expressed in the black humour of the question: 'Is there life before death'[9]

Today, not only have we seen the waning of. Christianity as an authentic cultural moulding force but we have also seen liberal secular humanism becoming increasingly inauthentic in its power to give political, academic, artistic and educational life purpose and significance. For these reasons recent years have seen a third contender for the spirit of man - the counterculture of the younger generation - as it has flowered in pop music, communal experiments, new left politics, free university experiments, drugs, and the drift toward the spiritual wisdom of the East. {5}

(2) THE RETREAT FROM THE WORD

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God; all things were made through Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made [10]

Pure Reason, incapable of any limitation, is the Godhead itself.[11]

Then I have fashioned an image, too, false as an image must be!
Thus I am defeated! Thus all was madness that I believed before
and cannot and must not be given voice. O word, thou word that I lack![12]

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.[13]

He who speaks does not know; he who knows does not speak.[14]

The conviction that the gods are silent; that the world is possibly not an ordered cosmos, but more probably a chaos are fundamental to the growing secularity of our culture. It is considered intrinsically impossible for the temporal world under the care of man to make contact with the transcendent in a way that can be understood and talked about in ordinary language.

The cultures of the Renaissance and Reformation had a number of important features in common, although their spiritual roots were different. Both had a real concern for man in his temporal life. Both believed that the important issues of life could be understood by man, and that human effort put to thinking about the nature of things was neither a vain pursuit, nor a construction of a mere model of reality. It was also believed possible by both to express and communicate such truths in human language. Both believed that the transcendent character of such truth really touched human culture and society. The Renaissance gained its impetus from a new way of looking at the literature of classical Greece, and was accompanied by a renewed interest in the philosophy of Plato; the Reformation from a rediscovery of the Bible.

The emphasis upon the vernacular languages was not only a linguistic matter. It was the result of the conviction that important matters could be expressed and communicated in ordinary language. In the late mediaeval period all important discussion, all Church teaching and liturgy was conducted in Latin, not the vernacular. Against this the Renaissance produced a flowering of poetry and song in the languages of the vernacular. It was the conviction also of the Reformers that the truths of the Bible were able to be understood by ordinary men in their own language. No priest should stand between men and the Bible, legislating the interpretation. Priests and scholars were secondary helps. The primary source was Scripture, enlightened by the Holy Spirit.

Thus it was that the cultures of the Renaissance and Reformation believed that the vernacular languages were able to grasp and communicate transcendent truth. Thought and language were not unrelated to the important issues of life. They were integrated with them. This is in sharp contrast to the general thought of the Orient. For Eastern thought, the really important {6} things of life ultimately leave the impediments of the material

world, of conceptual thought and of language. It is only by breaking down the barriers that language erects that we may grasp that which is truly important and eternal. Truth is found ultimately in silence. This is perhaps no better illustrated than by the Zen Koan:

You know the sound of two hands clapping,
what is the sound of one hand clapping?

Here the Zen novitiate is set upon the path of a retreat from the word. In our own culture, we have become so preoccupied with the material world, as the object of consumption and manipulation, as the object of scientific theory through the development of specialized languages, that we are effectively blinded from Truth by the verbosity of our secularity.

How the culture of the Renaissance and Reformation developed into the culture of the modern West is a long and involved story. For our present purposes however we may begin with Descartes.

RATIONAL CERTAINTY AND SCEPTICISM

Descartes, often called the founder of modern philosophy, lived during the late Renaissance. The scientific work of Brahe, Galileo, Kepler and others forced him to look with disdain upon the decadent scholastic philosophy and science of his day. Looking around for a point of departure that would enable philosophy to have something of the certitude of geometry and arithmetic, he came up with his famous dictum 'Cogito ergo sum' - I think, therefore I am. Man, for Descartes, was essentially a 'thinking thing'. Human reason became the certitude by which man could know and apprehend the reality of God, the soul and the mathematically conceived physical universe. Moreover, in Descartes' view, the soul was essentially equated with thought and was held to be in fundamental disjunction from the body. Thus the scholastic dualism of Man as Body and Soul gave way to the Cartesian dualism of 'Res Extensa' and 'Res Cogitans' Mind and Matter — which has profoundly affected Western thought ever since.

However, the tradition of philosophy that grew up in England during the 17th and 18th centuries, rather than seeking certitude of knowledge or reality through abstract reason, sought the same certitude in the experiences of the senses. Hume showed how this led to ultimate scepticism about causality, about the self that supposedly transcends the succession of sense experiences, and, needless to say, about God and the immortality of the soul.

Kant considered the Rationalism of the European thinkers to be going beyond the legitimate bounds of human reason with speculations about God, immortality, the soul, material and thinking substances. Equally, he thought that the extreme scepticism of Hume did not take sufficient notice of the proper scope of human reason. To resolve these problems Kant made some crucial distinctions, of which we shall consider three: the first has to do with *the respective knowing activities of the senses and of the mind,* the second between the *phenomenal world* and the *noumenal world*, and the third between the realm of *pure reason* and the realm of *practical reason.* For Kant the *noumenal world* was the realm of ultimate reality - of God, of the soul, of immortality, of material and thinking substance. However, although this world presented itself to the sense experience of Man

as the *phenomenal world*, it remained forever beyond man's conceptual grasp because the knowing activity of the mind was {7} considered to be one of organizing the experience of the phenomenal world according to certain categories. Moreover, in this respect, whereas the determined realm of nature (Descartes' "Res Extensa") was organized under the categories appropriate to *pure reason*, the realm of freedom (Descartes' "Res Cogitans") — appropriate to man's experience of the moral imperative - was organized under the categories of *practical reason*.

Upon the critical philosophy based upon such distinctions, Kant sought to demonstrate the invalidity of the traditional arguments for the existence of God on the grounds that they try to argue in the noumenal realm, and as such do not belong to the scope of *pure reason*. However, for Kant the existence of God was necessary for the *form* of the moral imperative that provided the foundation of man's experience of freedom. Accordingly the existence of God is guaranteed for Kant by considerations of *practical reason*. However, although God was there, He was silent and unknowable. He was not required to provide the *content* of the moral imperative, but only its *form*. The content of morals was discovered by free, rational reflection, not by revelation. This silence of God created no problem for Kant. He saw man's task less in any intimate relation to transcendence than in the secular tasks of life. In turning his eyes from the heavens to the earth, Kant indicated his spiritual kinship with the secular optimism of the eighteenth century 'discovery' of the power and scope of human reason, now released from the fetters of revelation. Usually described as the Enlightenment, this movement held boundless possibilities for uncovering the mysteries of the universe through science and for harnessing its secrets for the benefit of human progress in industry and technology. The leading thinkers of the age conjured up a vision of the progress of man which quickly provided both a universal cultural imperative and a basis for understanding the cosmos without resort to the superstition of religion.

The 19th century is, in many ways, the story of the consequences. Philosophy and theology in Germany were severely affected by Kant. Hegel sought to bridge the Kantian distinctions in a universal Idealism, in which Divine and human reason were identified and unfolded in a dialectical movement in a history of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Schleiermacher sought to rescue Christianity by replacing 'religious feeling' for the Word of God, as the focal point for Theology. In doing so he drew heavily both on the residue of a Christian memory in German culture and also on the rising tide of Romanticism. Fulfilling the vision of the conquest of human reason, the 19th century can speak of a Faraday, a Watt, a Daimler and an Edison - to name but a few men who have furnished our contemporary world with railways, electricity and motorcars.

A MYSTIC AND AN ATHEISTIC SILENCE
The significance of 'the silence of the gods' did not dawn upon the 19th century. Nietzsche was one of the few 19th century intellectuals to appreciate it. For most, however, the faith in the power of man to come to terms with .his problems on the basis of science and reason was too strong to worry about the problems created by an empty heavens. With the breakdown in this faith, however, the problems it created became far more central.

In Anglo-Saxon countries, the philosophy of our century has focussed upon language; its meanings and limitations. Finding its beginnings in G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell it was continued by Wittgenstein and A. J. Ayer. In his book 'Language, Truth and Logic' the latter, by means of the verification theory of meaning of the early Logical Positivist movement, attempted to dismiss language about God as meaningless. In Kantian terminology it could be said that {8} because Ayer saw that the noumenal was not within the realm of experience, language attempting to discuss it had to be considered meaningless. The silence of the gods therefore became an atheistic silence. However, although the unknowable noumenal world was construed in such atheistic terms by the main line of Logical Positivism, that there was also another view is made clear by the following comments of Rudolf Carnap, one of the most able and prominent representatives of the movement.

There was a striking difference between Wittgenstein's attitude toward philosophical problems and that of Schlick and myself. Our attitude toward philosophical problems was not very different from that which scientists have toward their problems. For as the discussion of doubts and objections of others seemed the best way of testing a new idea in the field of philosophy just as much as in the fields of science; Wittgenstein on the other hand, tolerated no critical examination by others, once the insight had been gained by an act of inspiration... Once when Wittgenstein talked about religion, the contrast between his and Schlick's position became strikingly apparent. Both agreed of course in the view that the doctrines of religion in their various forms had no theoretical content. But Wittgenstein rejected Schlick's view that religion belonged to the childhood phase of humanity and would slowly disappear in the course of cultural development. When Schlick, on another occasion, made a critical remark about a metaphysical statement by a classical philosopher (I think it was Schopenhauer), Wittgenstein surprisingly turned against Schlick and defended the philosopher and his work.

These and similar occurrences in our conversation showed that there was a strong inner conflict in Wittgenstein between his emotional life and his intellectual thinking. His intellect, working with great intensity and penetrating power, had recognized that many statements in the field of religion and metaphysics did not, strictly speaking, say anything. In his characteristic absolute honesty with himself, he did not try to shut his eyes to this insight. But the result was extremely painful to him emotionally, as if he were compelled to admit a weakness in a beloved person. Schlick and I, by contrast, had no love for metaphysics or metaphysical theology, and therefore could abandon them without inner conflict or regret. [15]

In other words Wittgenstein chose the alternative of a mystic silence, in which it is better to listen to the allusion of meaning engendered by the language of the noumenal world than to abandon it as non-existent.

One of the main strands of contemporary European philosophy - Existentialism - is also bound up with our theme. Karl Jaspers believes strongly in the importance of the transcendent and that we do not fully participate in our potential humanity unless we encounter it. This we may do through the experience of what he calls 'boundary situations', the communication of which involves what he calls 'cipher language' - the

language of the symbols of the transcendent that have to be completed in silence. Of his philosophy, he says:

This philosophy is neither idealistic nor realistic, neither metaphysical nor ontological. About the things we would like to know - whether and what God is; what the world rests on; what may be the basic process, or eternal Being - about these it tells us nothing.

It is just an attempt to establish how and where we find ourselves. It shows the ways of appearance for us, and the ways of our own appearance.[16] {9}

The gods are silent, but the silence is again a mystic one. Through the encounter with transcendence we may discover ourselves and the appearance of being. The Kantian distinction between the 'noumenal' and the 'phenomenal' is still there. However Jaspers is far from content to remain within the confines of a positivistic phenomenal world; on the contrary an encounter with the noumenal world that remains forever veiled is vital to being human.

Martin Heidegger, in his early philosophy was an existentialist. However in his later philosophy, he has become increasingly preoccupied with language as the means of revealing the mystic hidden order of Being. He too is vitally interested in the Kantian noumenon despite the fact that it must remain veiled. If language cannot tell us about the important questions of life in terms of contentful answers, then the poet may give us some allusion of the grandeur and mystery of Being.

This existentialism stands somewhat in contrast to that of Sartre, for whom man is radically separated from both nature and the transcendent realm of Being. Man chooses to make of himself what he will; he discovers himself by authenticating his will. The heavens are bare; nature is brutish. Man alone is free.

KAFKA

One cannot help but feel that these views stand in stark contrast to the actual conditions of our social and cultural life. Our vast technological network speaks the voice of the grand cultural achievement. However, all this belongs to the one world. No one brings this out more clearly than Franz Kafka.

Had one to name the author who comes nearest to bearing the same kind of relation to our age as Dante, Shakespeare and Goethe bore to theirs, Kafka is the first one would think of.[17]

Whatever literary quality his writing may have to warrant this comment, it is certainly accurate with regard to Kafka's ability to portray the spiritual condition of our age.

The gripping reality of Kafka's world is precisely its unreality. The social world is a mixture of a bureaucracy drowning in a deluge of forms and files, with an obscure officialdom that seems well informed of what is really going on, but keeps everyone else in total ignorance. The resulting literature conveys the mystery, the oppression, the alienation of modern life. However, in what precise way is he to be interpreted?

One of the remarkable things about the contemporary literary criticism devoted to Kafka is the hopeless failure of critics to be able to reach any kind of agreement. Now, one would not expect agreement upon every point, but in 1961 alone there were over 5000 publications devoted to the interpretation of Kafka! Critics were both exceedingly diverse in their interpretations, and also very rarely critical of each other about the correctness of their interpretations. There were numerous political, theological, sociological, psychological, allegorical, and symbolic attempts to interpret him.[18]

Why all this confusion? Kafka himself says:

Speaking the truth is not a very great merit it's so little too - all the time I'm trying to convey something, unconveyable, to explain something inexplicable, to tell of something which I have in my bones, and which can only be experienced in these bones.[19] {10}

If we remember what we have examined from Kant to Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Jaspers, we may begin to realize what he means. The really important things of life can neither be grappled with by the use of the faculty of thought, nor may they be expressed through the *content* of language. Kafka seems to have realized all these things very profoundly and they conjured up for him a great, oppressive fear - inspired by the possibility that 'the World Order may be based upon a lie[20].

Kafka had an undoubted yearning to come to terms with the ultimate nature of things. However, his despair results from an awareness that this yearning will always remain veiled behind the mystery of the noumenal world.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the most eloquent part of his language is not so much what is said, as in what is left unsaid. Kafka achieves his literary effects by bringing normal life and language together in abnormal ways. The abnormality sometimes almost fits together, but as other times it just does not connect up in a normal way. This applies also to the themes of his works. The 'Trial' and the 'Castle' are symbols which almost fit with what one might expect when someone is arrested, or when a castle forms the centre of power over a nearby town. However, in the way that Kafka treats them, one never knows just what these themes refer to with the result that an air of mystery, the suggestion of realism and the feeling of alienation are all conveyed. Temporal life is estranged from transcendent being. Yet there is the strong feeling that this should not be. Man is alienated from the social system and organization of power - yet there is the feeling that the real power resides in unknown forces which control and direct social life.

Language cannot express the truth of the nature of things in terms of its content - yet the language of normal things and; events put together in a slightly abnormal way has power to evoke something about ultimate reality.

That Kafka was aware both of the symbolic character of his work and the complete alienation of ultimate reality from ordinary life is apparent from the following parable:

The Emperor, so it runs, has sent a message to you, the humble subject, the insignificant shadow cowering in the remotest distance before the imperial sun; the Emperor from his deathbed has sent a message to you alone. He has commanded the messenger to kneel

down by the bed, and has whispered the message to him; so much store did he lay on it that he ordered, the messenger to whisper it back into his ear again. Then by a nod of the head he has confirmed that it is right. Yes, before the assembled spectators of his death - all the obstructing walls have been broken down, and on the spacious and loftily-mounting open staircases stand in a ring the great princes of the Empire - before all these he has delivered his message. The messenger immediately sets out on his journey; a powerful, an indefatigable man; now pushing with his right arm, now with his left, he cleaves a way for himself through the throng if he encounters resistance he points to his breast, where the symbol of the sun glitters; the way, too, is made easier for him than it would be for any other man. But the multitudes are so vast; their numbers have no end. If he could reach the open fields how fast he would fly, and soon doubtless you would hear the welcome hammering of his fists on your door. But instead how vainly does he wear out his strength; still he is only making his way through the chambers of the innermost palace; never will he get to the end of them; and if he succeeded in that nothing would be gained; he must fight his way next down the stairs; and if he succeeded in that nothing would be gained; the courts would still have to be crossed; and the courts the second outer palace; and once more stairs and courts; and once more another {11} palace; and so on for thousands of years and if at last he should burst through the outermost gate - but never, never can that happen - the imperial capital would lie before him, the centre of the world, crammed to bursting with its own refuse, Nobody could fight his way through here, least of all one with a message from a dead man - But you sit at your window when evening falls and dream it to yourself.[21]

As Erich Heller comments:

Kafka represents the absolute reversal of German idealism. If it is Hegel's final belief that in the absolute, truth and existence are one, for Kafka it is precisely that they are for ever divided. Truth and existence are mutually exclusive. [22]

SCHÖNBERG

This same remark could well be made about Arnold Schönberg, who, along with Debussy and Stravinsky, was a major architect of 20th century music. Schönberg began his musical life in the tradition of Wagner. However, although several early works were written in these rich chromatic tones, he chose to follow new paths which brought him isolation and scorn from the musical world for the greater part of his life.

The work which relates most strongly to our theme is the opera 'Moses and Aaron'. It was begun in 1930 and remained uncompleted at his death in 1951. He wrote the text himself, and although it is based upon Exodus Chapters 2, 3 and 32, Schönberg gives it an interpretation which vividly illustrates the disjunction of Truth from Existence.

The theme of the drama is essentially in the relationship between the two brothers, Moses and Aaron. Moses is the thinker, the inarticulate mystic, who is able to grasp the vision of the inconceivable in all its profundity. This vision is to be translated from an individual communion with God into a community of faith, fired with the same vision. However, Moses is not able to formulate his vision into symbols which will communicate to the people. Aaron is the eloquent man of the world, who is able to convey the message to the people through tangible signs and wonders. At one level, the drama is about the conflict

between two personalities. At a deeper level, the drama is about the relationship between transcendent truth and its relationship to temporal reality; between the Idea and its image; between the Vision and its communication. To highlight this problem, Schönberg gives the character of Moses a *Sprechstimme* (a voice in between speech and song) whilst Aaron has a soaring tenor line to sing.

Act 1, opens with Moses apprehending the mystic vision. He agrees to collaborate with Aaron, who will be his spokesman. Initially the Israelites reject any idea of being directed by an invisible God, but are persuaded to follow Moses, after Aaron performs the miracles with the rod. Act 2, opens in the desert with the Israelites waiting impatiently for Moses to return from the mountain. Acceding to the impatience of the people, Aaron says 'He will give form to the ever-present and always-common substance' and creates the golden calf, whereupon follows the bloodthirsty orgy of drunkenness and dancing. Moses returns and confronts Aaron. There follows the crucial dialogue in which Moses accuses Aaron of not giving form to the Transcendent Idea, but rather an idol, to which Aaron replies that the Tables of the Law in Moses' hands are also an image. Moses smashes the Tables, and soon afterwards collapses to the ground with the words: {12}

> *Inconceivable God!*
> *Inexpressible, many-sided idea,*
> *Will you let it be so explained?*
> *Shall Aaron, my mouth, fashion this image? Then I have fashioned an image too,*
>   *false, as an image must be.*
> *Thus I am defeated!*
> *Thus all was but madness that I believed before, and can not and must not be*
>   *given voice. O word, Thou word, that I lack.* [23]

Act 3, consists of a single scene in which Moses pronounces judgment upon Aaron: by his words and miracles Aaron has alienated the people and himself from the transcendent vision. However, Moses sets Aaron free, but once the latter is released from his chains, he collapses and dies.

The paradox is this: Moses is powerless without Aaron, for without him the vision cannot be given temporal form in a communal way of life. However, with Aaron, Moses' vision is inevitably perverted - simply because giving concrete expression inevitably means it suffers perversion. Schönberg struggled in vain to complete the music for the last act of the drama, thus indicating how real the problems were in his own life and work. The tragedy of the drama and of life is that the Truth of God and human existence are separated unbridgably.

STRAVINSKY
Another facet of our theme may be seen from Stravinsky - Stravinsky's cultural background was Russian. As such it was influenced only slightly by the Renaissance and Reformation, albeit that there was a strong current of the rationalistic Enlightenment blowing in the 19th century Russia that culminated in the 1917 Revolution. The major cultural background of Stravinsky's Russia was Byzantine, with a result that there was a strong emphasis upon the symbolic quality of transcendent truth.

During the 1920's, there was a phase in which 20th century music looked back on the classic era of the 17th and 18th centuries to gain its inspiration. Hindemith, Ravel and Prokofiev are associated with this movement, and Stravinsky, beginning with his 'Pulcinella' suite is usually considered one of its major innovators. Although he undoubtedly has a great deal in common with these neo-classicists, there are also some distinctive features which bear upon the theme under consideration. His opera-oratorio 'Oedipus Rex' illustrates the point. It is based upon the Greek Tragedy of Sophocles, with a libretto written by Jean Cocteau. It is to be sung in Latin, and although the characters are to be costumed, there is no action on the stage. The subject matter of the original is there the extent to which man is able to influence events and be held responsible for what he does. Nevertheless the Cocteau-Stravinsky treatment is fundamentally different from the original. The picture is one that is frozen in space and time in an attempt to point to a universal truth with no particular application. This may be verified by Stravinsky's own detailed accounts of the genesis and composition of the work. When reading a book on the life of Francis of Assisi, he was struck by the passage which read: {13}

French, was for St. Francis, the language of poetry, the language of religion, the language of his best memories and most solemn hours, the language to which he had recourse when his heart was full to express itself in his native Italian which had become vulgarised and debased by daily use; French was essentially the language of his soul. Every time he spoke French, those who knew him realized that he was happy.[24]

This gave Stravinsky the idea that if he were to choose a sublime subject for his new work, he would express it, not in the vernacular, but in a special language, something older and partly sanctified, something which might contain an incantatory element he could exploit in music. Latin seemed to offer the required qualities and he states that:

This choice had the great advantage of giving me a medium not dead, but turned to stone and so monumentalized as to have become immune from all risk of vulgarisation.[25]

Apparently Stravinsky felt so strongly about this that he was not really in favour of the speakers' part (which tells the story in the vernacular) - this was Cocteau's innovation.

'I wished to leave the play, as a play, behind. I thought to distill the dramatic essence'.[26]

This movement away from the vernacular is in fundamental opposition to the spirit of the Renaissance and the Reformation. It has more in common with the spirit of the Middle Ages, in which Latin, the holy language of the Church, was used to place Divine Truth of Grace upon a pedestal, distant from the temporal, secular world.

Thus Stravinsky can say:

The emotion aroused by art has nothing to do with our ordinary sensations and responses to the impressions of daily life.

and

The aim of art is to promote a communion, a union of, man with his fellow man and with the Supreme Being.[27]

'The Symphony of Psalms' and other 'semi-religious works' written in the Latin language are all in this spirit. They mark an important point in the use of religious language in music - in which there is no basic concern for the content the language expresses. The words are mere symbols for that which lies beyond our comprehension and power to express in contentful communication.

By way of contrast to Schönberg and Stravinsky is the example of the Bach St. Matthew Passion. It opens with a gigantic fugue, for double chorus, orchestra and boys choir. The heaving counterpoint of the orchestra and chorus sets a cosmic canvas, wherein all the different intricate threads interweave to form a unity of sound that speaks of the complex, confused and sinful life of man. Into this comes the clear sound of the chorale 'O Lamb of God most Holy', sung in unison by the choir of boys. One could consider this as representing the Word of God spoken in power to the complex and sin-ridden world of man. The word thus spoken is neither merely mystical nor merely symbolic. It has content that can be understood and applied. It is precisely this quality that produces music {14} universal in its scope, presenting a unified reality in which the truth of God and the existence of man are not unbridgably separated.

VIKTOR FRANKL
Not only is the retreat from the Word apparent in philosophy, literature and music, but as it underlies our way of life it also appears in the unlikely places.

There are many schools of psychiatry and psychotherapy. Some are based upon a behaviourist view of man, whilst others attempt to take a more integral view. The former approach virtually dismisses the inner person as having any significance for his mental health, leading to a strong reliance upon chemotherapy and electro-convulsive therapy as means of treatment. An example of the more integral view is the father of Logotherapy, Viktor Frankl, whose book 'Man's search for meaning', grew out of the author's experiences in a concentration camp, where he observed the difference the possession of a purpose to life made to the way in which men were able to cope with their extreme circumstances.

At a Conference in Alpbach in 1968, on the theme of 'Beyond Reductionism' in the Life Sciences, Frankl gave a paper in which he argued against those schools of psychiatry and psychology which have a reductionist view of man. He insists that psychiatry must be founded upon a total view, albeit that it is itself a narrow field of science. His own view shows much affinity with Jasper's Existentialism.

He tells of an experience in a Group Therapy session, to illustrate that whereas most therapies remain within the plane of the neurosis itself, logotherapy transcends this.

We had to deal, among other people, with a woman who had tried to commit suicide and was under therapeutic treatment in my department. She had lost a son of 11 years of age and was rebelling against her fate. I decided to participate in the group session and asked a question directed at the whole group:

'Imagine an ape that is punctured, again and again in order to manufacture an antipoliomyelitis serum. Is it possible that this ape should ever understand the purpose of its pain?'

The group of simple women responded by saying that this was sheer impossibility, because the purpose of inflicting this pain was located in a higher dimension, in the world of man, and an ape is not capable of reaching out into this dimension. Then I asked:

'What about the human world? Are you absolutely sure that it is the last dimension, a terminal in the cosmos as it were, that there is no dimension beyond the human world, a dimension in which the ultimate meaning of our human suffferings would be understandable? But then we too have no access to this higher dimension'. There was general agreement.

This question of course cannot be answered by doctor or scientist. It must be left open.... the ultimate meaning of human existence can never be given intellectually, but only existentially: not in words, but by our whole life, by our whole existence.[28] {15}

As it stands this last phrase is self-contradictory. To say that the ultimate meaning of human existence must be given by our '*whole* existence' and to simultaneously *exclude* the possibility of thinking contentfully about its meaning is simply a contradiction. In effect, it is, to affirm that the most important things in life lie totally beyond thought and language. Again, we have a mystic silence about the meaning of life. It might even be said that one of the differences between a behaviourist and an existentialist view of man is the difference between an atheistic silence and a mystic silence. To the one the transcendent dimension does not exist, whilst to the other it exists but is silent.

Not only in the transcendent realm is there a retreat from the word. Human society and culture have themselves become so confused and chaotic that it raises questions as to whether all attempts to speak about them are but vain efforts to speak about an unknowable, unstructured reality that has been repressively pushed into a mould that eventually stifles it. The following two examples bring these matters into focus. One is from Paul Goodman, the other from Ron Cobb.

PAUL GOODMAN
Perhaps best known for his critique of the American society of the 1950's in 'Growing up Absurd', Paul Goodman's writing has ranged widely over poetry, fiction, social criticism, city planning, psychotherapy, political theory and economics. He is cited by Roszak[29] as a champion of the youthful counter-culture, and has, for a long time, been sharp in his criticism of contemporary society. He has diagnosed today's problems according to the dictum that society is not created to suit man and his humanness, but man is socialized and educated to conform to society. With this background, the following experience is an enlightening example of the way in which the basic religious problems of our age disclose themselves unaware.

In 1967, Goodman was giving a course in 'Professionalism' to graduate students of all departments at the New School for Social Research in New York.

My bias was the traditional one: Professionals are autonomous individuals beholden to the nature of things and the judgments of their peers, and bound by an explicit or implicit oath to benefit their clients and their community. To teach this, I invited seasoned professionals whom I esteemed - a physician, engineer, journalist, architect etc. These explained to the students the obstacles that increasingly stood in their way of honest practice, and their own life experience of circumventing them.

To my surprise, the class unanimously rejected them. Heatedly and rudely they called my guests liars, finks, mystifiers or deluded. They showed that every professional was co-opted and corrupted by the system; all decisions were made top-down by the power structure and bureaucracy; professional peer groups were conspiracies to make more money. All this was importantly true and had, of course, been said by the visitors. Why had the students not heard? As we explored further we came to the deeper truth, that they did not believe in the existence of real professions at all professions were concepts of a repressive society and 'linear thinking'. I asked them to envisage any social order they pleased - Mao's Castro's, some anarchist Utopia - and wouldn't there be engineers who knew about materials and stresses and strains? Wouldn't people get sick and need to be treated? Wouldn't there be problems of communication? No, they insisted; it was important only to be human, and all else would follow.{16}

Suddenly I realized that they did not really believe that there was a nature of things. Somehow all functions could be reduced to interpersonal relations and power. There was no knowledge, only a sociology of knowledge. They had so well learned that physical and sociological research is subsidized and conducted for the benefit of the ruling class that they did not believe that there was such a thing as a simple truth. To be required to learn something was a trap by which the young were put down and coopted. Then I knew that I could not get through to them. I had imagined that the worldwide student protest had to do with changing political and moral institutions, to which I was sympathetic, but I now saw that we had to do with a religious crisis of the magnitude of the Reformation of the 1500's, when not only all institutions but all learning had been corrupted by the Whore of Babylon.

The irony was that I myself had said ten years ago in 'Growing up Absurd' that the young were growing up without a world for them, and therefore they were 'alienated', estranged from nature and other people. But I had been thinking of juvenile delinquents and a few beats; and a few years later I had been heartened by the Movement in Mississippi, the Free Speech Protest in Berkeley, the Port Huron statement of SDS, the resistance to the Viet-Nam War, all of which made human sense and were not absurd at all; here were absurd graduate students, most of them political activists.[30]

This example, rather than causing us to reflect on the ultimate realities of God and man's purpose in relation to Him, focuses on our relationship to our natural, social and cultural environments. We see looming before us the threatening possibility of the whole of our. 'knowledge', the whole of our social ordering being merely the agents of repression of a power elite - not because of any vicious class struggle or superior Fascist race, but simply

because we do not live in a law-ordered cosmos in which there is a 'nature of things' that may be investigated honestly and dispassionately. If there is no law-order, then our so-called 'knowledge' is merely a projection of our own minds upon a world of chaos that is deaf to our questioning even when it comes to matters of science and society. In such a world culture, science, society, religion and politics are all agents of repression. At best they are vain attempts to discover something in the universe which has no foundation in fact. At worst they are agents which subject man to the bondage of man, man to machinery, man to money, man to organisation, man to church, man to state, man to society.

In such a world -

There are no problems, only sorrows. [31]

What is even more interesting is that it takes someone like Paul Goodman to realize the fundamentally religious character of the problem. In fact he is critical of the way Christians have effectively secularized their message so that it is totally unable to meet these problems[32]. The parallel to the Reformation is interesting too, for, having come to the end of our retreat from the word, and the question now is, 'Where do we go from here?'

RON COBB
Ron Cobb is a cartoonist. The themes of his cartoons are sometimes political, sometimes environmental, sometimes religious. He has been much used in relation to the publications of the New Left. Of political cartoonists he says: {17}

Political cartoonists are playing with blocks and I have a feeling I want to break it all and say 'Look at what is! Look at that cold, hard void!'[33]

Since Ron Cobb is usually considered to be a political cartoonist, it is of considerable interest to ask a few questions as to what he leans by his cartoons.

I take great delight in creating enormous confusion and uncertainty. I like to leave a trail of very perplexed people with the potential - in a sort of older, Biblical sense - to be humbled by reality. I've always felt uncomfortable around people who are very certain about their world and their values, no matter how defined: left, right, in the middle; religious, irreligious.

The only thing I accept about the organisation of thoughts (which is just really nerve impulses, into what we might call perception or conception) is that it is an extension of the functional needs of the animal. I think man must temporarily organise his behaviour and focus his thoughts, relying on some expedient folktale about the true nature of the world, to get things done.

What I object to is people who begin to feel that these temporary organizations of thought are reality itself, and begin to think that the world is this or that way, according to some system. Too often, the mere fact that man has words for things, the ability to label and categorise, begins to condition his children to view all reality, to reduce all that is

true and real, to that which can be talked about, described and categorised. But a crisis, one way or another, will bring man face-to-face with his maker, or will bring man face-to-face with his deeper nature. The categories have to be put aside, and you just feel something... from top to bottom! These moments, these flashing moments when he's all put together (as Jung says) are the only times when he's really sane. It's unfortunate that it takes disasters and hideous reversals of life's symmetry and order to do this: but these moments, like sexual orgasm, the threat of death, extreme fear of sadness, or intellectual contradiction, leave man face-to-face with the voice. At that moment man is at his highest potential, because he's integrated.

So I love to create the intellectual contradiction. I love to expose the paradox.[34]

Cobb believes that most people function in an unreal world, because they act upon the assumption that not only is there a nature of things with which man may come to terms in a contentful way, but also that it conforms to the neat and tidy systems that people have constructed or inherited. The purpose of his cartoons is not so much to point out that certain things are wrong, but rather to break through the habitual categorisations that people make - to break down their systems of thought - in order that they confront the ultimate reality - variously called 'man's deeper nature', 'his maker', and 'the cold, hard void'. The crisis situations, reversals and paradoxes to which he refers bears a great deal of similarity to what Karl Jaspers calls 'boundary situations'. Through existential encounters we discover ourselves and the precarious nature of our real condition - for which the power of thought and word are impotent.

