

CHAPTER 2

A SYNOPTIC VIEW OF MY CRITICISM

1. A Synoptic View of the Influence of the Nature-Grace Ground-Motive on the Thought of Dooyeweerd.

This section will be followed by an oversight of the history of nature-grace thinking on the questions of God's eternity, man's eternity, and time as well as some of the problems that relate immediately to these questions. There will also be a section dealing with specific evidence from Dooyeweerd's works which will try to substantiate what is here presented generally and synoptically. In the part of this dissertation dealing with reconstruction alternatives to the criticisms in these sections will be presented. Because the criticisms as well as the positive alternatives that follow will be detailed and specific it is good for the reader to see in advance the direction of the unfolding criticism as a whole.

Problems in Dooyeweerd's thinking in respect to supra-temporality as well as those points which have been most emphasized by his critics are in the last analysis due to the influence of the nature-grace ground-motive upon his thinking. It will be shown that what seems to restrict the reformational direction in his thought is the influence of this ground-motive at central points, and that these points are in desperate need of reformation. In the next section it will be shown that the restrictive influence of the nature-grace ground-motive takes specific form in a Greek ontology type. This ontology type further restricts the dominating reformational influence of the Christian ground-motive of the

Word of God in Dooyeweerd's work. Failure to spot the influence of nature-grace on his thinking at these points drives Dooyeweerd into employing a specific ontology type. Therefore a general presentation of the influence of the nature-grace motive must precede a general description of the ontology type which is present. Throughout this section it must be borne in mind that the contentions will not be proven in this part, but that a section of detailed proof for what is here stated will follow. By seeing the general direction and purport of the criticism in advance, the reader will be in a better position to judge the evidence without getting lost in the details of the criticism.

First of all, it would seem that Dooyeweerd works with a scholastic view of the eternity of God, conceived of as an eternal present. Because Dooyeweerd is a transcendental critical thinker and opposed to all metaphysics and especially theoretical speculation concerning the nature of God, this view of the eternity of God does not often come to explicit expression.

Relating closely to this notion of God's eternity is a notion of the heavenly created as eternal in distinction to the earthly created as temporal. His hesitance to deal at all with the heaven of the angels and the created eternity of man is not simply to be explained by the emphasis in his thinking on being transcendental and critical. This is true to a certain extent, but it is just as certain that he regards heaven, the place of the departed saints and angels and the ascended Christ in his glorified human nature, to be subject to a different order. Cosmic time does not apply to this other realm but is limited to the earthly temporal horizon and this has the consequence that all that happens beyond the limits of cosmic time is out of bounds for theoretical thought. For this

reason Dooyeweerd differs markedly with Popma and Vollenhoven in respect to his view of heaven. It is my contention, in agreement with Vollenhoven and Popma, that there is nothing created that is beyond the limits of cosmic time. The created heaven, including the world of the angels, the departed saints, and Christ in his glorified human nature, is subject to the same cosmic time, is involved in the same cosmic becoming process (grote wordings process), and partakes in one history, the history of heaven and earth. On the contrary, Dooyeweerd speaks of the fact that "in this eschatological aspect of time faith groups the eschaton and in general that which is or happens beyond the limits of cosmic time,"¹ and considers it according to the order of time as it is found in the faith aspect. In line with this he stresses the supra-temporal as the central sphere of occurrence in sharp distinction from the historical aspect of time.² In addition, he contends that created cosmic time must always be seen to be in need of correlation with created eternity. This created eternity is not only to be thought of in respect to the individual hearts of men, but is an order, a sphere, a realm in and to which the categories of cosmic time cannot be applied. In conjunction with this, Dooyeweerd also speaks of the heart or soul at death as leaving this life and going into eternity.

From these and other considerations it is clear that Dooyeweerd has fallen into accommodation with the nature-grace ground-motive. This whole notion of heaven as eternity has been developed in Reformed scholasticism

1. H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, I (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953), p. 33.

2. Ibid., I, pp. 32-33.

and is part of the nature-grace ground-motive itself. His failure to see that this view of heaven is a constituent ingredient in nature-grace thinking is just more evidence that he has not purged his thinking on this point.

The importance for Dooyeweerd of supra-temporality, created eternity and eternity in general is caused by another theme of nature-grace thinking which is present in Dooyeweerd. The notion that time and history come to an end, that time and history cease at the judgment day, is a common feature of nature-grace thinking. That "time is for a time" is generally accompanied in nature-grace thinking with the addition that after time ends, eternity begins. The event which brings an end to cosmic time is the judgment day. This emphasis is also present in Dooyeweerd but only comes out explicitly in a few places. What is very clear however in Dooyeweerd is his tendency to verticalize eschatology. The term "verticalize" presents a problem in itself, but let it suffice at this point to say that verticalizing is a tendency to over-emphasize the direction of created reality to God's eternity. This can be made clear if one thinks for a moment what horizontal would mean. If it is true that cosmic time and the created law order never end, never cease, but last and endure everlasting, that succession of events, duration as it relates to individual things will never come to an end, then cosmic time, including heaven and earth, has endless horizons which continually open up before us. This is what is meant by the term "horizontal." On the other hand, if one thinks that cosmic time will cease, then this endless dimension of cosmic time and God's faithfulness to his law order comes to an end with the judgment day, and the horizon of the new earth, if there is any attention given to it, and in general, the eschaton, must be di-

rected and turned in a vertical direction. That this is the case in Dooyeweerd can be seen in the fact that the consummation of meaning, sometimes referred to as the kingdom of God, is characterized as being above time or supra-temporal. As was stated before, Dooyeweerd places great stress on the supra-temporal, by which he means created eternity. He thinks of the eschaton as making up a central feature of what happens above time in the supra-temporal in general.³ This stress can only be explained by his accommodation to the nature-grace ground-motive.

It only takes a few considerations from the Scriptures on these points to show that there is something unhealthy about Dooyeweerd's views on these subjects. For instance, it is the stress of the New Testament that "the age to come" cannot only be viewed as starting with the end of this age, the period characterized by man's fallen existence. Rather, "the age to come" begins for most New Testament writers with the resurrection and ascension of Christ. "The age to come" is not in any way to be characterized as eternal, as opposed to temporal, especially if one has in mind by the term "eternal" the idea of an existence not subject to cosmic time, the created order, or the law ordinances which were laid down at creation. Eternal in the Scriptures often involves the notion of the incorruptible as opposed to the corruptible. In this sense, eternal can be somewhat opposed to temporal, but then temporality is synonymous with the corruptible and the eternal with the incorruptible. "The age to come," centered in heaven where the glorified Christ in his human nature is present, is dated like life on earth. This notion of "the age to come" is slowly becoming the common consensus of theologians

3. Ibid., I, p. 33.

who hold fast to the authority of the Word of God, and also of the theological world in general, since Oscar Cullmann. This is not however just one theological view among others but is part of the biblically Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation in respect to the kingdom of God and the consummation.

Another consideration is the fact that eternal life as the possession of believers is not something entered into at death or at the resurrection, but is given to one by faith. Eternal life is the present possession of all believers which comes to the fullest expression at the resurrection of the dead and in the life on the new earth. As a consequence, eternal life has nothing to do with a non-temporal life or one which is eternal in the sense of not being subject to successive unfolding, or development, but rather, eternal life is dated. Popma especially has dealt with the biblical notion of eternal life in contrast to the many scholastic positions of nature-grace thinking.

It can be said that Dooyeweerd does not give these important facets of the biblical ground-motive sufficient emphasis and attention, but beyond that it will be shown that he has distorted this rich biblical perspective in a definite way. This distortion can be seen to be the influence of the religious ground-motive of nature-grace on his thinking.

Because Dooyeweerd did not purge his thinking of these common features of nature-grace in respect to God's eternity, created eternity, and time, the reformationally Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation which he, to such a great extent, rediscovered for the Christian community failed to bear rich fruit in these respects. Instead, distortions arose and controlled his thinking. In this complex of ideas

there is quite a clear depreciation of cosmic time. This can be seen in his over-emphasis on the transcendental direction of cosmic time toward that which is above time. By this he has in mind not only God but also created eternity. This notion of created eternity is a distortion of the biblical ground-motive. Dooyeweerd's construction of religious transcendence and the concentration point are involved in this verticalization of time and the eschaton.

Implicit in his system is more than one created cosmic order; an earthly temporal one and a heavenly one, and this feature of more than one created cosmic order is constitutive of the nature-grace motive. Popma has brought out the importance of the old Reformed biblical emphasis that the re-creation adds nothing new to the creation, in the sense that a new set of ordinances are created to govern the world of re-creation. Dooyeweerd also has emphasized this point by stressing, like Kuyper before him, that the fall in sin did not affect the creation ordinances, but God in his faithfulness maintains these creation ordinances in the re-creation, bringing them to fulfillment and to proper expression through the Mediator, so that nothing of the creation is lost. This great reformational insight of Dooyeweerd and his out-working of it, e.g., in the norm of cultural revenge, is not carried through in respect to the future, however. Popma has pointed out that this emphasis of the biblically Christian ground-motive carries with it that the created law-order never ceases. This means that God's faithfulness comes to expression through his everlasting maintenance of his creation. This explains the biblical emphasis on the resurrection of the body and the new earth. On the other hand, to say that cosmic time will cease is tantamount to saying that the creation will cease. Not to see

God's covenanted faithfulness in the present and especially the future restoration and renewal of the whole temporal cosmos, both heaven and earth, is to lack the biblical perspective on these questions.

The word "new" in the Scriptures (when applied to heaven and earth) never means a wholly new world order, where there is no time, where the original created ordinances are no longer in effect. Rather, life on the new earth is precisely to be seen in the carrying out of these ordinances in fullness forever. "New" when used as "new" creation, "new" man, etc., means the old creation purified of corruption, restored, and renewed. The renewed existence, in contrast to sinful corruptible existence, is so glorious that the prophets like to speak of the old as hardly recognizable, but the "new" always preserves the old in restored and renewed re-creation.

This biblical perspective, namely that the scope of the re-creation applies to life after the judgment and that the creation ordinances are preserved, maintained, and renewed, is almost wholly lacking in Dooyeweerd's thought. This lack accounts for his verticalizing of the eschaton and his emphasis on the transcendental character of the created reality as meaning. He lays little emphasis on what Scripture emphasizes, namely the continuity of the creation beyond the judgment day. Consequently, he does not stress the resurrection of the dead and the judgment day as the historical watershed between fallen human history and history as it will continue forever in all its periods on the new earth. The rich emphasis of heaven on earth after the judgment day, the interaction of the angelic world and heaven with earth during fallen history, all these things lose their reforming power in Dooyeweerd's thought. Dooyeweerd's stress on the transcendent character of the heart and on

the transcendent religious horizon (although containing some important implications for reforming Christianity) must be modified if the ground-motive of Word-revelation is to drive us in hope toward the consummate life on the new earth. Dooyeweerd's unwillingness to consider questions which relate to the future life of believers, as well as his unwillingness to consider the importance of the angelic heavens, is not to be explained fully by his transcendental critical emphasis which is often healthy and necessary to cut off theo-ontological speculation in these matters. It is also to be explained by the fact that there is a tinge of scepticism present in his basically good emphasis on transcendental critical thinking. This sceptical tendency robs the thinking of faith (geloof-denken) from seeing the importance of the Word-revelation in regard to the heavenly side of the created temporal cosmos, the importance of the creation and paradise history, as well as the biblical emphasis on the continued faithfulness of God to his created law-order in the life on the new earth.

This verticalizing tendency is particularly disastrous because Dooyeweerd conceives of the law order as a temporal order. This brings with it a depreciation of law order since there is a definite depreciation of cosmic time.

In the section dealing with the evidence of this nature-grace emphasis an attempt will be made to show that Dooyeweerd's idea of the concentration point as supra-temporal relates to the fact that in his thought created eternity is a substitution and correction for Kuyper's emphasis on the unity of creation and re-creation in the eternal Word.

Kuyper's strong emphasis on God's eternity and of events finding their unity in God's eternal plan, in almost neo-Platonic fashion, has been

corrected by Dooyeweerd. Supra-temporality and created eternity is the substitute in Dooyeweerd for Kuyper's emphasis on the unity of creation and redemption in the eternal plan of God in the Mediator. The supra-temporal is the central sphere of unity, totality, fullness, and consummation which cannot be given in cosmic time, but on the other hand, is not to be found in the eternal mind and counsel of God. Dooyeweerd takes his concentration point in Christ as the New Root and with this somewhat supra-lapsarian, semi-Kuyperian emphasis it is not possible to do justice to the stress of the ground-motive of Word-revelation on the creation, the fall, and as we have seen already, the re-creation in its future horizon. It will be shown that a tendency toward philosophic, theoretical unity has caused a distortion of the ground-motive of Word-revelation, a misplacing of the concentration point, and a distorted notion of created eternity, all of which is due to the presence of the nature-grace ground-motive.

2. A Synoptic View of the Ontology Type in the Thought of Dooyeweerd.

The specific form which the influence of the religious ground-motive of nature-grace has on Dooyeweerd's thinking can best be exposed by the use of the problem-historical method of Vollenhoven.⁴ It seems

4. This is a very difficult, complex method in many respects but its results are most accurate and it does the most justice to the diversity of figures in the history of western thought. Unfortunately there is little of Vollenhoven translated. Of particular importance for an introduction to his method is: H. E. Runner, Sylabus for Philosophy 220 - The History of Ancient Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Calvin College Mimeo, 1958-59). This is a partial translation of Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte, I, Grieksche Philosophie (Franeker: T. Wever, 1950), with a helpful introduction by Runner, pp. 1-28. For help in fixing the categories of Vollenhoven in one's mind see Vollenhoven, "Geschiedenis van de Wijsgerige Anthropologie," (Amsterdam: gecorrigeerd dictaat door D. Zijlstra, mimeo, 1961-62). Some articles in English by Vollenhoven: "The Course of Plato's Development," Bibliothèque du Xme Congrès International de Philosophie, II (Amsterdam: L. J. Veen, 1948), pp. 1-16. "The Significance of Calvinism for the Reformation of Philosophy," The Evangelical Quarterly, III (1931), pp. 387-403, IV (1932), pp. 128-160, 398-427. "Occasionalism and Physics," Free University Quarterly, III (1951). There is a recent trend to combine somewhat the methods of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. Zuidema has always worked rather happily with both Dooyeweerd's and Vollenhoven's methods. The most recent attempt at this is that of H. Hart, "Stellingen over het pragmatisme," Corr. bladen, XXIX (1965), pp. 23-24. Also, Hart, The Challenge of our Age (Toronto: AACCS, 1968), p. 7. For an evaluation and comparison of the methods of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd see C. Seerveld, "Voor en uit de praktijk," Corr. bladen, XXIV (1960), pp. 5-10. Also, Seerveld, "Dooyeweerd's Contribution to the Historiography of Philosophy," Philosophy and Christianity (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1965), pp. 193-202. For a more elaborate comparison and critique of the two methods see Popma, Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1963), pp. 91-151. For an evaluation of the significance of Vollenhoven's method in particular see Popma, "Historische methode en historische continuïteit," Phil. Ref., XVII (1952), pp. 95-145 (with English summary pp. 142-145); S. U. Zuidema, "Vollenhoven en de reformatie der wijsbegeerte," Phil. Ref., XXVIII (1963), pp. 134-146; Vollenhoven, "De consequent probleamhistorische methode," Phil. Ref., XXVI (1961), pp. 1-34.

that after many attempts to classify Dooyeweerd in terms of the ontology types distinguished by Vollenhoven, that only one type coherently accounted for the problems which are found in his writings. At this point it is necessary to put aside the question of the place of law with its three pagan answers, objectivism, subjectivism and realism, and the question concerning the relationship of the universal to the individual with its three pagan answers of universalism, partial-universalism (higher-lower scheme and the macro-microcosm theme), and individualism. Since Dooyeweerd has done such ground-breaking work on the idea of the law and its significance for Christian thinking, any attempt to classify him in regard to the question as to the place of the law demands a great deal of analysis. In a later section some of the differences between Vollenhoven, Popma, and Dooyeweerd on the nature of the law will be dealt with. For now it will just be indicated that Dooyeweerd shows some relatively clear indications of having a realistic, or more precisely, a neo-realistic cast to his thinking concerning the question, "where is the law." The question of the zeitgeist in which Dooyeweerd must be placed will also be set aside for the moment since this is inextricably tied to the question concerning the place of the law.

The ontology type that can be seen to be present in Dooyeweerd can be described as follows: a cosmogono-cosmological monism, with the theme of priority, involving semi-contradictory contrasts.⁵ This is not a complete classification because it leaves the question of impetus

5. For further information and explanation see the index to Vollenhoven's Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte, and "De consequent probleamhistorische methode," pp. 19-22. Also, "Enoetisme en 'ahoristos dyas' in het praeplatonische denken," Phil. Ref., XIX (1954), pp. 58-59, 146-168, (English summary on pp. 165-168); "Plato's realisme," Phil. Ref., XXVIII (1963), pp. 106-110.

theory and the further specification of instrumentalism vs. vitalism undecided. Later on some attention to these questions will be given but for now the facets of the ontology type which are most clearly present in the thinking of Dooyeweerd will be concentrated on.

First of all a general synopsis of how this classification seems to fit and explain the problem areas of Dooyeweerd's thought will be presented. At first sight one would think that Dooyeweerd's thinking should be classified as dualistic rather than monistic. This would appear to be the case because Dooyeweerd places a great deal of stress on distinctions like supra-temporality and cosmic time, heart and functions, root unity above cosmic time and relative unities within cosmic time, religion as supra-temporal, central sphere and temporal modal spheres, etc. It was Dooyeweerd's unique stress on the fact that the heart is transcendent and above time in its participation in the concentration point of our cosmos, that makes it appear to be a dualism in his thought. Another indication of this dualism might be said to be Dooyeweerd's distinction of two kinds of generation in respect to man: temporal bodily and central spiritual (*geestelijk*).⁶ Almost all of Dooyeweerd's critics have focused on these pairs of ideas. However,

6. H. Dooyeweerd, "De leer van den mensch in de W.d.W.," *Corr. bladen*, V (1942), p. 143. Here he says, "De schepping van den mensch naar lichaam en ziel, die volgens de Schrift volkomen voltooid is, werkt zich creatuurlijk uit in den weg der generatie. Deze generatie heeft zowel een lichamelijke als een geestelijke (religieuze) zijde. Naar de eerste, die in den kosmischen tijd verloopt, is de menschheid uit éénen bloede geworden. Naar de tweede, die niet in den tijd verloopt, zijn wij het 'geestelijk zaad' van Adam en deel aan diensvolgens in zijn zondeval. De natuurlijke lijn der geestelijke generatie wordt echter doorbroken door de nieuwe generatie uit den Heiligen Geest of wedergeboorte. Deze generatie uit den Heiligen Geest heeft echter de natuurlijke lijn der geestelijke generatie uit Adam tot voorwaarde, niet tot richtsnoer (de 'natuurlijke' mensch, de *anthroopos psychikos*, is eerst, daarna de 'Geestelijke' mensch, de *anthroopos pneumatikos*)." Also found in *Sola Fide*, VII/2 (1954), pp. 8-18.

one is also very much struck by Dooyeweerd's attempt to overcome all dualism in his thinking especially as it relates to the Thomistic, scholastic idea of the soul as a rational substance, or anima separata. From the beginning of his career, Dooyeweerd has placed a great deal of stress on the unity of man and constantly warns both against viewing the heart or soul of man as a substance and against substantializing tendencies. His emphasis on the integral, radical character of human experience, his stress on the heart as a center of direction (which can only be understood in its three religious relations: to God, to the world, and to our fellow man) all militate strongly against a dualistic classification. In addition, Dooyeweerd has stressed the meaning (*zin*) character of created reality which embraces and over-arches all categories in his system⁷ and certainly seems to speak against a dualism. Dooyeweerd also stresses the idea of dynamic refraction of created reality from a totality or fullness into a rich diversity of temporal aspects and temporal individuality structures. It would seem that one cannot think of root unity, totality, and fullness of meaning on both law and subject sides as in any way actually separate from their modal and typical temporal expressions.

According to Vollenhoven, in all dualistic positions there is the primal distinction of transcendent and non-transcendent. This division indicates two realms, each of which has its own origin, so that the dualist must be thought to have two equally ultimate principles or ori-

7. Brümmer emphasizes the importance of the all-embracing character of the category *zin* or meaning, *Transcendental Criticism and Christian Philosophy*, pp. 50-62, 163-165. See also my master's dissertation, pp. 17-36, 93-103.

gins corresponding to the two realms. The monist on the other hand is said to answer the question of origin by pointing to only one origin for reality. For this reason Vollenhoven sharply distinguishes a dualism from a duality, since a duality only indicates two sides or dimensions of one thing, whereas dualism denotes two equally ultimate principles or origin.

Instead of having two realms, the transcendent and the non-transcendent, the monist seeks to account for diversity in the cosmos by speaking of a bifurcation of contrasts from one single origin. From the one origin there bifurcates two major contrasts, one of a higher species and the other of a lower species. The monist, therefore, generally has a more difficult time explaining the problem of evil, since evil must also proceed from one origin. But the real problem for the monist becomes the relation of the two major contrasts. Vollenhoven distinguishes various monistic positions which deal with this relation and which have arisen in connection with the question of movement in the cosmos. Of interest here is the theme of priority. This theory asserts that of the two contrasts, higher and lower, influence is exercised by the higher on the lower but not by the lower on the higher. In parallelism, in distinction from the theme of priority, the two primal contrasts run parallel to one another not influencing each other. In interactionism both species, lower and higher, exercise mutual influence upon each other.

In the theme of priority the cosmos is viewed as semi-contradictory, the contrasts being in tension as distinguished from and opposed to purely contradictory and non-contradictory monists.⁸

8. See footnote 5 of this chapter for discussion of the theme of priority.

Now as we keep some of these basic distinctions in mind the tangled problems in Dooyeweerd's thinking become unraveled. The basic contrasts in his thinking are now to be seen in those pairs of contrasts which were mentioned earlier. Those who see a dualism in Dooyeweerd have focused on these.

A. The Basic Contrasts:

Within created reality in respect to man the basic contrast is between the created eternity of the heart of man and his temporal function mantle, the human body. This same basic contrast of supra-temporal and temporal runs through Dooyeweerd's thinking from beginning to end. An example of this is to be seen in the contrast between the supra-temporal transcendent fullness, totality, and root unity of created reality on the one hand and its temporal diversity and revelation within cosmic time on the other. Dooyeweerd contrasts religion, as the central supra-temporal sphere, with the modal aspects which are temporal revelations, manifestations, and refractions of the integral undifferentiated central sphere (which on the subject side is the fullness of all man's temporal functions concentrated in a unity of direction upon the origin of the cosmos). A further example is his distinction between the unity, fullness, and totality on the law side in the law of love which is supra-temporal, on the one hand, and structural law which is temporal and relates to the diversity and coherence of our cosmos on the other. These basic contrasts are most globally seen as contrasts between the earthly temporal cosmos and the heavenly side of the cosmos, between the supra-temporal soul or heart and the temporal cosmos, between supra-temporal root unity, totality, and fullness on both subject and law sides and temporal diversity on law and subject sides.

Before we get to the origin of these mutual primal contrasts, some clarifications are necessary. Dooyeweerd clearly states that the boundary between the sovereign Creator and the created is the law. This must be kept in mind so that the central contrasts are not misplaced. He rightly shows that both subjects and objects are subjected to law. This correlation of the law with created reality which is subjected to it, must definitely be maintained. The primal contrasts within the cosmos however, relate to root unity, totality, and fullness in the higher contrast and cosmic time with its law and subject sides guaranteeing diversity and coherence in the lower contrast. It also must be made clear that the primal contrasts cannot be regarded to be between the modal aspects and typical structures of individuality. This point must be made, because Vollenhoven has pointed out that Dooyeweerd, because he views cosmic time on its law side as a time order of modal aspects, with each aspect having its particular aspectual expression of cosmic time, has substantialized the modal functions.⁹ The accuracy of Vollenhoven's criticism must be evaluated in greater detail later, but for now it can at least be said that Dooyeweerd shows a clear tendency to substantialize the modal functions. Due to his emphasis on the idea that the constant governing types and modal functions are always realized in concrete things and events and therefore are never to be thought of as occurring in reality as separate,¹⁰ it seems that the substantializing tendency must be explained differently. This means

9. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," pp. 2, 7, 13, 14.
 10. This is especially clear in Dooyeweerd's article, "Schelling en evolutie," Phil. Ref., XXIV (1959), especially p. 127, also pp. 146, 148-149.

that the primal contrast cannot be regarded as running between modal and typical structures in the temporal cosmos. Just as we noted that it could not be seen to run between the law and subject sides.

In order to trace the one source from which these primal contrasts have bifurcated or proceeded, one is helped by turning to the article by Dooyeweerd, "Schelling en evolutie." In this article he draws attention to a very important distinction in his thinking. This concerns the difference between the finished supra-temporal work of the Creator and the great becoming process.¹¹ Dooyeweerd stresses that God's acts of creation cannot be regarded as having taken place within time in temporal succession as Spier has attempted to show, but rather, all temporal descriptions (for example those found in Genesis 1) presuppose the creation of cosmic time itself. Consequently the creation acts of God are not temporal events. Dooyeweerd also has a rather unique position which is placed in sharp contrast to the scholastic notion of psycho-creationism, in which there is thought to be a continuous special creation of human souls in time after God's creation in six days was completed. He lays a great stress upon Genesis 2:1-4, where emphasis is placed on the finished character and completion of God's creative acts. All of God's created activity is complete and it concerns not only the first pair of human beings but the totality of created reality.¹² Genesis 1 speaks of the finished character of God's creating work which relates to the totality and fullness of all created reality. God can never again be said to create. This creation of the totality of the cosmos, heaven and earth, is said to

11. Ibid. pp. 115-116.

12. Ibid.

be the work of God "in the beginning." Genesis 1:1 refers consequently to the supra-temporal creative acts of God as they relate to the totality, unity, and root of the cosmos.

Dooyeweerd then speaks of the temporal becoming of the finished work of creation. All created reality unfolds or becomes according to the creation order. The creation order in a certain sense must be distinguished from the temporal order. The creation order in God's work of creation can only be approximated in the structures of time. In the beginning of this article Dooyeweerd stresses the importance of distinguishing between the finished creation of God which is supra-temporal and cosmic time in which the great temporal becoming process takes place. He says, "De gehele tijdelijke orde met het gehele wordingsprocess dat zich daarbinnen zou voltrekken was ongetwijfeld in de schepping begrepen, maar slechts als creatuurlijk resultaat van Gods voltooide scheppingswerk."¹³ Dooyeweerd goes on to distinguish creation and becoming as they relate to man.

De schepping omvat m.a.w. de totale mens in zijn centrale afhankelijkheid van God, als beelddrager van zijn goddelijke Oorsprong; de forminger en het ontvangen van de levensadem is de uitwerking van Gods scheppend weerd in het tijdelijke wordingsprocess, overeenkomstig de ordeningen en structuren door God in de orde des tijds gesteld. De schepping zelve gaat alle menselijk begrip en alle menselijke voorstelling te boven, omdat zij geen tijdelijke gebeuren is; maar het werk Gods 'in den beginne'.¹⁴

From this quotation and the surrounding context it would appear that Dooyeweerd simply distinguishes between the work of creation by God and the great cosmic temporal becoming process according to the order of time. Cosmic time was created itself, and the totality and

fullness of God's created work now "becomes" successively according to the order of cosmic time. God's supra-temporal acts of creation are incomprehensible to theoretical thought and revealed to ordinary experience in terms of time, accommodated to our faith function. These acts should be seen as the transcendent religious presupposita of all temporal succession and becoming. From this the twin primal contrasts are not yet evident. In this article there is only talk of the great cosmic temporal becoming process. This process is in the lower contrast only, and this comes clearly to the fore when we compare this article, "Schepping en evolutie," with another, "De leer van den mens in de W.d.W.," in which he sets forth ideas concerning his view of philosophical anthropology.¹⁵ Here Dooyeweerd distinguishes between a temporal cosmic becoming or generation in respect to man's body and a supra-temporal spiritual (geestelijk) generation.¹⁶ Here we have the higher primal contrast. From God's creation "in the beginning" of the totality of the creation comes two contrasting generations. The higher generation relates to the becoming or generation of the hearts of men and the generation in the lower contrast relates to temporal generation of man's body. These must be seen in strict correlation. Mankind is created as a totality "in the beginning" and then this created mankind unfolds in two contrasting but always strictly correlated generations. Since the finished creation of God refers to man as a whole man and as an individual member of the whole human race, created as a unity and totality "in the beginning" by God, he can never be thought of as a composite of two substances or as separate entities

15. Dooyeweerd, "De leer van den mens in de W.d.W.," pp. 134-143.

16. See footnote 6 of this chapter.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

but rather must be seen as a unity in duality of supra-temporal heart and temporal function mantle.

Since these primal contrasts, created eternity or supra-temporality and temporal reality, are always in strict correlation, neither contrast can be thought to exist before the other. Therefore God's acts of creation are neither in time or in created eternity but are the cause and condition of both. Therefore when Dooyeweerd speaks of man being created as a unity or totality by God this must have reference to man before both temporal bodily generation and spiritual supra-temporal generation have begun. In this way the unity of man is more original or basic than the duality in man, and for this reason also Dooyeweerd cannot be thought to be dualistic.

The creative acts of God are the origin of both created eternity and cosmic time and therefore neither can be applied to the character of God's creative acts. The two contrasts, especially as they relate to the mutual generations of heart and body of the individual man, are strictly correlated and therefore in this respect, neither contrast is primary.

This is not all that can be said at this point. Dooyeweerd speaks of the "voltooide scheppingswerk" in which "de tijdelijke orde met het gehele wordingsproces dat zich daarbinnen zou voltrekken was ongetwijfeld in de schepping begrepen, maar slechts als creatuurlijke resultaat,"¹⁷ but in a footnote on the same page he tries to guard against viewing the creative calling into existence through God's Word as an ideal pre-existence of the created in God's Spirit.¹⁸ One is driven because of this and other statements by Dooyeweerd to wonder about the

17. Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie," p. 116.

18. Ibid., p. 116, footnote.

character of this finished creation which is the totality of all created things. As a finished or completed totality of created reality it must be thought to exist as the result of God's creative acts. But this existence can neither be characterized, on the one hand, as an ideal pre-existence of the creation in God's Spirit, nor, on the other hand, can its existence fail to be sharply distinguished from the temporal becoming of this created totality. There are some reasons for designating the character of the existence of the total created reality from which all temporal becoming proceeds as supra-temporal. This would seem to place a primacy of some sort on the supra-temporal higher contrast in distinction to the strictly correlated character of created eternity and time as they are related to man. The further working out of this problem will be postponed so that the rest of the general synopsis may be presented.