> Is our habitat a chaos?
> Need we jump into nothing to discover our being?
> Can we think about, talk about, write about
> The Word that abides midst decaying grass?
> Are we absurd because of who we are
> Or because of what we have done? {18} {19}

(3) BETWEEN HELL AND UTOPIA

the condition of modern society

The choice is no longer between Utopia and the pleasant ordered world that our fathers know. The choice is between Utopia and Hell.[35]

The construction of Utopias used to be despised as the foolish refuge of those who could not face the real world. But in our time social change has been so rapid, and so largely inspired by utopian aspirations, that it is more necessary than it used to be to consider the wisdom or unwisdom of dominant aspirations[36]

BRAVE NEW WORLD AND 1984

Within Western civilization, utopian writing has a long tradition. As a literary work a utopia traditionally performs two functions: one of criticising an existing society, the other of suggesting an alternative form of society. The classic work from which the literary genre derives its name - 'Utopia' by Sir Thomas More[37] - achieves these two functions in two distinct parts, the one devoted to a criticism of early sixteenth century England and the other to a description of the envisaged society upon the island of Utopia. However there are other ways in which these two functions can be achieved. Plato's 'Republic' and Bacon's 'Atlantis', for example, simply develop a picture of the alternative society which stands in relation to the existing form as a mirror in which the latter may be criticised. Bellamy's 'Looking Backward' does a similar sort of thing only projecting the alternative form of society into the future.

To qualify as a genuine utopia the main features of the alternative form of society should normally contain some new historical developments that are capable of being realized in a concrete situation within the not too distant future. Such works as Butler's 'Erewhon' and Morris's 'News from Nowhere', for example, have difficulty satisfying these requirements. Although the former certainly acts as a mirror to criticise Victorian England, it hardly offers a genuine alternative society. Whilst the alternative envisaged by the latter would appear to imply that subsequent to the Revolution everything will return to a mediaeval form of society in which God is replaced by Nature, cathedrals by styled houses, the feudal autocracy by a local democracy, the rigid hierarchy of the guilds by a free choice of occupation and the knights by craftsmen, it hardly embodies any new developments.

In spite of these failures to conform to a rigid pattern of utopian writing such works undoubtedly add some new angles to the utopian literary tradition. The twentieth century in particular has seen a large number of literary works that belong in some sense to this tradition, and such are worth studying for the light they are able to shed upon the existing form of our society. Two in particular stand out. I refer to 'Brave New World' and '1984'.

In 'Brave New World' society is rigidly divided into the classes of job requirements needed to keep society going. Each class is manufactured in the Brood-and-Conditioning Centre to which the reader is introduced at the beginning of the book. Everyone is 'educated' just enough to enable them to fit into their job specification. The 'education' of a 'child' begins {20} immediately after its 'birth' - in an environment compatible with its

hereditary disposition. This is done in such a way that everyone is made to feel that their own particular class is superior. This is achieved by various means, including that of oft-repeated slogans. The Beta-class, for example, often repeat: Alpha-children wear grey. They work much harder than we do, because they are so frightfully clever. I am really awfully glad, because I don't work so hard. And then, we are much better than Gammas and Deltas. Gammas are stupid. They all wear green, and Delta children wear khaki. Oh no, I don't want to play with the Delta-children. And Epsilons are still worse.

Everyone gets what they want; all are happy and all obey the rules. All fulfill their function and like what they do; they dislike doing anything else.

The society is entirely collectivised. To seek solitude is punishable. Family life is dangerous to the stability of the system and has been abolished. To speak of father and mother is so unbecoming that it makes people blush. An enduring union between two people of the opposite sex is forbidden with communal ethics requiring a continual change of partners.

The longing for the experience of thrills is provided for by a variety of entertainments, complete with feelies - metal knobs on every seat which provide sensations in harmony with the rest of the programme, a regular dose of 'soma' and, of course, sex.

Every change endangers stability. Even science is a danger since every new discovery has its practical consequences. The appearance of practising science is maintained but is really only an illusion; no one acquires anymore knowledge than is needed for his job.

The masses, of course, cannot do without religion, and the deity, in harmony with the new age, is Henry Ford. His model-T is its religious symbol - convenient because it is obtained merely by removing the upper portion from all the crosses.

The story includes the account of an alpha who falls outside the general pattern; as an ovum it had a wrong dose of alcohol. When fully developed he feels lonesome and estranged from the rest. Permission is granted to him to investigate a reservation where savages live behind a high tension wire in a 'natural' state. One savage is of 'civilized' parentage and therefore shunned by the rest. The two aliens quickly meet up and the savage is subsequently removed from the reserve as a curiosity. We are led to witness the reactions of a freedom-loving man to the life of a fully collectivised people. No one can comprehend his preference for danger, tension, self-denial and anticipation. Pursued by reporters, cameras and microphones, the lover of freedom concludes that only suicide offers escape from this collectivised 'community'.

The society of 'Brave New World' is a world-state in which war has been eliminated and where the first aim of the rulers is at all costs to prevent anyone from 'falling ,out of line in their outward behaviour, That of '1984' is a world in, which three superstates - Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia exist in a permanent state of war. Oceania is governed by four ministries - a Ministry of Peace, which conducts war; a Ministry of Plenty, which regulates the distribution of goods; a Ministry of Love which directs espionage; and a Ministry of Truth that keeps 'knowledge' up to date. Above-all this stands Big Brother,

whose picture stares from every wall. Everybody must love Big Brother but must hate everybody else. {21}

The administration uses all manner of means to spy on the populace. Uniform thinking is promoted by the Ministry of Truth and enforced by the Thought Police.

In contrast to Brave New World spiritual isolation between people is the norm. One man does not know what his neighbour does; his orders are automatically received on a piece of paper, and the paper results of his own efforts placed in a pneumatic apparatus. As far as the individual is concerned his work makes no sense; what happens further to his work remains a mystery. This isolating specialization is the result of the merely scientific mode of organization that shapes the life of society at large. This isolation is carried through as far as possible even in life outside of the job situation. People move together in spiritual isolation; love is forbidden; hate and fear must reign. All is directed toward Big Brother.

Like 'Brave New World', '1984' has its hero. Winston secretly keeps a diary in which he expresses aversion to the system. He hates Big Brother and lives in fear of being arrested by the Thought Police. He meets Julia, a girl who is of like mind. They have an illicit relationship. It is not the sexual intercourse that is forbidden; on the contrary Big Brother commands this for the begetting of children. It is the intimacy of spiritual union within their relationship that is suspect. The plot thickens as they get to know a third dissenter by the name of O'Brien and together the three of them search for information regarding the underground movement.

Winston is arrested by the Thought Police, who reveal that the underground movement is a fiction to trap dissenters. O'Brien turns out to be an agent of the Thought Police. Winston is imprisoned as part of a process to convert him to orthodoxy. The treatment is so successful that he is willing to grant that two and two make five if Big Brother so declares. The climax of the novel occurs when Winston betrays his love for Julia. Loving Big Brother he is then released as an 'effective' member of society.

'Brave New World' was written in 1931, prior to the advent of Nazism and Stalinism. '1984' was written in 1948 just after the war spent in conquering the Nazi terror. At the time of writing, therefore, neither novel criticised an existing form of society in the strictest sense of the term. Nevertheless, each certainly envisages a form of society having features in common with ones we have known in our century. Moreover, the possibility of construing them as a criticism of the past is certainly impossible in the case of 'Brave New World'. The correct way to view them would appear to be as embodying certain elements of the present which have the potential to develop into the envisaged society at some point in the future.

In this light there are two major differences with the classic utopia. The first is that the mirror into which we look to gain our perspective is deeply affected by nihilism. The heroes of both novels are conquered by evil forces with no hope offered now, in the future or beyond the grave. This feature often produces the title of an anti-utopia for such literary works. However, it deserves recalling that the root meaning of 'utopia' is not 'paradise' but rather 'nowhere'. Taken in terms of this root meaning, therefore, it is not impossible for a utopian writing to be undergirded by a nihilistic view of life and thereby

lose its utopian (i.e. its 'nowhere') character. However, it is certainly a reflection upon the dominant nihilism of the twentieth century; a matter that is deeply related to the theme of the previous chapter. {22}

The second way in which 'Brave New World' and '1984' depart from the classic utopia is in the fact that it is less the *existing* form of society and more the envisaged form - the utopia itself - that is placed under criticism. If the *envisaged* societies are to be interpreted as embodying developments that are realizable in the future, then they are neither to be conceived as a portrait of a hell removed from earth nor as a direct criticism of an existing society; they would appear to be criticisms of the future!

On the face of it, this would seem to be a very strange conclusion. To criticise something that hasn't yet come about would appear to require some knowledge of the future, and in the light of Karl Popper's criticisms of historicism[38] some care needs to be exercised in advocating such a possibility. Despite the fact that the future may not be predicted and is not predetermined in any sense that denies man's freedom, I want to suggest that it is both meaningful and important to consider the future. Human society is both *pulled* toward a fulfillment resulting from man's vision of the future in the present and *pushed* toward this fulfillment by its Past development.[39] However, man's vision of the future society is a matter that has normative qualification, and his formative activity in the light of his vision may be all right or all wrong, with whole series of possibilities in between. Consequently, for a variety of reasons, the actual outcome of man's formative efforts in the development of human society may differ radically from the vision he sets out to follow.

Thus I would submit that upon the basis of insight into the existing form of society and the directive forces that are presently shaping man's image of the future it is indeed possible to envisage something of the future form of society. This is not to say that the future is in some way predetermined; it is simply to say that the future is powerfully shaped by the forces that presently shape his vision of it. In such a light the implicit criticisms of the future forms of society envisaged in 'Brave New World' and '1984' are best understood as criticisms both of existing conditions within the present form of society and of the directive forces that are being brought to bear upon the future. The implication is that unless the latter are checked and redirected then the conditions resembling the envisaged form of society will come about. The crucial questions to be discussed, therefore, are firstly the driving vision that has and is shaping the direction of modern society and secondly, some insight with respect to the actual form of modern society.

I propose, therefore, to sketch the development of the vision that has been brought to bear upon modern society and then to sketch the way in which this vision has actually affected the development of the main lines of the pattern of modern society.

THE GROWTH OF TWO IDEALS
Any consideration of utopia must take its starting point from Plato's 'Republic'. Although a work of strict philosophical design rather than a novel, its exceptional qualities lend to it a character that makes it the starting point for many issues affecting the development of Western civilization.

Plato's object is to construct a theory of justice. According to him this is more readily discerned upon a large scale than upon a small one. Moreover, since, to his mind, there is a parallel between man as a microcosm and the state as a macrocosm, he prefers to investigate the latter. Thus he develops his theory of 'Res Publica', or what we would term the state. Plato considers that men live in society because of mutual need in a situation in which they each {23} have a natural aptitude to be good at only one thing. These natural aptitudes thus produce a class differentiation into society based upon the different skills that men perform. The most ancient of these classes is that of the artisans. However, Plato considers this to be a somewhat inferior class, and goes on to discuss civilized society as being characterised by the addition of the class of Guardians, which are further subdivided into the classes of warriors or auxiliaries and rulers or Guardians proper. These are considered to arise when the community of artisans becomes too large.

The special virtue of the second or warrior class is considered to be courage, and since they should be warlike only in relation to the enemy, society must be protected against their unbridled passions by giving the warriors a good mental education, including gymnastics and music. Since the special virtue of the Guardians or rulers is considered to be wisdom, for them education in gymnastics and music is merely a preparation for the study of philosophy. As wisdom is considered the highest virtue, the good life of the individual arises when this virtue directs all others. Similarly the just state arises when wisdom rules the society in the person of the Guardians.

Utopia therefore occurs when the rulers become philosophers and the philosophers rules. Consequently the education of the Guardians and Auxiliaries is considered to be of the utmost importance and is given a great deal of attention on the part of Plato. The life of the Guardians is fully collectivised. They possess no private property, hold wives and children in common, and share the same living and dining quarters. Parents do not know their own children and propagation is ordered by the Mate to ensure that only the best quality off-spring are born - and so to further the best interests of the state.

Within such a social order, Plato's view of justice is simply that each man should do the one work to which his nature is best suited. This means, of course, that each person should follow in the footsteps of the class into which he was born. Thus the carpenter should confine himself to carpentering and the shoemaker to making shoes. Not much harm is done, however, when two artisans change their natural places. However *should anyone who is by nature an artisan... manage to get into the auxiliary class or should an auxiliary get into the class of Guardians without being worthy of it ... then this kind of change and underhand plotting would mean the downfall of our state.*[40] Plato therefore draws the conclusion that any change in or mingling between the classes must be injustice, and its opposite therefore the justice that he has been seeking. *When each of our three classes does its own job and minds its own business, that is justice and makes our city just*[41].

In a word the wisdom of the rulers was to be of such a character that it prevented the crossing of class barriers and educated people only in a manner that was appropriate to their station in life.

Plato's views have had a strong influence upon the development of Western society. They provided an ideal which was readily able to justify the Feudal class system, with its rigid divisions and education to fit. Moreover the power of this form of society has existed well into the twentieth century. The ideal took upon a more ascetic and mystical tone with the Neoplatonism of the mediaeval period: the Guardians became the monks, nuns and ecclesiastical order generally - living out a collectivised but celibate life wholly devoted to prayer and contemplation - whose supposed superiority earned them the wise oversight of the rest of civilization. {24}

More's Utopia
Plato also exercised a strong influence upon More's 'Utopia'. This work is divided into two parts, the first of which is concerned with a criticism of the society of More's day. The second is the portrayal of a perfect communal life on an imagined island narrated by someone who had, lived there for a period of five years.

The island is shaped like a new moon; its centre is 200 miles wide; its 54 cities, with the exception of the centrally located capital, are all alike, situated a day's journey apart. Each city is divided into four equal portions built around a. market. Streets and houses closely resemble each other; dress is simple and uniform, allowing only for a difference between the sexes and for the married state. Meals can he taken at home, but most inhabitants prefer the common dining halls. The necessities of life can he obtained free of charge from the market; the products of labour are all taken there; nobody takes away too much. Gold and silver are not esteemed, but to journey to another place requires a licence.

The food supply comes mainly from farms, each of which is .manned by forty persons. Each year twenty people are shifted to the city to make room for twenty others, with some elasticity permitted. A working day is of six hours duration, and is preceded by lectures. Although these are not compulsory, they are attended by the whole populace.

More's division of labour and his classes of society correspond quite well with those of Plato. Utopia has three classes, the highest of which is the scholarly class, consisting of those who devoted themselves entirely to study. These are selected from the body of the people during their early education. Everyone else belongs to the class of artisans, who are skilled workers capable of toiling in the factory and on the farm. A separate warrior class does not exist as the citizens of Utopia do not need policing and in the case of invasion every citizen is able to take upon the responsibility of a warrior. The third class consists of slaves, recruited from criminals and foreigners who have fled other lands seeking asylum.. The rulers are selected from the scholarly class; however they are elected by the people.

In More's Utopia private ownership has been abolished, and thus everything has been fully collectivised. However, by contrast with Plato, family life remains intact. Married sons and their wives live with their parents and are governed by their fathers. Once the family becomes too big the sons establish a new family life for themselves.

Ample freedom is allowed in matters of religion, with certain principles being generally acceptable upon the basis of rational proof: faith in God, the immortal soul, the reward of

good deeds and the punishment of evil. Beyond this religion is considered to be a personal matter. The communal gatherings held for regular worship focus solely upon the matters that are held in common, and in this sense take upon a character that bespeaks an unmistakable pride in their way of life.

When the narrator and his comrades tell, the inhabitants about Christ, many are converted and left unmolested. One, however, begins to preach that the Christian religion excells others; for this he is banished from the island. {25}

New Atlantis
Francis Bacon's 'New Atlantis' was published in an incomplete form almost a full century after More's 'Utopia'. It, too, has a connection with Plato. According to Bacon, the Atlantis represented by Plato as a sunken continent in the Atlantic ocean never really vanished, but can be reached by a long and arduous journey over the watery wastes.

To the modern reader, the first things that makes its impression upon reading 'New. Atlantis' is the apparent manner in which the Christian religion provides the basis for life on the island. In this respect it would seem to contrast markedly with More's 'Utopia'. The writer explains that twenty years after the ascension of Christ, a shining cross was seen in the sea by the inhabitants of the island. Moreover, when one of the wise men of the house of Solomon investigated the cross, he received a book containing the Old and New Testaments, and a letter promising the inhabitants of the island peace and goodwill from God and Christ. Thus it is that the inhabitants became Christians. They are made to seem extremely sympathetic and humane and they demonstrate their Christian allegiance by making the sign of the cross.

However, upon closer examination, it is plain that the real centre of attention and source of blessing is the activity emanating from the house of Solomon. The name refers both to the Old Testament king noted for his wisdom and to the philosopher king described by Plato. It was he who established the mode of life on the island, and it was he who instituted the house of Solomon. Through the labour of this house, living conditions are improved, and communal life is freed of its defects. Nothing is left to chance; everything is examined systematically. The results of such investigation serve as the basis for further action and as a means of enlarging man's control over his environment. Some scholars visit foreign lands to assemble the results of science others collect experiments from books; some investigate and gather all the mechanical experiments and practices that may be useful: others engage in performing experiments. Another group tabulates the results collected so that axioms might be established. Next come those who seek a practical application of such axioms. Other scholars draft new and higher experiments and still others apply them.

The wisdom practiced in the house of Solomon has a distinctively modern ring about it. It is in fact less related to the Old Testament character of Solomon and to Plato than to the modern university and technical college. This is the more apparent if Bacon's 'New Atlantis' is compared with another utopia of the period - namely Campanella's 'The City of The Sun' - which envisages a manner of life in an hierarchical order under the Pope in accordance with the universal pantheistic religion based upon a blending of Platonic-

Socratic ideas with Christianity, incorporating astrology, cosmic mysticism and the cabbala.

Two Ideals

It can be said without much fear of contradiction that both 'Utopia' and 'New Atlantis' embody images of forms of society that have exerted a great deal of influence upon the development of the modern world. In 'Utopia' the main emphasis is upon the *organisation* of society upon collectivistic lines through the abolition of private ownership whilst in 'New Atlantis' it is upon the means afforded *by the application of science to technical life* with the intent of controlling nature. However, together these two ideals - the *socialistic* and the *scientific or technical* - have given very powerful substance to the vision with which men and women have been actively trying to give direction to social life over the last two hundred years. {26}

However, before these ideals could exercise this dominant power, very powerful counter-forces had to he conquered. Until the eighteenth century the dominating outlook and its accompanying form of society was extremely resistant to tampering with what it took to be 'the natural order of things'. As Jacques Ellul comments in this matter:

The natural order must not be tampered with and anything new must be submitted to a moral judgment - which meant an unfavourable prejudgment. This was the popular mentality created by Christianity, particularly during the seventeenth century. Closely related to these were sociological taboos, in particular, the conviction that a natural hierarchy exists which nothing can modify. The position of the nobility and the clergy, and above all the King, could not be questioned.... The natural hierarchy operated against the practice of the mechanical arts, which would only bring conveniences to the lower classes. And since the lower classes too believed in the natural hierarchy, they could only be submissive and passive; they did not try to better their lot. The important point here was not the reality of the facts or the existence of the hierarchy; it was the belief in its natural and sacred character which stood in the way of technique.[42]

The change from this attitude necessary for the development of the modern world is very far-reaching. The man who had previously adapted himself to nature and to society had to give way to the man who would adapt nature to his hand and seek an equalitarian levelling in society. Although the contributing features to his change in outlook are extremely complex, I think three fundamental contributing sources may be distinguished: the heritage of millenialism and dissent dating from the mediaeval period, the Reformation largely associated with the names of Luther and Calvin and the movement of Humanism expressed in the Renaissance and associated with such figures as More and Bacon. The relationship between these three movements, and their further impact upon such matters as the growth of modern science, of democracy, of capitalism and of socialism is a complicated one, and attempts to lay such modern features at the feet of any one of these three currents is open to grave charges of over simplification.

However, the contribution of the heritage of millenialism and mediaeval dissent to the growth of the *socialistic ideal* is one of considerable importance, and one which has been considered carefully by Igor Shafarevich in his study of socialism[43]. He writes that the *'history of socialist doctrine can be divided into three periods:*

i) *Socialist ideas were well known in antiquity. The first socialist system, whose influence can be seen in all its countless variations right up to the present, was created by Plato. Through Platonism socialist ideas penetrated to the Gnostic sects which surrounded early Christianity, and also to Manichaeism. In this period the ideas of socialism were propagated in schools of philosophy and in narrow mystical circles.{27}*

ii) *In the Middle Ages socialist ideas found their way to the masses. In a religious guise they were propagated within various heretical movements, the Catharists, the Brethren of the Free Spirit, the Apostolic Brethren, and the Beghards. They inspired several powerful popular movements, for example, the Patarenes of fourteenth century Italy, or the Czech Taborites of the fifteenth century[44]. Their influence was particularly strong during the Reformation and their traces can still be seen in the English revolution in the seventeenth century.*

iii) *Beginning with the sixteenth century, socialist ideology took a new direction. It threw off its mystical and religious form and based itself on a materialistic and rationalist view of the world.... This movement came to its peak in the eighteenth century, the 'Age of Enlightenment'.[45]*

One of the most interesting and significant examples of the transition from (ii) to (iii) above is provided by the Digger movement and its intellectual spokesman, Gerrard Winstanley. He firmly advocated both the abolition of the private ownership of property and formal organization of religion. Moreover, in the course of his development the spiritual climate of his thought made a steady progress from a Christian Theism founded in the Scriptures to a Pantheism that was a peculiar blend of rationalism and mysticism, showing both the influence of More and of the Mediaeval millenialists.[46]

Basic to the development of Western culture since the sixteenth century has been the increasing predomination of the Faustian man, the Prometheus who stole fire from heaven and imposed his will on earth. Doubtless the mediaeval heritage of millenialism and dissent, the Reformation, and the Humanism of the Renaissance have all contributed to the way in which this man has appeared in the West. However, it is of some importance to distinguish the motivating spirit of the Reformation from that of the humanism that has increasingly seen its ideals concretised in the forms of life expressed in More's 'Utopia' and in Bacon's 'New Atlantis'. Amongst many it has become almost axiomatic to lay the blame for the development of the individualistic Faustian man squarely at the feet of the Reformation, especially in its Calvinistic form. Both the rise of capitalism and the rise of the ecological crisis have been traced to Protestantism.[47] It is perhaps worth recalling that both the rise of democracy and the rise of liberty have also at various times been directly attributable to the Reformation. However, as Herbert Butterfield has pointed out, the rise of liberty cannot be attributed to the Reformation alone; it arises from a situation in which there was a clash between diverging viewpoints {28} in which people from both sides advocated tolerance toward the others.[48] Doubtless there is a connection between primitive Calvinism and Puritanism; doubtless too there is a connection between Puritanism and the rise of Democracy, Liberty, Capitalism, Science and Technology. However to presume that this connection is of the kind which would place a direct causative link between the Calvinistic Reformation and any or all of these features of

modernity shows an extremely naive perception of the complex nexus of historical causation.

As far as the Biblical emphasis of the Reformers is concerned, there are two main issues involved. The first concerns man's *individual* responsibility before God, the second, his attitude toward life in this world. Whilst the root of individualism is often attributed to the former the dominating attitude toward nature is usually based upon the calling of man to exercise dominion over the earth given in Genesis Ch. 1:28. Now, the Biblical emphasis of man's *individual* responsibility before God was placed in opposition to the sacerdotal doctrine in which this responsibility was supposed to be born by a priestly class. It was not an emphasis of a *social* kind at all. Within the social realm the Reformers continued to emphasise the communality of human life with its incumbent responsibilities of caring for others. The Biblical emphasis upon vocation was one of restoring the intrinsic dignity to man's labour within the ordinary things of life. This was emphasised over against the supposed superiority of the ascetic, monastic ideal of living so strongly brought out on the part of the mediaeval church. Moreover, although the Reformers taught that material well being could be a sign of God's blessing upon the. labour of men and women, they did not teach any necessary relation between the two.[49]

In this light the immediate effect of the Reformation upon social and cultural life was neither to produce an individualistic form of society nor to bring about a Faustian attitude toward nature. On the contrary it not only emphasised that the body of the people - individually and corporately - were responsible before, God and could approach Him directly through Jesus Christ, it also emphasised that they had the same responsibility before God for life within this world. This had the effect of going some way toward freeing non-ecclesiastical realms of society from the control of the institutional church without leaving them in a merely 'secular' realm. Life in this world had a dignity and significance conferred upon it as men and women were called to see their daily labours as a service of exercising care and dominion over God's creation for His greater glory. To see the control of nature by means of science and technology *as the means of salvation and to thereby bring in the Kingdom of God* was quite foreign to the spirit of the Reformation. However, the spirit of the Reformation was not long in being infected by the ideal of individual liberty espoused by such men as John Locke and the ideal of science and technology espoused so powerfully by such men as Francis Bacon. Indeed it was common by the end of the seventeenth century for the children of the Reformation to be interpreting the Bible and living out their lives in ways that owed a great deal to these ideals. Far from being interpreted as the fruit of the Reformation this development must he considered a denial of its basic spirit. {29}

The ideals of the sovereign freedom of the individual and the seeking of a dominating control over nature do not find their origin in the Christian religion. They have their origin in the humanistic ideal of man as the measure of all things. As such they are ideals of a religious character, giving powerful direction to the life of Western civilization. It is in this sense that the *socialistic* and *technical* ideals expressed in 'Utopia' and 'New Atlantis' have provided images of forms of society that have greatly influenced the actual development of the modern world.

However, these ideals have not always gone hand in hand; on the contrary they have frequently been in opposition to each other. In the century following Bacon there was an increasing emphasis upon *science*. Although this was mainly with regard to what is often termed pure science, there was also an increasing inclination for a scientific approach to technical or practical life. However, Rousseau emphatically denied that the technical or scientific ideal was wholesome for humanity, and rather emphasised the socialistic ideal in the sense of seeing it as the means of realizing human freedom within a reorganised society. This strain was taken up by others subsequent to the French Revolution. Such figures as Saint Simon, Owen and Fourier set about trying to organize the 'new community' of mankind in ways that sought to abolish private ownership. However, they did not deny the technical ideal; they rather sought to develop it under the guidance of the socialistic ideal. Hence they tried to develop industry upon truly communalistic lines.

Usually referred to as *utopian* socialists these figures were succeeded by the *scientific* socialists. In particular Karl Marx brought together the technical ideal and the socialistic ideal in a new way within his general theory of historical materialism. He considered the technical means of controlling nature to be the foundation of all historical development, with the form of society being erected upon its foundations being determined by the way in which men and women were organized in relationship to the ownership of these technical means. Thus the growth in the technical means was the root of development of class conflict. The socialistic ideal, according to Marx, could only be achieved through the technical ideal. Its achievement was to be the destiny of the working class, who though in his time greatly oppressed, would in the development of the class conflict, overthrow their oppressors to be free to realise the socialistic ideal. In this, of course, Marx's thought has great power. However, despite Marx's repeated maligning of utopian socialism, it can scarcely be denied that the appeal of his own version of socialism has generally been because it incorporated a programme to struggle toward a better society for those who were oppressed. In this his thought gave a sense of justice and destiny to those who embraced it. However, as much as the utopian socialists Marx was driven on by a faith in his ideals. His so-called scientific proof of the development of society was simply an investigation of selected facts, seen through glasses that were coloured by the technical and socialistic ideals married according to the rite of the Hegelian dialectic.

The power of these two ideals was evident also in the liberal and non-revolutionary brand of socialism that has been particularly influential in Anglo-Saxon countries. In fact what Marxism and Liberalism had in common - against utopian socialism - was a priority given to the *technical* ideal in the development of human society. Liberalism believed that this would lead to the socialistic ideal by an evolutionary path; Marxism by, a revolutionary one. The ideal of the non-revolutionary path to utopia is well illustrated by the utopian novel 'Looking Backward', by Bellamy, written in 1887. A best-seller, this novel gave great impetus to attempts to move toward the utopian goal. In the face of the appalling social conditions existing toward the end of the century, {30} Bellamy promises a society in the year 2000 in which altruism prevails, maintained by central planning and social control. Trade and industry have grown to even greater and greater lengths, bringing with them greater prosperity and security because of the concentration of organization and control. Capital, trade, industry and labour have all been nationalized: war has been banished, as has the class-struggle, money competition, political parties, lying, intrigue and insecurity. Life is wholly collectivised, and in exchange for their loyal

service of this state-controlled collective, everyone has all his needs provided for - from the cradle to the grave.

Labour is compulsory between the ages of 21 and 45, after which a person is retired. Everyone is at liberty to choose his own vocation, but overemployment is prevented by a central directory relating the attractions and the burdens of every occupation, thereby insuring good employment everywhere. The equal reward of labour is regarded as the restoration of its dignity, and the incentives are provided by a division into classes, accompanied by the bestowing of honours upon those who are promoted. Everyone must start at the bottom. The lowest class consists of unskilled labourers; the second of apprentices; the third of fully-fledged workers subdivided into six groups; the fourth of officers of many ranks, from the lowest to the highest office of the president of the state who is also the chief of the industrial army. Every promotion in class or rank is granted by superiors exclusively upon the basis of a person's qualifications for the job. Elections are held only for the highest ranks, namely, from a generalship over an industrial group up to the presidency. Women work in the same way as men; however, they usually work at a different task and for fewer hours if married with children.

By contrast with Marx, Bellamy wants to restore religion to a position of honour, and the leading character listens to a sermon in the year 2000, not in a church, but at home on the telephone. As a matter of course the church is regarded by him as the brotherhood of all mankind. The theme of the sermon is *progress*. A world of poverty, filth, fraud and injustice, motivated by self-interest has become a world in which wealth, justice and devotion to others reigns. As the result of the transformed conditions men are once more capable of praising God. *The long and weary winter of the race is ended. Its summer has begun. Humanity has burst the chrysalis. The heavens are before us.*

The Twentieth Century
'Looking Backward' marks the very apogee of the late nineteenth century belief in progress - progress understood in the sense of realizing the social ideal of 'Utopia' by means of the technical ideal of 'New Atlantis'.

Science and technique had indeed enriched human life. However, it was soon apparent that wars did not belong to the past. In 1914 the greatest of all wars broke out, and whoever had believed in the triumphal march of humanity had to adjust to the real situation in which violence, deceit, and injustice continued to exercise a strong mastery in human affairs. The certainty of progress has been radically undermined by this and many other events in the twentieth century. This has resulted in a radical reversal of a vital conviction within the hearts of the vast majority of people. The fragrance of western culture with its heroic Faustian man has been dissipated in a storm of crisis. In particular the *socialistic* utopian ideal has been severely undermined. The same, however, cannot be said for the *technical* ideal. Despite the fact that science no longer has quite the same power to enwrap humanity with the prospect of progress, the belief that reality may be brought under man's control by the application of science to technique continues to exercise an immense power in modern life. {31}

The possibilities of its wholesale application to life forms the substance of the utopian novel 'Walden Two' by B.F. Skinner, the well-known and controversial Harvard

psychologist. Walden Two is a community of some thousand people living on farmlands in the United States that have been purchased and adapted for the purpose. Life in the community is entirely collectivised. Even though marriage persists, the family is to all intents and purposes abolished. Children are brought up communally under an educational programme that has been designed by the Educational Planners. The Planning activity with regard to education is typical of the whole life of the community. It functions entirely upon the premise that human life is a matter of behavioural patterns that may be adapted and controlled by the techniques that facilitate them.

People show all the outward signs of being content and in harmony with one another and the community functions very efficiently under the control of the Planners, whose task it is to place the whole mode of living - facet by facet - under continual test by an investigation of all possible new techniques in an attempt to come up with those which produce the 'best` social results. The following extract illustrates how this approach works with regard to what is commonly called 'morals'.

"...You can't foresee all future circumstances, and you can't specify adequate future conduct. You don't know what will be required. Instead you have to set up certain behavioural processes which will lead the individual to design his own 'good' conduct when the time comes. We call that sort of thing 'self-control'. But don't be misled, the control always rests in the last analysis on the hands of society.

One of our Planners, a young man named Simmons, worked with me. It was the first time in history that the matter was approached in an experimental way.... Simmons and I began by studying the great works on morals and ethics - Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, the New Testament, the Puritan divines, Machiavelli, Chesterfield, Freud - there were scores of them. We were looking for any and every method of shaping human behaviour by imparting techniques by self-control. Some techniques were obvious enough, for they had marked turning points in human history. 'Love your enemies' is an example - a psychological invention for easing the lot of an oppressed people. The severest trial of oppression is the constant rage which one suffers at the thought of the oppressor. What Jesus discovered was how to avoid these inner devastations. His technique was to practice the opposite emotion. *If a man can succeed in 'loving his enemies' and 'taking no thought for the morrow', he will no longer be assailed by hatred of the oppressor or rage at the loss of his freedom or possessions. He may not get his freedom or possessions back, but he's less miserable. It's a difficult lesson. It comes late in our program. "*[50]

Education, ethics, work, sex, politics, art, personal relationships... the whole of life in Walden Two is approached from the vantage point of seeking the best techniques to accomplish the behavioural results that have been judged to make men and women 'happy', 'content' and 'secure' in their mutual living together.

The whole mood of the book conveys the impression that the venture is entirely successful in its attempt to produce a utopian society - in the sense of its realising both the *socialistic* and the *technical* or *scientific* ideals. Of the visitors who go to inspect the community, it is significant that those who reject it are a young woman with too much by way of prestige and material benefits to lose, and a philosopher who cannot accept the wholesale 'experiential' attitude of the community. On the other hand, the hero, after duly

weighing up the experiment and what he personally might lose or gain, forsakes all and makes a pilgrimage to join the community. {32}

Despite the fact that the *technical* ideal is basic to both, the mood of 'Walden Two' stands in radical contrast to that of 'Brave New World'. The difference is that whereas 'Walden Two' is still motivated by the *faith* that the technical ideal is the way to achieve the *socialistic* ideal, 'Brave New World' casts the very strong suggestion that the technical ideal has distinctly totalitarian and demonic consequences for human society. In these two visions of the future we are indeed poised between Hell and Utopia.