The strict correlation of the supra-temporal heart and temporal body in which the duality of contrasts come to clear expression must be seen to be the result of their original root unity found in God's creative work from which the contrasts proceed. It would seem that Dooyeweerd's emphasis on strict correlation gives a continual reminder to this original root unity. The stress on correlation does imply that there has been bifurcation and, to some extent, separation which then is overcome through correlation. Correlation would seem to imply two correlata. The duality is always kept in strict correlation for otherwise man would fall apart into central heart and temporal functions. Dooyeweerd lays great stress on the correlation of the supra-temporal heart and the temporal body. His whole idea of cosmic intuition, the act structure, theoretical analysis and synthesis as related to religious

supra-temporal self-reflection, rooted in the heart and root of consciousness, the selfhood, constantly shows the importance of never being able to separate these two contrasts and strongly attests to their strict correlation.

Dooyeweerd has stressed the fact that cosmic time cannot be understood except in strict correlation to created eternity.¹⁹ When Dooyeweerd made this statement he was referring to more than the individual human heart in correlation with its temporal body. Rather, created eternity has reference to that which is central, unified, and fully in contrast to what becomes in time according to the order of time. The root of the cosmos, first in our head Adam and later in Christ, according to his human nature, subjected to the central unity of law, is regarded as supra-temporal. The created and fallen human race participates in their hearts in the fallen supra-temporal root of the created cosmos. The created and fallen human race is the central religious supra-temporal root community. The individual selfhood, as supra-temporal, participates in this root community of mankind, the hearts of which participate in their covenant head Adam. The new re-created and reborn humanity is a supra-temporal root community of hearts participating in the new root of the re-created cosmos, Jesus Christ according to his human nature, subject to the central law of love. In this sense all that is central, unified, religious, concentrated, and undifferentiated partakes of

19. In a small sectional meeting of the W.d.W. on March 21, 1954, in Amersfoort, M. C. Smit brought up the question of time and eternity in respect to history. Dooyeweerd stressed at this point that cosmic time must always be thought of in strict correlation to created eternity and that his notion of time could not be understood without this correlation. Re the a priori relation of the temporal to the supra-temporal in general, see Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 31, footnote.

character of created eternity which is, of course, in strict correlation to the temporal becoming of this root community in its manifold forms, temporal manifestations, and revelations.^{20 21}

This root community, however, is in its created eternal character, very dynamic. As we have seen, Dooyeweerd speaks of a spiritual supra-temporal generation of man's heart. It is impossible to conceive of what a supra-temporal spiritual generation would involve since this whole higher contrast must be thought to possess the nature of created eternity and is not directly subject to the cosmic earthly temporal order. In this sense the hearts of men are beyond law if law is seen to be the temporal law spheres and typical structural laws which govern temporal functions and temporal individual things and events. Man in his heart is subject to the law as central in distinction from the diversity of laws which apply to the diversity of his temporal functions. In this sense the primal contrast runs through both the law and subject sides since the unity of the law side and the root unity on the subject side are created but supra-temporal while the diversity of laws and diversity on the subject side are temporal. Not only must created eter-

20. Dooyeweerd uses the term openbaren when referring to the fact that the supra-temporal expresses itself in the temporal. The fullness of meaning, the totality of meaning reveals itself in rich temporal diversity. It manifests itself, expresses itself, but generally he uses the term "reveals." This is a rather strange use of the idea of revelation. One would normally think of the counsel of God revealing itself in the creation and history of the world, but this is not what Dooyeweerd has in mind. It is the created fullness and totality which is revealed.

21. This use of the idea of created eternity in which more is obviously in mind than the eternal character of the heart of the individual man presents some problems. How this broader use of created eternity is related to the totality of created reality as the result of God's creative acts from which the cosmic becoming process proceeds is not always clear. It would seem that this totality including the heart is to be regarded as being in a status of created eternity. This will be dealt with in greater detail later.

nity or the supra-temporal which is the higher contrast be thought of as being dynamic, since a spiritual generation takes place, but being central it is called the central realm of occurrence.²² Here Dooyeweerd definitely sets off his idea of supra-temporality from any static view of supra-temporality. For this reason Dooyeweerd cannot be thought to be a dualist in the line of Xenophanes, for instance.²³ Vollenhoven, in speaking against Dooyeweerd's view of the self, is recorded as saying, "Tijd en verandering zijn correlaat: raakt heel de mens. Pas op voor het dualisme in de zin van: transcendentie is onveranderlijk en niet-transcendentie is veranderlijk-tijd."²⁴ But this view of transcendent and non-transcendent, which was characteristic of the purely cosmological dualist, Xenophanes, cannot be applied to Dooyeweerd. As we have seen, Dooyeweerd stresses the dynamic character of the supra-temporal or created eternity and even speaks of a spiritual supra-temporal generation which could hardly be done if he conceived of the transcendent horizon as unchangeable like Xenophanes. As to what this dynamic character is, however, Dooyeweerd in line with his critical transcendental thinking will not say, precisely because it transcends our temporal horizon which is the boundary for theoretical thought.²⁵ Dooyeweerd's thinking in these respects can only be viewed as a monism with higher and lower con-

22. Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, I, pp. 32-33.

23. Vollenhoven, *Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte*, I, pp. 59-66; Popma, *Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie* (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1963), pp. 11-88; Popma, "De eeuwigheid Gods volgens Boethius," *Phil. Ref.*, XXII (1957), pp. 35-51.

24. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," p.

25. Dooyeweerd, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 32-33. Here he rejects the phrase "central trans-cosmic time" as applying to the supra-temporal in general because it would not be serviceable to cover both realms. It is said in line with the question of criterion for the use of terms. To apply this phrase to the supra-temporal would leave one "entirely in the dark."

trasts which are always kept in strict correlation since they proceed from the creation work of God "in the beginning."

One last consideration before the theme of priority is taken up is the relation of the heavenly created to the earthly temporal cosmos and to created eternity. We can formulate the question somewhat like this: is created eternity, which Dooyeweerd emphatically insists must be seen in strict correlation to cosmic time, to be identified with the heaven of the angels and departed saints? Dooyeweerd distinguishes clearly our earthly temporal cosmos from the heavenly created as it has relation to the angelic world.²⁶ It would seem from a host of different considerations, which will be presented in greater detail later, that Dooyeweerd thinks of created eternity and heaven as very closely related, and it would appear that in places they are even identical, although he does not speculate much concerning this. From other statements it would appear that he distinguishes somewhat between created eternity and heaven as eternity. In general, however, we can say that created eternity and heaven, being the place of departed saints and angels as well as the ascended Christ, are related closely enough to be considered as making up the higher contrast of his monistic position.

B. Theme of Priority:

Central for understanding the vision of Dooyeweerd as a whole is the presence of the theme of priority. My judgment about the character of Dooyeweerd's concentration point, its transcendence above time, and the nature of supra-temporality (*boventijdlijkhed*) in its many applications is pulled together and confirmed when the complex of problems summarized by the term "supra-temporality" is viewed in the light of the

26. *Ibid.*, II, p. 53, footnote.

theme of priority. The defenders of Dooyeweerd on this point have emphasized the unity in Dooyeweerd's view of man, in particular that of heart and temporal body, and religion and its functional and typical expressions. It is particularly when the fact is emphasized that the heart of man is not in cosmic time, but exists above time, and that this is one of Dooyeweerd's central ideas, that defenders of his system come to his defense. It is in answer to these defenders that the theme of priority is of supreme importance.

As was briefly mentioned before, it is unique to the theme of priority as it is found in many monists, e.g., St. Augustine's third period, that influence is always exercised on the lower contrast by the higher contrast and not by the lower on the higher. The lower is directed by the higher. Particularly in those who hold to the impetus theory among these advocates of the priority theme, movement is started in the lower only after an impetus from the higher contrast, as opposed to those defenders of the priority doctrine without impetus in which movement is present in the lower but steered by the higher as a rider steers a moving horse.²⁷

It seems to be the case that in Dooyeweerd direction, influence, and movement are always exercised by the higher contrast in general, the supra-temporal upon the lower contrast, that is, all which transpire within the cosmic earthly temporal horizon rather than in the reverse direction from the lower upon the higher contrast. This state of affairs which will be seen immediately following from different angles seems to

27. See footnote 5 of this chapter for more about the priority doctrine.

explain why Dooyeweerd speaks of the heart of man as transcendent,²⁸ of religion as transcendent,²⁹ and of the supra-temporal body of Christ as transcendent.³⁰ This word "transcendent," as used by Dooyeweerd, carries with it the implication that the heart, the concentration point, is permanently above time, and can never be regarded as in time. It means consequently that transcendence is not to be considered the result of an activity in which the heart of man is thought to move from within time to above time, but rather the term "transcendence" is a description of the permanent status or position of the heart and the concentration point because of its nature as transcendent, i.e., above cosmic time. This means that Dooyeweerd can often speak of the heart as residing in a central transcendent sphere, i.e., religion; of the heart as participating in a transcendent supra-temporal religious community, the body of Christ; and, because of this transcendent position the heart is provided with a still more all-embracing horizon, i.e., the transcendent religious horizon of created reality, rather than only the earthly temporal transcendental horizon.

This theme of priority comes to rather clear expression in two terms used frequently by Dooyeweerd. These terms are "expression" or "revelation" (openbaring) or "breaking" and "concentration." Dooyeweerd uses the term "expression" when referring, for example, to the fact that all man's temporal functions are expressions of the transcendent unity of

28. I was once challenged to show that Dooyeweerd applied the term "transcendent" to the supra-temporal. There are numerous places in which this term is used. In respect to the heart see Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," Phil. Ref., V (1940), pp. 179, 197, 209, 222.
29. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, pp. 552, 562-564, 570, 572, 578, 596, 598.
30. Ibid., III, pp. 214-215, 537.

man, the heart.³¹ The heart on the subject side is the unity, totality, and fullness of all man's temporal functional life and all these functions must be thought to come from this heart. They must be said to come from the heart because the heart is the individual root unity of those functions in which all the functions are present in an undifferentiated way. That these temporal functions can be said to be present in the heart as undifferentiated and therefore indistinguishable, is clear from his idea of cosmic time as a prism. This prism concept has the signification of refracting into rich diversity that which before the refraction was an undifferentiated unity or fullness, e.g., light. This clearly applies to the heart of man and there is no sense to the analogy if one does not think of the functions as proceeding from the transcendent heart of man in some sense.

It would seem that Dooyeweerd can speak of the heart as the whole man before God, because all the functions are present in the heart before their refraction.³² This comes to light in what he says concerning the creation of man. "De schepping omvat m.a.w. de totale mens in zijn centrale afhankelijkheid van God, als beelddrager van zijn goddelijke Oorsprong; de forming en het ontvangen van de levensadem is de uitwerking van Gods scheppend woord in het tijdelijke wordingsproces,

31. Dooyeweerd, "Individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch substantiebegrip," *Phil. Ref.*, IX (1944), p. 33. Here he says, "Het is dan de integrale tijdelijke uitdrukkingsvorm van den geest des menschen die zich uit geen der modale aspecten van den tijdshorizon laat uitsluiten. Zoals het zonlicht door het prisma gebroken wordt in de zeven kleurengamma van het lichtspectrum, zoo breekt zich de geestelijke wortel-eenheid van 's menschen existentie door den tijdshorizon in de rijke verscheidenheid van modale aspecten en individualiteits-structuren van het lichamelijk bestaan."

32. Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, III, p. 88.

overeenkomstig de ordeningen en structuren door God in de orde des tijd gesteld."³³

Although Dooyeweerd nowhere in this whole section explicitly speaks of the heart as the whole man before God it seems that from the context one is almost forced to conclude that this is the case. Whether it is here the case is particularly important in this context since he is clearly speaking of creation as distinguished from becoming and of cosmic temporal becoming as proceeding from the completed creation work of God. Man as a totality is created and stands before God. If a case can be made that man as created totality before temporal becoming is the whole man in his heart then we have a clear picture of how functions have come forth from the heart, even genetically, and also a clear example of what Dooyeweerd means by refraction. This is an essential point, because many of his students have focused on the heart's concentration of its functions upon itself, or concentration, and neglected to see the equally important notion that temporal reality depends on the supra-temporal and is the expression in time of the higher supra-temporal contrast.

This interpretation is brought out by what Dooyeweerd says of the bodily forming process. He says,

Onder invloed van het dualistisch vorm-materieel motief van de griekse wijsbegeerte was hier de centraal-religieuze zin van het bijbels scheppingsmotief uit het oog verloren. Want hoe kon de mens binnen de tijdelijke orde tot een "levende ziel" worden, wanneer God niet in den beginne zijn scheppend woord gesproken had, dat het gehele mensdom in zijn totaliteit, gerepresenteerd in zijn stamvader en stammoeder, tot aan zijn riep, een aanzijn dat zich eerst in

33. Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie," p. 116.

het wordingsproces binnen de tijdsorde zou uitwerken? Of meent men dat de voltooiing van de schepping van de mens slechts op twee menselijke individuen zou slaan en dat hun nakomelingen niet in het voltooide scheppingswerk van God begrepen waren? Maar ook de eerste mensen, die binnen de tijdelijke wereld op aarde verschenen, waren onderworpen aan het lichaamelijk formeringsproces, waarvan Gen. 2:7 spreekt, en waarin zij tot "levende ziel" werden, doordat God hun de "levensadem inblies." Formering nu, hoezeer ook uitwerking van Gods scheppend woord, is zelve geen schepping, maar vormgeving aan een reeds eerder in de tijdelijke orde aanwezig materiaal, dat ook zelve eerst door het goddelijk scheppingswoord tot aanzijn kwam, evenals de "levensadem."³⁴

Certain things can be said on the basis of this quotation. The temporal bodily forming process follows upon the finished creation of mankind. As we have seen, this creation embraces the "totale mens in zijn centrale afhankelijkheid van God, als beelddrager van zijn goddelijk Oorsprong." The becoming process is a becoming of what is created totality, i.e., nothing becomes temporally which was not first created. This comes out clearly when Dooyeweerd stresses that the creative work of God embraced not only the first two individuals but mankind in his totality. Although in this context Dooyeweerd nowhere says explicitly that the hearts of all men represented in their ancestors Adam and Eve (stamvader en stammoeder) were created and then became in the temporal process according to the order of time, this seems to be what is implied. He speaks of a temporal bodily forming process which would clearly seem to distinguish what is dealt with in Genesis 2:7 from the hearts of men. In many other places, especially when Dooyeweerd speaks of the heart of man as concentration of all functions, the heart is looked at as the whole man with all the functions undifferentiated because they are concentrated. That Dooyeweerd views this created man-

kind as totality, as really existing before its subjection to the temporal becoming process, comes out clearly from what Dooyeweerd says in a footnote in this context. He says, "also werd de mens tot een levende ziel. Deze uitspraak spreekt duidelijk van een wording van de mens tot een tijdelijk levend wezen. Deze wording van de mens tot een levend wezen onderstelt dat de mens reeds geschapen was. De mens stond reeds voor God door het Woord dat hem tot aanzijn riep."³⁵ This becoming of man to a living being presupposes that man already was created and gives clear indication that becoming follows creation. The temporal becoming embraces a bodily forming process and "body" for Dooyeweerd indicates an enkaptic whole of all man's temporal functions which are expressions, refractions of a root, undifferentiated unity and fullness. The body, the functiemantel, finds its concentration point in the heart. That it is the heart as the not yet temporally refracted and differentiated totality which Dooyeweerd has in mind as created by God in the beginning, seems to come out, in this context. In speaking of the fact that the revelation concerning the creation cannot be identified with the creation itself he says,

Die openbaring richt zich primair tot het menselijk hart, het religieuze centrum van ons bestaan, waarin God "de eeuw" gelegd heeft, en waarin door de werking van Zijn Geest alles wat in de tijd geschiedt in centrale relatie tot Hem wordt gevatt. Maar zij gaat als openbaring ook in de tijdsdimension van onze ervaring in, om de mens binnen de tijdsorde in het geloof aan te spreken. Binnen de tijdsorde nu spreekt de Woord-openbaring over God zelf vaak in termen van de tijd, maar dit wil niet zeggen dat God en zijn scheppingsdaden in die tijd zouden zijn besloten.³⁶

Two things appear from this quotation. First, he is talking about

35. Ibid., p. 115, footnote.

36. Ibid., pp. 116-117.

the heart as the religious center and is also viewing this center in its strategic importance as the point to which God primarily directs the revelation of his creation. Second, it appears that this religious center cannot be regarded as being in the time horizon or subject, as religious center, to the time order. If this were not true, revelation concerning the creation would not also have to go into the temporal horizon to speak to man in faith nor would it need to be addressed to the temporal faith function of man. The higher-lower contrast comes forth clearly here when one notices that revelation concerning the creation is addressed to man in his religious center, in which God has laid eternity, and to man in his temporal faith function within the time horizon and under the time order.