Two ideals have powerfully shaped the positive form of modern society: the *socialistic* ideal has had a significant embodiment in More's 'Utopia' and the *technical* ideal a most powerful expression in Bacon's 'New Atlantis'. Whilst the former envisages the *redemption of society* being achieved through a social reorganization in political and economic terms, the latter envisages it coming about through man's mastery of nature by means of his science and technology. Although these two ideals belong together in the concrete development of the modern world, in the remainder of the present Chapter I shall focus mainly upon the way in which the *technical* ideal has led the development of modern society. In the next Chapter more emphasis will be placed upon the socialistic ideal, particularly as it is linked with the spirit of revolution.

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY and TECHNIQUE
Modern society is almost unintelligible without an insight into the function of science and technology. These elements constitute its warp and woof, or to update the simile, its cement and reinforcing. However, as both Ellul and van Riessen point out[51], there is a great deal of confusion regarding the relationship between science and technology, with the latter generally being construed as an application of the former. Moreover, Ellul uses the term 'technique' in a different way from 'technology', denoting by it *this or that procedure for attaining an end...* technique is the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency *(for a given stage of development)* in every *field of human activity.*[52] (emphasis his). For him 'technique' embraces both the 'machine' and 'organization', and can neither be identified with the former nor separated from the latter.[53] These confusions call for some clarification of the respective characters of technology and technique in their relation to science, to the machine, to organization and to planning.

'Science' may be ordered in a general way as that activity in which men approach reality with, the purpose of investigating its functioning in relation to some notion of law. This definition would not restrict the area of investigation to what is, more correctly termed *'natural science'.* It calls for a far wider application of the term. However, with regard to whatever area of reality is under investigation, *'science'* is an activity characterised by the quest for understanding derived from investigative and abstracted analysis rooted in our experience of reality. *'Technology',* on the other hand, involves the building or the giving of form to nature by means of tools for human ends. In this sense it is evident that technology need have nothing to do with science. In fact the development of technology preceded the development of science.[54] {33}

The relationship between science and technology goes in both directions. On the one hand science employs technology. This is most evident in the use of experimental apparatus in science. Such apparatus is the *'tool'* with which the scientific investigator proceeds to do his work. Indeed, when the needed technological means are not available, science does not advance. Nevertheless, although science is, in this sense, dependent upon technology, the activity is nonetheless properly called *science* because the technology is employed toward an investigative goal.

On the other hand, technology may employ science in the sense that it may be made the object of investigation with a view to its further development. However, since the manner in which science is brought to bear is qualified by the technological goal, the whole activity is properly called technology rather than science. To differentiate it from *'primitive'* technology, however, it could well be called *'scientific technology'*. In the modern world, the latter has a highly differentiated and dynamic character. For this reason some appreciation of the basic differentiated character of modern technological life is necessary if we are to gain insight into its interaction with the broader social and cultural life of man. The following fundamental features may be distinguished: tools, technological execution and technological design.[55]

'Tools' are technological objects formed by man for the purpose of using them in further technological form-giving. Whether we consider a stone adze, a garden spade or the digital computer, we are fundamentally concerned with tools in this sense.

'Execution or technological form-giving' is the activity in which tools are actually employed to fashion nature toward new designs. This is so whether we are considering a cottage industry, an assembly line in which human workers participate with machines, or a fully automated process which requires men only as technological operators, and from which 'labour' has been entirely eliminated.

'Technological designing or planning' is the elaborate and involved activity preceding the actual execution just described. This is a decisive characteristic of modern technology, and although it has a scientific basis and is characterised by a scientific approach it is nevertheless the case that it is of a technological rather than a scientific nature. Three stages may be distinguished in this activity. In the first the technological problem is described, analyzed and scientifically formulated. In the second existing knowledge is brought together, hearing on technological facts and things which can be expected to be of importance for solving the problem in question. Finally the engineer imaginatively conceives of the solutions to a detail or to the whole of the problem, which he than casts in scientific formulations. Subsequently he positivises the product of his imagination into a concrete design for the execution of the new technological project.

Thus, in relation to *'technology'*, the *'machine'* is a tool used in the process of technological form-giving or execution; 'organization' is the manner in which human beings cooperate and arrange themselves in relation to one another and to the machines involved in the process of technological execution; and 'planning' is the design activity which precedes technological execution.

A great deal of human life is involved with form-giving: bringing up children, medicine, communications, education, politics, law, arts, scholarship are all activities in which men give form to nature, man and society. However, {34} in a day in which the fundamental identity of man is either suppressed, dismissed or placed in doubt, a natural and crucial question arises: in what sense is the form-giving associated with the activities just cited to be distinguished from technology?

It is precisely at, this point that both science and technology encounter the freedom of man, the liberty of choice to go the way that accords with conviction and the responsibility that it entails. Both a deterministic and probabilistic conception of science attempt to come to an 'objective knowledge' of the world through an effective denial of this freedom. Such a viewpoint has dire consequences for a technology and culture so largely influenced by science. As van Riessen writes in this connection:

Freedom is a fundamental limitation of science. Science can but grant freedom recognition and then respect if at a distance by allowing it room. When freedom is denied, because of the belief in a totalitarian science without limits, an erroneous path is taken. Science then becomes entangled in internal contradiction. For if freedom is short-circuited in a theory, then man, the inventor of this theory, as a part of reality, is also conceived of as determined. From this position it is even impossible to raise the question as to whether or not the theory is itself true... Another weakness of a deterministic conception of science is that it has no place for God's leading in history. At best it would be compatible with the conception of a God who confines himself to creation and now lets history run its course like a watch. But on this standpoint, when we leave God out, nothing changes... We are confronted with the question of the relation between the order *of reality enabling science to proceed with its task, the* freedom *of man, and the* providential leading *of God. Is God's leading to be equated with an order of the some character as the laws of science? Surely not. Such an automatization of reality shrinks it into a time-piece. Are we then to conceive of God with Karl Barth as the wildly other, entirely disassociated from the observed order in the cosmos, the orderly course of history? Such an exaggeration, derived from the philosophic theme of eternity and time, is also in conflict with the scriptural data which reveals in so many ways the manner in which God directs and will continue to direct our life. All three elements are to receive our recognition: The order and the laws, enabling us to recognise and build upon God's* faithfulness *our freedom, by which our* responsibility *is established and God's leading which gives power to our* prayer *and prevents our actions from becoming arrogant....*

It is very salutary for our faith to discover that the basic motive of humanism, a humanity that redeems itself and progresses to the sovereign domination of reality, is itself projected into modern science. To many humanists modern science is pre-eminently the means of self redemption..... That is the significance of the abuse of power on the part of science when man is concerned? I have stated above that freedom is a fundamental limitation to science.... Our thesis is essentially changed when science is applied to the formation *of a* future *reality. Science Lays down the law to reality; if it errs in the sense described above, the error will not remain limited to science, as such, but will lead to a malformation in practice. For then* freedom *will be exiled insofar as, and wherever* science is applied to what men shall and shall not do. (emphasis his)[56] {35}

Moreover, once this loss of freedom is accompanied by *a retreat from the Word* that should direct and illuminate the path men should take, and in that sense *'lead'* their cultural form-giving, then indeed we have a situation in which it is very difficult to distinguish, in any fundamental way, between technology on the one hand and education, art, politics, medicine, communications and scholarship on the other. The implications of this loss of insight are nowhere more consistently and starkly apparent than in the outlook espoused as *'behaviourism'*.

That the historical development of this viewpoint is thoroughly rooted in a gross over-estimation of science, is evident from its unqualified acceptance of a Comtean view of history. J.B. Watson, writing in 1925, informs us that, the medicine man, the soothsayer and the prophet of antiquity were lazybones but nonetheless keen observers. They operated with fear and thus knew how to train followers and to keep them under control. Then they organized with the result that religions and churches arose. In these a God to be feared and an individual soul, distinct from the body, played an important role. This soul lingered in science for a long time but psychology has never been able to obtain the soul in a test-tube. Behaviourism therefore abolishes the soul, preferring to deal with what it calls 'human behaviour'. Taking its cue from natural science behaviourism wants to describe this 'behaviour' in terms of causal phenomena - between a chain of stimulants and reactions.[57] This sounds comparatively innocent if behaviourism is to be construed as science, in the sense that it is concerned primarily with *'inquiry'*. However, that it is more concerned with technology in the sense of *'controlling what'* it calls 'human behaviour' is evident from the manner in which B.F. Skinner advocates dealing with the growing problems of our time.

In trying to solve the terrifying problems that face us in the modern world today, we naturally turn to the things we do best. We play from strength to strength, and our strength is science and technology. To contain a population explosion we look for better methods of birth control. Threatened by a nuclear holocaust, we build bigger deterrent forces and anti-ballistic-missile systems. We try to stave off world famine with new foods and better ways of growing them. Improved sanitation and medicine will, we hope, control disease; better housing and transportation will solve the problems of the ghetto, and new ways of reducing or disposing of waste will stop the pollution of the environment. We can point to remarkable achievements in all these fields, and it is not surprising that we should try to extend them. But things grow steadily worse and it is disheartening to find that technology itself is increasingly at fault.... The application of the physical and biological sciences alone will not solve our problems because the problems lie in another field. Better contraceptives will control population only if people use them.... New methods of agriculture and medicine will not help if they are not practiced, and housing is a matter not only of buildings but of how people live. Overcrowding can he corrected only by inducing people not to crowd and the environment will continue to deteriorate until polluting practices are abandoned.

In short, we need to make vast changes in human behaviour... It is not enough to "use Technology with a deeper understanding of human issues', or 'to dedicate technology to man's spiritual needs' or to 'encourage technologists to look at human problems'. Such expressions imply that where human behaviour begins, technology stops.... What we need is a technology of behaviour.[58] {36}

Skinner develops his theories on the control of human behaviour in the remainder of his book, the central theme of which is the need to build upon a 'scientific' view of man with regard to organizing society and human relations. However, as Skinner himself admits,

The picture (of man) which emerges from a scientific analysis is not of a body with a person inside, but of a body which is a person in the sense that it displays a complex repertoire of behaviour. The picture is, of course, unfamiliar. The man thus portrayed is a stranger, and from the traditional point of view he may not seem to be a man at all. "For at least one hundred years", said Joseph Wood Krutch, "we have been prejudiced in every theory, including economic determinism, mechanistic behaviourism, and relativism, that reduces the stature of man until he ceases to be man at all in any sense that the humanists of an earlier generation would recognise"...what is being abolished is autonomous man - the inner man, the homunculus, the possessing deomon, the man defended by the literatures of freedom and dignity. His abolition has been long overdue.

Autonomous man is a device used to explain what we cannot explain in any other way. He has been constructed from our ignorance, and as our understanding increases, the very stuff of which he is composed vanishes. Science does not dehumanise man it de-homuneulises him, and it must do so if it is to prevent the abolition of the human species. man qua *man we readily say good riddance. Only by dispossessing him can we turn to the real causes of human behaviour. Only then can we turn from the inferred to the observed, from the miraculous to the natural, from the inaccessible to the manipulable.*[59]

Thus, in the name of science Skinner seeks to abolish human freedom. His use of the word 'science', however is simply an attempt to ascribe a superiority to his views upon the basis of their supposed appeal to the 'empirical phenomena' as opposed to mere 'speculation'. In truth, however, he is setting forth a viewpoint of man-in-the-world in which the difference between technological and non-technological form-giving has been fundamentally eroded. The result is that men are viewed not as *acting* in freedom with a call to responsibility in their form-giving; rather they are viewed as *behaving* in a manner that is presumed to be technologically determined by environmental conditioning. The impression is given, therefore, that man's problems are all of a technological nature, with solutions to be sought in the discovery of the appropriate environmental and educational techniques.

It might be argued that the case of behaviourism is an extreme one. I would reply by suggesting that this particular movement of thought has succeeded in clearly articulating the dominant ideal that has shaped the modern West. It is for this reason that 'more moderate' advocates of the technological ideal find behaviourism very difficult to refute, for, whilst they may be nobly trying to resist the full implications of the cultural ideal they have embraced, they have no principled means of opposing its implications.

I think that the above-cited erosion of the distinction between technological and non-technological form-giving implicit in behaviourism is the root of what Jacques Ellul calls *technique*. Technique may be described as the technological aspect of human form-giving. Whether it be with reference to speaking, walking, cooking, playing the 'cello or making love, all human life requires the mastery of some feature of nature. In the sense

just described {37} therefore, technique may properly be considered as the technological means toward an end that is not itself technological. We may therefore speak of educational, artistic, economic, medical and legal techniques insofar as the latter are properly directed towards goals that are educational, artistic, economic, medical and legal in the sense that such goals may be distinguished from what is technological. However, once human form-giving either loses sight of its non-technological ends or inhibits the God-given freedom of man in responsibly realizing such ends, then the technological aspect of human form-giving becomes absolutized and it is in this sense that the word 'technique' is used by Ellul in his *book 'The Technological Society'*. He claims that modern civilization *'is first and foremost a civilization of means' and that whereas without exception in the course of history,* technique belonged to a civilization *and was merely a single element among a host of non-technical activities, Today* technique has taken over the whole of civilization.[60] (emphasis his).

This leads to a modern civilization that is at once totalitarian and fragmented. It is fragmented because of the ultra-specialization into the many and diverse techniques requiring hosts of specialist technicians to administer them. It is totalitarian because of the absolutization of means to the neglect of ends. *Thus*, as Ellul himself writes, *'a science of means comes into being - a science of techniques, progressively elaborated. This science extends to greatly diverse areas; it ranges from the act of shaving to the act of organizing the landing in Normandy, or to cremating thousands of deportees. Today no human activity escapes this technical imperative. There is a technique of organization, just as there is a technique of friendship and a technique of swimming. Under the circumstances it is easy to see how far we are from confusing technique and machine. And, if we examine the broader areas where this search for means is taking place, we find three principal subdivisions of modern technique, in addition to the mechanical and the forms of intellectual technique (card indices, libraries, and so on).*

1. Economic Technique *is almost entirely subordinated to production, and ranges from the organization of labour to economic planning. This technique differs from others in its object and goal. But its problems are the same as those of all other technical activities.*

2. The Technique of Organization *concerns the great masses and applies not only to commercial or industrial affairs of magnitude (coming, consequently, under the jurisdiction of the economic) but also to states and to administration and police power. This organizational technique is also applied to warfare and insures the power of an army at least as much as its weapons. Everything in the legal field also depends on organizational technique.*

3. Human Technique *takes various forms, ranging all the way from medicine and genetics to propaganda (pedagogical techniques, vocational guidance, publicity etc.) Here man himself becomes the object of technique.*[61]

Ellul endeavours within the course of his book to bring evidence in support of the all-encompassing manner in which 'technique' dominates each of these areas of modern life. Whilst the evidence is compelling I think that Ellul may justly be accused of being 'too pessimistic.' I say this for three reasons. First, he fails to draw attention to the many benefits that have been brought about through the growth in technology (medical science

and medical technology being a good case in point); secondly he is prone to let his major thesis colour everything he touches, resulting in a failure to give the shafts of light penetrating the darkness their proper due. Finally, although he recognizes that the conditions he describes could be changed by means of some other {38} cultural imperative capturing the allegiance of mankind[62], he does not himself offer such an alternative. This is particularly surprising in view of Ellul's own Christian confessional standpoint. These qualifications notwithstanding however, Ellul has placed his finger upon the main cultural imperative of our time in a way that vividly exposes the way in which its vision of Utopia is potentially a *'Brave New World'.*

THE GROWTH OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Although the ideal of the *'Technological Society'* had been well expressed in Bacon's 'New Atlantis', it encountered some considerable resistance before it assumed its present dominant position. In this connection I have already made mention of the way in which the traditional outlook upon nature and society was such as to inhibit the growth of the dominance of technique[63] In addition the *'universal'* ideal of Renaissance humanism was opposed both to a specialisation of learning that lost sight of its universal context and to a surrendering of ends to means. Ellul comments upon the significance of this for the growth of *technique* in the seventeenth century in the following terms:

Society was at a crossroads. More and more the need was felt to create new means; even the structure these must take was clearly perceived. But the framework of society, the ideas in currency, the intellectual positions of the day were not favourable to their realization. It was necessary to employ technical means in a framework foreign to them; these techniques were powerless to force a decision or to eliminate outmoded means. They ran up against the profound humanism, issue of Renaissance humanism, which still haunted the seventeenth century - it believed not only in knowledge and respect for the human being but in the genuine supremacy of man over means. This humanism, bound up with the idea of universalism, did not allow techniques to grow. Men refused to conform to any uniform law, even when it operated for their own good. This refusal was found in all strata of society: in the most complex way when finance directors and parliamentary counselors refused to utilize new and precise techniques of accounting and legislative supremacy; in the most summary way when the peasants rejected new and rational methods of recruitment proposed for the army. The world had to wait for the eighteenth century to see technical progress suddenly explode in every country and in every area of human endeavour.[64]

Ellul goes on to discuss five factors that were significant in the transformation of civilization by *technique*: the fruition of a long technical experience; a population expansion; a suitable economic environment; the plasticity, of the social milieu; and the appearance of a clear technological intention.[65] However, although such features as the long technical experience, the growth in population and the immediate economic circumstances were certainly necessary for the social realization of the *technical ideal* it was the basic change in the dominant spiritual climate of the eighteenth century that produced the conditions in which the latter could flourish. I have already given some consideration to the growth of the *technical ideal* as embodying a clear technological intention[66]. The change in social plasticity is related to the ideal of individual liberty,

associated with the growth of liberalism.[67] In this latter connection Ellul himself, writing with particular reference to Revolutionary France, claims that – {39}

A systematic campaign was waged against all natural groups, under the guise of a defense of the rights of the individual; for example, the guilds, the communes, and federalism were attacked, this last by the Girondists. There were movements against religious orders and against the privileges of Parliament, the Universities, and the Hospitalers. There was to be no liberty of groups, only of the individual. There was likewise a struggle to undermine the family. Revolutionary legislation promoted its disintegration; it had already been shaken by the philosophy and the fervours of the eighteenth-century. Revolutionary laws governing divorce, inheritance, and paternal authority were disastrous for the family unit, to the benefit of the individual. And these effects were permanent, in spite of temporary setbacks. Society was already atomized and would be atomized more and more. The individual remained the soul sociological unit, but, far from assuring him freedom, this fact provoked the worst kind of slavery.[68]

The social plasticity of Anglo-Saxon society occurred in a somewhat different manner. There the Reformation had had a profound effect upon the rigid mediaeval form of society with firstly Puritanism and then Liberalism contributing to the limitation of the power of the monarch.

Moreover, although nonconformity was eventually permitted, it was nevertheless made very difficult for practicing nonconformists to hold positions of public office within the life of the nation. Nonconformists tended therefore to become merchants and traders, and at the same time tended to become associated with the growing Lockean liberalism with respect to economic life. As Ellul comments

In the eighteenth century, England was essentially mobile and unstable in all its structures. Christianity itself was not the conservative force it proved to be on the continent. Two great currents divided English society before the advent of Methodism: the Church of England the Puritans. The Puritans, even after their political failure, were the predominant influence. In keeping with the trend set by the Reformation, they exploded all prevailing religious taboos and developed a practical and utilitarian mentality that emphasized the use and even the exploitation of the good things of this world given by God to men. The relationship of this trend to the development of capitalism is well known[69]. The Church of England had favoured tolerance since the end of the eighteenth century and had adopted as its leading principle Bishop Warburton's idea of social utility. Here, too, there was a kind of secularization of religion. Religion is no longer the framework of society; it can no longer impose its taboos or forms upon it. Rather, it integrates itself into society, adjusts to it, and adopts the notion of social utility as criterion and justification. At the same time the disintegration and atomization of English social groups occurred - brought about not so much by the influence of the State (as in France) as by the destruction of peasant society which began in the early eighteenth century and of which Defoe and Swift were such eloquent witnesses.

The peasant commune and the peasant family were slowly ruined in the eighteenth century. The historian notes the collapse, relentless and more rapid in France, of a whole

society which had been in equilibrium until then. The struggle between the landed and the moneyed interests ended with the victory of the moneyed interests.[70]{40}

There was one major difference between the outlook of the feudal form of society and that of the liberalism that so strongly shaped the initial forms of industrial society in England and France. In the former the bonds of fealty between lord and vassal were considered to be mutual. The lord was assumed to bear a responsibility for the wellbeing of the people dwelling on his land in exchange for their allegiance and faithful service. No such bonds' of fealty existed in the liberal outlook. Those in the possession of the capital required to finance the growth of technology in industry saw little need to take responsibility for the dispossessed mass of workers seeking some form of sustenance from the sale of their labour in the factories. Although liberalism was undoubtedly led by a social ideal of individual liberty it indeed came to mean a liberty for those who had the necessary capital power to employ others. A worker could not be free. Moreover those in possession of such capital usually considered it their inalienable right to the absolute ownership of industry thereby grossly distorting any biblical ideal of stewardship and responsibility for the welfare of 'fellow labourers' (i.e. the workers) in a common industrial enterprise.

The initial growth of the *technical ideal* applied to society was therefore both promoted by and associated with a social ideal of the individual liberty of the landowner and the possessor of capital. However, despite other differences it has been the common hope of Liberals, Marxists and Democratic Socialists that by means of science and technology to human society humanity would overcome its difficulties so that an undisturbed, harmonious human fellowship would arise.

With regard to the character of the influence of this technical development upon modern society, three phases may be distinguished. They correspond to the bringing of each of the three differentiated aspects of technology - tools, *execution* and *design* - to bear upon the 'scientific' organization of society as a whole. Only the first of these three phases may be said to belong properly to technology as such. The latter two derive their 'technological' character from the way in which the *technical* ideal has led the actual development of the positive form of so much of modern society. Thus as long as 'technique' is restricted to technology proper its ills will be seen only in relation to the first phase.[71] In the second two phases, however, 'technique' is applied to man and to human society in such a way as to view *all* cultural form-giving as primarily *technological* in character. Whether this has been done in the interests of being 'practical', of furthering the advance of the socialist ideal, of 'scientific detachment', or of a precision of analysis supposedly afforded by mechanical-scientific models of reality that do not seriously reckon with the reality of human freedom and responsibility, is of secondary significance. What American Pragmatism and Soviet Marxism have in common is this committment to the primacy of technology in all cultural form-giving.

THE MACHINE
The first phase of the development of 'The Technological Society' concerns technology proper and relates primarily to the development of the *tool*. In this phase science is brought to bear upon technology insofar as the latter is directed toward the control of nature irrespective of man. It is pre-eminently associated with the development of the

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machine and covers the bulk of the nineteenth century. Technologically this was accompanied by the division of design and execution into different hands, with the consequence that the crafts-man of former times was differentiated into the engineer and factory worker. {41}

Sociologically it shaped the plastic conditions prevailing at the end of the century into a situation in which a relatively small number of individuals with capital power employed a large body of dispossessed workers in a manner that was very different from the bonds of fealty that existed within the feudal order of society. The conditions of the workers was appalling, leading to the development of Trade Unions, a form of society bearing some relation to the mediaeval guild, yet at the same time having a very different background and purpose - reflecting both the nineteenth century industrial conditions and the ideological conflicts associated with them.

Thus the fact that the first phase of the development of 'the technological society' was associated with the machine does not mean that it had no sociological or environmental impact. The formation of the latter may not have been subject to techno-scientific analysis, however whilst the form of social life tended to be strongly influenced by the growth of liberal individualism at the expense of the breakdown of the feudal hierarchy, it tended, by default to treat men like machines. Moreover, there has been an increasing tendency to develop the specifically technological environment in a manner that takes insufficient account of the overall aesthetic relationship between technology and nature.[72] Indeed, the fact that this has only received attention since the *ecology* of the natural environment has been threatened is sufficient commentary upon the continued aesthetic insensitivity of the ruling technocratic elite.

ORGANISATION
The second phase in the development of 'the technological society' is one in which the focus of attention for 'scientific' scrutiny is upon *man in production*. It derives from that part of technology which I have already described as *execution* or technological form-giving. Although the development of modern tools such as steam engines, lathes, looms and presses had removed much of the uncertainty in the production of goods, *man in production* was still very much an uncertain and uncontrolled factor. The control of labour and the common effort was not complete; a 'scientific' approach to the organization of the common effort in labour was needed. If men were treated as part of the machinery then a scientific analysis of the total production process quickly leads to the conclusion that articles may be mass-produced if each man does many simple operations of the same kind, leaving it for the next man to add his bit to the job. Thus the *assembly line* was born. With it another important area of the industrial enterprise was made accessible to scientific management and control.

In the course of time this sphere has been further expanded and more intensively controlled. The first definitive result was the *Taylor* system of 'scientific' management with its productivity analysis, its study of elementary notions and of the time required for them, the study of the physical conditions of the job and of waste incentives. The greater the degree of control the greater the certainty of future production. And, because from the 'scientific' point of view the most economical method of operation could thus be prescribed it was supposed that this was the way in which the maximum of production

could be reached. The problem is, of course, that in taking for its object this 'science' has not recognised the full creaturely integrity of man the image-bearer of God, but has reduced him to a technological abstraction. Moreover, it is the analysis based upon such abstractions that are then used as the basis for efficiently organizing man's productive activity. This is exactly the mark of the predominance of 'technique' in the organization of human society. {42}

The devaluation involved in this process is immense. The scientific organization of the division of labour carried through consistently produces a situation in which mass production assigns a very elementary function to the individual worker; a simple operation that must be repeated with the regularity of clockwork every minute of the hour, every hour of the day, every day of, the week, every week of the year. Then by technical means it is generally possible to integrate these elementary functions into one total process of production. The example of the moving chain in the freezing works is a good example of the way in which this is done. In such a situation man's vision of life is narrowed, tending to be shaped by his rigid function on the 'job'; he has little contact with both the final product and the person who uses it; he has little freedom in his *'work'*; virtually no responsibility and is called to, exercise a minimum of initiative.

F.W. Taylor, usually called the father of scientific management, has declared before a committee of inquiry that his idea of scientific management in the workshop was not in the first place concerned with analysis by means of the chronometer, with specialization, with an increase in efficiency, the lowering of costs, greater profits, higher wages and the like. He had in view a mental revolution of the workers and managers according to which he would change their sense and understanding of their mutual obligations in their work and their sense of industry.[73] Scientific management involving a rigid division of labour integrated by means of *'technique'* would produce a mentality in which men would cooperate and have security at the expense of freedom and responsibility. It is crucial at this point not to identify *'technique'* with *'mechanical technique'*. In its initial development the assembly line doubtless was very much of the latter character, with workers very much becoming part of the machinery. Although this situation has by no means been abandoned, it has since come under considerable criticism from management theorists. However, by far the greater part of the discussion continues to be of a technical kind. Mechanical techniques may have given way to social and psychological techniques, however, the implicit life context for discussing the meaning and purpose of man-at-work is still one that is defined by technique[74].

Although the assembly line began as a means of the organization of social life within the specific context of *industry* it embodies two features that are of some significance with respect to the general development of *'the technological society'*. The first is with regard to the way in which any ideal of individualism, and independence is countered and replaced by an organizational ideal. The second is with regard to the hyper-specialized manner in which any individual is required to make his contribution to the patterns of organized life.

We have already taken note of the basic intention of F.W.Taylor in his management theories. They required a basic change in attitude wherein the individual worker was required to cooperate in a fairly minimal 'job', gaining an efficiency and a relationship to

an 'organized' workforce. W. H. Whyte's *'The Organization Man'* is a by now classic study of the way in which *'technique'* has affected the organization of life in modern times. The replacement of the ideal of individualism by an organisationalism is one of the basic features of his thesis. The first part of his book is concerned with the decline of the Protestant ethic', with its outlook of independence, hard work and rugged individualism, and its replacement by the social ethic of *'The Organisation Man'*. The terms in which many authors discuss this change are typified by the following quote from F. Tannenbaum's *'A Philosophy of Labour'*. They idolise {43} the communality of the mediaeval period and bewail the encumbent evils of the industrial revolution brought by individualism.

'Membership in a guild, manorial estate, or village protected man throughout his life and gave him the peace and serenity from which could flow the mediaeval art and craft. The life of man was a nearly unified whole. Being a member of an integrated society protected and raised the dignity of the individual and gave each person his own special role. Each man, each act, was part of a total life drama, the plot of which was known and in which the part allotted to each was prescribed. No one was isolated or abandoned. His individuality and his ambitions were fulfilled within the customary law that ruled the community to which he belonged.

The Industrial Revolution destroyed the solid moorings of an older way of life and cast the helpless workers adrift in a strange and difficult world. The peasant who had been reared in the intimacy of a small village... now found himself isolated and bewildered in a city crowded with strangers and indifferent to a common rule. The symbolic universe that had patterned the ways of men across the ages in village, manor, or guild had disappeared. This is the great moral tragedy of the industrial system[75]

Individualism is thus discredited and the task is seen as one of recreating the belongingness of the Middle Ages with the means of scientific techniques. Whyte himself suggests that there are three fundamental building blocks for this ideology: scientism, belongingness and togetherness.

'The first denominator is scientism. This is the practical part of the social ethic, for it is the promise that with the same techniques that have worked in the physical sciences we can eventually create an exact science of man. In one form or another it has had a long and dismal record of achievement; even its proponents readily admit that the bugs are appalling. But this has not shaken the faith in scientism, for it is essentially a utopian rather than a technical idea.*'*[76](emphasis mine).

'The job is to recreate the belongingness of the Middle Ages. What with the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution and other calamities, the job is immensely more difficult than it was in those former days. But with new scientific techniques we can solve the problem. *What we must do is to learn consciously to achieve what once came naturally. We must form an elite of skilled leaders who will guide men back, benevolently, to group belongingness'*[77]. (emphasis added).

It is in these somewhat ironic terms that Whyte goes on to discuss the ways in which men like Elton Mayo, Lloyd Warner and others have endeavoured to tackle the problems of

rootlessness and estrangement, first in the industrial worker and subsequently in the broad spectrum of organisational life. Their diagnosis is that each individual needs to feel he belongs to the organization. They seek to achieve this by means of a variety of counselling techniques and vocational guidance programmes. However, the human relations doctrine they advocate must not infringe upon the beliefs of individuals. The counsellors must not push anyone around, argue with anyone, or have any philosophy save that of the need to belong. Through the scientific application of human relations, the neutralist technician will guide the individual into a satisfying solidarity with the group. This is to be done so skilfully and so unobtrusively that the individual has no awareness of his being made to feel {44} that he belongs. Moreover, it is not enough simply to belong; the organization man must participate in a togetherness with his colleagues, for it is again believed that science has proved the group to be far more than the mere sum of its individual members.[78]

The *'scientific-technical'* basis of human relationships within this picture of organizational life is quite evident. The same is true of the second feature of the influence of *'technique'* upon the organization of modern life: its specialization. In comparison with the organization of industry in the period prior to modern mass production, the individual tasks, with the notable exception of a comparatively small percentage, require relatively less skill and training on the part of the individual worker. A century ago it took many years and considerable native aptitude to make a skilled general mechanic of the kind who then made engines or buildings or carriages or tools or machines. Today it takes a much shorter time even for a so-called skilled worker to learn the necessary skills to take his place in the assembly line. On the other hand there are a number of tasks requiring very great skill and training. Moreover, whilst the growth in this specialized knowledge in both science and technology has been phenomenal, it has been accompanied by a general 'de-facto' acceptance of the Comtean law of three stages in history. According to this view both religion and philosophy, in the sense of providing an integrated overview of life, have been superseded by the positive sciences. However, with the evergrowing plurality of the sciences this ultra-specialization is not accompanied by an integrating perspective of life that itself rises above science and technique. The result is that even the tasks of the well qualified people take upon an 'assembly-line' quality. Each provide their little bit of technical expertise toward a culture and a society that has no other unity than its commitment to such a way of doing things.

Thus it is that science and technique have become the new 'integrating factors' in modern life. However the connecting element in human organization should never be simply a technical matter. If it is truly an association of human beings then they must participate together in a common activity that is united in a sense of purpose *'beyond'* technique. This holds true for the fellowship of love within the family; the jural aims of the State; the worshipping, confessional community of the Church; the investigational aims of the university; and the production goals of the factory. Moreover, each of these particular social institutions functions in an. overall social context in which its own character must relate to those of others. Hence any proper sense of concrete purpose of any one such human organization can only be properly appreciated within the concrete setting of the whole. Appeals to the mediaeval situation of the sort discussed above generally omit the crucial factor that organization in mediaeval life was never simply a technical matter. The organization of guild, church, family, feudal estate etc. were set within a total life context

that transcended not only the immediate organization and the techniques associated with it, but also the very context of human life itself. This situation has been radically altered by the modern technoscientific attitude, in which matters having to do with the purpose of life and the proper aims of any specific societal form are lost sight of through being accorded only individual significance. Thus, having passed from an individualistic to an organizationalistic society, matters of purposes and aims of such organized forms of societal life continue to be individualistic whilst their 'communal' basis for operation is of a technical-scientific kind. The result is the domination of technique and a communal loss of in-sight with regard to their proper tasks. This situation is nowhere more {45} clearly evident than in conflicts between the government and the trade union. In modern democratic societies both are very powerful organizations and aside from a proper appreciation of their respective tasks, conflicts of brute power can develop. These are technical in origin because the basis of organisation in each case is such to obscure insight into their respective tasks and hence provide proper limits to their legitimate use of power.