In this same quotation we notice that revelation has two sides corresponding to the higher and lower contrasts in man. This point will be dealt with later when we treat the Incarnation and the concentration point.

Dooyeweerd's way of speaking about the heart and the image of God seem to point up the fact that when he says, "De schepping omvat m.a.w. de totale mens in zijn centrale onhankelijkheid van God, als beelddrager van zijn goddelijke Oorsprong," he is referring to the heart of man viewed as the whole man. In another article Dooyeweerd refers to the image of God in man as "het centrale zetel van het beeld Gods." He says,

Slechts in de ontsluiting van ons hart voor Gods Woord-
openbaring worden wij aan ons zelf ontdekt en onthult
zich de ware wortel-eenheid van onze existentie, die,
als de centrale zetel van het beeld Gods, de tijd in
zijn kosmische zin-verscheidenheid transcendeert, omdat,
naar de scheppingsorde al het tijdelijke in haar op de
eeuwigheid in haar bijbelse (niet Griekse) zin diende
te worden geconcentreerd. In de afvallige richting
van het menselijk hart is dit beeld Gods geheel ver-
duisterd, maar in Christus Jezus is het ons in zijn

ware zinvolheid geopenbaard. En slechts in en uit Hem
leren wij in de gemeenschap van de H. Geest verstaan, in
welke zin wij in het centrum onzer existentie de tijd te
boven gaan, ofschoon wij tegelijk binnen de tijd besloten
zijn.³⁷

In this same article he speaks about the image of God in man and about the heart. "Niet uit ons lichaam, maar uit het hart onzer existentie komt de zonde voort en niet ons lichaam, maar ons hart moet wedergeboren worden. In bijbelse zin is het menselijk lichaam de 'tempel' van Gods Geest, maar niet het centrum en de radix van onze naar Gods beeld geschapen menselijkheid."³⁸ In these two quotations we see the way Dooyeweerd views the image of God in man and the heart. In one place it even appears that the image is identified with the heart, in other places only as the central seat of the image, giving the impression that the image is more than the heart.

To sum up the case, it appears that Dooyeweerd is saying that the human race as a totality represented in Adam and Eve (stamvader en stammoeder) was created by God in the beginning. All that will unfold and be subject to the temporal process of becoming is present here as finished creation. There would seem to be a root community of hearts represented in the heart of the first representative root, Adam. Since the heart appears to be the image of God for Dooyeweerd, God is represented as creating the total man in his central dependence on God as image bearer and with all men as image bearers in Adam. Since Dooyeweerd can speak of the heart as the whole man, the whole human race can be said to be created. This created human race unfolds and becomes in rich diver-

37. Dooyeweerd, "Van Peursem's critische vragen," Phil. Ref., XXV (1960), p. 103.

38. Ibid., p. 133.


sity according to the temporal order.³⁹ The whole man becomes both body and heart since both are subject to generation, the body to a temporal generation and the heart or soul to a supra-temporal generation process. From the created whole man, that is, the heart, the whole man becomes. The temporal body functions comprehended and undifferentiated in the created heart now unfold in their rich diversity in the temporal becoming process. On the other hand, all the individual hearts of men created in their first representative become by a supra-temporal generation. In this way we see that all reality as it exists now is the expression or openbaring of its prior existence as created undifferentiated totality. Dooyeweerd intimates that reality as it exists through temporal becoming and supra-temporal generation had a pre-existence. He tries to set his idea of reality's pre-existence as finished creation apart from an ideal pre-existence of the created in the Spirit of God. He says, "Men hoede er zich daarom voor op speculatieve wijze het scheppend tot aanzijn roepen door Gods Woord als een ideele van het geschapene in Gods Geest te vatten. Ook dit is een ondeugdelijke poging van het menselijk denken om tot de verborgenheid van Gods scheppingswerk door te dringen."⁴⁰ Here Dooyeweerd warns one against viewing the creation work of God in the beginning as a temporal event on the one hand and as an ideal pre-existence of the creation in God's Spirit on the other hand. The existence of the created is not an ideal pre-existence in the Spirit of God; it exists as created, as

39. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, III, p. 88ff. For the idea of the breaking of the spiritual root unity into rich diversity of modal aspects and individuality structures of bodily existence see "Individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch substantiebegrip," p. 33

40. Dooyeweerd, "Schelling en evolutie," p. 116, footnote.

the finished creation. It is this finished existing creation that now becomes in the great becoming process. Here, then, we see the monistic origin of both generation processes on the one hand, and also, since it is the heart or root which is created and therefore becomes, we see how the priority is given to the higher contrast. The lower temporal becoming is directed from the higher but it also is a becoming of the created in its pre-existent root unity and totality. The lower contrast does not influence the higher but is the developed expression of it.

It can be diagrammed something like this:



The theme of priority appears most clearly in Dooyeweerd's idea of concentration. In line with the theme of priority, concentration is always concentration from the lower towards the higher, as this lower is directed, guided, or concentrated to the higher. This theme comes out in many facets of Dooyeweerd's thought. For example, his whole transcendental critique depends on his idea of the transcendent starting point being beyond the temporal horizon.⁴¹ The dependence of the transcenden-

41. Theoretical thought cannot overcome the anti-thetical relation set up in the analytical gegenstand relation unless it is directed above itself to a transcendent supra-temporal concentration point. The

tal critique on this supra-temporal transcendent starting point means that intermodal synthesis can be accomplished. Because the center of consciousness is supra-temporal, transcendent, not in time, synthesis can be completed. Immanence thinking is forced, on the other hand, to

point to see is that the concentration is the point from which the concentric direction is initiated and given to theoretical thought and that it is helpless without the higher. Dooyeweerd says, "Nowhere, hence not in the logical aspect either, does cosmic time in itself offer a concentration point that could serve as a point of departure for philosophic thought. In time meaning is broken into an incalculable diversity, which can come to a radical unity only in the religious centre of human existence. For this is the only sphere of our consciousness in which we can transcend time." A New Critique, I, p. 31. On the same page in a footnote he states this even stronger. "Even the idolatrous absolutizing of the temporal cannot be explained from the temporal horizon of human existence. For the latter nowhere provides a point of contact for an idea of the absolute, unless it be related *a priori* to the supra-temporal. This act of concentration presupposes a supra-temporal starting point in our consciousness." See also Dooyeweerd, Verkenningen in de Wijsbegeerte, (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1962), pp. 31-46; also "Het dilemma voor het Christelijk wijsgeerig denken," Phil. Ref., I (1936), pp. 7-14. In "Del Vecchio's Idealistic Philosophy of Law," Phil. Ref., XXII (1957), p. 15, Dooyeweerd says, "This endeavour to synthesize the antagonistic motives of nature and freedom was uncritical of theoretical thought. For a theoretical synthesis presupposes a starting point in human consciousness which transcends the antithetical basic relation of the theoretic attitude of thinking. This starting point is only to be discovered in the transcendental way of concentrating our theoretic act of thinking on the I. But this concentric direction of theoretic thought is not to be explained from the intrinsic structure of the latter which, on the contrary, binds it to the divergence of the antithetically opposed modal aspect of our experiential horizon. It can only originate from the religious basic motive which rules the I-ness as the religious concentration point of human existence." It appears from these quotations and countless others that theoretical thought cannot initiate the concentric direction. The lower is moved by the higher, and this means that theoretical thought is helpless without the ego in the higher, in fact it is the ego that thinks and thinking without its relation to its center and transcendent drawing-together-point (*betrekkingspunt*, point of connection) is an abstraction. The act of thought is an expression of the ego in the temporal horizon which the ego initiates and self-reflection in the concentric direction is the return movement of the thinking ego to itself which is also only initiated by the transcendent ego. The whole transcendental critique depends on this theory of priority.

complete the synthesis by taking one of the poles in the intentional-antithetical gegenstand relation. This antithetical relation of theoretical thought is set up in theoretical analysis. Theoretical analysis must move by its inner nature to theoretical synthesis. But the antithetical relation is caused by the intentional opposing of the logical function to the nonlogical function of our real act of thought. This intentional opposition, set up through analysis, cannot be overcome by taking either side of the opposed aspects. A point must be found above the diversity of the functions opposed to one another. The condition of functional diversity is precisely cosmic time as breaking or refraction law. Therefore the point of synthesis must be beyond cosmic time. It is the transcendent center of consciousness in its I-ness or selfhood that proves to be the hidden player behind the scenes. It completes the act of synthesis by directing the functions to itself or by concentrating them in itself. In this way, through concentrating or directing the opposed diversity to itself as concentration point above the diversity, the diversity is seen in its deeper unity and intermodal synthesis is accomplished.⁴² Ultimately, all functions are functions of the selfhood and analysis is initiated by the transcendent self and is overcome in synthesis by re-direction back to selfhood. The selfhood as transcendent to the lower pulls or draws the lower to itself. The lower is thereby given concentric direction since the higher is defined as a focus point, concentration point, betrekkingspunt, etc.

All of the lower is directed by the higher contrast. The com-

42. Dooyeweerd's distinction of the concentric and divergent directions of consciousness is of great importance because it lends support to this analysis of the presence of priority. This will be dealt with in a later section.

hensive character of this direction of the higher contrast by the lower comes out clearly in Dooyeweerd's answer to a question from Van Peursen. He says,

Maar als hij zijn bedoeling nader tracht te verduidelijken door de toevoeging, dat de eeuwigheid meer moet worden gezien als "vanuit de tijd intensief op God gericht zijn," dan heeft bij blijkbaar niet bedacht, dat Gods "eeuwig zijn" in geen geval in de religieuze relatie van de mens tot zijn Schepper is te vatten. Anderzijds kan de tijd zelf niet "religieus gekwalificeerd" zijn, omdat "kwalificatie" juist een immanente tijdelijke bepaling is. Maar de tijd is naar zijn immanente zin-dynamiek wel "religieus gericht," d.w.z. intrinsiek betrokken op het religieuze concentratiepunt der menselijke existentie. Want slechts de mens staat in de centrale religieuze relatie tot God.⁴³

It is apparent that Dooyeweerd holds that time in its immanent meaning-dynamics does not direct itself; it is directed. The use of the passive is very characteristic of Dooyeweerd, e.g., the lower is moved, is directed, is concentrated. This is possible because the lower is intrinsically related to the transcendent supra-temporal center in the higher contrast.

To say that time in its immanent meaning-dynamics is religiously directed implies and sums up many facets of Dooyeweerd's thinking. For example, the whole historical opening process is led and directed by the heart through its temporal faith function. The opening process is one that is directed from above in the transcendent religious sphere of human existence. Another example is the important stress which Dooyeweerd gives to the transcendental direction of time. The transcendental direction is the anticipatory or concentric direction of all temporal reality to the transcendent (in the higher contrast) concentration point in which the individual human heart participates. Temporal

43. Dooyeweerd, "Van Peursen's critisch vragen," p. 140.

reality is meaning and this signifies that it points to the transcendent root unity and from the root unity to the 'αρχή' of all meaning. It points to the unity because it is directed to the unity by the root unity. Temporal reality is meaning because it is pulled from above towards a unifying point. Temporal reality without reference to this unifying transcendent root unity is incalculable diversity. It proceeds from created totality and becomes rich modal and typical individual diversity and is pulled back to its root unity from above by this root unity and 'αρχή' from which it has proceeded.

Just as all temporal societal structures are expressions of a supra-temporal religious root community, so they are all directed by this supra-temporal root or religious community, the body of Christ. The being directed by is always accomplished by being directed to. Only in this way is reality religious, that is, concentric, unified, and meaning-(full). Without this concentric direction of the lower by the higher contrast through the transcendent supra-temporal concentration point, the lower temporal reality cannot be related to God. Without this directedness toward God by the transcendent root it tends to fall into meaninglessness, into nothingness, although God's grace keeps this from happening since in Christ he maintains the created order.

This theme of priority also comes out clearly in Dooyeweerd's idea of idolatry. The selfhood turns from its true Creator-directed worship toward worship of the temporal. The selfhood is above the temporal because it directs the temporal toward itself, but the selfhood does not stand in itself, it is ex-sistent, it must concentrate itself on an origin. But having turned from its true Origin the apostate selfhood turns to the lower, relative, earthly, temporal, and created and seeks

to find rest in the temporal diversity by absolutizing some aspect or facet of it. This whole process of apostasy depends on the fact that the lower is directed by the higher contrast to its Origin so that this structural process continues to be present even in apostasy, although now the directions are changed. The higher, the transcendent selfhood, directs its immanent functioning towards itself, and then from this higher point of relation it turns toward the lower and absolutizes it, instead of directing the lower beyond itself to its Origin. This process can only be redirected by a pulling from the true Origin. The concentration of the heart upon its lower temporal idol can only be overcome by its being redirected from the still higher Divine Origin which pulls it away from its temporal allegiance of absolutization of the lower.

In summary, we have seen in a few important ways how the theme of priority works in Dooyeweerd's system. All of these will be dealt with in detail at a later point. One consideration is necessary at this time, however. The terms "transcending" and "concentrating" cannot be thought as if the heart in the temporal transcends or moves from the lower temporal to the higher temporal. Concentrating or transcending is an act of the selfhood which is always transcendent, that is, above time. The temporal transcends by being directed by the supra-temporal, by being pulled above itself, by being drawn like a magnet towards one point. This transcendent position of the selfhood and the concentration point is caused or is possible because it exists in a central relation to the Divine eternal Origin. This Divine Origin draws the concentration point out of itself, that is, from resting in itself; towards its final resting point, the *αρχή* which alone stands in itself. Temporal di-

versity is drawn and directed to and by a supra-temporal root unity which is again drawn to and by a supra-temporal root unity which is again drawn to and by the Divine Origin. The apostate selfhood loses its actual transcendence when it directs itself from its transcendent sphere of existence toward a pretended Origin in the non-transcendent, i.e., the immanent temporal. This absolutization and consequent loss of actual transcendence cannot be explained unless the selfhood is located in a transcendent position, unless it has a supra-temporal sphere of existence, a supra-temporal structural central relation to the Divine *αρχή* beyond the creation.