Nevertheless, mere technique is well able to establish relationships between people, particularly if the *nature* of the social ties in a human relationship in an organization are viewed as secondary to the *stability* of the institutional forms which are supposed to sustain their life. Moreover it is obviously more efficient and economical to sacrifice the bond of participation in the terms of the meaning and purpose of a societal relationship to a bond of merely technical means. Science and technique are able to bundle a far greater number of people together with almost no questions being asked. However the appearance of social unity thereby obtained is merely technical in character.

Planning
The third phase in the development of 'the technological society' may be distinguished by its relationship to that facet of technology we have identified as *'design'* or *'planning'*. Since the organization of modern society is upon the basis of science and technique, we have here to bear in mind not only the planning related to technology proper, but also the planning that has to do with *'the organization of society'*. In this latter respect the growing centralization of modern society is of particular significance in which fewer and fewer people are involved in the decisions affecting not only the contours but also the very content of the lives of millions. Its basis of organization upon science and technique is the fundamental cause. For, by this means vast numbers of people may be brought together in a way in which principled questions regarding the nature and task of the organization (be it a trade union, a university, a teachers association, a political party or a church) may be suppressed, allowing the active few in the leader-ship to manipulate the organization according to whatever principles (suppressed of course) they espouse. In addition to this form of centralization *within* the different forms of social life there is also a tendency toward centralization in a more total sense. It has two main causes: the ways in which the spheres of the State and of industry and commerce have come to dominate and penetrate every other human activity, and the ways in which State and economic life have themselves increasingly interpenetrated since the second World War. J. K. Galbraith has commented extensively upon such developments in modern life in his book 'The New Industrial State'. In the version of this that was broadcast as the B.B.C. Keith Lectures, Galbraith said that:

'The last seventy years, and especially those since Hitler's war, have been a time of great change in the basic arrangements of economic life... Machines have extensively replaced crude manpower, and one machine increasingly instructs other machines in the process we call automation. Industrial companies have become very large. They are no longer directed by great entrepreneurs as a right of ownership. They are guided impersonally by their staff. They deploy large amounts of capital, much of which they derive from their own earnings. This is now the important modern source of savings. We do not allow income needed for industrial expansion to get into the hot and eager hands of those who might use it for personal consumption.... These companies are {46} also at considerable pains to persuade the customer what he should buy everyone agrees on consumer sovereignty in principle but that does not mean that anyone trusts it in practice. Finally, even in countries such as the United States, where faith in free enterprise is one of the minor branches of theology, the state plays an increasing role in affairs. It stabilizes aggregate demand or purchasing power; it underwrites expensive technology such as the development of supersonic transports and similar misfortunes; it restrains wages and prices to prevent inflation; it provides the technical and presumptively educated manpower that modern industry requires; and it is the State that buys upwards of a fifth of all that the economy produces. It is fascinating to reflect that in the allegedly unplanned and capitalist economy of the United States the State plays a very much Larger role in almost every facet of economic activity, including the share of all goods produced and consumed, than in the avowedly planned and socialist economy of India.'[79]

In the nineteenth century the State generally interfered very little in the affairs of economic life. This situation is generally interpreted by Marxists as evidence for the way that the State was supporting the interests of the ruling class - those who owned the capital necessary to finance the growth of industry. Moreover, upon the basis of their analysis of the growing conflict of class interest, Marxists confidently expected this form of economic life to produce social conditions that, would give way to the advent of socialism upon a world-wide scale.

The early part of the twentieth century certainly came into the kind of economic crisis anticipated by the Marxists. Moreover this crisis has resulted in a complete turnabout in the relationship between the State and economic life that prevailed in the nineteenth century. In the given circumstances, the State could have taken a course that was intent upon breaking up and spreading the concentration of economic power whilst itself possibly assuming a larger part of the economic power only upon a temporary basis. However, whilst this course has at times been followed - examples are the anti-trust laws in the United States and the Monopolies Commission in Great Britain - on the whole governments have followed a slow but sure path that has meant the entanglement of economic life with political power in a big way.

It is ironic that the countries in which this tendency toward the interpenetration of the State and economic life is most marked goes under the name of 'socialism`. It is true, of course, that one of the main ideals of socialism is bound up with the socialization of the means of production. This primacy of economic demands in the principles of socialism was emphasised in 'The Communist Manifesto' of Marx and Engels in the words '...*Communists can state their theory in one proposition: the destruction of private property*.' According to the socialistic *ideal* people should hold things in common and

cooperate in such a way as not to exploit one another. In this sense it envisages the element of compulsion associated with power of the state as being done away with. As such, there are two main problems with the socialistic ideal. The first is that it views evil as resulting solely from the economic form of society, the second that its account of the different forms of social life - State, family, church etc. - is given simply in the terms of the 'ideological constructs' of men in relation to the economic form of society.[80] {47}

In reality socialism has worked out very differently to its ideal. The abolition of private property may have resulted in the abolition of the very poor. However, ownership has fallen into the power of the State and the State is in the sole hands of *'the party'* which *'manages, plans and directs the whole of life'*. Thus it is precisely the element of *compulsion* in the cooperative effort that is dominant. Moreover, in the sense that the lives of the masses are so totally 'planned' by the party elite, the modern 'socialist' state is the very apogee of 'the technological society'.

In this respect, although the forms of society in the 'democratic' countries have some marked differences, they also exhibit some marked similarities. Private ownership still exists. However, its character has changed drastic-ally since the nineteenth century: the State has taken upon itself the task of redistributing wealth through the tax system; and large amounts of capital are owned by monetary and industrial corporations as such. The latter continue to be supported by shareholders but nowhere near to the extent they were in the nineteenth century. Of significance in this respect is the fact that the control over capital is no longer in the hands of those who *own* it but in those who *manage* it.

Despite the characteristics of those societies espousing 'socialism' and the changed character of those societies espousing 'democracy' it is still common practice to distinguish them upon the basis of their economic systems - as either socialist or capitalist. Upon the basis of the common trends within each of these forms of society, there is something fundamentally wrong with the continued adherence to this analysis, which is, in any case, largely due to Marx. This is one reason why the book *'The Managerial Revolution'*[81] written in 1940 by the former Marxist James Burnham, is rich in insight regarding the economic form of the society that was and still is universally taking shape in the second half of the twentieth century. A one-time collaborator with Trotsky, Burnham abandoned the strict canons of Marxism without jettisoning the key features of a view of history that was rooted in the class struggle. He argues, in effect, that *ownership* of the means of production is *not* the key issue. Rather it is *control* over the means of production. Under feudalism and capitalism, ownership may have implied control but the developments in technology and in the organization associated with it have made it untenable for this assumption to go unchallenged. He agreed with the Marxists that capitalism was collapsing; however he disagreed with them in their assumption that the form of society that was supplanting capitalism could be called socialist. Instead he suggested that the economic form of society that was universally replacing capitalism was one to be described as a *'managerial society'*. Since he cited not only Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany, but also America' New Deal (and doubtless would also include the Welfare State in all its forms) as developing types of 'managerial society' the book proved most unpopular in all circles during the 1940's. This is understandable since it seemed to make nonsense of the issues to which the war effort was devoted. Burnham's weakness is that he considers the economic form of society to be

all determinative, with political differences as merely 'ideological' reflections of the economic basis.

However, despite this bias, which he inherits from Marx, Burnham's analysis is, in retrospect, very illuminating, precisely because it focusses upon what modern 'capitalism' and 'socialism' have in common rather than wherein they differ. The distinctive features of the *'managerial'* form of society are twofold: a transference of the power over the means of production from the owners of capital to those actually in the positions of managing and planning {48} the enterprise; and a growing alignment of mutual interpenetration between the State and economic life. In terms of a view of history based upon a class analysis related to the *control* (as opposed to the *ownership*) of the means of production, Burnham argues that a fundamental change has taken place. Whereas capitalism involves a control of the means of production by the owners of capital, and a free reign given to them on the part of the State, managerial society involves a control of the means of production by the *'managers'* of industry with support being given to them on the part of the State.

The remarkable thing is that even allowing for the differences in fundamental viewpoint, Burnham's analysis has much in common with that developed more recently by J.K. Galbraith in *'The New Industrial State'*. The latter argues, with particular reference to the large modern corporation, that it is the managers, engineers and technologists who control the means of production, the designing of future projects, the market, and hence so much of modern life.

Due to the sophistication and specialization of technology required for modern production, the corporation now plans its production lines in advance. This planning activity is directed neither by consumers nor by shareholders, but is undertaken by the managers working in concert with the technicians and engineers. The share-holders are satisfied with the return of a regular flow of profits; however they no longer control the activity of the enterprise. The march toward expansion, growth and improvement is in the hands of the planners and designers. It is essentially a collective activity, requiring the expertise of a large number of skilled personnel who bring their technical gifts to bear upon the development of the enterprise. They are bound by the cultural ideal of *'technique'*, and accordingly plan the pattern of life for the consuming population whom they must persuade to purchase their goods. To achieve this it is necessary to develop techniques of advertising. In a. market economy, advertising has the simple function of making known what products people have for sale, taking it for granted that the consumer has the final say. However, this situation leaves the planned economy in a situation of far too much uncertainty. To eliminate this uncertainty it must be able to control the purchase of its products. This it seeks to do through advertising, which thus assumes a character of deliberately trying to persuade people to buy the goods they have produced, employing psychological techniques for the purpose. However, management of the consumer on the scale necessitated by the planning of the modern business corporation requires that these be some means for comprehensive, repetitive and compelling communications between the managers of demand and those who are being managed. Technology has once again solved the problem with the development first of radio and then of television. These, in their capacity to hold effortless interest and their accessibility over the entire cultural

spectrum, their independence of any educational qualification, are admirably suited to mass persuasion.

Although, in 'democratic' countries, industrial life is not brought directly under the authority of the State, the former can only maintain its comprehensive planning activity if it works in close cooperation with the State and other institutions. For, in a 'democratic' State there are two planning tasks that the large corporation cannot perform. It cannot supply the specialized manpower that modern technology, organization and planning require; it can train but it cannot educate. Nor can it absorb the risks and costs that are associated with very advanced forms {49} of scientific and technical development.

These shortcomings define the role of the modern State with regard to economic policy, and in this sense the planning activity of the State is closely bound up with the modern corporation.

At one time universities were relatively few in number and had a definitively general approach to education. Although this often meant that they were reserved for future clergymen, teachers and the like, a specifically vocational approach to education was specifically rejected. However, within the last seventy years both State and industry have poured a great deal of money into the university system, demanding of it in return an education that is united to the needs of running the highly specialized and technical society that has taken shape. As Galbraith comments:

'It is significant that when industry required millions of unlettered proletarians, that is what the educational system provided. As industry has come to need engineers, sales executives, copywriters, computer programmers, personnel managers, information retrieval specialists, that is what the educational system has come to provide…… When we realize that our new concern for education is the result not of a new enlightenment but a response to the needs of industrial planning, its excessively vocational character is a problem. We are in danger of having a race of men who are strong on telemetry and space communications but who cannot read anything but a blueprint or write anything but a computer programme.'[82]

In its newly self-appointed task of the management of the economic system the governments of the liberal democracies fix prices and wages, regulate demand, supply the decisive factor of production, train manpower, underwrite technology and the markets for products of technical sophistication. Both governments and the people who elect them act as if the functioning of the economy was a major responsibility of the State. In the formally planned economies of Eastern Europe, the role of the State is not startlingly different. There is therefore a convergence between the two ostensibly different social systems, the one billed as socialism and the other as capitalism. Their convergence is being produced by the central character of planning that belongs to both and the close cooperation between the State and economic life that belongs to both. In this connection it is perhaps worth taking note of some of Burnham's comments written in 1940:

'Under managerial economy it will be possible to plan*, to a considerable extent, the general process of production. This will be possible because control of the economic*

process will be centralized: there will be the institutional mechanisms for translating deliberate planning into action....

Fascist and Communist ideologies denounce in. the same words the 'chaos' and 'anarchy' of capitalism. They conceive of the organization of the State of the future, their *State, exactly along the lines on which a manager, an engineer, organizes a factory;that is their conception of the State is a social extension generalized from managerial experience.'* [83]

Many features of Burnham's theory of the managerial revolution have since proven false. Not the least of these is his undermining of the differences between the 'socialist' or 'totalitarian' countries and the 'democratic' countries. Such failures are at least in part due to his commitment to the view that the political form of society is but a reflection of its economic form. There are still very many significant differences in the 'socialist' and 'democratic' {50} political forms of society. Despite these the different social totalities have a lot more in common than is often admitted. The root of this commonness is in the fact that both have sought to follow the road to Utopia by way of the *technical ideal*, and in doing so have yielded a technological society in which the manner of organization and planning has a centralist and merely technical form.

Moreover, this centralization of planning coupled with the mass organizationalistic character of modern society has resulted in. the vast growth of the phenomenon of bureaucracy, of which Max Weber had the foresight to write:

'It is horrible to think that the world could one day be filled with nothing but those little cogs, little men clinging to little jobs, and striving toward bigger ones....This passion for bureaucracy is enough to drive one to despair. It is as if in politics... we weredeliberately to become men who need 'order' and nothing but order, become nervous and cowardly if for one moment this order wavers, and helpless if they are torn away from their total incorporation in it. That the world should know no men but these: it is in such an evolution that we are already caught up, and the great question is, therefore, not how we can promote and hasten it, but what can we oppose to this machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of the bureaucratic way of life [84]

The reasons for *bureaucracy* replacing *capitalism* and its factory system as the term calling forth the most deep-seated abuse when applied to modern society are therefore not far to find.

THE CONDITION OF MODERN SOCIETY
When Anthony Burgess's novel. 'A Clockwork Orange' was first published in 1962, it was dubbed one of the most cogent and terrifying visions of things to come since George Orwell's '1984'. Like '1984' and 'Brave New World' the novel has a hero, who, because of the strongly nihilistic current that underlies the work, is really more of an anti-hero. Alex, the teenage anti-hero, is the leader of a gang of young hoodlums which fraternizes in its own private language and takes over society after dark, terrorizing town and country with acts of rape and stealing. Seized by the State police after a particularly grisly bout of thuggery, Alex undergoes the 'Ludovico Treatment', a savage system of aversion shock-therapy that reconditions his responses and turns him into a model but mindless

citizen - in short, a 'clockwork orange'; a mechanized being which only appears to be human.

In the film version of 'A Clockwork Orange', Stanley Kubrick accompanies all the violent action on the screen with the music of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony and 'Singing in the Rain'. The overall result is an excellent witness to the basic realities of modern society. We have the embodiment of *the technological society* on the screen accompanied by a bourgeois release mechanism in the music. The result is that the whole thing is turned into an entertainment that simultaneously avoids, escapes, celebrates and feeds upon the horrific realities represented on the screen.

In these ways the film portrays two basic aspects of the spiritual condition of modern society: the actual conditions of our social and cultural reality, and the attempt to persuade that everything is at it always was, and will turn out all right in the end if we but do our jobs properly. The first is the mechanised, materialised, throwaway reality of *the technological society* {51}; the second is the bourgeois escape that is afraid to look too deeply into the problem in case the 'bubble' bursts.

Alex and his gang are the perfect examples of young people who are brought up to think that their freedom is significant, and in this sense they should not necessarily do what others - particularly their elders - tell them to do. They have also been led to believe that their lives may be fulfilled by getting a 'good job' and by constantly feeding upon the mechanical, material, sex-soaked, throw-away environment of *the technological society*. However, as they live out their 'freedom' they come up against the mechanised bourgeois reality of established society. The latter, although supposedly genuinely 'morally' shocked, do not seek to persuade the 'pop' anti-heroes of the error of their ways and implore a moral and spiritual reform; nor do they seek to punish them for their misdoings. They resort to behavioural reconditioning. But the horrifying starkness of this mechanized reality is softened and turned into an entertainment by the music of Beethoven's embodiment of the Enlightenment ideal of human brotherhood and freedom.

The escapist celebration of lost innocence coupled with the sensate enjoyment of the fleeting moment is the very essence of the bourgeois spirit. As such its genesis and development is nowhere better illustrated than in the history of Western popular music.

There are many features of the developments in modern music that bear directly upon the spiritual condition of modern society. If we were to leave aside the great contribution that pre-twentieth century music makes to twentieth century culture (and in this respect it is of some importance to realize that ours is the first period of Western culture to be so dependent upon the *past* for its musical life) then one of the most significant features of modern music is the gulf that exists between the declining tradition of 'high art' and the rise of popular music. Such contemporary exponents of the former as Stockhausen and Xenakis may have mastered very sophisticated techniques which give them a powerful position in the further shaping of the tradition of Western 'art' music. However, such is the chasm that now exists between that tradition and popular music that they have increasingly lost contact with the majority of people. At the same time we have witnessed a cultural development that loosely goes under the name of 'pop'. If the former is a narrow technical elite then the latter is characteristic of the modern mass man. However,

the starkness of this situation tends to be masked by the way in which the 'classics' and 'light classics' of a century or more ago supplement our musical diet.

For the greater part of its history, the tradition of what we might call Western 'art music' has been in an integral relationship to its popular music. Although not typical, the best illustration of this relationship is to be found in the manner in which the chorales of the German Reformation provided the vehicle for the rich artistic developments associated with the cantatas, passions and organ chorales associated with that movement. In this way the Lutherans avoided both the tendency toward elitism characteristic of Roman Catholic church music and the tendency toward symbolic barrenness characteristic of the Calvinistic tradition of church music. For the present purposes, however, the possibilities of the relationship between 'popular' and 'art' music is well illustrated by 'The Beggar's Opera' by John Gay. This was first produced in London in 1728. Musically the work draws from both the 'classical' styles of the day and from popular English folk-song. The subject {52} matter of the opera is the rather dubious but nevertheless very human intrigues of ordinary people. The dialogue is subtle, rich in allusions to the basic 'equalities' of all men - once they remove the masks of social class and station; and the work concludes in a way that parodies the aesthetics of 'Opera Seria'. The latter significantly had the habit of turning tragedy into a story in which 'everyone lived happily ever after', and in this way foreshadows the escapist, bourgeois developments in the popular art that took place in the nineteenth century. In its day, however, 'The Beggars Opera' itself was a truly popular work that was full of interest for the whole spectrum of society. Moreover, it *confronted* and exposed the full realities of life, and did not try to *escape* from them by pretending that things were other than they really were. It is precisely this element of escaping the full realities of life that characterises the popular music of the West during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, the beginning of this development can be traced to the very centre of the European culture of the time: Vienna. In the early nineteenth century, with such figures as Schubert and Weber, Vienna saw the beginnings of the deep and pessimistic version of Romanticism that became the major formative influence upon the tradition of 'high' art in the West. With the music of Johann Strauss, it also saw the development of a popular music (associated initially with the 'upper' social classes) that embodied the sentimental, life-avoiding version of Romanticism that has been so characteristic of Western popular music ever since. In this connection Wilfred Mellers writes of Strauss's 'Die Fledermauss' as follows:

'In 'Die Fledermauss' the centre of the action is a ball, which hints at the contrast between appearance and reality. The story deals with petty deceptions and adulteries, the masquerade of human passions; yet the point is that none-the-less, everyone loves everyone else; except the Bat who, in a fit of petty spite, wants to reveal the truth about themselves to these charming pea-pie. Because he invokes reality, the Bat is the villain; but it turns out that he invokes reality only in order to defeat it. The Grand Finale looks as though it has achieved a degree of honesty, for along with the dominant hedonistic motive it shows us the military theme, the prison theme, even the death-fear - all of which permeated Viennese life, as we see from the music of Schubert and Mahler. The Bat admits that everyone deceives everyone else, that the military shadow darkens the charms of Lilac Time, that one may end up not in a palace but in a prison; he even admits that we may ultimately die. Having done so, however, he would persuade us that. all this is exquisitely funny. While there is true grace, vivacity and ebullience in Strauss

the Waltz-King, celebrating physically the passing moment, we can understand why his soft evasion degenerated into the tabloid feeling of Lehar, Oscar Strauss and Leo Fall. Tin Pan Alley was spawned in the gutters of Vienna'.[85]

Turning from reality to a world of shallow sentiment, of moralism, of a celebration of the passing moment, of pious feeling are all aspects of *the spirit of bourgeois reality* that lies at the heart of the development of the mass man. Indeed, it is only in the light of an appreciation of this spirit that we can understand what *entertainment* really is. It is essentially *a diversion* from reality in the bourgeois sense; it is certainly not an intrinsic feature of popular music. In this respect it is no accident that the most realistic contribution to twentieth century popular theatre came from Berthold Brecht and Kurt Weill, who deliberately based their 'Threepenny Opera' on the model of 'The Beggar's Opera', and produced it exactly two hundred years later in 1928. Nor is it accidental that the most played work during the Nazi years in Germany was 'Die Fledermauss'. {53}

One cannot discuss the development of popular music without considering Afro-American music. This music has a fascinating story that we can only touch on. It is one in which African music, European ballad singing and mountain fiddling, Puritan psalm singing, the hymns of Isaac Watts and Charles Wesley; cultural and social exploitation; hardship; and the strong reforming influence of Christian faith all work together to produce a music that is the very opposite of the European bourgeois popular music. The story of European popular music in the twentieth century is essentially one in which the Afro-American idioms have been incorporated and transformed by this bourgeois reality. This has deep roots into the nineteenth century with the 'Nigger Minstrels', a form in which white blackened their faces and entertained by caricaturing the music and habits of the negro. The interaction of the two shaping spirits is clearly evident in the songs of Stephen Foster. The bourgeois sentimentality and longing for lost innocence is exemplified in 'Beautiful Dreamer', whilst it is offset by his imitations of the Negro idioms in 'De Camptown Races' and 'Swanee River'.

From the 'Nigger Minstrels' grew the cakewalk, and to this tradition was added a vulgarisation of the ragtime music of men like Scott Joplin and Joseph Lamb. The result was clearly seen in the early Charleston years of this century. Then there was Jazz. Growing out of the situation in New Orleans, the jazz music of men like King Joe Oliver was a lively, joyous music that was rich in poly-phony. Again it was imitated and developed by whites, the end result of which was the swing music associated with the names of Benny Goodman and Artie Shaw that was all the rage before and during World War II. Whilst the older tradition of bourgeois sentiment persisted after the war, principally associated with Doris Day, Rosemary Clooney, and Frank Sinatra, the late fifties and six-ties saw the development of 'pop', a form of music that owed much to the commercialized negro idiom of 'Rhythm and Blues'. Its relationship to the popular culture which preceded it is well expressed by George Melly when he writes that

'Traditional culture is a 'wine culture' and pop culture is a 'cake culture'. Until pop the tendency of most artists in every medium was to work within the tradition of a wine culture while living in what was increasingly a coke culture. Even those artists who did use modern imagery were for the most part out to shock, or to demonstrate the spiritual desert of modern life in contrast to the certainties of the past'.[86]

For the greater part of the nineteenth century up until just after World War II, Western popular music could broadly be described as being romantically sentimental. It had the bourgeois quality of being able to turn away from the sober realities of life and to offer a sweet, but shallow and baseless hope that stood in contrast to the bitter realities of life. The way in which the spirit of this popular romanticism has transformed the stronger and deeper realities of life implicit in genuine Christian faith is well illustrated by the portrayal of the lives of the Von Trapp family by Rodgers and Hammerstein and the Hollywood film industry. The Von Trapp's had inherited a rich musical culturein their native Austria. They were Roman Catholics with a deep and meaningful faith in Christ. Rather than conform to the patterns demanded of the Nazi Regime, they left all they had with the purpose of making a new life in America. They began by singing their way around the country, bringing something of the rich heritage of Austrian music to the American people. The reality of this story is portrayed in the biographical account of Maria Von Trapp. This was filmed in the 1950's in a way that incorporated the richness of the music and the struggles of the Von Trapps, but in a way which portrayed their Christian faith as something merely formal. {54}

The bourgeois popularization of the full reality was completed in 'The Sound of Music'. Many of the elements remain in the latter. However its character has been completely transformed by the spirit of romantic sentimentality.

In its initial developments in the late 1950's 'pop' was a protest against much of the hypocritic emptiness and romanticising of this bourgeois popular culture. However, in keeping with the basic nihilism inspired by *the retreat from the Word*, it proposed no solutions and was for the most part *against* a great deal but *for* nothing. Instead it became thoroughly embued with the sex-soaked, mechanical, consumerist, sensate and throwaway character of *the technological society*, and accordingly adopted a non-reflective, non-didactic tone that celebrated the passing moment in a spirit of sensate enjoyment. Thus it lives in and for the moment whilst at the same time escaping from the problems that are proposed by it. Henry Ford's technological dictum that 'History is bunk!' has its pop variant in 'History is junk!'. The great genius of pop has been its ability to bring people out of the doldrums of their mechanical existence and simultaneously provide an escape from and a sensate fulfillment of *the technological society*. Coupled with advertising it is indeed symbolic of the mass man, providing him with the language of the 'reality' he has cynically come to accept as 'home' and yet knows that in it he is deeply estranged from home.

The Elite and the Mass
In Plato's 'Republic' society is divided into three classes; artisans, warriors and philosophers. However, only the latter two are concerned with the all important business of ruling. The artisans are required by their station in life to be content with their job. In More's 'Utopia' there are slaves, artisans and scholars. The major difference with Plato is the homogeneity of life to which these three classes contribute - supposedly produced by the abolition of private property. The artisans all attend lectures given by the scholars, and although the rulers may be chosen from the latter, all are called upon to exercise their responsibility for electing rulers. Severing the Biblical and Classical past from Bacon's 'New Atlantis' we are in a society which bears the marks of modernity, for it consists

largely of technical and scientific experts on the one hand, and artisans on the other. However there is one crucial point at which 'modern society differs from 'New Atlantis'. Bacon stood in that classical tradition which sought to maintain a unity of life that was reflected in its learning. This is particularly evident in his book 'The Advancement of Learning', a treatise very largely devoted to the task of gaining a correct insight into the interrelationship between the different branches of theoretical and practical knowledge. His other major work, 'Novum Organum' is concerned with the correct methods of scientific investigation, consciously being set against Aristotles' original 'Orgamum'. Correct method for the attainment of knowledge was vital for Bacon, as is evident in his oft-quoted dictum 'Knowledge is Power'.

Bacon's starting point for interrelating the various fields of knowledge was man himself - particularly the 'knowing man' with his faculties of memory, reason and imagination. Accordingly he viewed 'history' - both human and natural - under the category of *memory*; philosophy - metaphysics, mathematics, logic and morals under the category of *reason*; and the arts under the category of the *imagination*. This schema for integrating the whole of knowledge was adopted by the French Encyclopaedists in the eighteenth century. The *discours preliminaire* of D. Diderot and J.L. d'Alembert's 'Encyclopedie on Dictionnarre Raisonne des Sciences et des Metiers' is a good example. This {56} work could function either as a dictionary or as an encyclopaedia, the distinction being that whereas a dictionary was ordered merely according to the technical details of the alphabet, an encyclopaedia had an ordering in which all the knowledge of the sciences, arts and technical skills took their place within an overview of reality. For this latter purpose the *discours preliminaire* was of supreme importance, providing the key to an understanding of the encyclopaedic as opposed to the *dictionary* character of the work. As the *discours preliminaire* was printed separately and used for educational purposes within French schools, the organization of knowledge based upon Bacon's 'knowing man' had a great impact upon the French Enlightenment and as a consequence upon general European life.

However, under the strong influence of the Positivist strain of thought - which saw the only reliable knowledge as that of the positive sciences - most educational institutions, particularly within the Anglo-Saxon world, have given up any ideal of the unity of knowledge. With the ever increasing accumulation of what the modern world chooses to call 'knowledge', the result had been an ever-increasing specialization and fragmentation that has yielded a view of life that is broken up into a whole range of bits and pieces, lacking integration. In the modern world, for example, a dictionary is an alphabetical list of words whilst an encyclopaedia is an alphabetical list of subjects. For Diderot and d'Alembert the latter would also be a dictionary. For many purposes, of course. a universal evolutionary principle functions as an integrating principle for modern life. This is well illustrated in the attempts of such men as Julian Huxley in 'The Humanist Frame', Jacob Bronowski in 'The Ascent of Man' and Teilhard de Chardin in 'The Phenomenon of Man'. For the most part, however, it is the technical, dictionary character of modern knowledge that predominates. This is nowhere more the case than in the modern Anglo-Saxon university. It knows nothing of the kind of task that Bacon set himself in 'The Advancement of Learning'. The task of philosophy, even at its best, has virtually become synonomous with the questions of logic and methodology, that Bacon attempted to deal with in 'Novum Orgaanum'. In this light the quest for knowledge in the University has

become very much akin to that of searching for nuggets in a gold rush: a person attempts to stake their claim in a certain area, and dig away in search of their fortune.

However, modern life is less dominated by science in the sense of *investigation* and far more by science applied to technology in the great Faustian quest for control. Although Bacon considered that 'knowledge was power' he would not have been prepared to invert the dictum to that it read 'that which provides power is knowledge'. However, under the pseudo-criteria of requiring knowledge to be 'useful' on 'practical' lurks an overt pragmatism that has a merely Promethean urge for change and control. This spirit has more and more come to dominate modern life - not only with regard to technology proper, but also within the investigative life of the university, where it has given birth to the publish or perish mentality that increasingly shows little concern for truthful insight. In summary, modernity has taken Bacon's 'knowing man' as its starting point, stripped him of the quest for knowledge in the terms of truthful insight and left nakedly exposed the lustful search for power by means of technical control.

Thus, despite the tremendous growth in specialized and technical 'knowledge' life in the modern world has lost any sense of meaning and integration that cannot be embraced by a merely technical and therefore specialized kind. The loss of life perspective coupled with the ultra-specialization has produced a class division of a new kind - that between the *technocratic elite* and the {56} *mass man*. Whilst the former replaces the philosopher class of Plato and the scholarly class of More, the latter replaces the age-old class of artisans. Characteristic of both classes in modern life is a loss of insight with respect to the particular task being undertaken in respect to an overall context of life. The technocratic elite is characterised by a great deal of specialized technical knowledge, which gives him power to plan, direct and above all control. The mass man on the other hand is marked by the need to be content with a menial job on an assembly line or in a bureaucratic machine that generally requires little insight, and even less initiative. He is largely governed by the singular need for the security of a regular job that can help him to secure the basic material needs to live by. The major difference between the technocratic elite and the mass man is due to the highly centralized and technically organized form of society that we now inhabit. In this form of society the technocratic elite are those who are able to exercise the power and thereby control the lives of millions. This power is in the hands of comparatively few. In Russia and Sweden it essentially resides *in the Party*. The democratic countries it tends to be dispersed into the leaders of the Trade Unions, the managers of corporations and the Government. The mass man may be *theoretically* in control within a democracy. However, although he may exercise his vote at an election, he generally has little insight and, moreover he has to operate within the context of alternatives that have been put before him by one elite or other. The latter, moreover, are increasingly resorting to means of seeking to *control* voting patterns rather than appeal to principles that are the supposed possession of the mass man.

Of the universal and particularist power of the technocrat over the lives of individual men and women, Ellul writes as follows:

'Because it is first of all scientific, technique obeys the great law of specialization; it can be efficient only if it is specialized. In the case of human beings, efficiency has a double meaning. It means that technique must be applicable without raising storms of protest.

And it means that it must not neglect the scientific aspect of its specialization. Techniques are designed for application to a relatively limited number of cases; as a consequence, general applicability cannot be envisaged. Every human technique has its circumscribed sphere of action, and none of them covers the whole man. As we have seen, there are psychological techniques, educational techniques and many others. Each of these answer one and only one particular need. If one of them is applied, it does indeed encroach on some private sphere or other of the individual, but the greatest part remains private. There is therefore never any clear reason to protest. This relatively impersonal technical operation is a far cry from one which would hurl man brutally into a world of concentration camps where the most strident, dramatic, overwhelming techniques suddenly descend on him....

A single technique and its guarded application to a limited sphere is the starting point of dissociation. No technician anywhere would say that he is submitting men, collectively or individually, to technique. The biogeneticist who experiments on the human embryo, or the film director who tries to affect his audience to the greatest possible degree, makes no claim that he is working on man. The individual is broken into a number of independent fragments, and no techniques have the same dimensions or depth. Nor does any combination of techniques (for example, propaganda plus vocational guidance) correspond to any part of the human being. The result is that every technique can assert its innocence. Where, then, or by whom, is the human individual being {57} attacked? Nowhere and by no one. Such is the reply of technique and technician. They ask indignantly how it can be alleged that the human being is being attacked through the application of the new school of technique. According to them, the charge itself demonstrates an absence of comprehension and the presence of erroneous, not to say malicious, prejudices. And, in fact, every technician taken separately can affirm that he is innocent of aggressive designs against the human being. The biologist, working on a living embryo with the consent of the mother, is guilty of no assault on her life or her honour. Thus, since no technician applies his technique to the whole man, he can wash his hands of responsibility and declare that the human being remains intact.[87].