To summarize thus far, we have seen that movement in the lower in all cases is due to initiation from the higher contrast. It is at the impetus or initiation from the higher that the lower temporal points beyond itself and receives concentric direction. It is only when temporal reality is directed and moved from above that it is meaningful, because it does not stand in itself and it has no root unity.⁴⁴ This is the theory of priority.

As was said at the beginning of this section, Dooyeweerd seems to use an ontology type which was described as being cosmogono-cosmological, monistic, employing the theme of priority and being, therefore, semi-contradictory. Vollenhoven has shown that this theme of priority is only

⁴⁴. In *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetenschapen*, II (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1935), p. 27, Dooyeweerd says, "... zo kan de vraag: wat is zin? Niet worden beantwoord zonder ons te be-zinnen op den corpsprong en eenheid van allen tijdelijkken zin. Geen enkele tijdelijke zin-structuur bestaat 'an-sich'. Dat wat haar eerst tot zin maakt ligt boven de tijdsgrond in de zin-volheid van onzen kosmos. Zin is 'ex origine' de samentrakking van alle tijdelijke zijden van het bestaan in één bovenlijdelijk brandpunt en dit brandpunt is, gelijk wij vroeger zagen, de religieuze wortel der schepping, die slechts zin en daarmee aan zijn heeft krachtens Goddelijke, souverein scheppende zin-geving."

found in positions which are semi-contradictory.⁴⁵

C. The Semi-Contradictory Feature:

The semi-contradictory feature of the ontology type in Dooyeweerd's thinking is of course modified by the presence of the Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation, but it seems that there are still clear traces of this theme at various places in his thinking.

Dooyeweerd, in describing created reality's mode of being as zin or meaning, does not hesitate to speak of the effects of sin upon created reality in such terms as meaninglessness, a tendency towards nothingness, dispersion (verstrooidheid), etc. To be added to this is his use of the notion of sin as a privation of meaning.⁴⁶ Although he seeks to guard himself from a speculative use of this idea, he nevertheless feels quite justified in using it. This is quite strange since this notion has grown up and is part of the Greek theo-ontological tradition and has generally been rejected by Reformed thinkers. Now, as has been said before, Dooyeweerd lays great stress on the fact that in Christ nothing of the created reality is lost and that God holds the created law order intact through the fall and in spite of the sin of man. In discussing the effect of sin on the positivization process, as that process is influenced by apostate man, Dooyeweerd is seeking to do justice particularly to the effect of the religious misdirection of

45. See footnote 5 of this chapter.

46. Dooyeweerd, "The Secularization of Science," (tr. by R. D. Knudsen) International Reformed Bulletin, IX (July 1966), p. 5. "That is also why human existence, in its religious center, is subject to a law of religious concentration, which has not been abrogated by the fall. All the power of the devil is based on this law of concentration in human existence, because without this law idolatry would be impossible. Sin is a privation, a lie, a nothingness; but the power of sin is something positive, which is dependent on the created goodness of reality." Also, A New Critique, II, pp. 32-36.

apostasy on the historical forming and positivizing work of man. This is a deep point in Dooyeweerd's thinking and the use of the notion of privatio in this context is to a certain extent understandable.⁴⁷ The unique place of positivization in Dooyeweerd's thought and the influence of apostasy on this process might justify some resuscitation of the old pagan notion of evil as privatio.

We have seen that the theme of priority is apparent in the fact that the direction and influence between the two contrasting realms are always exercised by the higher on the lower. The traces of semi-contradictory emphases come out most clearly in the way Dooyeweerd pictures idolatry.

There are two forces operative on the sinful heart of man. Dooyeweerd likes to speak of the rich diversity of the modal functional aspects as tempting the apostate man, who, because of the in-created existent character of the selfhood with its concentric tendency, must restlessly find a ground. The universality in its own sphere of all the temporal functional aspects allow illusory full scope to the absolutizing, continuity desiring, and restless character of the apostate supra-temporal selfhood. In apostasy the selfhood is drawn toward the rich diversity of temporal reality. In the end, any absolutization of a sphere of temporal reality, because of its universality in its own sphere in which a cross section of the whole temporal cosmos is ex-

47. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, p. 33. "Is sinful reality still meaning? Is it not meaningless, or rather the adversary of meaning, since meaning can only exist in the religious dependence on its Origin? Here we indeed touch the deepest problem of Christian philosophy. The latter cannot hope to solve it without the illumination of Divine Revelation if it wants to be guaranteed from falling back into the attitude of immanence-philosophy." See also pp. 330-337, 362-365 in this same volume.

pressed, proves to be only one among many possible absolutizations. Apostate man is confronted with an "embarrassment of riches," by the many possibilities for "isness" and by the diverse aspects which all lend themselves to similar absolutization. Cosmic time relativizes all the modal functional aspects by directing them to their fullness of meaning in the transcendent supra-temporal consummation and fullness of meaning.⁴⁸ Each functional aspect is in the last analysis only a relatively sovereign refraction of a transcendent supra-temporal fullness of meaning, lost sight of in apostasy. Apostasy is described as a loss of the true concentric direction towards the true Origin. The redirection is a pulling of the selfhood by the divine drawing (*trekere*) away from the temporal diversity upon which it has concentrated its attention, with which it is bedazzled, to which it has directed itself, and in which it is seeking to find rest. The Word of God is described as a central driving power (*drijfkracht*). *Kracht*, a duurzaam, a power. It is also, however, a pulling or lifting power, for it pulls the selfhood away from its temporal absolutizations. It pulls and attracts the selfhood toward its true Origin so that the true concentric direction of the self upon its true Origin can be regained. This is a Divine redirection in which the unity of direction of the selfhood is restored. The dispersion (*verstredelheid*) of the selfhood in which the selfhood is broken and lost in the diversity of functions and lost in the incalculable *z'welvoo* of cosmic temporal individuality is overcome. The selfhood can go in two directions, either from the supra-temporal or transcendent religious sphere toward the temporal diversity in the temporal horizon or toward its eternal resting point in its true Origin. The rightly

directed selfhood directs its functions by pulling them in self-reflection toward itself as their transcendent unity. The concentric direction of meaning is centered in the selfhood which must direct its temporal functions, as well as all of created reality by its transcendental boundary (*grenz*) function, faith, toward itself as the root unity of the cosmos and thence to the Origin of the cosmos. The transcendental anticipatory direction of the cosmic time and the pointing character of cosmic temporal meaning in a concentric direction above time to the root unity and Origin, is a structural state of affairs which is held in effect despite the fall of man by the transcendent Origin in the higher. This explains the concentration on and absolutization of the temporal by the selfhood in apostasy. This also figures strongly in the leading of the opening process by the apostate faith. Nevertheless, the meaning character of created reality is made so dependent upon the direction of all temporal reality by the selfhood, which is transcendent to it, that when apostasy occurs in the root, mis-leading and even meaninglessness arises. Dooyeweerd insists that this loss of meaning even influences the law side in the process of positivization.

The integral radical character of the selfhood as the image of the integral radical Origin⁴⁹ is seen in the similar way in which both concentrate and direct. The selfhood in the concentration point concentrates or pulls toward itself its diverse functions in which it is involved through its cosmic intuition. It pulls and directs as a magnet all its temporal expressions toward itself and it is directed and pulled out

48. Ibid., II, pp. 3-4, 489-490, 540-541, 560-561.

49. For interesting usage of these important terms see Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning (Zutphen: J. B. Van den Brink, 1963), pp. 28-42.

of itself toward its Origin. It directs the lower temporal toward it-self by being pulled or drawn by the Divine Origin. It is concentrated by being drawn by the power of the Divine drawing (trahere). By this power from the Origin it gives concentric direction and meaning unity to the restless temporal diversity which has lost its fullness of meaning by having been refracted through the prism of cosmic time. The temporal is restless because it no longer has unity, fullness, and a ground, and it continues to be such until it returns in the transcendental anticipatory direction toward the unity and fullness of meaning from whence it was refracted. This is all gained by its being drawn and directed from above by the concentration point. It does not find its fullness without its being directed by the root unity of the cosmos towards the $\Delta\rho\chi\eta'$ or Origin which is a pre-condition for the temporal meaning aspects finding their unity and rest. The temporal meaning dynamics "get stuck"⁵⁰ in the last aspect of the cosmos, the faith aspect, if the selfhood in the transcendent realm has lost its direction toward the $\Delta\rho\chi\eta'$. The temporal meaning dynamics cannot be fulfilled and reach rest if the root is broken and is directed towards the temporal meaning itself. The meaning dynamics is turned back on itself, but it, by its created structure, does not stand in itself but points and shows its dependence precisely by its being drawn by the Origin toward himself.

Dooyeweerd stresses the fact that sin is a transgression of God's law but also stresses the fact that sin is loss of meaning, a privation.

Another way in which Dooyeweerd pictures man's apostasy indicates

50. For the use of this expression see A New Critique, II, p. 189.

the semi-contradictory tendency in his thought. To be completely in the temporal horizon is to be enstatically dissolved in the incalculable diversity of time.⁵¹ The animal world is closed up in time and man's uniqueness is particularly shown by the fact that the human act-structure is an individuality structure which has no qualifying or typical function, not even the faith function.⁵²

The fact that man has no typical qualifying function expresses for Dooyeweerd the fact that man has an eternal destination and no temporal destination like the animals. Therefore, to have one's selfhood in time would automatically mean loss of transcendence above the animals and also brokenness. To place the selfhood under cosmic time as an eternally or everlasting ordinance, as will be shown later must be done, is simply impossible for Dooyeweerd.⁵³ This would immediately imply from Dooyeweerd's point of view that there can be no intermodal synthesis, no time-consciousness, and no unity, because there is no root unity within the temporal diversity but only above the diversity. Time is something that must be transcended if unity is to be gained. There seems to be

51. Ibid., I, pp. 33-34.

52. See the note by Dooyeweerd where he mentions that the view that the body of man was once defended by him as being qualified by the faith aspect, but that he has definitely thrown this view over. Inleiding tot de Encyclopaedie der Rechtswetenschap (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, n.d.), p. 114, footnote 1.

53. In another context Dooyeweerd also stresses this fact. He says, "Maar naar onze beschouwing, de Christelijke opvatting der persoonlijkheid, kan evenmin het 'individueele ik' in den tijd worden gezocht en daarmede nemen wij principieel tegen de 'geesteswetenschappelijke sociologie' positie, die zulks met de geheele immanentie-philosophie juist wel doet. De individueele zelfheid is door en door religieus, bovenlijdelijk. In de kosmische tijdsorde kan noch aan den individueelen mensch, noch aan het verband zelfheid, ikheid toekomen. Dit is het cardinale uitgangspunt voor iedere wezenlijk Christelijke beschouwing der tijdelijke samenleving." De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: W. Ten Have, 1931), p. 113.

involved in the notion of cosmic time as a breaking law, a depreciation of time. Popma has shown this tendency in many forms. It might even be implied in the figure of the prism which Dooyeweerd loves to employ.⁵⁴ Despite the fact that Dooyeweerd says it is only an image and should not be fought over,⁵⁵ it figures too centrally in Dooyeweerd's thought to be replaced. He calls cosmic time a brekingswet (refraction law) and the nuclear moments a brekingspunten (points of refraction). All his systematics on cosmic time presuppose the figure of the prism and there is no image that could be conceived of that could replace this. The moment this image is changed many features of Dooyeweerd's system do not fit well.⁵⁶ The image seems to be more than just an image in Dooyeweerd's thinking.

For man to be completely temporal, that is, to have both heart and functions in time, is not only inconceivable for Dooyeweerd, but it would mean that man would have lost his eternal destination, would be condemned to restlessness and would not be any different than the animals.

Therefore Dooyeweerd pictures apostasy as a verstrooidheid,⁵⁷ as a

54. In "Disqualificatie van den tijd," Corr. bladen, XVII (1954), pp. 24-25, Popma speaks of the Greek background of this idea. "Men zou de vraag kunnen stellen of deze brekingsides niet enigermate door de antieke wijsbegeerte is beïnvloed; en ook of de wijsbegeerte der wetsides in haar brekingsgedachte wel geheel aan een disqualificatie van de tijd kan ontkomen." See also "De loochening van den tijd," pp. 26-28; "Geloof en geschiedenis," pp. 28-31; "Tijd en geschiedenis," pp. 12-16. All of these articles are in this same issue of Corr. bladen.

55. Dooyeweerd, "Van Peursen's critische vragen," p. 139

56. See the interesting article of van Riessen where he uses the figure of the circular staircase. "Systematiek - de werkelijkheid in den toren," Corr. bladen, VI (1941), pp. 81-82.

57. Dooyeweerd, op. cit., p. 103. "Binnen de kosmische tijdshorizon vindt de menselijke existentie geen wezenlijk concentratiepunt, maar blijft ze verstrooid in de verscheidenheid van modale aspecten en typische individualiteitsstructuren."

loss of unity, as a loss of time consciousness, as being restless, driven to and fro by the dynamics of temporal meaning, and as being lost in the time horizon.

To be completely in time, it seems, cannot be seen as meaning loss or loss of unity or time-consciousness, simply because the root unity or the concentration point found in the new human race in Christ, the second Adam, the new man under the central law of love, can be given in time. The totality and unity of the created can never be conceived of as given in cosmic time for Dooyeweerd. This brings with it a depreciation of the everlasting holding character of cosmic time as created ordinance, for the future on the new earth. Still more, it drives him to seek transcendence in an eternal central sphere of created meaning in which the root unity and the consummation of meaning can be achieved. He is forced to view the created cosmos as a correlation of created eternity and the temporal. This implies two orders and means that some of the created is not temporal, a notion which we shall see is a typical feature of nature-grace thinking. There is a semi-contradictory pull on the selfhood, toward the temporal in which it is involved and in which it participates in its temporal expressions and temporal function mantle or body, and toward the eternity of God above the created. This tension of two directions is overcome by the Divine trahere or pulling power of the Word of God as dunamis from above. In the reborn human race there continues to be this tension between concentration and direction toward the temporal, which must constantly be overcome by Divine grace which in general is expressed as the concentration on the eternal Origin.⁵⁸

58. The precise nature of this tension will be dealt with in a later

Doooyeweerd can talk about sevum as the state which must be constantly actualized, because without this actualization in which the selfhood is turned from concentration on the temporal, the selfhood falls away into meaning loss and even meaninglessness. Therefore, there is the necessity for continual Divine grace and reliance on the redirecting central power of God's Word and upon the temporal Scriptures by the faith function. The faith function is the "window to eternity." Without this window, temporal reality is closed off from its $\alpha\rho\gamma'$, root unity, and tends toward meaninglessness. The central importance of this "window to eternity" is not limited to God's eternity, but also to the created eternity in which the root unity of the cosmos is located, and through which all the temporal is directed to God from this one point in the higher, by God and by man. Created eternity is a structural, but not static, condition or state or status of the selfhood, but it must be continually directed to its $\alpha\rho\gamma'$ and must concentrate itself on its Origin. It does this concentrating necessarily because it is structurally made to do this by the religious concentration law which is not lost in apostasy. The actualization, however, only happens when the selfhood is directed and directs itself away

section. In discussing the three relations in which the ego must be conceived if it is not to resolve itself into nothing, Doooyeweerd says, "The first relation, namely, that of the human ego to the temporal order of the world, in which we are placed, cannot lead us to real self-knowledge, so long as it is viewed in itself alone. The temporal order of human life in the world, with its diverse aspects, can only turn away our view from the real center of human existence, so long as we seek to know ourselves from it." In the Twilight of Western Thought (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publ. Co., 1960), p. 182. Here we see somewhat this tension since the ego is bound to time, enters time enstatically via its intuition in order to know its body as its own, is consistently concerned with time because it concentrates the temporal on its self and directs the temporal to itself, yet he says that the temporal order of aspects can only turn away our view from the real center of human existence, so long as we seek to know ourselves from it.

from the temporal, by directing its temporal diversity toward itself.