Aware of the fragmentation of man that is occurring in modern life, many are seeking to restore some sense of man's unity. However, as Ellul remarks

Psychologists, sociologists, and teachers, that is... the psychotechnicians in general... want to restore mans lost unity, and patch together that which technical advances have separated. But only one way to accomplish this ever occurs to them, and that is to use technical means. Since the human sciences are applications of technical means; this entails rounding up those elements of the human personality that are still free and forcing (reintegrating) them into the expanding technical order of things.[88]

Although each person with technocratic power may claim no responsibility for the character of the overall situation that is developing, the power of the state in this respect should very much be brought into focus, for again as Ellul remarks

The basic effect of state action on techniques is to coordinate the whole complex. The state possesses the power of unification, since it is the planning power par excellence in society. In this it plays its true role, that of coordinating, adjusting, and equilibrating

social forces.... The state mobilizes all technicians and scientists, and imposes on all a precise and limited technical objective. It forces them to specialize to a greater and greater degree, and remains itself the ordering force behind the specialists. It forbids all research which it deems not to be in its own interests and institutes only that research which has utility.... In the decades to come, technique will become stronger and its pace will be accelerated through the agency of the State. The State and technique - increasingly interrelated /,are becoming the most important forces in the modern world they buttress and reinforce each other in their aim to produce an apparently indestructible, total civilisation'[89]

To appreciate the spiritual condition of the technocrat and the mass man we should recall that perhaps the most significant feature of the modern world is an underlying nihilism. The great majority of people in the twentieth century have no convictions to live by. Thus uprooted they try to escape the threat of nihilism. The technocrat seeks this within the context of his work, for it provides him with *power*. He fulfills himself in the Faustian passion for control - of man and machines.

To appreciate the spiritual condition of the mass man we need not only to consider the underlying nihilism, we need also consider the basic devaluation of man within the context of labour. Labour has not only lost its meaning as a vocational task to be performed in responsible freedom before God, it has taken upon a mechanical, technical, ultra-specialized character that is {58} thoroughly in keeping with the subjection of man to the *technical ideal*.

Taken together the underlying nihilism and the devaluation of labour throw a new light upon the significance of man's leisure activity. Because of the devaluation of work it is from man's leisure activity that he seeks meaning. However, because there is the fear that at root life is meaningless, leisure takes upon an unreal, fantasy and escapist quality that creates an illusion of meaning. Afraid of solitude he seeks solidarity with others in a Butlin holiday camp, a Radio Talk back, or a Football match. Alternatively he seeks to 'find himself' by becoming identified with a sporting hero or a film star. Ellul writes of this quest of the mass man in the following terms:

'Consider the average man as he comes home from his job. Very likely he has spent the day in a completely hygienic environment, and everything has been done to balance his environment and lessen his fatigue. However, he has had to work without stopping and under constant pressure nervous fatigue has replaced muscular fatigue. When he leaves his job, his joy in finishing his stint is mixed with dissatisfaction with a work as fruitless as it is incomprehensible and as far from really productive work. At home he 'finds himself' again. But what does he find? He finds a phantom. If he ever thinks, his reflections terrify him. Personal identity is fulfilled only by death; but reflection tells him that for him there has not been anything between his adolescent adventures and his death, no point at which he himself ever made a decision or initiated a change. Changes are the exclusive prerogative of organized technical society, which one day may have him decked out in khaki to defend it, and on another in stripes because he had sabotaged or betrayed it. There was no difference from one day, to the next. Yet life was never serene, for newspapers and news reports beset him at the end of the day and forced on him the image of an insecure world. If it is hot water or cold war, there were all sorts of accidents

to drive home to him the precariousness of his life. Torn between this precariousness and the absolute, unalterable determinateness of his work, he has no place, belongs nowhere. Whether something happens to him, or nothing happens, he is in neither case the, author of his destiny.

The man of the technical society does not want to encounter his phantom. He resents being torn between the extremes of accident and technical absolutism. He dreads the knowledge that everything ends 'six feet under'. Technical civilization has made a great error in not suppressing death, the only human reality still intact.... But amusement techniques have jumped into the breach and taught him at least how to flee the presence of death. He no longer needs faith or some difficult asceticism to deaden himself to his condition. The movies and television lead him straight into an artificial paradise. Rather than face his own phantom, he seeks film phantoms into which he can project himself and which permit him ea live as he might have willed. For an hour or two he can cease to be himself, as his personality dissolves and fades into the anonymous mass of spectators. The film makes him laugh, cry, wonder, and love. He goes to bed with the leading lady, kills the villain, and master's life's absurdities. In short, he becomes a hero. Life suddenly has meaning'.[90]

There are many ways in which the leisure activity of sport has been so thoroughly technicised that it serves as another illustration of the way in which society has become divided into the technocratic elite and the mass man. There is an increasing tendency, particularly in Eastern Europe, to resort to technology as the means of training up athletes to reach peak perfection. The pressure, agony, concentration and machine-like treatment of the human person in the process has been made the subject of a novel entitled 'Golden Girl' by Peter Lear. {59} It has been praised by those in the Athletics business as *'uncomfortably close to reality'*. On the other hand, the vast majority, unable to come anywhere near such heights, watch and identify with the incredible exploits of such super-trained Athletes.

In the reality prescribed by *the technological society*, the technocrat reigns supreme since life is highly organized according to technical means. Although the technocrat may gain partial fulfillment from his Faustian quest for power and control, the mass man has a deep desire to escape and find meaning. However, since he values his security more, he tries to escape in a way that will not threaten the form of society which will give it to him. Thus it is that a film like 'A Clockwork Orange' opens up for us the basic dilemmas of living in the technological society : the technicized reality and the bourgeois escape; the behavioural control of the technocrat and the clockworked mass man.

BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED
Although '1984' and 'Brave New World' have many differences, in both novels the *two ideals* which have so powerfully influenced the development of modern society have had a side exposed that has often been deliberately suppressed. I refer, of course, to the reality of evil in even the best of man's cultural form-giving. Basic to the specific form of society envisaged in each of these novels is a revolutionary hybrid of the technological manipulator with the political manager in a centralized takeover of power.

With its emphasis upon the political manger, '1984' symbolises the evil that results from the errors and perversions of the attempt to realize the social ideal; embodied in 'Big Brother' the *political manager* uses technology for propaganda purposes in a way that sets out to secure an unqualified allegiance which tolerates no opposition. Everyone must be brought into line, and be organized to achieve the technical and social goals as decreed by 'Big Brother'. Even all potential opposition is ruthlessly hunted out in a world situation in which three rival power-blocs embodying different forms of 'managerial' society are each pledged to maintaining and extending their influence. Absolute power is maintained by the fear of reprisal, and the resulting climate is one in which people are suspicious of one another and withdraw into themselves in case what they say be entered on the files of the secret police by an agent posing as a friend.

In 'Brave New World' the technological manipulator is dominant. Totalitarian power is secured not through the fear of reprisal, but by means of an appeal to *material security* in a way that effectively claims to be able to meet man's every need through the thoroughgoing technicising of the social and cultural environment. To achieve this a strong sense of group belongingness is necessary; however, it must be a belongingness that is of a merely technical kind, forbid-ding any other view of life's meaning and purpose any organized expression with respect to specific cultural areas such as labour, education, politics, social welfare or business. When men bow down to the *technical ideal* and value above all else the form of *material security* it offers, we have a situation in which they will willingly submit to a collectivised pattern of life, even though they function in it as little more than cogs in a wheel. Material security, technological advance and bureaucratic control are seen as three sides of the same coin; accordingly bureaucratic servitude must be tolerated if material security is to be enjoyed. Within this sort of totalitarianism the technical manipulation of the media is not maintained by propaganda. The mass {60} man needs to escape from the underlying nihilism and meaningless of his work in entertainment and the group celebration of sensate belongingness. Technical manipulation of the media is therefore typified by a form of advertising that seeks to encourage and exploit the continued support of the supreme value of *material security* whilst at the same time taking care to promise an escape or a fulfillment with which the mass man can identify only in his imagination. In this way the combined heritage of bourgeois escapism, the positivist and pragmatist spirit in science and philosophy, and the sensate enjoyment of the passing moment all contribute to the *belongingness* that people experience in the bureaucracy, the 'pub' and above all in the attempts of the media to create a 'sense of community' through the combined diet of commercials, 'pop', talkbacks and the like. In such a situation the victory of technology over man can be readily achieved by means of a highly centralised state whose totalitarian tendencies are both tolerated and encoureged by the citizenry in the interests of maintaining their material security.

THE NEW TOTALITARIANS
The combination of the political manager and the technical manipulator lying at the basis of both '1984' and 'Brave New World' is a reality that is firmly embodied in the social fabric of modernity. However, whilst '1984' mirrors the more overt forms of political totalitarianism that receives its clearest expression in modern Russia, 'Brave New World' mirrors a less overt and more subtle form of totalitarianism that could be said to characterise a potential if not actual degeneration of the modern West. In this light the

thesis of Roland Huntford in his book 'The New Totalitarians'[91] may seem at first a little strange. He claims that *'it is the Swedes who have come closest to this state of affairs.. Outside Russia, they alone have grasped the necessity of adapting politics to technology, untroubled by doubts or reservations. They offer the first example of a system that fulfills Huxley's prophecy. Historical accident and national idiosyncracies have pushed Sweden ahead on the road to 'Brave New World'.*[92]

The reason for the apparent strangeness of this view is that Sweden is in very many ways un-Western in its, typical cultural features. In particular it has known little of the struggle for religious liberty and has been largely untouched by the ideal of *individual* freedom: two forces which in various ways have strongly influenced the Western world. An example of the absence of this heritage in Sweden is provided by the common law: the view that the law should have an important function in protecting the individual from the unjust treatment of both other individuals and institutions, including the institutions of the state, receives little or no attention in Sweden. Thus *'Sweden, Like Soviet Russia, belongs to that group of countries in which 'individuality' has a derogatory ring' and the ultimate crime in 'Brave New World' is to deviate from a norm. That norm is innocent of ethics and morality, and decided on grounds of expediency alone. The situation is already a doctrine of Swedish law. Gone is the idea of right or wrong, or the moral content of an action. Crime is now defined as social deviation. The test of whether an offence is punishable, however, is solely whether it has awkward effects on the collective. Analogously, in non-criminal spheres the worst solecism is to be different... All this is not because Sweden is so far advanced but because, in all senses except the purely technological, she is so extraordinarily backward. Sweden is a relic of the Middle Ages, a State of corporations and communes, and the Swedes are mediaeval people living only as members of a group. It is an ideal situation for the incarnation of 'Brave New World'. Like the rulers of 'Brave New World', the managers of Sweden have abolished history in order to cut off the past and, by disorienting their time sense, to make people easier to manipulate.'* [93]{61}

Sweden gives all the outward signs of success: for well over a century she has managed to withdraw herself from the traumatic conflicts that have overtaken the rest of Europe; she is economically prosperous with one of the most comprehensive systems of social welfare in the world today, during the late sixties she had an 'enlightened' image with respect to the evils of the Viet-Nam war, offering a haven for many American draft-dodgers. However, Roland Huntford's survey tells a very different story. The neutrality, objectivity and corporate efficiency are less the product of enlightenment than of a profound insecurity and uniformity in the Swedish character - based upon a unique form of collusion between the government and the people. This cultural condition Huntford traces well back into the history of Sweden. Thus of King Gustav's motives in embracing the Reformation, Huntford writes that *'as a nationalistic despot, Gustav was always open to innovations that would extend his power, and it was in that spirit that he introduced the Reformation to Sweden. He was perhaps the first monarch to grasp property the political implications of Luther's doctrine. He saw, more clearly and rationally than Henry VIII, the uses to which a national Church could be put. If Henry knew only that he had to break out of the domination of Rome, Gustav from the beginning had the aim of better controlling his subjects. Gustav's purpose in accepting the Reformation was to make civil servants of the clergy. He and his successors became truly their own Popes.*

The Swedish Church was made identical with the State, a situation comparable only with the Russian, the Byzantine and the Mohammedan worlds.[94]

This Lutheran form of the *ancien regime* had effective control of Swedish life until well into the twentieth century. Indeed ecclesiastical hold over the population was never disturbed until a workable political substitute was available. Throughout Swedish history both Catholic and non-Lutheran Protestant dissent was effectively suppressed by law - without protest, shedding of blood or martyrdom of any kind. Indeed, until 1970, when the adoption of a religion was made a voluntary matter, all Swedes were automatically born into the State Church, whatever the convictions of their parents. Permitted since 1860, withdrawal was only converted from a privilege into a right in 1952. Before that anybody wanting to leave the State Church had to submit to a personal examination of the clergy, who had power, periodically used, to refuse the application. These examinations continued until the late 1940's.

Against this long background of the Erastian subordination of the Church to the State in which the collectivity took an absolute precedence over individuality, the Marxist orientated Social Democratic Party came to office in 1932. It has been in office without significant interruption ever since. Significantly the Party did not openly try to attack the Church as was the case in Soviet Russia. It rather used the existing Erastian structure of the Church to influence the people. The situation was one in which the Church was in any case spiritually weak, and in tune with its heritage remained ineffective in offering a substantial opposition. Gradually the Party has organized an alternative means of influencing the people with the result that it has now successfully usurped the traditional role of the Church. It is now in effective control of the schools, the Universities and the Media. It has successfully undermined the traditional role of the Swedish parliament and substituted a vast bureaucracy that has developed a firm pact between labour and management, a matter which has been achieved without wholesale nationalization.

Isolation, ignorance and hierarchical tastes have made the Swedes easy to control in the past and in the present, and the identity of Church and State has presented the political parties with a legacy of submissiveness and servitude. As Huntford writes, *'if the various reorganizing governments of Sweden,{62} from the Liberals of the nineteenth century to the Social Democrats of the 1960's, have been able to execute rapid and often uncomfortable changes virtually unopposed, it is because conformity has been made a cardinal virtue, and dissent a mortal sin. Ecclesiastical hold over the population was never disturbed until a workable political substitute was available. However, scornful of Christianity, the rulers of Sweden tolerated the Church as a means of controlling the population. And the clergy, being civil servants, still enjoy, by virtue of their bureaucratic status, a respect that they could never assure for their cloth. Men may abjure Christ, but they cannot bring themselves to drive out the priests. Sweden is one of the rare countries in which men are often anti-religious, but rarely anti-clerical.*[95]

Taking full advantage of the ecclesiastical servitude of the past, the Party has so organized and developed Swedish life to the point where economic equality, industrial harmony and technological advance have been achieved to a remarkable degree. However it has been achieved at a price: everything in Swedish life has been developed to maintain and extend the efficiency of the bureaucratic machine with the individual

reward for the Swedish citizen being an egalitarian material prosperity and security that is virtually unparalleled in the world. Taken together with the absence of censorship (at least in matters which have a sexual connotation) and the sexual promiscuity that is openly encouraged by the authorities, the conditions necessary for the taking root of 'Brave New World' are evident. Moreover, throughout the whole transformation that has taken place in Swedish life, the outward form of democracy has prevailed; there has never been any suggestion of the political managers ruling by fear as they have done in Russia. Indeed it is of some interest to recall the words of Aldous Huxley who wrote in a foreword to one of the later editions of his novel that *'there is of course no reason why the new totalitarianism should resemble the old. Government by firing squads... is not merely inhumane... it is demonstrably inefficient, and in an age of advanced technology, inefficiency is a sin against the Holy Ghost. A really efficient totalitarian state would be one in which the all-powerful executive of political bosses and their army of managers control a population of slaves who do not have to be coerced, because they love their servitude.'*[96]. We must conclude that Huntford's case for finding Sweden to be the first of 'The New Totalitarians' is a convincing one.

To what extent do the conditions in modern Anglo-Saxon countries resemble those of Sweden? In other words how far has the Western world travelled along the road toward the New Totalitarianism? Huntford writes that *'historical accident and national idiosyncrasies have pushed Sweden ahead on the road to 'Brave New World'. But even if she is isolated, inbred and incompletely Western, her present state cannot be dismissed as something alien and eccentric, curious to examine, yet with no portents for the rest of us. All that stands between ourselves and Sweden is a certain protective shell granted by the Western European heritage. But it is fragile, and it is being eroded from within and without. To watch present Swedes may be to watch our future selves'*[97]

Writing of the possibilities of the development of a *'Brave New World'* in 1958, a few years before his death, Aldous Huxley wrote that *'when 'Brave New World' was being written, I was convinced that there was still plenty of time. The completely organized society, the scientific caste system, the abolition of free will by methodical conditioning, the servitude made acceptable by regular doses of chemically induced happiness, the orthodoxies drummed in by mightly courses of sleep-teaching - these things were coming all right, but not in my time, not even in the time of my grandchildren.... We who were living in the second quarter of the twentieth century A.D. were the inhabitants, admittedly,{63} of a gruesome kind of universe; but the nightmare of the depression years was radically different from the nightmare of the future described in 'Brave New World'. Ours was a nightmare of too little order; theirs, in the seventh century A.F., of too much. In the passing from one extreme to the other, there would be a long interval, so I imagined, during which the more fortunate third of the human race would make the best of both worlds - the disorderly world of liberalism and the much too orderly Brave New World where perfect efficiency left us no room for freedom and personal initiative. Twenty seven years later, in this third quarter of the twentieth century A.D., and long before the end of the first century A.F., I feel a good deal less optimistic than I did when I was writing 'Brave New World'. The prophecies made in 1931 are coming true much sooner than I thought they would'*[98]

Huxley goes on in the course of 'Brave New World Revisited' to outline the following reasons for his expectations: over-population, over-organization in Big Business and Big Government, propaganda techniques, manipulative techniques in advertising, brainwashing, and the lack of concern or desire on the part of so many to take upon responsible freedom in their work and in public life generally. In the latter connection he writes that *'given unchecked over-population and over-organization, we may expect to see in the democratic countries a reversal of the process which transformed England into a democracy, while retaining all the outward forms of a monarchy. Under the relentless thrust of accelerating over-population and increasing over-organization, and by means of ever more effective methods of mind-manipulation, the democracies will change their nature; the quaint old forms - elections, parliaments, Supreme Courts and all the rest - will remain. The underlying substance will be a new kind of non--violent totalitarianism. All the traditional names, all the hallowed slogans will remain exactly what they were in the good old days. Democracy and freedom will be the theme of every broadcast and editorial - but democracy and freedom in a strictly Pickwickian sense. Meanwhile the ruling oligarchy and its highly trained elite of soldiers, policemen, thought-manufacturers and mind manipulators will quietly run the show as they see fit.*[99].

The historical background of Sweden may be very different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, it can scarcely be denied that those features which have shaped the background of these countries are in the process of being broken down: a high regard for responsible freedom, founded in religious liberty and the freedom of association; specific limits placed upon all forms of authority; the recognition that work is a divine calling and should therefore be developed so that it is vocationally fulfilling, both to the individual worker and to his fellow-man. These are fast being replaced by a degeneration of work, a decline in responsible freedom, a belief in organization on a merely technical basis, an increasing centralization of power in all forms of organization, and the ever-growing power of State Bureaucracy. Moreover, the effective situation of the Church is not all that different from that in Sweden. There has been little or no active persecution, and in many ways the Church goes on performing many of its traditional functions. Generally, however, the Church has either been so infected with Liberalism that its efforts to help rebuild and remodel society have added the traditional ideological support of the Church for the State in a secular garb, or else it has been so infected with a Gospel that is merely pietistic that it has offered little perspective for dealing with the complexities of modern life. Many 'middle of the roaders' have acted as if nothing fundamental had changed and have only just begun to notice to what degree the influence of the Church has waned. Accompanying the breakdown in the Christian consensus with respect to fundamental values regarding sex and marriage, there is an increasing pressure for 'liberalizing' {64} the censorship laws, and providing contraceptive advice for the very young. Again the increasing number of marriage breakdowns and family problems are being very largely dealt with the by the 'neutral', 'technical' state welfare services, if at all.

There is one significant difference: in Anglo-Saxon countries there is no *one* overall planning organization. There are still important lines drawn between the organization of Government, Trade Unions and Big Business that have been effectively eroded in Sweden. However, the trend is generally the same.

There are a number of reasons for supposing that organization and social control will be increased, giving more power to fewer people and encouraging even fewer to take responsible freedom. In the first place, for example, many are calling for social controls with regard to certain scientific and technological advances. The growth of genetic engineering is a case in, point. Those best qualified to judge consider that recent developments in this field are to be compared with those associated with the H-bomb, computers and automation, and that there are just as frightening possibilities lurking at the back of the power that has been unleashed. Gordon Rattray Taylor, for example, writes that *'I am forced to the conclusion that society will have to control the pace of research, if it can, and will certainly have to regulate the release of these new powers. There will have to be a biological 'ice-box' in which the new techniques can be placed until society is ready for them. This is not a conclusion to my taste at all. I do not feel in the least optimistic about our prospects of exerting such control without serious muddles and abuses. Nevertheless, the social consequences of what is in the pipeline could be so disastrous - nothing less than the break-up of civilization as we know it that the attempt must be made'*[100]

In the second place, almost overnight mankind has found itself confronted with a multitude of unprecedented crises: the population crises, the environmental crisis, the energy crisis, the raw material crisis, the food crisis, worldwide inflation, the threat of war etc. In this connection there has probably been no more prominent group endeavouring to bring home the more technical details of these problems than the Club of Rome. In both 'The Limits of Growth' and 'Mankind at the Turning Point' they have vigorously argued the seriousness of the problems that are presently facing mankind. They point out that although crises are not new to mankind, there are fundamentally three features which give cause for not expecting solutions to come about through a business as usual approach: the fact that the crises exist simultaneously with a strongly woven interrelationship between them; the fact that they occur on a global scale; and the fact that they arise through man's well-intentioned efforts to control his environment through the application of science to technology. In respect to the latter, the present crises raise fundamental questions regarding the dominating outlook of Western culture[101] - namely its enthronement of the Faustian man and his attempt to reach Utopia in the form of the *technical ideal.* A similar point has been made by Robert Heilbroner in his 'An Inquiry into the Human Prospect'. However, he suggests that the problem is that we have 'developed scientific technology in a lopsided manner, giving vent to its disequilibrating or perilous aspects without matching these ill effects with compensating 'benign' technologies or adequate control mechanisms'[102]. He goes on to emphasise that all the specific dangers facing mankind are *social* problems originating in human behaviour and that are consequently capable of amelioration by the alteration of that behaviour[103] {65}

The major problem with such proposals lies in the fact that although they sound as if they are introducing a needed ethical dimension under an authority executed in responsible freedom, it is by no means clear just how they are to be differentiated from B.F. Skinner's proposals to introduce a wholesale behavioural technology in an effort to solve human problems[104]. I'm not implying that anyone who suggests the introduction of some form of 'social control' over some aspect of human life is necessarily a behaviourist. I am simply pointing out that 'technique' has already extended to the organization and planning of

human society to an incredible degree, with considerable attention being given to *manipulative behavioural techniques in all sorts of ways*.

THE FUTURE

With the focus of attention being increasingly upon the possibility of solving these problems by means of *social* control, I suggest that under the prevailing outlook the chasm between the Technocrat and the Mass man will be driven deeper, resulting in a greater Bureaucratic servitude on the part of men and women. For these reasons I cannot accept the optimism of Alvin Toffler. In his best-selling book Future Shock'[105], Toffler considers that we are all suffering from an inability to adapt to the increasing rate of change because we are lacking in utopian vision with regard to the future. However, confident in the ability of the human being to be able to adapt himself to all manner of change, and confident too of his ability to construct an imaginative and exciting future out of the increasing possibilities of technology, he rejects the doomsday warning implicit in the development of the technological society. He claims that *'despite all the anti-technological rhetoric of the Elluls and Fromms, the Mumfords and Marcuses, it is precisely the super-industrial society, the most advanced technological society ever, that extends the range of freedom. The people of the future enjoy greater opportunities for self-realization than any previous group in history'*[106]

A very major part of Toffler's hope for the future derives from the way in which he seeks to revive the whole utopian tradition. He conceives this less in the sense of offering a criticism of the present form of society and more in the sense of providing *an ideal* in terms of which men and women may be motivated toward positively contributing to the increasing growth of technology, and thus direct it toward imaginative and utopian ends: specifically, he advocates the construction of 'utopia factories', in which teams of artists, technologists, engineers, psychologists etc. will be able to develop and project visions of possible future societies to those surrounding them. Thus *'scientific futurist institutes must be spotted like nodes in a loose network throughout the entire governmental structure in the techno-societies, so that every department, local or national, some staff devotes itself systematically to scanning the probable long-term future in its assigned field. Futurists should be attached to every political party, university, corporation, professional association, trade union and student organization.'*[107]

However, Toffler's utopian visions embody the epitome of the Promethean man. He advocates more technology in order that the individual will have a greater choice of alternatives, as if there are not already enough. Certainly vision is needed for the shaping of the future. However, the vision of which Toffler speaks is entirely inspired by a pragmatic Prometheus who desires to devour and seize the earth in the celebration of his own God-like freedom. In this light it is quite instructive to compare the utopianism of Alvin Toffler {66} with that of Herbert Marcuse. In 'One Dimensional Man' the latter subjected the form of Advanced Industrial Society particularly as it is embodied in North America, to a thoroughgoing critique; and in 'Soviet Marxism' he subjects the Russian version of socialism to no less a stringent critique. Moreover, in 'The End of Utopia'[108] Marcuse says that for the modern 'avant-garde Left' Fourier is more relevant than Marx precisely *because of his greater utopianism.* Accordingly he calls for the replacement of the development of socialism 'from utopia to science' by its development from 'science to utopia'. Following Marcuse, the New Left have been extremely critical of what it calls

'Technocracy' and has combined this critique with all manner of mysticisms and anarchisms that have roots in millennial utopianisms of the West[109].

Now, whereas Toffler's utopianism is thoroughly inspired by a *technical ideal* that promises the pragmatistic freedom of the Faustian man to build whatever he will within creation, Marcuse's utopianism is led by a *socialistic ideal* that has once again been severed from the *technical ideal*. For this reason Marcuse advocates the forsaking of the technical ideal in favour of an anarcho-socialistic ideal which will radically overthrow existing institutions, in order to establish a qualitatively new history, whereas Toffler advocates a renewed vision that is inspired by the utopian possibilities of technology that will be forth-coming if we prostrate ourselves before an even more pragmatistic version of the technical ideal. In this more pragmatic emphasis it is not *technology* that should dominate; rather it is *man's absolute freedom* acting through technology that should dominate reality. In this way Toffler is critical of both those who would seek to be critical of technology, and is also critical of those who would seek to make technology itself the master.

However, if the *socialistic* and *technical* ideals are to be recognised for what they are, then the verdict must surely be that they are but two of the most powerful of the secular gods of the modern pantheon. They each have their roots in the enthronement of man as the master not only of his own fate but also that of society, history, and indeed the very creation itself. The powerful shaping of modern technology and of modern society in the service to these gods has brought us into many of the dilemmas that have been considered in this chapter. The fault lies neither with technology nor with the aspirations for a more just and equitable form of society, it lies with the religious root of the animating spirit that has given both these and other aspects of modern culture, their positive form. Accordingly, a Christian appraisal of the present condition of human society must first of all expose the spiritual roots that have given it its positive form. However, in its offer of an alternative it must be careful not to offer an attainable utopia before the return of the King, for, as Augustine had the insight to see, all of man's cultural form-giving is caught in the conflict between *Civitas Terrena* and *Civitas Dei*, and no man or group of men are ever in the position of being able to bring in utopia. Modern humanism has in no small measure been rooted in. the hope of establishing a secularised form of the Kingdom of God through the results of man's own cultural form-giving. Quite convinced of man's ability to be able to bring in utopia in this way it has thrown off any expectation of the King's return. For this reason it has no alternative hope for the future. Throughout the history of the West there have been many 'Christian' variants on the attempts to establish utopia. In the past they have generally sought to bring in the {67} millenium; in more recent times they have tended to follow in the wake of humanism[110].

Man's task is neither to bring in the Kingdom of God, nor to sit by while the Kingdom of Darkness prevails over the affairs of men. It is to seek to live obediently to the law of God within the present context of a fallen yet redeemed creation whilst the fullness of the Kingdom must await the return of the King, Christianity can offer a substantial healing within the course of history. Utopian aspirations, however, must be repudiated. The problems of a substantial healing are greatly affected by the way in which idolatry obscures insight into the law of God. As long as man insists that *he* is the author of the meaning of creation and seeks to develop technology and the form of human society in

accord with ideals that are inspired by such idolatry that his insight into the givenness of the ethical, jural, aesthetic and economic norms for his life and form-giving, will be obscured in his attempt either to 'scientifically manipulate' human behaviour or to 'bring in a qualitatively new history that casts off all contact with the old, evil ways'.

Both Technology and Human Society can be developed in the freedom of responsibility if their meanings are comprehended within the coherence of creation, and recognised as creaturely callings to be undertaken humbly and fallibly before their Meaning Giver. The possibilities of developing Technology in the light of this perspective have been indicated by E. Schuurman in his book 'Technology and the Future'[111]. His positive suggestions are to be seen against the background of the outlooks of both the *transcendentalists* (Junger, Heidegger, Meyer and to less an extent Ellul), who consider the development of modern technology an intrinsic denial of human freedom, and the *positivists* (Wiener, Steinbuch and Klaus) who can see modern technology only as the confirmation of man's power over his environment. Against both of these standpoints he maintains that technology may be developed by man in creaturely freedom; and that a necessary condition for it to do so is the abandoning of its pretended autonomy.

'Even while man is driven by the hope of becoming omnipotent and omnipresent through technology, and of being delivered from the imperfections of human existence, the result turns out to be the opposite. Man gets caught in the snares of technocracy, losing his freedom, his individuality, his community, in fact the whole meaning of his existence. The belief *in the* autonomy *of man is the origin of the dislocation of technological development and of the meaninglessness which man brings upon himself as a judgment. Because the perspective on the other world is lost, in the end the perspective on this world also disappears. 'In the end' - for at the first the secularized motives may not be apparent right away'[112]*

Specifically this means that technological form-giving is to be seen as creaturely service; not as the means of claiming Promethean power. This involves first of all the recognition that not all cultural form-giving is of a technological character, and that it is a fundamental error to try to cast all cultural form-giving into its mould. Technology is but one part of man's form-giving, and as such should take its place not only within the context of {68} the whole of such form-giving but also within the setting of the entire created cosmos. In this connection, technology itself has not only an economic and a physical side, but also an aesthetic, a social an ethical, and a jural side which take positive form in man's form-giving. Thus even technology itself is never simply technical[113].

Moreover, there needs to be some considerable reflection upon the way in which the shaping of human society has been so falsely led by the *technical ideal*. This applies especially to the basis upon which society is organized and to the centralized planning which is involved particularly on the part of the State and the Multinational Company. The ultraspecialization that is accompanied by these trends goes right to the heart of so much of the modern phenomenon of bureaucracy. In this respect it is of some urgency to recover the essential meaning and dignity of work as a divine calling for which *every* human being has a measure of responsible freedom. The phenomenon of the technocratic elite and the mass man in modern society is in this sense fundamentally anormative.

In summary, until the return of the King, the future, like the past, will remain between *hell* and *utopia*. However its proximity to the one pole or the other will depend upon the degree to which this alternative spirit of a truly radical Christianity is taken up. {69} {70}

(4) REVOLT

1789 is the starting point of modern times[114]

Until Rousseau's time, God created Kings who, in their turn, created peoples. After 'The Social Contract', peoples create themselves, before creating kings. As for God, there is nothing more to be said for the time being.[115]

THE AGE OF REVOLUTION
It was the best of times; it was the worst of times.
It was the age of wisdom; it was the age of foolishness.
It was the epoch of belief; it was the epoch of incredulity.
It was the season of light; it was the season of darkness.
It was the spring of hope; it was the winter of despair.
We had everything before us; we had nothing before us.
We were all going direct to heaven; we were all going direct the other way.
In short, the period was very 'like the present period.[116]

Thus Charles Dickens indicates the ambiguities of the French Revolution. The conflicts of that period: between Romantic and Rationalist, between Republican Socialist and Aristocratic Overlord, between Industrial Technology and the well-being of Factory Labourers have intensified to produce the conflicts and tensions of the modern world. Moreover the spirit that has increasingly set and nurtured these polar tensions has also a close connection with the French Revolution.

In 1890 Edmund Burke had already used *religious* language to describe the Revolution, speaking of it as a sect aiming at a universal empire. He warned the men of his time that this was not just a change of dynasty, but that it was a new kind of political event. As far as he was concerned it was not simply a reaction against the injustices of 18th century France; it went much deeper, involving a revolt of men against the divine Order of Creation. After Burke, however, most historians rejected this assessment of the French Revolution, preferring instead to see it simply as an attempt to solve a peculiarly French problem. In recent decades, however, many have returned to the view that the most significant thing about the French Revolution was its basic animating spirit. Notable in this respect is Prof. Georges Lefebre of the Sorbonne, whose book, 'The Coming of the French Revolution', originally published in 1930, was completely rewritten in 1951, to show the supra-national implications of the Revolution. The revised version supports the idea that the revolutions in Switzerland, those of 1830, 1848 etc., the South American revolutions, the Russian revolution and much of the revolutionary spirit of Africa and Asia, belong to one continuing movement of the human spirit. It is in this sense that the period of history since the French Revolution has been called the *Age of Revolution*.

Albert Camus speaks of the animating spirit of the French Revolution in the following terms: {71}

Metaphysical rebellion is the means by which a man protests against his condition and against the whole of creation. It is metaphysical because it disputes the ends of man and of creation.... The metaphysical rebel is, therefore, certainly not an atheist, as one might

think of him, but inevitably he is a blasphemer. He simply blasphemes, primarily in the name of order, by denouncing God as the origin of death and as the supreme disillusionment...