One could almost say that as the selfhood directs the temporal to itself, it is simultaneously directed by its Origin. Not to be concentrated on one of the temporal aspects is to be concentrated on the $\alpha\rho\gamma'$. The importance of seeing the distinction between structure and direction; i.e., religiously being in a right or wrong direction; i.e., toward or against God, which is emphasized by Vollenhoven, is somewhat confused in Doooyeweerd. It might be said that structure tends to be reduced to direction. Meaning-fulfillment is transcendence of the temporal and is a loss of temporal diversity (in the sense that diversity is no longer distinguishable) in the unity above time, the converging center of direction toward the $\alpha\rho\gamma'$ of all the temporal meaning dynamics in its restlessness. Structure is transcendentally-directed meaning. Meaninglessness, nothing, and meaning loss tend to occur when this direction is lost. The structure is almost its pointing character. The abiding significance of the cosmic creational ordinances, their holding for the future after the judgment on the new earth, is lost sight of.

This tendency to reduce structure to direction which is found in Doooyeweerd's idea of meaning, despite the great importance of this idea of meaning for cutting off all substantialization of created meaning, is an expression of the semi-contradictory theme in his thinking. When the direction to the $\alpha\rho\gamma'$ is lost, the structure tends to privation of meaning. Even despite the grace in Christ there is some privation of meaning.

As was said before in discussing nature-grace, there is a verticalization of the eschaton. The tendency to reduce structure to direction is caused, in the last analysis, because of a scholastic view of cre-

ated eternity. The future horizontal linear character of cosmic time is blocked. The endless character of cosmic time and the everlasting or eternal validity and holding character of the creational ordinances beyond the judgment day is not reckoned with. Re-creation expresses centrally God's faithfulness forever to his original creational ordinances. If there is the implicit idea that eternity begins at the judgment day, the idea of the structural constancy of all creation ordinances including the idea of cosmic time with its "forever" or everlasting character is lost. Structure comes to an end. For Dooyeweerd all that is earthly is governed by cosmic time and all aspects are aspects of time and are intrinsically temporal. All individual temporal unities are temporal. Thus when one does not think of time as endless and of the re-creation as the fulfillment and maintenance of creation ordinances on the new earth, then, on Dooyeweerd's own basis, there is bound to be a total lack of treatment of the problem or a complete ignorance about the future after the judgment because eternity must be a whole new structural order, everything of this earth being intrinsically temporal. On the basis of Dooyeweerd's own position concerning the temporal character of earthly reality and the general importance of cosmic time it would seem natural to insist on the continuity of cosmic time after the judgment day. It is necessary to so insist on this if the created is to continue to exist in anything like its present structuration. It is precisely Dooyeweerd's lack of emphasis on this fact and Popma's correspondingly great emphasis on the importance of this point of the everlasting character of the created ordinances, which show the nature-grace influence which restricts the reformational direction of the ground-motive of Scripture concerning the kingdom of God and the consummation

in Dooyeweerd.

Because the future constancy of the structure of temporal created reality after the judgment day is blocked by a second wetsidee or order idea, that of eternity in nature-grace fashion, the consummation and eschaton is forced in a vertical direction. The verticalization, as the tendency to reduce structure to direction, is caused because there is no future for the present created structure after the judgment day for Dooyeweerd. In a discussion with Dooyeweerd,⁵⁹ I once asked him whether he thought that the fact that Paul speaks of faith abiding in I Cor. 13 after the judgment day, had any bearing on whether the function of faith would abide after the judgment. Dooyeweerd gave an interesting reply. First he said, "Faith turns into sight and therefore faith passes away." When I mentioned the fact that Paul emphasizes that faith abides, he stressed the fact that we know really nothing about the future after the judgment. When I then asked how it would be possible to conceive of a resurrected man without all the functions and the law spheres holding, he seemed to reconsider his previous statement and agree that I was laying my finger on an important point. The general fact that Dooyeweerd has not laid emphasis on the constancy of ordinances for the future is simply not understood unless one sees that he uncritically has taken over and works more or less implicitly with a traditional scholastic view of heaven as eternity, the eternity of God as present, and also the idea that time ceases. It was probably in the interest of avoiding theologism and speculative metaphysics in his own thinking that Dooyeweerd failed to see the all important influence which the speculations in nature-grace on these points exercise on the think-

59. At his home in Amsterdam, June, 1964.

ing of Christendom. It is also probably because in all of these areas we know so little and because there has been so much speculation concerning God's eternity, heaven as the place of departed saints and Christ now, and also concerning the future after the judgment day, that Dooyeweerd thought he could best deal with these areas by not dealing with them. But this is an important type of oversight. The Bible sets itself over against all manner of speculation on these points, against views which were struggling to gain power over the lives of the early Christians. The Stoic, the Hellenistic-Judaistic, and the Sadducean views of God's eternity, heaven, and the future, are polemicized against by the New Testament authors. Popma brings this out very clearly.⁶⁰ It is in accordance with the ground-motive of Word-revelation that we must be directed properly in our thinking concerning these issues and that we must continue to see the reformational Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation as pointing us away from all mythical notions of heaven, God's eternity, and the future. That we should seek to set off the true position from the false positions on these points is one of the chief tasks of Christian philosophy, just as it is one of its chief tasks to be led by the Biblical motive concerning the creation and to set itself off from false mythical views of the beginning of the world. Because, then, the future is blocked and there is no idea of the future for the structure, the structure is given significance and meaning only when it points beyond itself to the created supra-

60. Popma, "Burgerschap," *Phil. Ref.*, VII (1942), pp. 98-122.

temporal⁶¹ and to the Origin. It cannot be denied that created reality shows its dependence on God and in this sense does not stand in itself. The fact that the world was created shows its dependence on God as its Origin. Meaning, as dependence on its Origin is one thing, but dependence on created eternity for fullness, root unity, and the consummation of meaning is another. The eschaton, the unity, the consummation, all these are fulfilled in the central sphere of occurrence or the transcendent religious horizon, which is supra-temporal, beyond time. Beyond time signifies not only God in his exalted eternity above the created cosmos, but also the created central realm or the transcendent horizon of created eternity. The idea of meaning as dependence has a great deal of significance because God is the great goal of the creation. But the kingdom is fully come only when God dwells with his people on the new earth forever as the Mediator, whom the peacemakers will see face to face because they will see the face of his Son, Jesus, in his glorified flesh, whom to see is to see the Father. The consummation, the glory of God and the kingdom are according to the ground-motive of Word-revelation, fully realized when God comes to the earth in judgment and comes to dwell on the earth, making heaven on the earth because

61. Dooyeweerd, *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetenschap*, II, p. 27. "... zo kan de vraag: wat is zin? niet worden beantwoord zonder ons te bezinnen op den oorsprong en eenheid van allen tijdelijken zin. Geen enkele tijdelijke zin-structuur bestaat 'an-sich'. Dat wat haar eerst tot zin maakt ligt boven de tijdgrens in de zin-velheid van onzen kosmos. Zin is 'ex origine' de samentrekking van alle tijdelijke zijden van het bestaan in een bovenlijdelijk brandpunt en dit brandpunt is, gelijk wij vroeger zagen, de religieuze wortel der schepping, die slechts zin en daarmede aanzijn heeft krachtens Geddelijke, souverein scheppende zin-geving." This article which we have quoted before, stresses the importance of the new earth but also deals with the place of heaven and traces in Hellenism and Judaism the views current in respect to heaven and earth, time and eternity, and how there is a conscious polemic in authors of the N.T. to avoid the speculative currents.

of his abiding presence. It can never be verticalized into a seeing of God, in which faith will no longer be necessary, having turned into sight in some vertical heavenly eternity in which time and temporal created functions no longer apply; rather, it is consummated in the faithful seeing and believing of the resurrected mankind as it listens to and obeys the word of Jesus which is spirit and life and which is fulfilled in eternal life on the new earth.

D. Cosmogono - Cosmological:

Another problem in which Vollenhoven sees ancient pagan thought addressing itself to is the place of the myth. The myth was a substitute for Word-revelation and one's relation to it in paganism was all determinative for the structure of one's thinking.

Vollenhoven distinguishes three basic answers to this question which were all found before Socrates. These are theogono-cosmogono, cosmogono-cosmological, and purely cosmological or purely structural thinkers. The theogono-cosmogono thinkers are also called mythologizing thinkers by Vollenhoven.⁶² They had views of the origin of the gods as well as of the origin and genesis of the cosmos.⁶³ These views were couched in myths which were pagan substitutes for divine Word-revelation concerning the creation and genesis. These mythologizing thinkers

62. See footnotes 4 and 15 of this chapter.

63. For the importance of myth in its relation to theogony and cosmogony see Popma, "Myth en wijsbegeerte," Phil. Ref., XXIX (1964), pp. 68-102; Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie, pp. 1-75, 91-151; Nadenken over de Tijd (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1965), pp. 238-260; Levensbeschouwing, VII (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1965), p. 388 (this index, under "myth" and "mythologie," gives a general survey of Popma's thoughts on myths contained in his 7 volumes); "Threskeia," Corr. bladen, XXIII (1959), pp. 1-4; "Mythe," Corr. bladen, XVII (1953), pp. 9-10; "De nabijheid Gods," Corr. bladen, XXIV (1960), pp. 1-5. See also, Mircea Eliade, Das Heilige und das Profane (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1957); Patterns in Comparative Religion (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1958).

were especially represented in six types of Orphic theologies.

In reaction to these mythologizing thinkers and to myths of popular religion were the purely cosmological thinkers and cosmogono-cosmological thinkers. The harshest reaction and repudiation of myth was found in the purely structural thinkers. Not only did they reject the myth but also de-emphasized any idea of genesis or development of the gods or the cosmos. Rather, they emphasize the structural constancy and eternity of the present structure and for them development or unfolding was denied or made insignificant for understanding the structure of the cosmos. This thinking is often present in empiricistic thinkers and quite often among the natural scientists who seem to have no eye for the history of their specialty and the history of theorizing.⁶⁴ This type of thinking is also current in the present linguistic analytical movement with its de-emphasis on the history of philosophy and its emphasis on metaphysical problems regardless of their development.

Cosmogono-cosmological thinkers were also against the myth but tried, in contrast to purely cosmological thinkers, to do justice to the genesis historical evolving character of the cosmos. They did not concern themselves with the gods. For these thinkers structure can best be seen in its historical unfolding from simple to complex in its genesis. In this connection it is interesting that all evolutionists are cosmogono-cosmological thinkers (according to Vollenhoven).⁶⁵

64. See Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 7-98.

65. Vollenhoven, "Hoofdtrekken der wijsgerige problematiek in de hedendaagse mens-beschouwing," (Amsterdam: mimeo, n.d.) p. 7; "Cursus 1959-1960, onderdeel III, wisselwerkingstheorie," (Amsterdam: mimeo, 1960) p. 1; "College systematiek- het probleem van de tijd," pp. 6-8, 13-14.

Dooyeweerd certainly could not be called a theogonic, cosmogonic thinker since he stands firmly on the Scriptures and repudiates mythologizing thinkers. For him speculation about God is totally out of bounds. There might be a touch of mythologizing in his view of the supra-temporal but he always stresses that his view of aevum is taught throughout the whole of Scriptures. Nor does Dooyeweerd elaborate upon supra-temporality in any detail as one finds in mythologizing thinkers who try to account for life in terms of elaborately fantasized tales.

Nor could Dooyeweerd be called a purely structural thinker. Although Dooyeweerd has a distinct predilection for eternity in which there is rest, harmony, and unity,⁶⁶ he has this because he emphasizes unfolding, development, differentiation, and time. Dooyeweerd has always been concerned with doing justice to the insights of historicism and evolutionism. Over against rationalism he has stressed the insights of Von Savigny and the German historical school. Dooyeweerd has been concerned with historicism from the beginning and this emphasis and involvement must certainly be seen as providing at least a partial motivation for his emphasis on the supra-temporal character of the heart and the concentration point and also his general desire to transcend the temporal horizon.

This emphasis is also seen in Dooyeweerd's idea of differentiation. Kuyper, before Dooyeweerd, loved to speak of created reality as an organism which developed from seeds which contained the whole in potency and in an undifferentiated state. In his early years Dooyeweerd used this

66. This point is very important and will be dealt with later in survey fashion in which the data in which the predilection comes to the fore will be reviewed.

Kuyperian terminology much more than in the present. He exercised critique on Kuyper for his German-idealistic organological thinking.⁶⁷ Nevertheless one can see in Dooyeweerd much of the same terminology. The terms "undifferentiated" and "differentiated," "inner" as opposed to "outer," "inner development," his stress on "potentiality," and phrases like "unfolding process," "the great cosmic temporal becoming," all show that Dooyeweerd is not a purely cosmological thinker. To be added to this is his use of the term "refraction" or "splitting" in which as light, the totality of meaning is broken into a rich diversity of temporal structures. It must always be kept in mind that time also is a principle of cosmic temporal coherence as well as a principle for diversity and of the refraction of meaning. Refraction never is a fracturing in the sense of making things completely separate. What develops in time is in a cosmic temporal coherence and the modal aspects can have their existence by being interwoven and realized in temporal relative unities or individual things, acts, and events. What is refracted in diversity is immediately positioned relatively in a cosmic temporal coherence of meaning in which nothing can be regarded as totally separate, unrelated to anything else, but rather it is interwoven in a network of relations of dependency, the whole of which is dependent on a transcendent root unity and origin of meaning. This comes very strikingly to the fore in his third volume of A New Critique, especially in his ground-breaking idea of enkapsis. It is also evident in his idea of individuality structures as a whole and especially in his stress on the integral character of naive experience. So much does

67. Dooyeweerd, "Kuyper's wetenschapsleer," Phil. Ref., IV (1939), pp. 193-232.

Dooyeweerd emphasize the coherence and development of created temporal reality that the importance of the idea that cosmic time is the principle of diversity and a law of refraction has often gone unnoticed although it plays a key role in his thinking. For this reason Dooyeweerd can talk about temporal unities, totalities, wholes, and their factual duration according to the time order, but these are always relative unities, totalities, and wholes because they are temporal refractions of the fullness of meaning and therefore in need of root unity and fullness above time. All these considerations show quite clearly that Dooyeweerd puts a great deal of emphasis on history, development, unfolding, differentiation, all of which are necessary for understanding and seeing the structural law side of reality which is always realized in changing, factual, and concrete things and events. He is definitely not purely structural or cosmological. These considerations only generally place or type Dooyeweerd, but there are also a few other things which tend to show traces of cosmogonic-cosmological thinking in Dooyeweerd.