Metaphysical revolt, in the proper sense, does not appear in any coherent form in the history of ideas until the end of the eighteenth century: modern times begin with the crash of falling ramparts. But, from this moment on, its consequences develop uninterruptedly and it is no exaggeration to say that they have shaped the history of our times.[117]

THE ANGLO-SAXON ALTERNATIVE

Although the repercussions of the French Revolution powerfully affect the course of modern times, the initial impact of its radically humanistic spirit was felt far more strongly on the continent of Europe than in Britain and America. The immediate enemy of the radicals - *the ancien regime*, the powerful collusion between the Aristocracy and the Clergy - was far stronger on the continent of Europe. Anglo-Saxon countries were nourished by two strong forces that greatly tempered the injustices of *the ancien regime* in England. These were the ongoing influence of Puritan and Evangelical Christianity, and the heritage of Whig Liberalism.

The Puritan movement of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries had a profound effect upon the political life of Anglo-Saxon peoples. It placed the doctrine of the 'Divine Right of Kings' under the criticism of the Scriptures and accordingly demanded that the King see himself as a servant of God, accountable as such, to the people through Parliament. If the chilling winds of the early Enlightenment did much to curb and quash the Puritan spirit in the late seventeenth century, its rationalistic Deism was imbued with a concern for constitutionally limiting the power of the monarch, giving legal rights to nonconformists and protecting the rights of property owners.

The general Deistic outlook nourishing Whig Liberalism, however, was not openly hostile to God. Its cool, intellectual spirit certainly undermined and effectively denied the power of the Gospel of God's grace in Jesus Christ. However, it replaced this not with a rank atheism but with a somewhat detached attitude in which religion, although a suitable topic for sermons and for general discussion was a matter on which commitment and ecstasy were considered to be in bad taste. God was less of a Father and more of a first cause of the physical universe, less of a Person whose love and grace were central to fallen men and more as the inconceivably intelligent being who had made the amazing universe now being discovered by the exercise of Reason. In the light of this outlook, Christian love was transformed and secularized into a humanitarian good will - with the corollary that the most important of life's virtues was to be socially useful. The latter concern provided many a Deist with the desire to retain the Church as a necessary institution. Nevertheless *spontaneity, enthusiasm, spiritual experience were chilled and numbed; prayer as the lyrical outburst of the soul to its Maker, was dubbed fanaticism, while cold reason was pronounced the all-sufficient guide of life. The reflex of all this upon the bone and marrow of practical religion, became increasingly apparent. The metaphysical Deity was finally resolved into a bundle of barren abstractions; the Bible, which to the early Reformers and Puritans was the 'Chart and compass of Life', the Book of books, came to be regarded simply as a book, and often a despised book; while Jesus*

Christ, far from being acclaimed as the incarnate revelation {72} of God and Saviour of men, was reduced to the level of a mere ethical teacher - and a misleading one.[118]

However, in the midst of the Deistic Rationalism of the early eighteenth century, there grew in both Britain and America, a movement that powerfully affected the development of Anglo-Saxon culture. This was the Evangelical Revival, spearheaded in its human architecture by John Wesley. J. R. Green claims for this Revival that it *changed, after a time, the whole tone of English society. The Church was restored to new life and activity. Religion carried to the hearts of the people a fresh moral zeal, while it purified our literature and our manners. A new philanthropy reformed our prisons, infused clemency and wisdom into our penal laws, abolished the slave-trade, and gave the first impulse to popular education.[119]* After enumerating some of the greatest men of the eighteenth century, 'The Cambridge Modern History' adds that *'But more important than any of these in universality of influence and range of achievement, were John Wesley and the religious revival to which he gave his name and his life.[120]*

Such comments bear witness to the significance of the Evangelical Revival for the life of Anglo-Saxon peoples. The reforming influence of Evangelicalism exemplified by such men as William Wilberforce, combined with the Liberalism of such men as Edmund Burke, were two strong forces preventing merely conservatistic reactions to the demand for the instant achievement of the *socialistic ideal* that erupted with the French Revolution.

However, although both Evangelical Christianity and Liberalism have both been effective in offering resistance to the spirit of revolt that appeared in 1789, the cultural impact of the Evangelical Revival was already on the wane by the middle of the nineteenth century. The Liberalism that once again assumed the dominant spiritual power in populating men's vision and hopes was, due to Hume and Kant, now purged of its Deism, and full of a doctrine of universal and inevitable *progress*. Through the co-operative application of Reason and Science, mankind would see the inevitable upward march of civilization. Moreover, under the inner dynamic of this vision of the *advance of civilization*, the British Commonwealth expanded all over the globe.

UNREASON AND REVOLUTION
'Coral Island' and 'Lord of the Flies' are two novels treating a similar theme. In the former, three boys, Ralph, Jack and Peterkin - products of the best that English Public Schools could offer - are wrecked upon a desert island. They so successfully set about the task of overcoming their adversaries - natives, pirates, paganism and cannibalism - that their achievement cannot help but stand as a symbol for the inevitable victory of the co-operative process of civilization envisaged by nineteenth century Liberalism. In 'Lord of the Flies', a plane load of schoolboys is forced down while an atomic war is raging. All the adults are killed. The leading characters this time are Ralph, Jack and Simon: but instead of behaving like little Victorian gentlemen, the boys gradually revert to a state of primitive savagery and anarchy. Superstitions and violent factions develop, threatening what remains of their civilized heritage.

Thus, whilst the themes of the two novels are similar, the ideals expressed in each are very different: the one is a product of a nineteenth century Liberalism: the other of a twentieth century realistic pessimism. {73}

Our century has seen many challenges to the upward march of civilization championed by nineteenth century Liberalism.

First there was Dada.

'Dada manifesto 1918: 'Dada means nothing'. 'Thought is produced in the mouth'.

'Art falls asleep.... 'ART' - a parrotword - replaced by Dada.... Art needs an operation. Art is a pretension, warmed by the diffidence of the urinary tract hysteria born in a studio'.

These negative definitions of Dada arose from the rejection of what needed to be rejected. This rejection arose from a desire for intellectual and spiritual freedom.... It drove us to the fragmentation or destruction of all artistic forms, and to rebellion for rebellion's sake to an anarchistic negation of all values, a self- exploding bubble, a raging anti, anti, anti, linked with an equally passionate pro, pro, pro![121]

The collages of Kurt Schwitters and the ready-mades of Marcel Duchamp are two of the most significant contributions to this movement, which struck the world of its time as a gross assault on 'civilization'. It is sometimes claimed that 'Dada' was simply the disillusionment of the 1914-18 war. However, the fact that Duchamp's first ready-made - the bicycle wheel - dates from as early as 1913 (although the movement was not 'founded' in Zurich until 1917), would indicate that such a simple causal relation is untenable. Of Dada's subsequent significance, Professor Rookmaaker remarks that

'It used all art forms and tried to break all taboos, all norms of art, all sacred or non-sacred traditions. Dada was a nihilistic creed of disintegration, showing the meaningless of all Western thought, art, morals, traditions. It destroyed them by attacking them in an ironic way, with black humour, by showing them in their absurdity, by making them absurd. And this was not just a few men on their own: they were a strong group and were to have a considerable influence, determining the form and approach of much that came later, right up to our own time. So the Dada movement was not the whims of a few lunatics at the fringe of our culture: it gave form to at least one side of the spirit of our age.[122]

The continuing influence of Dada is nowhere more eloquently portrayed than in the work of 'Monty Python's Flying Circus'.

Then there was Rock and Roll.

The older popular culture associated with the names of Irving Berlin, Cole Porter, Benny Goodman and Frank Sinatra arose from the bourgeois spirit of reality-avoiding sentiment. The style of Rock and Roll derived mainly from the post-war commercial development of Negro blues, known as Rhythm'n Blues. As such Rock 'n Roll was a basic protest against

the values of the bourgeois popular music. In the early fifties Elvis Presley, Bill Haley, Chuck Berry and others offered this stream-lined mechanisation of black blues and barrelhouse music interfused with white Country Western music. In the early sixties the Beatles achieved their most hysterical success with such rocking and rolling numbers. Their colossal hit with Chuck Berry's 'Roll over Beethoven' is perhaps symbolic of the whole event. Its very title indicates a rejection of Western civilization. However, although this was a revolt against the shallow, sentimental world of avoiding the realities of life, it proposed, no solutions. It has neither target nor aim. It was *against* a great deal but *for* nothing. It admitted neither past nor future It lived in and for the present, dedicated to feeding on the experience of the senses and {74} to 'telling it like it is'. As such 'Blackboard Jungle', 'Rock around the Clock' and Elvis were considered by most of the older generation to be in revolt against the fundamental values of Western civilization, with such potential for anarchy and moral decadence that might bring civilization to its knees.

Then came the violence of the student riots of the 1960's, and the development of the New Left, surfacing around such particular protests as the Viet-Nam war and civil rights for the blacks in America. That it is again a revolt against 'civilization' that marks the core of this revolutionary confrontation with the Establishment is the claim of Richard Lowenthal in his article 'Unreason and Revolution'.[123]

He first of all analyzes the contemporary drift of the Left the world over in the terms of 'a dissociation of practice from theory'. Prior to the advent of Marxism during the 1840's, utopian socialism had been a part of the romantic revolt against the beginnings of industrialization. What Marx did was essentially to marry this utopian vision to a dialectical logic of history, which, rather then opposing material and industrial progress, believed their development to he of vital importance for the attainment of utopian freedom.

Thus the utopian goat and the violent overthrow of the old order were not the objectives of immediate action; their possibility was mediated by the laws of the historical process, by Reason as manifested in History - their achievement by a rational strategy based on insight into that process[124]

Lowenthal then discusses how, from Lenin to Mao, Mao to Castro, Guevara, Debray and the New Left, there is a gradual falling apart of this Marxist synthesis.

Lenin believed that some objective conditions were necessary for the victory of the Revolution. Only once the internal contradictions of the economic basis of social ordering had reached crisis proportions, should the party engage in a violent seizure of power. Even then success was assured only when the party had won a strategically decisive following among the masses prior to the point of crisis. For Lenin the role of the party never consisted in the organization of the violence necessary for overthrowing the old order. Violence might play a crucial part in its action at the critical moment, but its primary task was to win over the masses before that moment, by a policy based upon a correct analysis of the social conditions.

Mao became the first to make use of the structural flexibility of the centralized *Vanguard party*, by seeking the necessary support among the peasants, rather than the urban working class. Moreover, he recognized that because of the varying materialistic influences upon the country from outside, the struggle for power was likely to be far more continuous and decisive in China than it had been in Russia. Nevertheless, Mao believed implicitly that only a policy built upon winning and retaining the support of the peasant population in the regions concerned, based on a realistic analysis of the conditions and needs of the people in the area, would the revolution be successful. This involved an organization of the guerrillas that maintained constant contact with the peasant population by living in their midst.

In this way they were not singled out by the militarily superior enemy, and were assured of reliable information of the changing conditions, of supplies and a reservoir for new recruitment. Although the party (as with Marx) no longer represents the actual evolving consciousness of a working class increasingly aware of its historical interests, it still represents (as with Lenin) the leaders' {75} 'scientific' analysis of the situation as a prerequisite for deliberate revolutionary action.

The tendency to separate the use of revolutionary force from any analysis of the political and social conditions is pronounced with Fidel Castro. Long before he ever dreamt of calling himself a Marxist, and probably before he ever studied Marxism, Castro acted on the assumption that armed minority action would, by itself, be sufficient to create a revolutionary situation. After this prescription had proved successful in Cuba, Guevara began to formulate his theories of the *revolutionary guerrilla vanguard*, and attempted to put them into practice in Bolivia. These theories, involving the separation of armed violence from a thorough-going analysis of the social and economic preconditions necessary for revolution, have been most fully developed in 'Revolution in the Revolution by Regis Debray. This book involves a radical reinterpretation of Marxist terminology. Only the uprooted guerrilla is the true 'proletarian' - because he has chosen a life of extreme deprivation and constant danger. The industrial worker is a 'bourgeois', simply because he has a regular job and values it. The basic terms of Marxist analysis are thus totally divorced from their original social and economic meaning.

The second part of Lowenthal's article discussed various ways in which this dissociation of Marxist doctrine from revolutionary practice is apparent - both within and without those countries under Marxist regime. Interestingly enough, movements and regimes that remain strongly Marxist in outlook are ceasing to be revolutionary, whilst those that are revolutionary are renouncing essential features of the Marxist analysis. Thus, the Soviet Union increasingly regards the development of its productive capacity as the only decisive factor for its advance to the Utopia of Communism - it is becoming less concerned with the revolutionary changes within its own boundaries needed to achieve this goal and less concerned with fostering revolutionary movements elsewhere. Communist parties in many advanced Western countries, particularly those with a strong following in a modern industrial working class, are proposing. 'revisionist' strategies for the socialist transformation of their countries by peaceful, democratic methods, based on the expectation that the inherent trend of modern industrial societies will enable them to join the governments and carry out the programmes with majority support, preferably without violence.

Conversely those New Left movements in the same countries, recruited chiefly from students, youth and other alienated from the mainstream of society for reasons of its hypocrisy, its injustice to minority groups, and its materialism, are the ones who are preoccupied with revolution. However, in seeking to initiate the revolutionary overthrow of the social order, they have departed a long way from the Marxist view of the rationality of history, the contradictions of which lead to a breakdown of society with a minimum of violence. Not only this, they have rejected the Marxist view of the prerequisite of industrialization for the achievement of the communist utopia. However, they have retained the view of conflict and confrontation, and have added to them a belief in the necessity of a revolutionary breakdown in Western civilization as the prerequisite for the utopian vision to rise. Thus Lowenthal concludes:

The new type of revolutionary movements, both on the outer fringes of our Western-centred world and in the advanced Western countries, as well as some phenomena within the latter that are not 'revolutionary' in the conventional, political sense of the term, can best be understood as symptoms of a crisis of Western civilization. It is this which explains their increasing turning away from the Marxist type of analysis and strategy: for Marxism, in its origin, its values and its commitment to rationality is indissolubly linked to its Western heritage... {76}

The danger to Western society from these new movements is serious. It is not the danger of a 'Third World bloc' abroad or 'revolution' at home; it is the prospect of destruction, decay and barbarisation....The real menace within the West is not that the young extremists will 'take over', they cannot even take over the universities. But they can paralyze and, in some cases, destroy them by first destroying the climate of tolerance and rational discourse which is the breath of academic life. They can deprive our societies of an important part of the well trained and loyal elites needed for the steady administration and economic management of research and education. And they can create a backlash of police brutality and right wing extremism which will in effect help them to obstruct the working of democracy and the constructive solution of urgent problems.

I do not, of course, know any simple answer to these problems, any magic prescription for coping with them...civilization must be defended by upholding and renewing its standards in action, by combining a faith in its values with the determination to apply them constructively in a changing world - and therefore to make sacrifices for them - inside and outside the West. Only if we can restore hope by doing that will the West survive. Otherwise it will succumb to barbarization - and that means (as the whole of history is there to teach us) succumbing not to some particular barbarian ideology, movement, or tribe, but to its own failure.[125]

Richard Lowenthal is a liberal. He believes in the Western liberal tradition, with its fundamental values of the freedom of the individual, tolerance, progress and above all the power of reasoned argument. It is upon these principles that civilization flourishes. It is when these principles cease to guide our way of life that civilization is in peril.

However, it is not immediately obvious what Western civilization he believes to be at stake. He can hardly mean *the living* culture of the present. So much of that is taken up in the power of technique applied to science, technology and commerce. In the arts, we have, in addition to Dada, Surrealism, the Theatre of the Absurd - adding further testimony to the breakdown of reason to come to terms with reality. Moreover popular culture has continued to be dominated by Pop - that non-intellectual, sensate enjoyment of the fleeting moment. It is true, of course, that this nowhere near exhausts our contemporary cultural horizon. We have access to the Western culture going back over generations. But those who live in continued celebration of the arts of the past, are living on a *memory* that effectively alienates them from the realities of the present. Very little of our *contemporary* culture reflects the outlook of Liberalism. It may still be the officially prevailing outlook of our universities, our schools and our politics; however that these very institutions are subject to a crisis of authority, of meaning and of credibility is symptomatic of the point at issue. The strengths of Liberalism are precisely its failings. Its tolerance takes insufficient account of evil; its individualism allows and encourages competitive exploitation and consequent economic injustice; its view of progress is too materialistic; its detached stance of Reason often renders its arguments mere sophistry. It is the reality of 'Coral Island' and does not know quite how to come to terms with 'Lord of the Flies'.

The New Left may be at fault in terms of its tactics. Its only alternative may be to build something 'human' out of the chaos of the downfall of the Establishment; it may have lost confidence in the rationality of history and have a hideous face in the form of revolutionary violence. It may have too little appreciation of the culture of the past. Nevertheless its critique of the present is closer to the reality we experience than the Liberal Establishment {77} would have us believe. However, to se the full significance of the confrontation of the New Left with 'the Liberal Establishment' within the Anglo-Saxon world we heed to gain some perspective upon the development of political life since the French Revolution.

LIBERALS, RADICALS and CONSERVATIVES

The course of the French Revolution was in its repercussions Western, not merely French. To its makers, as well as to its enemies, it was a proving ground for the ideas of the Enlightenment. Here the experiment of abolishing the bad environment and setting up the new good environment was actually made. The experiment produced the Reign of Terror, Napoleon and a bloody war. Obviously something had gone wrong. Yet the intellectual leaders of mankind by no means drew the simple conclusion that the ideas behind the experiments were wrong. They drew, indeed, many conclusions, and from these conclusions much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is understandable. We (can) make a very rough division into those who, though shocked by the Revolution, continued to hold, with the kind of modifications suited to respectable middle-class people, the basic ideas of the Enlightenment; those who attacked these ideas as basically false; those who attacked these ideas at least as incorporated in nineteenth century society, as basically correct, but distorted, or not achieved, or not carried far enough. Putting the matter in terms borrowed from politics, we (can) consider the points of view of Centre, Right and Left.[126]

The social and cultural shape of the modern world has developed from the vision of the Enlightenment. Central to this vision of life was a Man who was the measure and master of all things. In defiance of Cod, King and Church, this Man would establish an order of society in which all men would live as brothers, unexploited by Church and King. In establishing this universal brotherhood of man, all distinctions between Class, Religion and Race would be abolished; authority would no longer be superimposed from above but would emanate from the collective will of the people. In achieving these goals of liberty, equality and democracy, Reason alone would be the guide. The existing order of society was to be conquered before a Man thus, destined to inherit his heaven on earth. Generally speaking, but with some notable exceptions, it has been this secular, utopian vision that has provided the basic forward direction in which political life has travelled during the last two centuries. The basic differences - between radicalism, liberalism and conservatism are essentially differences first with respect to the enthusiasm with which the Enlightenment vision has been embraced and second with respect to the pace and manner it was to be enacted. Hence, it is in this light that we may gain some insight with regard to the Liberal, Radical and Conservative stances that have characterised the great changes in the political form of society in modern times.

Liberalism
It is not unfair to say that modern liberalism gained its first definitive expression from the pen of John Locke. Locke was not a man who suddenly rebelled against God, the Church and the State. On the contrary he was one who was thoroughly appreciative of authority within the legitimate limits 'dictated by Reason'. Moreover, he made something of a Christian profession - albeit that his Christianity was one 'within the bounds of Reason'. With regard to Locke's emphasis upon the 'light of Reason', Peter Laslett says of him *that it serves to spell out in thick black letters Locke's quite literal belief that reason is the mode of co-operation between men: reason, he had just said, is 'the common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society'. It is not an isolated statement, but a recurrent repetitive theme, perhaps developed in detail as a later insertion, but essential to Locke's account of the maintenance of Justice inside and outside organized {78} society....In perfect freedom, equal to each other, capable of rational behaviour and so able to understand and co-operate with each other, that is how we are born. It must be emphasized that we are all born this way, bond or free, savage or civilized, inside or outside society or state, for it is a truly universal doctrine in Locke.... There can be no arbitrary source of power of one man over another, not even a source in Revelation.*[127]

The development of democratic ideals in modern times did not, of course, originate with Liberalism, but rather with the Calvinistic Reformation. As A. T. van Leeuwen points out, the kind of democracy that sprang up on this soil bore a distinctive character. It is of a constitutional type and is based upon a recognition of the universally binding character of God's law. It combined a full acknowledgment of the equality of all men before God with an equally thoroughgoing recognition of the legitimate power conferred by Him upon men in authoritatively exercising their various tasks in life. The difference in spiritual background between this notion of democracy and that deriving from Stoic doctrine is apparent in the emphases placed upon 'God's law' as opposed to 'Natural Law' and in 'Revelation' as opposed to 'Reason'. As van Leeuwen writes:

As opposed to this Hellenic type of democracy, the type bred by Calvinism bears a markedly Old Testament   character.... English democracy bears the mark of Calvinism most obviously, whilst democracy in France, though it bears traces of Calvinistic influence through its connections with the American Revolution, is in fact almost entirely the product of an egalitarian and rationalistic ideal. American democracy in its original form offers a bridge between the two types.[128]

If the first emphasis of Liberalism is upon 'Natural Law' as apprehended by 'Reason unaided by Revelation', then its second is a limitation in the power of the State in the interests of the freedom of the individual. Central to this, however, is the *social contract* view of society, in which free, autonomous individuals bind themselves together out of a *state of nature* by means of *a contract*. In this respect the limitation in the legitimate exercise of State power, for Liberalism, originates with those men who make the social contract. Moreover, this contract is considered to have a continuing binding force in the mutual interests of individualistic freedom. That Liberalism thus contains the seeds of an individualistic capitalism is pointed out by C.B. MacPherson in his important study entitled 'The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism'. In this he writes of John Locke that

(His) astonishing achievement was to base the property right on natural right and natural law, and then to remove all the natural law limits from the property right...Locke begins by accepting, as the dictate both of natural reason and of Scripture, that the, earth and its fruits were originally given to mankind in common. This was of course the traditional view, found alike in mediaeval and in seventeenth century Puritan theory. But Locke accepts this position only to refute the conclusions previously drawn from it, which had made property something less than a natural individual right.[129]{79}

This Locke achieves by means of the postulated 'State of Nature'. In this 'every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men.[130] (emphasis added).

Hence Locke, in his view of man in the State of Nature, emphasises the right of the individual to own property in a manner that enabled this ownership to be considered as an absolute right that was exclusive of social obligation. Moreover, he considers money to have developed within precivil society and that the advent of civil society was primarily for the mutual protection of the property of those who have appropriated it in the State of Nature. As a consequence, as MacPherson points out[131], it is clear that Locke's views justify the unlimited appropriation of property on the part of some at the expense of the continued poverty on the part of others. The justification for this is in the terms of considering the former as industrious and the latter to be lazy and unable. Those not in the ownership of property are therefore not considered full members of civil society; they do, however, continue to own themselves. With regard to his views on property and the poor socioeconomic position of the underpriviledged, Locke is far removed from a

biblical spirit. The many features built into the Old Testament form of society - such as the Year of Jubilee - had the purpose of simultaneously enabling those subject to adversity a means of regaining property (which is never viewed as theirs in an absolute sense; it is God's) and of preventing economic power being allowed to fall into the hands of an elite landed aristocracy.

Alongside these property-based themes in Locke's social theory, there is also much that is said with regard to the individual equality and freedom of men in the State of Nature. Each individual in this state, for example, is free to follow the Law of Nature as apprehended by Reason. The task of the Body Politic with the advent of civil society is also considered to be one of following the Law of Nature; it is this which justifies the majority of propertyholders rebelling against the Sovereign in the event of the latter going beyond the dictates of Reason. As MacPherson again points out[132], Locke is fundamentally ambiguous with regard to his picture of man in the State of Nature with the result that it is capable of a variety of interpretations. In the young and promising country of North America a 'State of Nature' existed in which men and women were embued with the growing optimism of the Enlightenment, with the result that the ideals of freedom, of equality, of democracy, of limiting the power of the State prevailed, resulting in the United States of America being the first country in which Liberalism prevailed. Regarding the relationships that developed between the Church and the State under Liberalism, it is of some importance to consider Locke's basic nominalism regarding all societal structures. In this respect van Leeuwen points out that

Although he would derive the historic growth of government from the initial action of God's providence, (Locke) makes little or nothing of the religious basis of the State. The State does not exist to the glory of God, but only for the welfare of the individual - which he interprets in the sense of a utilitarian empiricism. His Letters on Toleration *reduce the Churches to the status of free associations which in all moral and political affairs are* {80} to *accommodate themselves to the ordinances of the State. The Toleration Act of 1689 did indeed uphold the State Church; but it also recognized the dissenters as 'denominations' and allowed them religious liberty. The theocratic relationship between State and Church which Calvin - and in a different form Cromwell also - had envisaged finally made way for a point of view which set a new course towards the Enlightenment.[133]*

The separation between Church and State that took root in America needs to be understood in the light of the Liberal standpoint. In standing for freedom of religion, the American Constitution not only forbids interference of the State in matters related to the Church, it also embodies a view of religion that is thoroughly embued with the spirit of the Enlightenment: the entirety of civil life was to be ordered according to the Law of Nature as apprehended by Reason, 'religion' being identified with that personal confessional life lying beyond the pale of the unified civil order founded upon Reason. This supposedly provided a foundation for a common secular life that was independent of religious and sectarian strife. However, that this Enlightenment view is itself confessional in character has been, in part at least, uncovered and exposed by the recent discussion initiated on 'Civil Religion in America' by Robert Bellah.[134]

If John Locke was the major spokesman for Liberalism in the eighteenth century then its major spokesmen in the nineteenth century were Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Both were strong advocates of the supremacy of reason and of a democracy in which individual freedom with moral integrity would lead to the progress of mankind. However, whilst their ideas were influential throughout both Europe and America, for many the United States of America itself stood for the liberal ideal toward which all nations should be striving. The significance of the United States and also of Great Britain, in this regard, has meant that the Anglo-Saxon world at large has provided something of a liberal leadership that has purported to stand for freedom and democracy against all forms of totalitarian tyranny.

Radicalism

The ambiguities in Locke's social theory were far-reaching. Although in terms of the emphasis upon the freedom of the individual in the State of Nature, it *appears* to promote a better lot for mankind, in fact, it is a theory which guarantees the continued priviledges for those already possessing them. However, in terms of the promise of freedom and equality to all, Rousseau began to sound an entirely new note, evident from the following words that open his book 'The Social Contract':

Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Many a man believes himself to be the master of others who is no less than they, a slave. How did this change take place? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? To this question I hope to furnish an answer.[135]

With Rousseau there is no tolerating the condition of the inequalities amongst men. Utopia is a condition which men have a right to and which is theirs for the taking. 'The Social Contract' is therefore primarily an enquiry into the legitimacy of power. However, as Camus points out:

It is a book about rights about facts and at no time is it a collection of sociological observations. It is concerned with principles and for this very reason is bound to be controversial 'The Social Contract' amplifies and dogmatically explains the new religion whose god is reason, confused with Nature, and whose representative on earth, in place of the king, is the people {81} considered as an expression of the general will.

The attack against the traditional order is so evident that, from the very first chapter, Rousseau is determined to demonstrate the precedence of the citizens' past, which accorded the people their place, to the pact between the people and the king, which established royalty. Until Rousseau's time, God created kings who, in their turn, created peoples. After 'The Social Contract', peoples create themselves, before creating kings. As for God, there is nothing more to be said for the time being.... Power, therefore,is no longer arbitrary, but derives its existence from general consent. In other words, power is no longer what is but what should be...... It is evident that, with 'The Social Contract', we are assisting at the birth of a new mystique - the will of the people being substituted for God Himself. 'Each of us', says Rousseau, 'places his person and his entire capabilities under the supreme guidance of the will of the people and we receive each individual member into our bodies as an indivisible part of the whole'

The will of the people is, in fact, coercive; its power has no limits. But the punishment it inflicts on those who refuse to obey it is nothing more than a means of 'compelling them to be free'....The will of the people is, primarily, the expression of universal reason, which is categorical. The new God is born. That is why, the words that are to be found most often in 'The Social Contract' are the words 'absolute', 'sacred', 'inviolable'. The body politic thus defined, whose laws are sacred commandments, is only a by-product of the mystic body of temporal Christianity....Rousseau is, in fact, the first man in modern times to institute the profession of civil faith. He is also the first to justify the death-penalty in a civil society and the absolute submission of the subject to the authority of the sovereign. 'It is in order not to become victim of an assassin that we consent to die if we become assassins.' A strange justification, but one which firmly establishes the fact that you must know how to die if the sovereign commands and must, if necessary, concede that he is right and you are wrong. This mystic idea explains Saint-Just's silence from the time of his arrest until he goes to the scaffold. Suitably developed, it equally well explains the enthusiasm of the defendants in the Moscow trials. We are witnessing the dawn of a new religion with its martyrs, its ascetics, and its saints. To be able to estimate the influence achieved by this gospel, one must have some idea of the inspired tones of the proclamations of 1789.[136]

The radicals followed in the wake of Rousseau. They embraced the Enlightenment principles with passion unequalled in human history. The utopian vision of the instant achievement of equality, justice and freedom for all upon the basis of a secularistic brotherhood was regarded as Man's intrinsic right, deviation from which was punishable by death. Since the main obstacle in the way of such a development was perceived to be *'the ancien regime'*, the Radical Enlightenment was not content with the peaceful coexistence with the Christian religion characteristic of Liberalism. The *ancien regime* God, Church and State - as the enemy of mankind, must be broken to make way for progress. Of this change in spiritual motivation, van Leeuwen writes that

In spite of the direct links which undoubtedly exist between the American and French Revolutions, the passage from the one to the other involves a leap into a different spiritual climate. The background to the French Revolution contains nothing of the Old Testament Theocratic outlook of Puritanism on the relation between Church and State, where political renovation goes hand in hand with religious renewal, of which it is in fact the product. This is why the French Revolution is of such general historical consequence. It gave political form to a new image of man and of the world - an image based essentially on the sovereignly of reason and one which in fact dispensed with the hypothesis of God's existence.[137] {82}

The major spiritual impetus to radical thought subsequent, to the French Revolution came from the Young Hegelians, culminating, of course, in Marxism.

Hegel's philosophy was supreme in the Germany of the 1920's. The self-realization of Absolute Spirit in the dialectical historical process of Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis - was considered the ultimate philosophy, uniting into one whole philosophy and religion, justifying Christianity and the highest form of religion, and the Prussian State as having a final place in destiny. All Hegel's pupils had to do was to work out its implications in the various fields as yet only touched upon by Hegel himself. However, differences of

opinion soon began to appear, with the two most hotly debated issues being the immortality of the soul; and the personality of God. Hegel's intention had been to show that philosophy and religion were reconcilable and thus to refute rationalist critics of the Kantian type while at the same time attacking both the Scriptural revelation of the 'supernatural' theologians and the romantic notions surrounding the religion of feeling developed by Schleiermacher. In doing this Hegel used expressions suggesting that the Absolute Spirit's knowledge of himself was the same as man's self-consciousness, and this was one of the themes taken up by the Young Hegelians. Another was the tendency to view Hegel's dialectical movement of history less as a justification for the existing state of affairs and more as the basis for future movement under the impetus of Rational Criticism. For them 'The rational was real' and the dialectical method provided the basis upon which men could move into the future through a criticism of the present and the past.

To begin with their criticism was launched upon the Christian religion. The leader in this respect was Bruno Bauer who, according to David McLellan,

evolved more and more towards a radical form of criticism based on destroying religious beliefs rather than justifying them. This evolution concerned the object of criticism rather than the method. Whereas before criticism merely showed the deficiencies of past religious ideas and how they stood in contradiction with development towards the perfect harmony, now criticism began to demonstrate the absurdity of any kind of religion…… Christianity, however, revolutionary it was in its inception, had now been surpassed and become an obstacle to progress.[138]

However, whereas Bauer remained an Hegelian Idealist, Feuerbach removed its speculative metaphysics, turning its language of the Absolute into language of the human 'species', whose essence was communal, whose knowledge comes by sense-perception and who lives in a constant exchange with nature.

In the Germany of the early nineteenth century, religion was so closely interwoven with politics that it was not surprising that the Young Hegelian's views on the State should parallel those on religion. In all their thinking but more especially in politics, the Young Hegelians were influenced by the French Revolution. As David McLellan ocomments:

Their political philosophy can be well described as 'philosophical radicalism'. As such they were distinct from the much more widespread liberal movement. Liberalism, being a movement with a large amount of at least tacit support among the more prosperous citizens, was above all practical. It had the ideas of the Prussian Reform Era to look back on and its philosopher was Kant. Radicalism was more inspired by Rousseau and the French Revolution seen through the eyes of the Young Hegelians, and tended to be excessively theoretical. Liberal doctrines arose from the desire of the bourgeoisie to be represented in the government, {83} whereas radicalism was limited to a small circle of intellectuals, who tended to adopt revolutionary attitudes and reject compromises.[139]

The achievement of Marx and Engels was to combine the humanistic religion of Feuerbach, the dialectics of Hegel, the communism of Hess, the economic theories of Ricardo and Adam Smith with the revolutionary potential of the working class, destined

in their minds to be the heirs of the glorious utopian future of mankind. The significance of Marx's thought for the modern world needs little comment. It forms the spiritual and social reality of no mean part of mankind and functions in such a way as to provide the ideological background for many others who are alienated from the existing social and cultural conditions - whether or not they arise from a genuine awareness of social and economic injustice.

Amongst modern 'Marxist' thinkers, none has been more influential in the West than Herbert Marcuse. He has been quick to spot the revolutionary potential of many of the alienated and misfitted of Western society, as is made clear by his closing remarks in 'One Dimensional Man'.