Earlier we saw that Dooyeweerd stresses that the higher contrast, the supra-temporal or eternity in its created sense, is to be seen as dynamic rather than static.⁶⁸ It is thought of as the central realm of occurrence in distinction from the historical aspect and the temporal manifestation of occurrence. We also noticed earlier that he speaks of a spiritual (*geestelike*) supra-temporal generation of hearts in contrast to temporal bodily generation and becoming. There is consequently genesis in both contrasts, the higher and lower. A problem

68. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. 32-33.

seems to arise here in that this characteristic of the dynamic, which involved occurrence and generation, would appear to conflict with the characteristics of unity, fullness, totality, and undifferentiation also ascribed to this realm of the supra-temporal. This difference between the dynamic and static or eternal character in the traditional sense of the supra-temporal will be accounted for later.

Generation in the higher contrast has been emphasized to show that the cosmogonic emphasis in Dooyeweerd affects the whole created universe in its temporal and eternal sides. This brings us to the most important consideration. It relates to the temporal diversity of the law side of the cosmos. Dooyeweerd stresses the intrinsic temporal character of the law side of the cosmos both in its modal and typical laws. Both modal and typical immediately imply diversity and Dooyeweerd regards the unity of law as strictly supra-temporal and not temporal while the diversity of law is strictly temporal. This temporal character of the diversity of law does not mean that it is not constant. Constancy can be temporal and this constancy which is ascribed to the law side is the *apriori* structural framework for all changing factual things and events on the subject side which is always individualized and subject to duration. This comes out rather clearly when Dooyeweerd says,

We must further observe, that all the basic structures which we shall discover in temporal reality in the course of our inquiry, the modal structures of the various aspects as well as the typical totality-structures of individuality, are grounded in the order of cosmic time. They are all specific structures of time and as such necessarily related to the factual duration of transitory beings, events, processes, acts, social relationships and so on.

The entire empirical reality in its overrich diversity of structures is enclosed and determined by universal cosmic time. In each of its modal aspects, the latter expresses itself in a specific modality of meaning with respect to temporal order as well as duration.

But its cosmic character discloses itself precisely in

the indissoluble inter-modal coherence of meaning into which it fits the modal structure.

This order discloses its temporal character, namely, in the empirical opening-process of the modal aspects of reality. In this process, anticipatory structural moments come to be developed; and these moments disclose their inner coherence of meaning with the modal aspects that are later in order. The complex of anticipatory structural moments is, for example, lacking in the as yet closed structure of the logical aspect as we discover it in the pre-theoretical attitude of thought. Anticipatory structural moments find expression within this aspect only in the theoretical attitude of thought. Only in the latter is disclosed the inner connection with the historical, linguistic, economic and later aspects. Thus, to give another instance, in a closed primitive juridical order, the anticipating connection with morality, as expressed in the principles of equity, good faith, good morals, punishment according to guilt, etc., is absent.

The opening-process, intended here, has temporal duration and comes out according to the inter-modal temporal order of the aspects.⁶⁹

Another indication of this is found in the following quotation.

All these modal aspects are interwoven with one another in a cosmic order of time which guarantees their coherence of meaning. As we shall see below, time order is necessarily related to factual time-duration. And only this indissoluble correlation of order and duration can be called cosmic time, in distinction from all its special modal aspects.⁷⁰

Still another time Dooyeweerd discusses this.

We have said in an earlier context, that all structures of temporal reality are structures of cosmic time, and as structural law they are founded in cosmic time-order and are principles of temporal potentiality or possibility. In their realization in individual things or events they have time-duration and actuality as transitory, factual structures.⁷¹

In Vollenhoven's lecture on time this feature of Dooyeweerd is brought to attention. Vollenhoven insists, in contrast to Dooy-

weerd, that the central religious law as well as structural law is both temporal and supra-temporal in distinction from the positive law which is temporal only. It is supra-temporal because it relates directly to God and temporal because it relates to that which is subjected to and correlated with it.⁷² Dooyeweerd denies that modal and typical laws are supra-temporal and that the central religious law is temporal. The idea of time for Dooyeweerd is the presupposition for diversity of law and not the reverse. Time itself is a law for the diversification of law. Time is therefore called a boundary and this boundary is distinguished from the boundary character of the central law of love. This is the boundary between Creator and creature, but time as a boundary does not affect the created center of man since the heart is transcendent to this boundary. There are two boundaries in Dooyeweerd which again give indication of what we mentioned before, that there are two law orders indicative of a nature-grace influence. Law in its temporal diversity is therefore subject to this cosmogono-cosmological process of becoming in a way which could not be said of Vollenhoven, for instance. This problem will be taken up in more detail later but this general section gives some indication of a rather unique view of law and its entwinement with time and genesis.

E. The Universal and Individual:

Another important facet of the typology is how Dooyeweerd addresses himself to the problem of the relation of the universal and individual in the cosmos. This is central in Dooyeweerd and so complicated that it will only be mentioned at this time in order to note its importance.

72. Vollenhoven, "College systematisch - het probleem van de tijd," p. 14.

69. *Ibid.*, I, p. 29.

70. *Ibid.*, I, p. 24.

71. *Ibid.*, I, p. 105. See also "Van Peursen's critische vragen," p. 113, footnote. He says, "Ik heb nergens gezegd, dat de wetten boven de werkelijkheid verheven zijn. Onze ervaringswereld bestaat slechts in de correlatie van haar wets- en subjectsszijde, m.a.w. de wetszijde behoort tot de empirische werkelijkheid."

For example, the fact that time is the principle of cosmic diversity and that totality, fullness, and root unity can never be given within cosmic time (and are therefore supra-temporal and transcendent) are all-controlling ideas which lie at the basis of the whole system. A question arises as to what precisely is the difference between a principle of individuation which Dooyeweerd disclaims because it is always involved in false problematics, and the notion or idea of time as a law for cosmic diversity. Dooyeweerd's stress on a root unity above and never in time bears on this question. This question is tied to time as a prism, the idea of created eternity, the idea of the transcendent horizon, and many other considerations. Not until clarity is gained on this point can there be any reconstruction of Dooyeweerd or penetration into his transcendental critical thinking. Therefore it is not possible at this time to classify him as either a universalistic individualistic, or a partial universalistic.

F. Neo-Realism:

Earlier it was suggested that Dooyeweerd seems to manifest a neo-realistic tone to his thinking concerning the problem of the place of the law in the cosmos.⁷³ One of the characteristics of realism is that the law for the cosmos is placed in a world behind the temporal world. Dooyeweerd's stress on created eternity and supra-temporality as a central sphere of occurrence, the fact that Dooyeweerd found that the term

73. For clarification of the term "neo-realism" see Vollenhoven, "Cursus 1959-1960, onderdeel III, wisselwerkingstheorie," pp. 3-4, where this term is defined. To my knowledge this is the only place in Vollenhoven's work where this is found. For background relating directly to neo-realism see "Addenda: Gesch. anthropologie colleges, 1962-1963," (Amsterdam: mimeo, 1963) pp. 2-5. See also footnotes 4 and 65 of this chapter.

"central, transtemporal," could not apply to this realm or sphere, indicated somewhat that there is the character of another world beyond this temporal world. Dooyeweerd speaks of it frequently as the "transcendent horizon," or "the life beyond or above." It is only as our starting point is found in this sphere or realm in which there is totality, fullness, and root unity that one can see a true notion of time.⁷⁴ Unless one participates in the totality of meaning which is only given in this realm, temporal diversity cannot be known,⁷⁵ and no content can be given to the transcendental ground-idea and idealism cannot be avoided.⁷⁶ There is some stress at least on the greater reality of the transcendent realm in contrast to partiality, relativity, diversity, and manifestations in the temporal.

The realist position was discovered by Vollenhoven by the fact that it stressed both subject and object and it was both governed by law, in opposition to subjectivism and objectivism. It also was discovered by Vollenhoven that realists have an emphasis on both the universal and individual sides of the cosmos in the temporal cosmos which is then distinguished from a notion of the universal in the higher world. In other words, there are two kinds of universals.⁷⁷ Dooyeweerd seems to fit this feature of realism since he lays due emphasis on individuality and universality in the temporal earthly cosmos. But as was noted before, he thinks of the unity of the law as only supra-temporal. Added to this is his stress on the fact that totality, fullness, and root unity

74. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. 8, 11-12, 15-21.

75. Ibid., I, pp. 8, 56, II, pp. 53-54.

76. Ibid., I, p. 88.

77. Dooyeweerd, Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte (Franeker: T. Wever, 1949), pp. 252-304.

are only given and existent as supra-temporal and eternal, and that the oversight of the earthly cosmos can only be gained by participation in this central sphere. It was also noted before that there is a pre-existence of all of the finished creation by virtue of God's creative acts which are the presupposita for all temporal manifestation and becoming. The idea that all man exist as created before they become in temporal existence is very reminiscent of Plato's Phaedo, although in Dooyeweerd it is obviously modified by his Christian ground-motive. This idea of participation in a transcendent starting point, as well as transcendence above the temporal, is the only way to meaning and understanding of the earthly temporal and without this transcendence, real understanding is impossible. It seems obvious that Plato thought that this was an intelligible world accessible only to the intellect through scientific theoria. Dooyeweerd regards this central realm of supra-temporality and of occurrence as a religious realm or world.⁷⁸ Participation in this realm is a religious participation and is not achieved by theoretical thought. If this is a form of realism, which appears quite possible, it certainly is a "Christianized" realism. The concentration point is only given in its unity, fullness, and totality in this central supra-temporal realm.⁷⁹ Christ, the new root of the reborn human race, must be participated in, and life comes from our rootage in him. All that is given here is one, radical, and integral. In this realm there is one headship, one sin, one law.⁸⁰ This claim demands substantiation, but from all that has been said in this

78. The term "world" would probably be objected to by Dooyeweerd, but he leaves all kinds of room for confusion on this point.

79. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. 1-5, 106.

80. Ibid., I, pp. 60, 102.

section on the ontology type in Dooyeweerd this classification of some form of realism seems to fit quite well. It also explains why the question of the universal and individual is so complex and hard to fix, as well as the problem of the place of the law.

It has been designated as neo-realistic because it is obviously a realism modified by the Christian ground-motive. Dooyeweerd sets himself off quite clearly from a neo-Platonic, neo-realistic position in dealing with ideas in the Divine mind.⁸¹ He will not have any part of a doctrine of apriori eternal ideas or a lex eterna à la Aquinas and the patristic and scholastic fathers. But the created eternal side of the created cosmos takes on many of the features of realism. The term "neo-realism" is a looser designation for different kinds of Christian synthesis with the realism of Plato and the early Aristotle.

G. Dooyeweerd and Augustine:

Augustine is classified by Vollenhoven as middle Platonic, neo-realistic, monist, cosmogono-cosmological thinker, with the doctrine of priority, semi-contradictory, macro-microcosm theme, impetus theory, and instrumentalist. It is possible to see the importance of the order and law idea as a ground hypothesis running through all of Augustine's work.⁸² It is especially the theory of priority that reminds one of Dooyeweerd's construction of the heart as influencing but not influenced by the lower contrast. Dooyeweerd's stress on the eternal and changeless, and the need for transcending change in the heart are very

81. Ibid., III, p. 559.

82. Zuidema, "De orde-idee in Augustinus' dialoog de ordine, twee wereld- en," Phil. Ref., XXVII (1963). Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 42-46, 66-76, 106; "Opstanding en anthropologie," Corr. bladen, XXXII (1968), pp. 1-5. The importance of the law idea was also brought to my attention by H. E. Runner in his address on the Encyclopedie of the Social Sciences at Trinity Christian College, Jan. 2-3, 1969.

close to Augustine. Dooyeweerd's ideas on the will and the struggle for the right direction of the will was a feature which he recognized to be very important in his early estimate of Augustine.⁸³ The supra-temporal as the central realm of occurrence out of which issues the struggle between the city of earth (*civitas terrena*) and the city of God (*civitas Dei*) and his general estimate of Augustine's book, *The City of God*, for a Christian philosophy of history show Dooyeweerd's dependence on Augustine.

The restless character of meaning and especially temporal meaning are re-echoed by Dooyeweerd. Augustine's famous sentence about the restlessness of the heart in Book I of the *Confessions* is often quoted by Dooyeweerd to show the meaning character of created reality as well as the religious concentration law and transcendental direction of meaning. When Dooyeweerd quotes this statement from Augustine he feels he is carrying forth the true spirit of Augustine's reformational insights. Zuidema puts more emphasis on the neo-Platonic (which should probably be changed to middle Platonic) character of this statement from Book I of the *Confessions*.⁸⁴

To be added to these similarities is the notion of sin as a privation of meaning which Augustine held central in his thinking, and Dooyeweerd's high estimate of Augustine's idea of creation as a creation "in the beginning" as distinguished from temporal becoming. However, this high

83. Dooyeweerd, "In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde," *Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde*, I (1925), pp. 19-25, 71-72, 77-79, 112, 114; for the primacy of the will in Augustine as specifically Christian, see p. 171.

84. Zuidema, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

estimation does not go without some criticism from Dooyeweerd.⁸⁵ Diemer in his book *Natuur en Wonder*, in developing the idea of creation in W.d.W. fashion, speaks of the creation "in the beginning" as a creation in the Word.⁸⁶ This formulation bears close resemblance to Augustine who identified the phrase 'εν ἀρχῃ' with Christ, the Word of God. Dooyeweerd nowhere disapproves of Diemer's construction, rather, he heartily recommends it. If pressed on this construction of Diemer's, Dooyeweerd might renege because he does hold himself off from any notion of an ideal pre-existence of the created in God's spirit. With Diemer's Christianized, Augustinian idea of creation, Dooyeweerd might very well have no quarrel. If this is true, it unlocks the mystery of Dooyeweerd's and Diemer's rather unique distinction between creation and becoming. Dooyeweerd's emphasis on unity and harmony in the eternal cannot be explained without a clear dependence on Augustine.

Noting these similarities and others one can see why William Young has characterized Dooyeweerd as a neo-Augustinian.⁸⁷

85. Dooyeweerd, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip," *Phil. Ref.*, VIII (1943), p. 87; IX (1944), p. 37, footnote; X (1945), pp. 39-48. Also, "De verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie en de strijd der faculteiten, II," *Phil. Ref.*, XXXII (1958), p. 68.

86. J. H. Diemer, *Natuur en Wonder* (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1963), p. 13. There is a clear neo-realism in Diemer and an evident speculative view of God's eternity as an eternal present. There are some similarities between Diemer and Dooyeweerd on the idea of eternity and supra-temporality, although it must be said that Dooyeweerd is not as speculative, therefore, something like Diemer's views on these points must underlie Dooyeweerd's view of supra-temporality. See Diemer's treatment of Augustine, pp. 109-117; his positive estimate of Augustine's idea that God created all things at once in the beginning - a view he seems to share with Dooyeweerd, pp. 112-113, 115-116; p. 164 has Dooyeweerd's evaluation of *Natuur en Wonder*.

87. William Young, *Toward a Reformed Philosophy* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), p. 86.

It is well known that Augustine's idea of time and eternity formed the matrix for much scholastic speculation on these points. Augustine's idea of God's eternity as an eternal present, heaven as eternal, and the idea of time ceasing at the judgment day are all at least implicitly present. On all these points there is a great deal of similarity, and anyone who has read Dooyeweerd knows his fondness for quoting Augustine's famous statement about the mysterious nature of time. All these factors make it clear that Dooyeweerd employs a similar ontology as Augustine and can be said to be in Augustine's line.