Underneath the conservative popular base is, the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colours, the unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process, their life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game. When they get together and go out into the streets, without arms, without protection, in order to ask for the most primitive civil rights, they know they face logs, stones and bombs, jail, concentration camps, even death. Their force is behind every political demonstration for the victims of law and order. The fact that they start refusing to play the game may be the fact which narks the beginning of the end of a period.[140]

However, it is questionable whether Marcuse's thought deserves the title "Marxist", for, in line with the drift of the New Left already discussed, it has in any respects departed from the key features of *historical materialism*. Nevertheless there is no doubting that it is *radical*, and in this it has very strong links with the background that spawned both Marxism and Anarchism. Indeed, as Alisdair MacIntyre points out[141], Marcuse's thought moves very much in the orbit of the Young Hegelian Movement. Like them he attempts a rational critique of the existing form of society in which the existing order is to be overthrown, thus making way for a glorious tomorrow. The preservation of civilization is unimportant; everything is to be sacrificed to the blind hope of what may rise out of the rubble of the revolution. In his hope of bringing down the existing order, Marcuse is willing to seize upon any group which may have a potential for the Great Refusal.

The advocates of the New Left are thus thoroughly embued with the utopian *social ideal* that has become disillusioned with the *technical ideal* as the major driving force of modern civilization. In this they have thoroughly departed from *historical materialism* - which considered the *technical ideal* the means to the achievement of the *social ideal*, However, in their desire to overthrow and rebuild from the rubble; in their willingness to resort to violence, they are one with the animating spirit of the radical humanism erupting from the French Revolution. {84}

Conservatism
There were many in the nineteenth century who opposed both Liberalism and Rationalism. Although they did so from a wide variety of different motives and

standpoints, they had in common both a fear of the abstract reasoning of the radicals and a fear of the utopian levelling of the ideas of democracy and socialism. In opposing the radical rejection of the supposedly unenlightened past, the conservatives wished to uphold the traditional societal order. Some were concerned simply to hold onto their lands and property; others genuinely believed that nothing of value could come about from cultural innovation of any kind, and were thus conservative in the sense of viewing any change as a departure from the truth. The majority of conservatives, however, were deeply influenced by the social ideal that had its origins in the Hellenic-Hebraic synthesis of mediaeval Christendom. As such it saw society as fundamentally hierarchical, headed by some alliance between Church and State. Dating from the division of the Roman Empire into East and West and from the divisions of the Reformation period, there were a variety of such forms: an Anglican one in England, a Presbyterian one in Scotland., an Orthodox one in Russia, a Lutheran one in the German and Scandinavian countries, and a Roman Catholic one in France, Spain and the Hapsburg Empire.

However, in spite of this diversity, there are a number of characteristic features which belong to the *social ideal* of this mediaeval synthesis. The most significant of these is that *man's position in society was firmly anchored in a number of different social forms*: family, guild, feudal estate, church, state, university. In each of these social forms, the bonds between people were strong, being founded in tradition, obligation and fealty. Men and women were thus never isolated individuals, nor were they members of society in some merely abstract *political sense*. They were members of a social order with a whole range of communal ties.

Secondly, the different forms of society - family, guild, church, state, feudal estate, university etc. - tended to be viewed in an overall *hierarchical* structure in which either the church or the state was given supreme place. In the Lutheran and Orthodox forms it was the state that tended to dominate life, whilst in the Roman Catholic form the church assumed pride of place. This meant that *authority* within society also had a characteristically hierarchical form. Thirdly *economic* power fitted into this same hierarchical pattern, with effective *political* power being but a reflection of the socio-economic features of this hierarchy. Fourthly, appointment to *authority* within the various forms of social life tended to be upon the basis of *inheritance*, with the consequence that marriages were invariably inextricably bound with both economic and political settlements, and class status. Moreover individuals were invariably bound to the same station in the social order as their parents. Finally, the conservatism of this social ideal was considered to embody both the classical wisdom of the Greeks and the wisdom of the Scriptures, receiving significant articulation from such figures as Thomas Aquinas in the Roman Catholic tradition and Richard Hooker in the Anglican tradition.

As used today the terms 'conservative', 'liberal' and 'radical' apply almost exclusively to the attitudes taken up toward the rate at which an existing form of society is to be changed: 'Conservative' is taken to mean an attitude of holding on to the status quo, 'liberal' which advocates moderate changes (often motivated by a concern for the freedom of the individual) and 'radical' one which insists upon immediate and far-reaching changes (often toward greater 'equality' in the sense of extending the power of the collective). Unfortunately this usage not only takes little or no account of the way in

which a *social ideal* gives direction to social change, it also tends to uncritically sanction the Enlightenment social ideal as the only viable alternative. {85}

The Enlightenment social ideal can be described as one in which social reality is presumed to revolve exclusively upon the political relation of the individual to the collective. Both the individual and the collective are considered to have inalienable rights which, given the right conditions, will work in perfect harmony. The *ancien regime* together with its social ideal was seen as providing conditions in which the individual was not free to live out his rights in relation to the collective. Hence it was the object of attack from liberals and radicals alike. Moreover it is the conflict of two social ideals that makes the French. Revolution of such momentous significance for the modern world. Conservative critics of the Revolution worked out of a different social ideal: rather than finding its roots in the political relation of the individual to the collective, they were found in the relationships of individuals to various social forms - family, guild, church, feudal estate - within an overall hierarchical structure. In place of authority deriving from the priviledges of birthright they enunciated the *democratic* ideal as one which would give all men a say in the running of the affairs of the collective. Moreover, whereas the conservative social ideal had sought to justify authority as given to man from God, the Enlightenment social ideal based authority either upon the rights of the individual or in the collective 'will of the people'. The basic conflict of the French Revolution was therefore with regard to a whole vision of life that gave meaning to two different social ideals. The social ideal leading the Revolutionaries saw the whole of social life in the political terms of the relationship of the individual to the state, the latter being conceived as the collective of 'the people'. In this relationship, individual liberty was supposed to lead naturally to an equality of persons in which each acted for the benefit of others. In this light the characteristic features of the conservative social ideal were to be demolished in one fell swoop, with 'Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite' a cry that bore witness to a social ideal that was fundamentally at variance with the one that had shaped the existing form of society. Hierarchy and authority were to be replaced by equality and brotherhood; all authority was to be founded in the individual and in the collective 'will of the people'. However in the way they brought hierarchy and priviledged authority and power under criticism, the liberals and radicals also undermined the independent significance of such non-political forms of society as the family, the guild, the church and the local community. The undermining has resulted from the view that social reality is fundamentally the political relation of the individual to the collective. Indeed this social ideal has proved to have a fundamental flaw that shows itself in the tendencies toward an anarchism of individualistic freedom on the one hand and a totalitarian collectivity on the other.

Nevertheless it is in the light of this Enlightenment ideal that we are now urged to adopt attitudes toward social and political development. Anything which brings further individual freedom and greater equality is judged 'liberal' or 'progressive' whilst anything which prevents this, is dubbed 'conservative' or 'reactionary'. In this light it is therefore of some importance to distinguish between the *conservative social ideal* and *conservatism* as the form of the status quo. Indeed the basic problem with the conservatism dominant today is that it has no other ideal than the status quo to give it direction. In this sense it is very different from the conservatism of the early nineteenth century.

In view of this distinction between the conservative ideal and conservatism it is of some importance to discuss the development of a social ideal that differs from both the Enlightenment social ideal and the conservative ideal, albeit that it derives features from both. I refer to the growth of what might be called *Christian Democracy* in Western Europe. {86}

Edmund Burke and Groen van Prinsterer
Edmund Burke was a sincere Anglican who had made his career in the British House of Commons. He began his political career as a Whig Liberal, and as such had supported the cause of the American 'rebels' in the American War of Independence. However, from its very outbreak he was opposed to the French Revolution, and became an intellectual leader against it. His principle work in this connection - 'Reflections on the Revolution in France' - was published as early as 1890. It led Bunke into conflict with many of the leading thinkers of his time. Tom Paines 'The Rights of Man' and James Mackintosh's 'Defence of the French Revolution' are two examples of such relations to Burke's criticisms. The conflict is fundamentally that between the Conservative and the Enlightenment social ideals, with Burke expressing a Liberalism that is coloured by the former and his opponents expressing a Liberalism that is coloured by the latter. To Burke the French Revolution was the work of an idealism that was imbued with the great hopes of the Enlightenment. As such he considered its desired radical break with the past would inevitably lead to social chaos and tyranny. Moreover, he was deeply suspicious of the view of man that lay behind the French Revolution. As Crane Brinton writes:

Burke starts with a Christian pessimism about the animal man; indeed, one of his great hatreds was his hatred for Rousseau who preached the natural goodness of man unsoiled by civilization, the Rousseau whom he called the 'insane Socrates of the National Assembly'. Ordinary men if left to the promptings of their desires, their passions, till according to Burke, always tend to run amuck, to cheat, seduce, violate, to make beasts of themselves. Yet in daily life most do none of these things, and the criminal exceptions can always he coped with in a sound society. Civil society presents the striking spectacle of potentially, 'naturally', bad men behaving like good ones, or at least quiet ones. We must conclude that just the opposite of what Rousseau said is true: man is saved, not ruined, by his membership in society, by his obedience to convention, tradition, prejudice, law and the like. His social and political environment is the one thing that stands between him and chaos.[142]

Although Edmund Burke is usually classed as a Conservative[143], it is quite clear from the fact of his earlier alignment with Whig Liberalism that he could not be considered a typical Tory. The problem was that although he was critical of the direction being taken by the French Revolution he was unable to strike out a political path that was a genuine alternative to Liberalism and Conservatism. Moreover, although Burke's attack on the revolutionary centralization and collectivization of power was the rallying point for a large volume of literature during the nineteenth century seeking to reinstate the significance and importance of non-political forms of society[144] they were generally either conservative in the sense of seeking to retain some form of the hierarchical social ideal or liberal in the sense of founding the social forms upon the sovereignty of the individual. Moreover, although many recognised the religious character of the radicalism that developed from the French Revolution, few were willing to deal with the religious root of

the problems in a way that departed from the hierarchical ideal that was founded in the mediaeval synthesis. However, such a path was developed in the Netherlands during the nineteenth century under the leadership of Groen van Prinsterer. In his book 'Ongeloof en Revolutie'[145] Groen analysed the political alignments of his time in the terms of being led by a religious principle. The Radicals he considered to be {87} the consistent humanists, inspired by a secular vision of an attainable utopia in the present era. The Liberals, though in agreement with the basic direction being taken by the Radicals, hesitated, compromised and adjusted their course of action both to the immediate needs and to their own material interests. The Conservatives were wedded to the past and to the hierarchical form of society, having little by way of positive principle to lead in an alternative direction In the face of this analysis Groen rejected all three of the major alternatives, seeking rather to develop a style of politics that was led by a radically Christian principle. Thus, again van Prinsterer may be considered by some as a conservative, as Evan Runner points out:

His prophetic insight and evangelical obedience elevate him above all the other conservatives of his time. It was what led him to break with conservatism. His act of evangelical obedience has given the Netherlands another political history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than the Anglo-Saxon countries. The difference is not a matter of national or racial differences; it is a difference in religious insight. In his religious insight Groen got beyond conservatism. His fundamental analysis can be summed up in one or two sentences: 'That to get rid of the evil it is not sufficient to combat its symptoms, but the germ has to be removed. That the only antidote to systematic unbelief is a radical and integral faith.'[146]

This path was developed by Groen van Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper in the latter part of the nineteenth century. They differed from the Conservatives in departing from any hierarchical social ideal, and differed from the Liberals in founding both the political and non-political forms of social life in distinctive spheres in all of which the ultimate sovereignty was given to God alone. Man's authority derived from God and was a calling to responsible stewardship in all such spheres of life.[147]

Christian Democracy in Western Europe
The French Revolution was not long in bringing forth reaction from Roman Catholic quarters. De Bonald with his three volume work entitled 'Theory of Political and Religious Power in Civil Society' (1796) and de Maistre with his 'Of the Papacy' (1817) were bitterly opposed to the Revolution, being thoroughly embued with a conservative social ideal that led them to *set forth a view of the papacy in history as the principal agency of civilization and unity. In the historical troubles of Europe the popes were the peacemakers and mediators[148]* These authors were particularly instrumental in shaping nineteenth century ultra-montanism, the movement which sought to give a unifying and central role to the papacy over against tendencies toward national independence within the Roman Catholic Church. Moreover, with all the conservative tone of their work there are indications of a definite shift of ground in which the major concern of the Roman Catholic Church toward Humanism rather than Protestantism as providing the major force threatening the Church. Indeed, in the wake of the political and social upheavals following the French Revolution, the Roman Catholic Church asserted itself as the only institution in the Western world that could provide a point of stability giving moral

guidance and spiritual security. Moreoever it was felt in Roman Catholic circles during the nineteenth century that sporadic and scattered reaction to deism, naturalism, rationalism, romanticism and evolutionism was neither sufficient nor really effective; a more systematic and all-encompassing approach was needed, and in 1868 Pope Pius IX published his famous bull *'Aeterni Patris'*, Philip Hughes, in his book 'The Church in Crisis: A History of the General Councils, 325-1870[149], comments about the work of this Pope and says that he wanted *to restate {88} the faith in certain matters where it had been attacked or misunderstood; to provide new safeguards for Christian marriage and the Christian education of the youth; and to take up in this new age the ancient problems of the revelations of Church and State and provide appropriate guidance, so as to promote peace and prosperity in the national life everywhere. That the State, everywhere, is labouring under an infinity of ills... is known to all, and the Church is at the mercy of terrible storms. In fact, the malice of God's enemies continually assails the Church's teaching, and the authority of the Holy See; it has robbed the Church of vast properties, brought about the dissolution of religious orders exiled and imprisoned bishops, set up systems of education where the none of God is never even mentioned, allowed the publication and sale of wicked books, and the organisation of societies whose purpose is to spread these evils still further.... It is the pope's bounded duty to take counsel about these matters in consultation with the whole body of his brethren, the bishops of the Catholic Church. Pope Pius IX was from the beginning of his reign consciously dedicated to the general restoration of Catholic life, and the coming council should do for the post-revolutionary world what Trent had done for the sixteenth century.[150]*

Accordingly the First Vatican Council was called in 1869-70. Amongst other things it declared the Pope infallible when he speaks officially concerning matters of faith and morals. It also re-affirmed the Thomistic nature-grace synthesis as the basis for re-emphasising and restating the faith for the modern world, and it was against this background that Pope Leo XIII took up the task of issuing a whole series of encyclicals dealing with the Christian life in this world. Etienne Gilson writes of this that

Among the encyclical letters of the Popes, none is more remarkable than those of Leo XIII, especially with reference to the teaching of the Church on social, economic and political questions..... the restoration of the social order in the light of the doctrine, and under the guidance of the Catholic Church...The Pope wanted to restore, by, the teaching of philosophy, 'the right principles of thought and action'.... This meant that Leo XIII considered a sound philosophical education the necessary basis for a future restoration of the social order. To consider the teaching of philosophy as a mere intellectual luxury, or as an unpractical method to reform modern societies, would therefore be a complete misinterpretation of his doctrine... the teaching of the Christian philosophy of the Scholastics, especially that of St. Thomas Aquinas, is considered by the Pope a necessary prerequisite to any practical scheme in view of restoring the social order.... Leo XIII had expressly declared that 'the cause of civilization lacks a solid foundation if it does not rest on the eternal principles of truth and the unchangeable laws of right and justice'..; To attempt a political and social reformation without having first ascertained its doctrinal foundations, such as are found in the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas, would therefore be tantamount to erecting a baseless structure. Catholics should not hope to restore any Christian political and social order on any other foundation.[151]

The series of encyclicals referred to by Gilson is the Leonine Corpus and they comprimise (1) 'On Socialism' (1878); (2) 'On Christian Philosophy' (1879); (3) 'On Christian Marriage' (1880); (4) 'On Civil Government'; (5) 'On Free-masonry' (1884); (6) 'On the Christian Constitution of States' (1885); (7) 'On Human Liberty' (1888); (8) 'On Christian Citizenship' (1890); (9) 'On the Rights and Duties of Capital and Labour' (1891). This last encyclical *'Rerun Novarum'* (Of New or Revolutionary Things) is, according to Anne Freemantle, *'the most famous of the Leonine Corpus. It is the Church's complete answer to 'Das Kapital' of Marx, and, indeed to Communism and Socialism in whatever form. It has been quoted, commented on, and printed many times, and is required reading for any student of economic history.*[152] {89}

In their respective attempts to revitalise Christianity for all of life and culture, Pope Leo XIII and Abraham Kuyper are two of the most significant leaders in the Christian Democratic movement that has taken root in Western Europe over the last hundred years. In family, youth, labour, employer, educational and political spheres in Austria, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, France, Holland and Belgium this movement has made no small contribution in helping to steer these countries along a path that differs substantially from that of Spain, Sweden and Russia. The whole movement has been well documented by the English Roman Catholic Scholar Michael P. Fogarty in his book 'Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953[153]. Overall, of course, the Roman Catholic contribution to this movement is dominant; even in Holland - the country in which Protestants have made the most strides - the Catholics have been equally if not more active. However, despite this Fogarty sees fit to say of the Protestant contribution to the movement in the Netherlands that the *'Dutch Protestants.... have built up over the last century one of the most successful and in many ways instructive political, economic and social movements to be found anywhere in the Christian world. But this achievement has been neglected to an astonishing extent by their co-religionists..... in the British Isles (and here one might well add the rest of the Anglo-Saxon world).*[154]

The first two parts of his book are devoted to spelling out the character of the *social ideal* that associated with the Christian Democratic movement; the last two parts are devoted to a study of their historical development. Our major concern here will be with the former. With regard to its relationship to the social ideals associated with Liberalism, Socialism and Conservatism, Fogarty writes that *It is at any rate a fact that the Christian Democratic movements do in general try to equip themselves with a comprehensive doctrine, covering both aims and methods. And it is also true that the programmes in which these doctrines are expressed are marked off from those of other movements by their synthetic or catholic quality. The parties, especially, draw material from all corners of the political universe, and criticise and rework it into a pattern in which each element finds its place in the perspective of the rest. They are as much preoccupied as liberals with the status role and security of the individual: with such things as human rights and the value of individual initiative. But a Christian Democrat will criticise the liberal approach as too individualist, and as 'humanist' in the sense of secularist. His own view, he would say, is 'personalist' in the sense of bringing into account all the dimensions of personality; social as well as individual, supernatural (and therefore Church) as well as purely human. Christian Democrats share with socialists an appreciation of the importance and rights of the collectivity, and especially of the State. But they hasten to add that they are not 'collectivist' either, in the sense of overstressing the role of any*

particular social grouping, and notably that of the State. They are on the contrary 'solidarist' in the sense of thinking always of collectivities as being at the service of the individual, not as superior to him. And they are 'pluralist' or 'federalist' in that they appreciate the value of social groupings of every size from the individual up to the community of all peoples of the world, and try to mark out the functions and organisation appropriate to each and its rights and duties over against the rest. The State takes its place as merely one, and not necessarily or always the most important, in a hierarchy of social groups. Christian Democrats are also conservative, in that they share with conservatives an appreciation of the time factor, of the difficulties of successful change, and of the importance of smooth continuous development. But they are convinced also of man's right and duty, to advance towards mastering his environment by the power of his reason and will. They would stoutly deny {90} that they are 'traditionalist', in the sense of being particularly attached to Me-shape of things as it now is or once was. This tendency to catholicity exists not only in the Christian Democratic parties but also in the trade unions, employers', farmers' and women's and youth organizations.[155]

Fogarty goes on, in subsequent sections of his first two parts, to explain that the Christian Democratic social ideal is essentially one of a two-way Pluralism. It is first of all a *'horizontal pluralism'*, which he describes as *'a policy which insists on the independence, rights, and responsibilities of each individual or group which can show that it has a legitimate sphere of its own.' Secondly it is a 'vertical or ideological pluralism' referring 'to the way in which ideologies cut vertically through the layers and groups of society', so as 'to set a man at variance with his father, and the daughter with her mother...' (Matt. X.35-6) as by contrast with the 'horizontal' division between, for example, the State and the local community or the Board of Directors and the primary working group. Different 'spiritual families', in a common French phrase - Catholics, Protestants, Marxists, 'humanists', or whoever they may be - should on the principle of 'vertical' pluralism be permitted and enabled to follow their own way of life, even when they are in a minority in a nation or group as a whole.* [156] [157]

These two features of the Christian Democratic social ideal may perhaps best be appreciated against the background of the Conservative social ideal discussed on page Like the old conservative ideal it emphasises that social life consists in the relationship of the individual to a whole complex of interlocking social forms - family, trade union, university, school, employers federation, state, hospital etc. However, Christian Democrats emphasise much more the *interdependent* character of these societal forms so that no one such should be permitted to dictate to another - at least with respect to its internal functioning. Unlike the old conservative ideal, appointment to positions of authority is democratic, not by means of privilege. Moreover, there is a much greater emphasis upon the significance of each individual being able to responsibly exercise economic-power. Again, whereas the old conservative social ideal tended to sanction one ideology - maintained by an established church - the Christian Democratic social ideal has a distinctive emphasis upon ideological pluralism. Finally, the greatest divergence of view between the Catholic and Protestant version of the Christian Democratic social ideal lies in the question of hierarchy. In this the Catholic version is more closely related to the old conservative ideal. As Fogarty writes *'the Catholic and the Reformed (notably Dutch Reformed) Churches express in slightly different terms an essentially similar idea about social structure. Catholics speak of 'the principle of subsidiarity'. It is an injustice, a*

grave evil, and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate to {91} aim of all social activity should be to help individual members of the social body, but never to destroy them'.[158]

For the Reformed churches the corresponding principle is that of 'sovereignty in one's own circle', or 'the special task and vocation of each social group'. There is obviously a difference of accent. The Protestant conception underlines the separate and exclusive responsibility of the individual and the small group, though only within defined limits and subject to a vocation of service to others. The Catholic phrasing stresses rather the inclusion of these small units of society in greater wholes, within which however they have a sphere of autonomy on which they have a right to insist.[159]

The history of the various features of the Christian Democratic movement is very complex and it suffices to say that whilst it has had a dominant influence upon Holland for almost a century, its influence upon the war-torn countries of Germany, Austria and Italy has achieved prominence only since the Second World War. In this it has played no small part in sustaining a centre-ist political and social life that is singularly lacking in such countries as Sweden, the Eastern European bloc and Spain.

THE ANGLO-SAXON ALTERNATIVE IN CRISIS
In the nineteenth century Conservatism held sway over the greater part of the European continent whilst Liberalism led the way in the Anglo-Saxon world. The First World War saw the collapse of Conservatism in Russia, Austria and Germany, giving way to a Marxist-Leninist radicalism in Russia and a more centre-ist Democracy in Germany and Austria. The increasing economic failures of the Weimar Republic led Germany to the choices of Nazism and Communism. They chose the former not realizing the fullness of its implications. However, the defeat of the Fascist and Nazi regimes in the Second World War resulted in an extension of the Marxist-Leninist alternative over the greater part of Eastern Europe, a break-up of the colonial power of Britain and France in Africa and Asia, and a Central Europe following a centre-ist Democracy somewhat after the pattern of the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, whereas the centre-ist democratic politics of the latter owes a great deal to the heritage of Liberalism, that of the former has resulted from no small contribution from the Christian Democratic movement.

The subsequent political division of the world around the Communist-bloc, and the Western-bloc, and the courting of power over the Third World of developing countries have long been recognised as the major political realities of the world since the Second World War. However, it is true to say that over the last ten years the kind of democratic leadership that has been exercised by the Anglo-Saxon countries in general, and the United States in particular, has done little to win the confidence of the developing nations or to justify a long-term hope within their own boundaries. Indeed the deep polarizations that have emerged both within and without would seem to indicate that something has clearly gone wrong with the Anglo-Saxon alternative; add the possible implications of this on the part of the communist-bloc are so obvious that they in turn only add to the problem.

The political and social achievements of the Anglo-Saxon world have long provided a leadership in the development of the modern forms of democratic government. Just as

Montesquieu and Voltaire studied British political institutions in the eighteenth century, so de Tocqueville studied American institutions in the nineteenth century. With a view to applying their insights to the situation of Europe in general and of France in particular, the purpose of these men {92} was to learn from the freedoms and accompanying stability of the Anglo-Saxon forms of social and political life. Writing with regard to the immediate problems facing France in the preface of the 1848 edition of his 'Democracy in America', de Tocqueville remarks that *It is not a question of finding out whether we are to have monarchy or republic in France; but we still want to know whether it is to be an agitated or a tranquil republic, an orderly or a disorderly republic, pacific or warlike, liberal or oppressive, a republic which threatens the sacred rights of property and of the family, or one which recognizes and honours them. It is a fearful problem concerning, not France alone, but the whole civilized world. If we can save ourselves, we shall at the same time save all the nations around us. If we fail, we shall bring them all down with us. According as we establish either democratic liberty or democratic tyranny, the fate of the world will be different. Indeed, one may say that it depends on us whether in the end republics will he established everywhere, or everywhere abolished.*

Now this problem, newly posed for us, was solved in America sixty years ago. For sixty years the principle of the sovereignty of the people, which we have introduced but yesterday, has prevailed unchallenged there. It is put in practice in the most direct, unlimited, and absolute way. For sixty years that people who has made it the common fount of all their laws has increased in population, territory, and wealth; and let it be noted, throughout that period it has been not only the most prosperous but also the most stable of all the peoples of the world. While all the nations of Europe have been ravaged by war or torn by civil strife, the American people alone in the civilized world have remained pacific. Almost the whole of Europe has been convulsed by revolutions: America has not even suffered from riots. There, the republic, so far from disturbing them, has preserved all rights. Private property is better guaranteed there than in any other land on earth. Anarchy is as unknown as despotism.

Where else can we find greater cause of hope or more valuable lessons? Let us not turn to America in order slavishly to copy the institutions she has fashioned for herself, but in order that we may better understand what suits us; let us look there for instruction rather than models; let us adopt the principles rather than the details of her laws The laws of the French republic can be and, in many cases, should be different from those prevailing in the United States. But the principles on which the constitutions of the American states rest, the principles of order, balance of powers, true liberty, and sincere and deep respect for law, are indispensable for all republics; they should be common to them all; and it is safe to forecast that where they are not found the republic will soon have ceased to exist.[160]

Although the situation of the world today is very much like that of France in the middle of the nineteenth century, it can no longer be said that the Anglo-Saxon world in general, and the United States in particular, offers the same lessons that de Tocqueville sought to draw in the early nineteenth century. Many events over the last twenty years: Viet-Nam, Watergate, the underhand activities of the CIA and the FBI, the decline of Britain as an Economic power have virtually destroyed the confidence in the acknowledged leadership on the part of the Anglo-Saxon world. The result is that many, particularly in the third

world countries are looking for a leadership elsewhere, to such paradigms as Cuba, Russia or China. Not only that, there are now a very large number of alienated and disillusioned young people in the Anglo-Saxon world who have lost confidence in its institutions and have either opted for some form of radical opposition, dropped out or have a merely fatalistic resignation to make out through the system in a way that will at least achieve some material success. The freedom and stability that once characterised the Anglo-Saxon leadership is no longer a reality and we live merely on the memory of the {93} achievement of the past at our peril.[161] As Robert Nisbet writes in his book 'Twilight of Authority':

It would be comforting if the revolt were simply the result of Viet-Nam and Watergate. But it cannot be so seen. In the first place the roots of revolt are deeper and older in this country (i.e. the United States). In the second place, precisely the same kind of revolt is to be seen in other Western countries, those which have known neither Viet-Nam nor Watergate. In Vest Germany, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Belgium, and even - now especially - England, the reports of citizen unrest, citizen indifference, citizen alienation, and hostility to government do not differ appreciably from what we are given in the United States[162]

Liberalism in Crisis
As a political and social ideology Liberalism is no less a complex phenomenon than Socialism. Moreover it is the former rather than the latter that is largely responsible for the kind of leadership that the Anglo-Saxon world has given to the development of a democratic form of government. As a social ideal Liberalism is generally regarded as having a strong emphasis upon individual freedom coupled with a limitation of State power over the individual. It has also a strong sense of equality in the sense that all men are considered equal before the law and that decisions should be made on the basis of majority decision. Finally, it is characterised by a strong sense of the rule of law and of the need to constitutionally limit the workings of any one branch of State. As such Liberalism is variously connected with such thinkers and politicians as John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Alexis de Tocqueville, J.S. Mill and WilliamGladstone.

Although the growth of Whig Liberalism in late seventeenth England has undoubted close connections with Puritanism, the latter can hardly be considered its only progenitor. Indeed this is evidenced by the fact that most scholars begin their study of Liberalism with John Locke, who can hardly be considered a Puritan. Although Whig Liberalism tended to be dominated more by a spirit of rationalistic Deism than that of Puritanism, I think that the background of Puritanism is indispensable for gaining some appreciation of its character. Indeed, I would like to suggest that a much clearer insight with regard to the complex character of Liberalism nay be gained if we appreciate it as a phenomenon against two different social ideals: the conservative social in its Anglican form and the Enlightenment social ideal that so wholeheartedly entered the historical arena in 1789, Whilst Puritanism undoubtedly had more in common with the former than the latter, it did embody some distinctive features: the democratic appointment of men to the Church ministry, the limitation of the power of the Sovereign (especially with regard to matters affecting the Church), and whilst some Puritans wished to replace Anglicanism by Presbyterianism as the established religion of the realm[163], the more Independent strain represented by Oliver Cromwell made considerable strides in allowing a freedom of

religion within the broad context of a Christian commonwealth. These features had no small influence upon the Glorious Revolution of 1688. However, in the form in which they were {94} taken up by the Whigs, the spirit of rationalistic Deism asserted itself. This is especially evident in the thought of John Locke, who embodies it in a manner which absolutizes the property rights of the individual. However, whilst the conservative social ideal was spiritually alive it acted as a very strong counterbalance to such humanistic tendencies within Liberalism. Edmund Burke is as very good example of a 'conservative' Whig in this sense. Moreover, this sort of 'conservative' Liberalism had a strong influence in the framing of the American Constitution, and was active in the development of nineteenth century French Liberalism under the guidance of Alexis de Tocqueville.

However, the impact of the radical humanism of the French Revolution had the effect of accelerating the humanistic tendencies within Liberalism. This is not only in evidence with Tom Paine; it is also evident in the development of the Utilitarian ideals associated with Bentham and James Mill. The latter sought to base all social and moral matters upon a 'sound scientific footing' with a unity and universality that was inspired by Newton's 'Principia'. The *principle of utility* was thus rooted in the view that *'nature had placed mankind under two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as determine what we shall do. Accordingly Bentham liked to think that he had discovered in the principle of utility a simple positive principle on which all men could agree so as to reform society on a systematic plan.*[164]Although John Stuart Mill was initially part of the Utilitarian school, he came to the point where he rejected its basic tenets. Possibly under the influence of de Tocqueville[165] he came to see that the emphasis upon the levelling implicit in the majoritarianism of the Utilitarians threatened a new form of tyranny - the tyranny of the majority. As G. Himmelfarb points out, the notion of liberty that was taking root under the Enlightenment social ideal was such that *instead of looking upon the people as opposed to their rulers and seeking to limit the power of the rulers, the aim was rather to identify the people with the rulers, to make the rulers representative of the people and responsible to them. In this case it was no longer necessary to limit power since power was presumably being exercised by the people themselves in their own interests; the only question was how to make power more completely representative and responsive.* Mill's answer in his essay 'On Liberty' was to further absolutise the freedom of the individual in a way that posited no coercion upon him or her except in the case of rendering harm to others. Thus *the content of Mill's principle is as notable as its simplicity. The principle has by now become so familiar, either in the form which Mill gave it or in the more amorphous form in which our culture has assimilated it, that we forget how radical it was - indeed how radical it still is. It has become so much a habit of thought that we tend to accept it as unproblematic, as self-evidently true. That except where it might injure another, is a proposition hardly anyone would dispute...Yet its very simplicity is a token of its boldness. The key words bear out the single mindedness of the doctrine: 'one', 'sole', 'only', 'absolute'. The entire argument hinges upon them; they appear in almost every sentence. There is 'one' principle, the 'sole' end, the 'only' purpose, and the 'only' part of conduct the principle governs 'absolutely' and the independence of the individual is 'absolute'.*[166]

In this way Mill sought to protect the individual from the threat of massification introduced by majoritarianism. In doing so he ended up opposing the individual to

collective society, thus illustrating the inherent problem of the Enlightenment social ideal: the liberty of the individual in relation to the will of the collective. The ideological Liberalism that came to dominate the latter part of the nineteenth century reverted to the collective in its emphasis. Having a {95} Kantian twist it embodied a strong belief in the Brotherhood of all Men in a way that respected and upheld the dignity of the individual in his calling to love and serve mankind. Moreover, it was bound to a belief in the inevitability of progress, linked with the power given to man by Reason and Science. This Liberalism was given a theological form in the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. As such, it became the de facto creed of the majority of the Protestant Churches within Anglo-Saxon countries. In this way the 'social gospel', 'modernism' and 'Liberal Theology' of the early part of this century were thoroughly embued with a hope and an outlook that was shaped by the Enlightenment social ideal.

Ever since the settlement of 1688, the Anglo-Saxon alternative has provided a unity of consensus within the life of the nation that was dependent upon a broad Christian heritage, and yet allowed for a diversity of Christian traditions. Whilst this held in only a qualified manner in Great Britain, where the notion of an Established Church continued to hold sway, the United States and the colonies developed very largely in a non-sectarian manner. Initially, the non-sectarian character of public institutions was understood in the sense that no one denomination should be allowed to have its particular views upheld. They were nevertheless acknowledged to function within some 'broad' Christian context. However, the encroachment of a Liberalism that is thoroughly embued with the Enlightenment spirit has changed this emphasis. 'Secular' now means 'secularist' and has no connotations of 'non-sectarian'. Moreover, the very distinction between 'public' life and 'private' life that is embodied in Economic and Educational matters bears the unmistakable stamp of the Enlightenment social ideal. 'Public' is that which belongs to 'the people' and 'private' is that which belongs to a restricted number of individuals. The social realities are not primarily the relationships of individuals within the social forms of state, family, school, trade union, church, university etc. the primary social reality is considered to be the individual in relation to the collective. The result is that the question of freedom is invariably considered in the terms of trying to hold a proper balance between the 'public' and 'private' sectors. Liberalism tends toward a protection of the latter whilst Socialism tends toward a protection of the former, thus providing the Right and Left of political life.

Thus to appreciate the crisis of Liberalism within Anglo-Saxon countries today, and the difficulty that such views have in sustaining the centre-ist politics of these countries, we need first of all appreciate how the 'conservative' Liberalism that has laid at the foundation of the development of the Anglo-Saxon form of social and political life has given way to a Liberalism that has been thoroughly shaped by the Enlightenment social ideal. In the second place the growth of the Liberalism of this latter variety has largely replaced the Christian consensus which nurtured the more 'conservative' Liberalism. Finally the ideological Liberalism of the end of the nineteenth century has proved a false hope. Progress is not inevitable; Science and Technology have an ugly side to them; the Brotherhood of Man is so divided as to cause grave anxiety about peace in our time; individual liberty provides too much opportunity for sexual and economic licence and insufficient opportunity for meaningful responsibility; within a society that is largely

organized on the basis of 'technique', the significance and meaning of human life is gravely threatened.

Robert Nisbet's book 'Twilight of Authority' presents a probing analysis of the way in which the events of Viet-Nam, Watergate, the activities of the CIA and the FBI are all related to the steady build-up of the centralized power of the United States' Executive Branch of State since World War I. In his view {96} the United States has moved a long way from whatever 'Liberal' principles it may have once espoused. Commenting upon this in relation to the general political situation of our times in a section entitled *the obsolescence of ideology*, he writes that

Politics in our era has become so nearly devoid of ideological divisions as is possible to conceive. We are in a condition astonishingly like that which beset Rome during the last century or so of the Republic, when all traditional and political issues disappeared, and with them parties in the true sense, to be replaced by mere power-blocs, each with nothing more than lust for office to guide it....Principles and convictions have ceased to matter greatly in the political process - at least by comparison with individuals and issues.. The once-proud ideologies of liberalism, radicalism and conservatism have dissipated themselves into often mindless devotions to this or that individual, this or that issue, irrespective of the relation of either to any seriously held body of belief. Liberalism has for the most part lost historic objective in its growing fascination with the uses of centralized power. Where freedom from power was for a tong time the chief ,end of liberal thought, participation in and control of power have become the chief idols of the liberal mind in. our time. This and, not to be omitted, a gathering relationism, indeed indifference on matters of morality. In her profound recently published 'On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case of John Stuart Mill', the historian Gertrude Himmelfarb has effectively shown and with an abundance of documentation the sorry decline of the liberal ideal in the West from one originally rooted in a desire to be free to follow the precepts of morality to the kind of escape from morality in any form that highlights contemporary liberalism.[167]

In connection with this last mentioned feature of the decline of Liberalism we should bear in mind the merely technical character of the organization of modern life. In the wake of the New Left reaction against this, a new freedom is being courted which seeks to shed the uniformity of organization and to mistrust the very nature of authority. Such ideals, for example, are strongly affecting the development of the new child-centred approach to education and to the pro-abortionist's banner of 'the woman's right to choose', to say nothing of the new sexual freedoms. It is a form of freedom that, although rooted in the absolutization of the individual, will not hesitate to manipulate the forms of organizational power to get its way.

The root of the problem lies with the Enlightenment social ideal, for, with authority being deemed in some combination of the absolute sovereignty of the individual and the absolute sovereignty of the collective, there is an inherent tendency for a polarization between Anarchy and Tyranny. Given the present balance between liberalism' and 'socialism' and progressivism and conservatism in Anglo-Saxon countries, we can on the one hand expect to see an increasing pressure to follow after the Swedish model - with its collectivist material welfare, its sexual freedom and its radical stance on such issues as

'Women's Lib' and 'Racism'. On the other, we can expect to see a conservatist attempt to preserve the status quo. In such a situation it is again worth bearing in mind that *'the two chief contestants in the present international situation are both rooted in the Enlightenment, so far at any rate as their respective civilisations reflect any general conception of man. The uniqueness of the United States is that it is a nation that was founded at a certain time in history in the full light of historical consciousness; it did not grow out of the soil of prehistory. Moreover, it was founded in the eighteenth century in the very heyday of the Enlightenment, and by men who participated in the clear rationality of that period... The philosophy of the other contestant - to look on its best and most idealistic side, a side that still enlists the {97} enthusiasm of millions of men - is Marxist humanism. This humanism harks back to the justly celebrated statement of Marx: 'To be radical is to go to the root of the question. Now the root of mankind is man.' Marx here speaks as a member of the generation of Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians, those who turned against Hegel and his Idea of the State and toward the concrete man, the historical creature of flesh and blood. This actual and historical man, they said, is to be the root of mankind, the root of society, and the State.*

But there is a further question that this leaves unasked: In what is the individual man to be rooted? The thoroughly problematic nature of men, this highly questionable and self-questioning animal is conveniently and fatefully dropped out of sight. Marx turned his attention to the social problem assuming that the only thing in the way of man's coming into his full humanity was the capitalist system. In this he was simply echoing the Enlightenment's optimistic assumption that, since man is a rational animal, the only obstacles to his fulfillment must be objective and social ones....

Behind the problem of politics, in the present age, lies the problem of man, and this is what makes all thinking about contemporary problems so thorny and difficult. The intellectual collapse that occurred in America after the decade of the 1930's, when intellectuals had been able to submerge themselves totally in a program of political action, shows that philosophy can no longer be considered an appendage of politics. On the contrary, anyone who wishes to meddle in politics today had better come to some prior conclusions as to what man is and what, in the end, human life is all about. I say 'in the end' deliberately because the neglect of first and last things does not - as so-called 'practical' people hope - go unpunished, but has a disastrous way of coming in the back-door and upsetting everything.[168]

A critique of contemporary politics must therefore concern itself with the fundamental questions of life and closely scrutinise the Enlightenment views of man and society that have nurtured both Liberalism and Radicalism. In this connection the critiques of such figures as Edmund Burke, Groen van Prinsterer and Alexis de Tocqueville "have considerable contemporary significance - for they were directed precisely toward the questions at issue. In a culture that has deeply-ridden *fears* of Marxism, the breakdown of Liberalism within Anglo-Saxon countries is producing a situation that is very serious. It is increasingly showing tendencies to polarise between a conservative protection of the existing form of society and a hope for its radical overthrow. The tensions of the *Age of Revolution* which the Anglo-Saxon countries have for so long been able to meet from within the strength of their own alternative has past.

The Call for Pluralism

The final chapter of Robert Nisbet's 'Twilight of Authority' is entitled 'The Restoration of Authority' and it begins by addressing itself to the following question:

Is it possible to arrest, to actually reverse, present accelerating tendencies toward political Leviathan on the one hand and moribundity of the social order on the other? Can bureaucratization of culture, mind, and spirit which assumes an even more militant, even military cast in the West be somehow offset by renewal of the social bond and its diverse contexts of authority and freedom?[169]

Although Nisbet is pessimistic with regard to such a possibility he does go on to spell out the kind of social ideal which he considers necessary to lead to an alternative form of society in which such threats might be averted. {98}

It is fundamentally a form of society which is marked by a *pluralism* in which *each major function in the social order...(has) the maximum possible freedom to achieve its own distinctive ends. What applies to school or university should apply also to economy, to family, to religion, and to each of the other great spheres of society.Everything must be done to avoid intrusion by some one great institution, such as the political state, into the spheres of other institutions..... Crucial are the voluntary groups and associations...To say, as is so often said, that responsibility has passed from the individual to the state is a half-truth. It is much truer to say that responsibility has passed to the state from what were once voluntary associations. It is in the context of such associations, in short, that most steps in social progress have taken place. To compare our bureaucratised, politicised age with some age in the past when individuals were obliged to look out for themselves, singly or in small households, is mere fantasy. Once we look carefully into the matter we are surprised by how many social groups, associations, and communities there actually were through which fragility and precariousness of individual and family life were moderated.....*

Tocqueville well knew the status of such associations in France, a status that went back to the ancien regime and that had given heavy confirmation by the Revolutionary law of 1791 which in effect forbade all voluntary associations. He knew too that nothing in the American Constitution specifically granted Americans this form of freedom, one that Tocqueville admired. He had already formed a strong opinion of the necessity of free Voluntary associations to any free society, especially when that society is a democracy. He was as sensitive as Lamennais, Lacordaire, and Montalembert to the insufficiency of a merely individual freedom in the modern mass state.[170]

Nisbet's plea for pluralism is an attempt to spell out a social ideal that has a lot in common with that of the Christian Democratic movement. In fact it is precisely the 'horizontal' side of the form of pluralism espoused by the Christian democrats. Family, University, School, Economic Life, Church, State are all to have their proper independence, organized by the free association of men and women acting in community. However Nisbet's pluralism lacks an explicit formulation of the 'vertical' or 'ideological' pluralism characteristic of the Christian Democratic movement. This is of some significance because it is the latter which gives the unity, drive and direction to the

common life of men and women across and within these different spheres of life, and it is precisely this kind of drive and vision which is so sadly lacking in Anglo-Saxon life.

At this point it is perhaps worth drawing attention to the differences in the way that modern Christianity has taken shape in Western Europe and the way it has taken shape in Anglo-Saxon countries. Up until the turn of the present century, despite the different denominational traditions, Christianity had a much greater general hold upon the life of Anglo-Saxon countries than was the case in Western Europe. That this situation was in no small measure due to the continuing influence of the Evangelical Revival of the eighteenth century, is the central thesis of W. Bready in his book England: Before and After Wesley'. He carefully documents the ways in which the message of John Wesley affected not only individual people but also the whole tone of Anglo-Saxon life: Education, Trade Unionism, Law Reform, Penal Reform and Social Welfare all developed in the nineteenth century in an atmosphere that was strongly influenced by the Christian gospel.[171] {99}

Indeed so complete was the early nineteenth century victory of Christianity over Deistic Liberalism that Bready, in the last pages of his book, quotes Elie Halevy. - *A century earlier John Wesley had defeated Voltaire. Would he defeat Karl Marx?* -and goes on to write that *In these words are focussed the very essence of the world's elemental problem today. John Wesley and Karl Marx, unmistakably, are the two most influential characters of modern history. The former revived and spread vital, practical Christianity; the latter formulated and mediated the gospel of revolutionary class-hatred, based on economic materialism. The two men are at opposite poles of human endeavour and social reform: they are as love and hatred; they represent the thesis and antithesis of modern thought and action.... Wesley's crusade represented the epitome of spiritual power; Marx's crusade, the epitome of material force. In the eighteenth century, as Halevy reminds us, the master Evangelist defeated the master iconoclast. In the twentieth century will he defeat the master materialist? Wesley versus Marx, is the crux of the modern problem and progress is no longer deemed inevitable. Christendom - whither bound?[172]*

Whilst the Christian Democratic Movement in Europe grew up amidst a climate of militant atheistic materialism that is here identified by Bready, within Anglo-Saxon countries the social edge of the Evangelical gospel was undermined by the Liberalism of the 'social gospel'. The reaction to this Liberalism on the part of the Evangelical movement as such, was to so emphasize the fundamentals of individual sin and salvation in Jesus Christ that it virtually became a movement which opposed evangelism to social concern.[173] The result has been that the public consensus has been sustained by a loose Christian-Liberal amalgam that has seen a gradual swing toward a thoroughgoing humanistic emphasis deriving from the latter pole. Moreover it is in the midst of the crisis produced by the failure of this amalgam that the Evangelical movement is once again asserting the integration of Evangelism with social concern.[174]

Comparing the situations of modern Christianity in Western Europe and in Great Britain, Michael Fogarty wrote in 1957 that *Britain sixty or seventy years ago was a broadly Christian country in which even the labour movement was still deeply marked with the stamp of the Free Churches. The dividing line ran not between Christians and non-Christians but between those who took one or another view on politics or economics or*

social policy. The main issues of political and social controversy had been those characteristic of Liberalism - free trade, for instance - and were coming to be those of Socialism and the 'managerial' society. On the Continent on the other hand large sections of society had already been lost to Christianity. Atheism was militant, and the dividing line in political and social life often ran between Christians and non-Christians. And when the Christian Democratic movements in due course emerged, the issues in which they were interested were not those characteristic of either Liberalism or Socialism, though they were prepared to learn from both. What interested them above all was problems of human relations; of the family, the small working group, the social group of every shape and size, with no exaggerated concentration after the Liberal manner on the individual or after the Socialist manner on the State. They were often also rather traditional in their outlook, at a time when Britain, with all its conservatism, was the leading example of the new dynamic, mobile industrial society. {100}

But today the lines have converged. It is no longer true that Britain is a Christian country in a sense in which other countries of Western Europe are not. The proportion of believing, understanding, and practising Christians - the sort of Christians who are statistically distinguishable as such - is very much smaller today in Britain as a whole than in the belt along the Rhine, from Flanders to the north of Italy, in which Christian Democracy has its greatest strength. It is doubtful whether it is even as high as in France. There is not yet much militant atheism or 'humanism'. But then neither is there anything like so much of this on the Continent as there used to be. In Britain and on the Continent alike, the problem for the Christian believer today is more likely to be to attract attention in an indifferent environment than to beat off the assaults of militant anti-clericals... It seems very likely, therefore, that the problem faced by the movements studied in this hook, and the formulas found for solving them, will have some relevance for British conditions. It is perhaps worth underlining that 'formulas' is used here in the plural. It is a common error to think that Christian Democracy is identified with one political and social formula; that which leads in politics, for example, to the party with a 'Christian' label, and particularly to the party which tries to group all Christians...There are many formulas, and much of the internal debate in the Christian Democratic world is concerned precisely with choosing between them.[175]

Events since 1957 have drawn the two situations even more closely together. The Counter-culture and the Protest movement of the 1960's, and the continued resurgence of Neo-Marxism make it plain that the basic need is to come to terms with both the *technical ideal* and the *social ideal* that have given so much by way of drive and direction to the development of Western culture. It is therefore not only necessary to come to terms with a Christian view of society. Despite the immense value of their contributions, this was not something that characterised the efforts of such men as Wilberforce and Shaftesbury in the nineteenth century. For the most part these men worked out of the vision of the Tory form of the conservative social ideal. This ideal has its strengths, but it also has great weaknesses. The contemporary situation is such that the development of a social ideal embodying the notions of pluralism is a high priority within Anglo-Saxon countries. Toward the attainment of such a goal we have much to learn from the Christian Democratic movement. In confronting the problems in developing such a social ideal, I can do no better than conclude with the words of Robert Nisbet.

I do not, I think, underestimate the opposition that will be mobilised on every possible ideological ground against such an eventuality. The voices of the present political order are claimant and often powerful. But I believe they will be revealed, and perhaps before the end of this century, to be as ineffectual as the voice of another once-powerful clerisy in Western history, that of the Roman Catholic Church, proved to be in the fifteenth century.

I hope so. The drive of both clerisies is, and always has been, toward universality with its overtones of homogeneity, toward unity with its inevitable degeneration into uniformity, and toward authority that shortly degenerates into monistic power. Ideas do not entirely make history; social, economic and military forces are requires. But no force ever becomes ascendant apart from an idea or philosophy that gives it legitimacy and intelligibility.[176] {101} {102}

Footnotes

[1] 'An Inquiry into the Human Prospect'. Robert L. Heilbroner: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc. New York (1974) p.13

[2] 'Two Cheers for Democracy' E.M. Forster Harmondsworth, England, Penguin Books (1939) p.83

[3] 'The Christian Mind' H. Blamires. London S.P.C.K. (1963) p. 4

[4] 'The Dust of Death' Os Guinness I.V.P. (1973)

[5] 'The Hollow Men' T.S. Eliot

[6] 'Irrational Man' W. Barrett. Heinemann (1961) p. 20

[7] 'The Life of Galileo' B. Brecht

[8] 'The Joyful Wisdom' F. Nietzsche.

[9] 'Philosophy and the Modern Mind' E. M. Adams. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. (1975) pp.28-29

[10] John 1:1-3

[11] The opening sentence of Hegel's 'Life of Jesus' (1795) (Das Leben Jesu, Theologische Jugendschiften, ed. H. Nohl, Tubingen (1907) p. 75.

[12] 'Moses and Aaron' Arnold Schonberg. Karl H. Worner. 'Schoenberg's Moses and and Aaron' Faber and Faber. (1963) p.195

[13] Tractatus Logicol Philosophicus. L. Wittgenstein. London Routledge and Kegan Paul (1961) p.151.

[14] Lao Tse

[15] 'Library of Living Philosopher Vol. 11: Rudolph Carnap. Ed. by P. A. Schilpp. La Salle (1963) pp. 26-27.

[16] Philosophical Faith and Revelation' K. Jaspers. Collins (1967) p.74

[17] W.H. Auden, quoted in 'Language and Silence' G. Steiner, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books. p. 160

[18] I am indebted for these details to a talk entitled 'Chorus of Lies on interpreting Kafka' by Prof. U. Gaier, of the University of Konstanz, held under the auspices of Victoria University, Wellington, in 1969.

[19] F. Kafka 'Letters to Milena' Corgi Book, Trans World Publishers 1967, p. 205.

[20] F. Kafka, quoted in 'Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre' W. Kaufman. Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company (1956) p. 121

[21] 'The Great Wall of China' F. Kafka, quoted in 'Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre' W. Kaufman p. 123.

[22] 'The Disinherited Mind' E. Heller, Penguin Books (1961,) p. 192.

[23] 'Schoenberg's Moses and Aaron' K. Worner. Faber and Faber (1963) p. 195

[24] I.Stravinsky quoted in 'Stravinsky, the Composer and His Works' E.W. White. Faber and Faber (1966) p.289

[25] Ibid p. 290

[26] Ibid p. 290

[27] I. Stravinsky, quoted in 'Introduction to Contemporary Music ' Joseph Machlis. Norton (1961) pp. 162,165.

[28] 'Beyond Reductionism' V. Frankl published in 'Beyond Reductionism' Ed. by Koestler and Smythies, Hutchinson (1969, p. 408

[29] T. Roszak 'The Making of a Counterculture' Faber and Faber (1970). pp. 178-204

[30] 'The New Reformation' P. Goodman, Random House (1970) pp. 46-48

[31] 'Another Side of Bob Dylan' (Record Cover)

[32] Paul Goodman 'The New Reformation' Random House (1970) pp. 61-63

[33] Ron Cobb. Interview with 'Salient' Victoria University Student's Newspaper Vol. 135. No. 16 July 12, 1972.

[34] Ibid.

[35] 'Power and Influence' W. Beveridge, London (1953) p. 355.

[36] 'The Impact of Science on Society' B. Russell, London (1952) p. 85

[37] 'Utopia' Sir Thomas More. first published 1516

[38] 'The Poverty of Historicism' Sir Karl Popper. Routledge and Kegan Paul (1961)

[39] The significance of the vision of the future in the present in actually shaping the future is the major theme of the two volume work by F.L. Polak.: 'The Image of the Future'. Oceana, New York (1961)

[40] 'The Republic' Plato Book 4, 434.

[41] Ibid Book 4, 434.

[42] 'The Technological Society' J. Ellul, Jonathan Cape (1965), pp. 49-50.

[43] An article entitled 'Socialism in Our Past and Future' summarizes the findings of an unpublished book on the same subject. It has been translated into English, and appears in 'From Under the Rubble' ed. A. Solzhenitsyn pp. 26-66, Fontana (1976). Examining societies over a vast range of historical periods, Shafarevich makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of the socialistic ideal as a distinctive form of society which aims at (1) equality and the destruction of hierarchy (2) the destruction of private property (3) the destruction of organized religion (4) the destruction of the family. Plato does not aim at (1), More does not aim at (3) or (4). Nevertheless, the compulsory collectivism that is embodied in the socialistic ideal tends to undermine the integrity of all these features.

[44] 'The Pursuit of the Millenium' N. Cohn, Paladin (1970), 'Dissent and Reform in the Early Middle Ages' J. Russell, Berkeley and Los Angeles (1965), 'Heresy in the Later Middle Ages' G. Leff, Manchester and New York (1967) and 'The Radical Reformation' G. Williams, London (1962) together survey the history of dissent and millenialism from the eighth to the sixteenth centuries.

[45] 'Socialism in Our Past and Future' I. Shafarevich. published in 'From Under the Rubble' ed. A. Solzhenitsyn. Fontana (1976) pp. 36-37

[46] Refer, for example, to 'Religion and the Rise of Capitalism' by Rolf Tawney, 'Can We survive Our Future', a symposium edited and introduced by G.R. Urban. Bodley Head (1971) pp.110-111, and 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis' Lynn White Nr. Science Magazine, March 10, 1967.

[47] 'Left-Wing Democracy in the English Civil War: a study in the social philosophy of Gerrard Winstanley'. D.W. Petegorsky Victor Gollancz, London (1940).

[48] 'The Whig Interpretation of History' H. Butterfield.

[49] Any further discussion of the link between Calvin's teachings and the rise of Capitalism cannot neglect Andre Bieler's 'La Pensee Economique et Sociale de Calvin' University of Geneva (1961)

[50] 'Walden Two' B.F. Skinner McMillan, New York (1948).pp.105-106

[51] 'The Technological Society' J. Ellul, Jonathan Cape (1965) pp.3-42; 'The Society of the Future' H. van Riessen. Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., Philadelphia (1952) pp. 117-136.

[52] 'The Technological Society' J. Ellul, Note to the Reader. {?}

[53] Ibid. pp. 3-22

[54] Ibid. p. 7

[55] I follow the distinctions made by I.E. Schuurman in his 'Techniek en Toekomst' van Gorcum, Assen (1972) p.400.

[56] 'The Society of the Future' H. van Riessen pp. 124-128

[57] 'Behaviourism' J.B. Watson (1925) p. 4 ff.

[58] 'Beyond Freedom and Dignity' B.F. Skinner Bantam/Vintage Book (1971) pp.1-3

[59] Ibid pp. 21-22

[60] 'The Technological Society' p. 19,128.

[61] Ibid pp. 21-22

[62] 'The Technological Society' p. xxviii; 'Can We Survive the Future' ed. G.R. Urban. Bodley Head (1972) pp. 89-102

[63] Refer to p.

[64] Ibid pp. 41-42

[65] 'The Technological Society' pp. 47-60

[66] Refer to p.

[67] Refer to p.

[68] Ibid. p. 51

[69] Ellul would appear to have here uncritically accepted the thesis of the direct relationship between the Reformation and Capitalism. Refer p.

[70] Ibid p. 56-57

[71] 'The Technological Society' pp. 3-60

[72] The section entitled 'The Artificial Environment' of 'Where the Wasteland Ends' by T. Roszak, Faber and Faber (1972) gives an excellent critique of this matter.

[73] 'The Society of the Future' p. 144

[74] Refer, for e.g., to the discussion entitled 'The Technique of Work' in 'The Technological Society' by J. Ellul pp. 349-358.

[75] 'A Philosophy of Labour' F. Tannenbaum, Knopf. New York, (1951), quoted in 'The Organization Man' W. H. Whyte Jr. Simon and Schuster, New York (1956) p. 41.

[76] 'The Organization Man'. p. 47

[77] Ibid p. 33

[78] 'The Organization Man' W. H. Whyte Jr. New York (1956)

[79] 'The New Industrial State' J.K. Galbraith in the form of the Reith Lectures. BBC Listener Vol. LXXVI NO. 1964 Nov. 17, 1966, p. 711.

[80] Refer 'Socialism in Our Past and Future'. I. Shafarevich published in 'From Under the Rubble' ed. A. Solzhenitsyn. Fontana (1976) pp. 26-66

[81] Indiana Press (1966)

[82] Ibid. BBC Listener Vol. LXXVI No. 1967. Dec. 8, 1966, p. 843.

[83] 'The Managerial Revolution' James Burnham. Indiana University Press (1966). p. 137, p. 197.

[84] Max Weber, quoted in 'Twilight of Authority. R. Nisbet. Heinemann, London (1976) p. 58.

[85] 'Music in a New Found Land' W. Mellers. Berrie and Rockliff (1964) pp. 93-94

[86] 'Revolt into Style' G. Melley. Penguin Books (1972) p. 10

[87] 'The Technological Society' p. 388-389

[88] Ibid. p. 411

[89] Ibid. pp. 307, 317-318

[90] Ibid. pp. 376-377

[91] Allen Lane, the Penguin Press (1971)

[92] 'The New Totalitarians' R. Huntford Allen Lane, The Penguin Press (1971) pp. 8-9.

[93] Ibid pp. 12-13

[94] Ibid. p. 20

[95] Ibid. p. 24

[96] Quoted in 'The New Totalitarians' p. 8

[97] 'The New Totalitarians' p. 9

[98] 'Brave New world Revisited' A. Huxley, Harper and Row, Perennial Library (1958). pp. 3-4

[99] Ibid pp. 110-111

[100] 'The Biological Time Bomb' G. Rattray Taylor, Panther Books (1969) p. 24

[101] 'Mankind at the Turning Point' M. Mesarovic and E. Pestel. Signet Book (1974) pp. 10-11

[102] 'An Inquiry into the Human Prospect' Robert L. Heilbroner. Norton, New York (1974) p.56.

[103] 'An Inquiry into the Human Prospect' Robert L. Heilbroner. Norton, New York (1974). p. 61

[104] Refer to 'Beyond Freedom and Dignity' for example.

[105] Bodley Head (1970)

[106] 'Future Shock' A. Toffler. Bodley Head (1970) pp. 282-283.

[107] Ibid. p. 415

[108] Quoted in 'Socialism in Our Past and Future, 'From Under the Rubble' ed. A. Solzhensitsyn. p. 66

[109] Refer to T. Roszak 'The Making of a Counterculture' Faber and Faber (1969) for a survey of the mystical and New Leftish critique of Technocratic Society.

[110] Refer, for example to 'The Pursuit of the Millenium' by N. Cohn, Paladin (1970)), 'The Radical Reformation' by G. Williams London (1962), 'Left-Wing Democracy in the English Civil War' by P. Petergorsky, Gollancz (1940) and 'Christianity and the Social Order' by R.J. Campbell Bell, London (1907). The first three survey these influences from late mediaeval times through to the English Civil War. The latter provides an example of the relationship between 19th century Liberal Theology and the growth of Anglo-Saxon optimistic socialism.

[111] 'Techniek en Toekmost' I. E.Schuurman. van Gorcum Assen (1972). A revised version is soon to be published in English by Wedge and van Gorcum.

[112] 'Techniek en Toekomst' I. E. Schuurman. van Gorcum, Assen (1972) p. 421.

[113] Ibid.

[114] 'The Rebel' Albert Camus. Peregrine Books. Harmondsworth, England. Penguin Books (1965) p. 82.

[115] Ibid. p. 85

[116] A Tale of Two Cities' Charles Dickens

[117] 'The Rebel' pp. 29-30, 32

[118] 'England: Before and After Wesley' J. Wesley Bready London. Hodder and Stoughton (1938) pp. 40-41

[119] 'Short History of the English People' J.R. Green, quoted in 'England: Before and After Wesley' p. 180

[120] 'The Cambridge Modern History' Vol. 'VI, quoted in 'England: Before and After Wesley' p. 180

[121] 'Dada-Art and Anti-Art' Hans Richter. Thames and Hudson, London (1965) p. 35

[122] 'Modern Art and the Death of a Culture' H.R.Rookmaaker, IVP (1970) p. 180

[123] *Encounter*, Nov. 1969.

[124] 'Unreason and Revolution' R. Lowenthal. Encounter Magazine, November 1969 pp. 23-24

[125] Ibid. p. 34

[126] 'Ideas and Men'. C. Brinton. Prentice Hall (1963) p. 320

[127] 'Locke's Two Treatises of Government' P. Laslett. Cambridge University Press (1967) pp. 95-96

[128] 'Christianity in World History' A.T. van Leeuwen, Scribners, New York (1966) p. 306

[129] 'The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism' C.B. MacPherson. Oxford University Press {1964) pp. 199-200

[130] 'Second Treatise on Government' John Locke. Section 27

[131] 'The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism' C. B. MacPherson O.U.P. (1964) pp. 199-221

[132] Ibid. pp. 238-247

[133] 'Christianity in World History' p. 315

[134] 'Civil Religion in America' Robert N. Bellah Daedalus 96 (Winter 1967)

[135] 'The Social Contract' J.J. Rousseau. Book I, 1

[136] 'The Rebel' A. Camus pp. 84-87

[137] 'Christianity in World History' A.T. van Leeuwen pp. 321, 323-4

[138] 'The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx' David McLellan. McMillan, London 1969) pp. 48-50

[139] Ibid. pp. 24-25

[140] 'One Dimensional Man' H. Marcuse. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London (1964)

[141] 'Marcuse' by Alisdair MacIntyre. Fontana Modern Masters (1970)

[142] 'Ideas and Men' C. Brinton p. 357

[143] For example 'Ideas and Men'. C. Brinton pp. 354-359.

[144] R. Nisbet in 'Twilight of Authority', Heinemann (1976) cites examples from conservatives, liberals and radicals in this connection.

[145] 'Unbelief and Revolution'. This has only begun to be translated into English. To date Lectures VIII, IX, and XI have been published by the Groen van Prinsterer Fund, Amsterdam.

[146] 'Scriptural Religion and the Political Task' Evan Runner. Wedge Publishing Foundation,Toronto 1974. pp. 89-90

[147] one of the best accounts in the English language of these developments it to he found in the PhD thesis of James W. Skillen. It is entitled 'The Development of Calvinistic Political Theory in the Netherlands, with Special Reference to the Thought of Herman Dooyeweerd'. Duke University, Political Science (1974). Ch.3 especially gives background to the developments cited above.

[148] 'Modern Christian Movements', J.T. McNeil. Harper Torch books p. 141

[149] New York (1961) Image Books (1964).

[150] 'The Church in Crisis: A History of the General Councils, 325-1870' P. Hughes. Image Books (1964) pp. 381-382

[151] 'The Church Speaks to the Modern World. The Social Teachings of Leo XIII'. E. Gilson. pp. 5-7

[152] 'The Papal Encyclicals in their Historical Context' Anne Freemantle. New York (1956) p. 166

[153] Routledge and Kegan Paul, London (1957).

[154] 'Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953' Michael P. Fogarty. Routledge and Kegan Paul (1956) p. xv

[155] 'Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953' pp.17-18

[156] Ibid. pp. 42-43

[157] The most complex situation in which this 'vertical pluralism' has been developed is in the Netherlands, where Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and Liberals have all tended to organize patterns of life according to their own principles. This situation has been subjected to a thoroughgoing analysis by Arend Lijphart in a book entitled 'The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands' University of California Press (1968). The main point that this author makes is that despite the deeply 'divided character of Dutch society, it is characterised by both a freedom and a democratic stability.

[158] Pius XI. Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* 1931, CTS ed. p. 37

[159] Ibid. pp. 41

[160] 'Democracy in America' A. de Tocqueville. ed. by J.P. Mayer and Max Lerner, in a new Translation by George Lawrence, Harper and Row, (1966). p. lxxxviii.

[161] This is apparent even in N.Z. For example two novels written in the last 10 years set in this country are based in and around the themes of freedom, revolt and oppression. I refer to 'Smith's Dream' by C. K. Stead and 'Broken October, New Zealand, 1985' by Craig Harrison. The latter in particular draws attention to the potential of the present divisions within the country (between the Unions and the government, the leftist students and the establishment and the Maoris and the Pakehas), in the absence of an adequate balance of powers in its constitutional provisions, to result in a military dictatorship.

[162] 'Twilight of Authority' R. Nisbet pp. 5-6

[163] The Westminster Confession was drawn up with this purpose in view.

[164] 'The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism' Elie Halevy. Faber and Faber (1928) pp. 26, 34

[165] J.S. Mill Autobiography edited by J.J. Cross. Columbia, New York (1960), pp. 34 ff.

[166] 'On Liberty and Liberalism: the Case of John Stuart Mill' Gertrude Himmelfarb. Knopf, New York (1974) pp. 14-18

[167] 'Twilight of Authority' R. Nisbet p. 49

[168] 'Irrational Man' W. Barrett. Heinemann, London (1961) pp.241-243

[169] 'Twilight of Authority.' R. Nisbet. p. 230

[170] Ibid. pp. 236, 271-273

[171] 'England: Before and After Wesley'. W. Bready. Hodder and Stoughton (1938)

[172] 'England: Before and After Wesley' W. Bready p.

[173] Refer, for example, to 'The Great Reversal' D.O. Moberg. Scripture Union (1972)

[174] Refer to the 'Covenant' of the Lausanne Congress on Evangelism as an example of the way in which this is coming about.

[175] 'Christian Democracy in Western Europe! 1820-1953' Michael P. Fogarty.

[176] 'Twilight of Authority' R. Nisbet p. 283