This still leaves the questions of the presence of the impetus theory and instrumentalism in Dooyeweerd to be considered as well as the more general question into which Zeitgeist Dooyeweerd is to be placed.

H. Instrumentalism and Impetus Theory:

If one starts from what seems to be clearest, that is, instrumentalism, one is working then with the hypothesis that there is also a doctrine of impetus present, since exponents of instrumentalism are always exponents of impetus theory. There seems to be fairly good evidence for saying that Dooyeweerd fits into this classification. Dooyeweerd says

Even on the immanence standpoint the choice of the Archimedean point proves to be impossible as a purely theoretical act which prejudices nothing in a religious sense. In truth the selfhood as the religious root of existence is the hidden performer on the instrument of philosophic thought. Only, it is invisible on the basis of the immanence-standpoint. [Underlining mine]

Actually, philosophic thought in itself offers us no Archimedean point, for it can function only in the cosmic coherence of the different modal aspects of meaning, which it nowhere transcends.

The immanent Ideas of the inter-modal coherence of meaning and of the totality of meaning are transcendental limiting concepts. They disclose the fact, that theoretical thought is not self-sufficient in the proper field of philosophy, a point to which we shall return.

No other possibility for transcending the inter-modal coherence and the modal diversity of meaning is to be

found, except in the religious root of existence, from which philosophic thought also has to receive its central direction.⁸⁸

Here the instrument idea comes quite clearly to the fore. The selfhood as the religious root is the hidden player on the instrument of philosophic thought. The higher uses the lower as its tool or instrument,⁸⁹ and on the other hand, philosophic thought is quite impossible without this transcendent starting point. The priority idea also comes out in the phrase, "that philosophic thought receives its direction from this hidden root." The impossibility of philosophic thought without this starting point in the transcendent comes out clearly when Dooyeweerd says,

We can thus provisionally summarize our point of view with reference to the limits of philosophy. The religious presupposition of philosophy, toward which the ground-Idea as transcendental foundation of philosophy is directed in its contents, toward which as Idea it points, is of a transcendent nature; whereas philosophic thought is itself of a transcendental character. The choice of the Archimedean point necessarily crosses the boundary line of the temporal coherence of our world. Philosophy itself, though directed by its ground-Idea, remains within this boundary

88. Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, I, p. 21.

89. *Ibid.*, II, p. 302. Here Dooyeweerd speaks of the function of faith "as an instrument of God's grace in Jesus Christ." The terminal aspect of faith and its strategic position in his system comes out clearly here in the fact that he calls faith the "open window" through which the light of God's eternity should shine into the whole temporal coherence of the world. It is in this context that he speaks of faith as the instrument of God's grace. Notice here the emphasis on light. Dooyeweerd likes to use the light metaphor, e.g. in the expression "the light of God's eternity," the prism figure and its many applications. Another example, Vol. II, p. 561, "The transcendent light of eternity must force its way through time.... The light of Divine revelation refracted through the prism of time...." P. 571, "The light of truth shines forth through the temporal horizon into human experience." For other references see pp. 563, 564, 572, 573, 578. The similarity to Augustine is obvious and it also points out the importance of the prism idea in Dooyeweerd. The light figures are close to a neo-realist light metaphysics. At this point there is also a similarity to Kuyper who also used a light figure.

line, because it is possible only by virtue of the temporal order of the world.

Transcendent and transcendental, taken in this sense, are thus no 'either-or'. For the actually transcendental direction of theoretic thought presupposes the transcendent and central sphere of our consciousness from which this direction starts, since this starting-point is not to be found in theoretic thought. Underlining mine

Only in this view as to the relation of transcendent and transcendental conditions of philosophy is the original and critical meaning of transcendental thought given its due.⁹⁰

From this we see that the true movement in philosophic thought, the direction toward the transcendent presupposita which fill and make philosophic thought possible, is instigated by an impetus from the higher. In the anthropological section of the third volume Dooyeweerd speaks of the temporal body of man as the expression field of the heart, and dwells on the fittedness in general of man's body as an instrument.⁹¹

The impetus idea can only truly be seen when one keeps in mind that the dynamics of meaning are caused by the refraction of the totality and fullness of meaning which refraction drives the diversity to seek again its fullness, unity, and consummation above and beyond itself. The movement in the lower is given impetus and is started after it has been forced through the prism of the time order which causes its restlessness.⁹² The questions of impetus theory and instrumentalism will be discussed in more detail later, but in general this classification seems to fit.

90. Ibid., I, p. 88.

91. Ibid., III, p. 88. He says, "But man is created after the image of God, as the lord of the 'earthly' temporal world. Therefore his body lacks any trait of specialization which would bind it to a specific milieu. The erect gait, the spiritual expression of the human face, the human hand formed to labour after a free project, testify to the fact that the human body is free plastic instrument of the I-ness, as the spiritual centre of human existence." Underlining mine

92. Ibid., I, pp. 3-4. "The coherence of all the modal aspects of

I. Zeitgeist:

The particular Zeitgeist which Dooyeweerd has been most influenced by will be dealt with in the section about the genetic historical development of Dooyeweerd's thinking. For now it can be said that neo-idealism in its rationalistic neo-Kantian form formed the primary motive in his earlier years with the emphasis being on the law idea, and then a slow shift to irrationalistic existentialism with the stress being on the religious transcendence of the heart as inaccessible to theoretical thought and as the only point from which historicism and immanence thinking could be overcome. Dooyeweerd's development of the ontology type

our cosmos finds its expression in each of them, and also points beyond its own limits toward a central totality, which in its turn is expressed in this coherence. Our ego expresses itself as a totality in the coherence of all its functions within all the modal aspects of cosmic reality. And man, whose ego expresses itself in the coherence of all its temporal modal functions, was himself created by God as the expression of His image." In a footnote on p. 4 he says, "We shall subsequently see why this deeper totality necessarily transcends the mutual coherence of all modal aspects of temporal reality, just as our selfhood transcends the coherence of its functions in these aspects." Here we see the idea of the expression of the totality in the lower which gives to meaning its restless, dependent structure and character. Movement is started in the lower by an impetus from the higher through refraction of the totality through the prism of time. The return of the totality is directed and caused again by the higher. Here the theme of priority is also clear as well as impetus which starts movement and is restless, pointing in the lower. On p. 5, Vol. I, the theme of priority is again clear and like the previous quote comes in the context of explaining meaning. "This abstraction from the actual entire ego that thinks may be necessary for formulating the concept of philosophical thought. But even in this act of conceptual determination it is the self that is actually doing the work. That ego is actually doing the work. That ego is actually operating not merely in its thought, but in all the functions in which it expresses itself within the coherence of our temporal world. There is no single modal aspect of our cosmos in which I do not actually function.... In this whole system of modal functions of meaning, it is I who remain the central point of reference and the deeper unity above all modal diversity of the different aspects of my temporal existence."

must be seen particularly against the background of these movements of the times (spirit of the times, streams of time, tijdstromingen).

The use of an ontology type to classify Dooyeweerd is at the most a hypothetical work. There are many facets that might not fit the classification, however, the case against Dooyeweerd in its totality does not rest upon precision in all points of this classification. This method of Vollenhoven is only a helpful tool in bringing together important features and emphases in Dooyeweerd's thinking in an interesting way.

3. A Global Survey of Certain Aspects of Nature-Grace Thinking.

This survey of nature-grace thinking on the questions of God's eternity, man's eternity, and time, is background for the critique of Dooyeweerd on these questions which will follow in the next chapter. In the last analysis, the key to the many problems surrounding Dooyeweerd's idea of religious transcendence is the influence of the nature-grace ground-motive on his thinking. No one more than Dooyeweerd has penetrated to the depth of this motive in Christian thinking, but it seems that he himself has not sufficiently purified his thinking of its influence.

As Dooyeweerd has pointed out so clearly in his articles "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip,"⁹³ the scholastic accommodation of the Christian ground-motive to the form-matter motive of Greek thinking resulted in a misconceiving of the nature of the creation order and cosmic time. Dooyeweerd points out the effect of this accommodation on the notion of creation,⁹⁴ and to some extent, on the scholastic notion of the eternity of God,⁹⁵ the eternity of man,⁹⁶ and the interrelation of these two to time.⁹⁷ Dooyeweerd has also laid bare the connection of the teleological, eschatological, beatific vision (*visio Dei*) of nature-grace to Aristotle's entelechy and the neo-Platonic hierarchy of being. An interesting hiatus in his treatment of the scholastic ground-motive is his neglect of eschatology in scholastic thinking.

93. Dooyeweerd, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip," *Phil. Ref.*, VIII (1943), pp. 65-99; IX (1944), pp. 1-41; X (1945), pp. 25-48; XI (1946), pp. 22-52.

94. *Ibid.*, VIII (1943), pp. 85-89; IX (1944), pp. 28-29, 34-40; X (1945), pp. 25-48. Also *Reformatie en Scholastiek*, pp. 35, 358-381, 490.

95. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën," pp. 2-4; *Reformatie en Scholastiek*, pp. 399-406.

96. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4; *Ibid.*, pp. 399-406.

97. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4; *Ibid.*, pp. 399-406. Cf. Popma, "Tijd en religie," *Phil. Ref.*, XIV (1949), pp. 126, 145.

In contrast to Dooyeweerd's lack of treatment of this point, attention is focused on his treatment in his own systematics of supra-temporality and creaturely eternity (*aevum* as it is called in an early work),⁹⁸ and on his statements of the necessary correlation of eternity (eternity here meaning creaturely eternity which he sharply distinguishes from God's eternity) and time. By critical intuition one feels that something is wrong with these points. Since many investigators are under the grip of the nature-grace ground-motive at this point, one can be led through Dooyeweerd's treatment of this motive to see the effects of this motive on one's thinking, especially one's view of Scripture and theology. Through this process of purification one's attention can be increasingly focused upon scholastic thinking in respect to the questions of eschatology, time, and eternity. Of great help in this regard is the definitive work of Okke Jager, *Het Eeuwige Leven*,⁹⁹ and especially the works of K. J. Popma. The unity of conception on these issues in nature-grace thinkers will quickly become evident. Even more startling is Dooyeweerd's lacuna in his treatment of these issues in Protestant and Catholic scholastic thinkers.

A general description of these points of consensus in nature-grace thinkers will be given in order to set the stage for our critique.

First, and all-controlling, is the theo-ontological¹⁰⁰ speculation concerning God's eternity, in which God's eternity is conceived of as an

98. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5.

99. Okke Jager, *Het Eeuwige Leven* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1962). See also my book review of this book in *The Westminster Theological Journal*, XXVII (Nov. 1964), pp. 60-66.

100. For the meaning of the term "theo-ontology" see the index of *Levensbeschouwing*, VII, p. 408.

eternal now or eternal present.¹⁰¹ The formulation of Boethius, at the conclusion of his *Consolation of Philosophy*, has played an important part in this speculation. Almost without exception this formulation has been taken over into scholastic thinking. Reformed scholastic theology operated almost exclusively with this conception. It is possible to find this definition present in Kuypers,¹⁰² Schilder,¹⁰³ Bavinck,¹⁰⁴ Geerhardus Vos,¹⁰⁵ and Louis Berkhof.¹⁰⁶ This definition however, is not the property of conservative Protestant and Roman Catholic thinkers. It occurs uniformly in old Protestant liberalism, as well as in neo-orthodox thinkers like Barth, Brunner, and in neo-liberals like Bultmann. Okke Jager, Popma, and Kuitert have also pointed out how, via the nature-grace thinking, this formulation of God's eternity penetrated into the early and later rationalistic, humanistic thinkers such as Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Kant. Popma has traced at great length the formulation of God's eternity in which past, present, and future are conceived of as in an eternal present, back beyond Boethius to the pre-Socratics. Without a doubt this notion is present in many Greek thinkers, e.g., Aristotle, Plato, Parmenides, and in the pre-Socratics at large. Although not all

101. Popma, "De eeuwigheid Gods volgens Boëthius," *Phil. Ref.*, XXII (1957), pp. 21-51; Popma, *Nadenken over de Tijd*, pp. 98-122, 143-146. Also, J. Stellingwerff, "Kritiek op K. Schilder als filosoferend dogmatist," *Phil. Ref.*, XXVII (1962), pp. 106-125; Jager, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Kuitert, *De Mensvermijding Gods* (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1957), p. 85.
102. Popma, *Nadenken over de Tijd*, pp. 122-130.
103. See footnote 100 of this chapter.
104. H. Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, Tweede Deel (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1908), pp. 153-154.
105. G. Vos, *Dogmatiek*, I, p. 11, where his definition is almost a direct quote from Boethius; see also pp. 74, 75, 79-100.
106. L. Berkhof, *Systematic Theology* (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1941), pp. 60, 63, 104.

Greek thinkers maintained this view of God's eternity, there is an amazing conformity. The fact that there is not a complete uniformity comes out clearly and with great importance for reformational thinking in the conception of Oscar Cullmann in his book, Christus und die Zeit.¹⁰⁷ The titanic wave of influence that this book had and still has for modern theology and philosophy¹⁰⁸ can only appear when we see that Cullmann's conception of God's eternity as linear, was in stark opposition to the power which the traditional view of God's eternity, as nunc eternum, had exercised on thinkers until that time. The view of God's eternity as a long line was not, however, a reformational, biblical conception. It has, as Popma points out, a scholastic background¹⁰⁹ and can also be traced to Greek thinking. Cullmann's alternative, which seemed to leave much more room for the redemptive historical interaction of God with Israel, his people, brought about serious revision in many quarters. This influence can be seen in the work of G. C. Berkouwer¹¹⁰ and especially in Kuitert.¹¹¹ Both views of the eternity of God are used by scholastic nature-grace thinkers, and both are rooted deeply and intrinsically in the theo-ontological pagan tradition.¹¹² But the formulation of Boethius ruled western thinking up until the epoch-making appearance

107. Cullmann, Christus und die Zeit (Zurich: A. G. Zollikon, 1948).

108. See especially Karl Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949); R. R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959).

109. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, II, pp. 313, 316, 331; VI, p. 58. In Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 110-115, there is an interesting comparison with Cullmann in Popma's comments on the remonstrant theologian, Philippus à Limborch.

110. Berkouwer, Dogmatische Studien: De Wederkomst van Christus, I, pp. 35-52, 62-63, 69, 92-95; II, pp. 185-186, 240-243. Berkouwer Geloof en Rechtvaardiging, Hoofdstuk VI, pp. 143-176.

111. Kuitert, op. cit., passim.

112. See footnote 100 of this chapter.

of Cullmann, after which the other line started to gain ascendancy.

Second, correlated with this idea of God's eternity is another idea which has exercised tremendous power on western thinking as a whole; the idea of an eternal heaven as opposed to the temporal earth. This means heaven in the sense which Scripture refers to it when it speaks of Christ in his glorified human nature. This heaven is the place of the angels and departed saints, as distinguished from what Scripture calls the cloudy heavens, the starry heavens, etc.¹¹⁴ It is the heaven where believers go after death when they are said in some mysterious way to be "with Christ" or dead in Christ, as distinguished from their being in their graves waiting for the resurrection. Heaven in this sense must be distinguished from heaven after the judgment day. Heaven after the judgment day is, in some scholastic conceptions, distinguished from heaven as the place of the departed believers, the angels, and Christ, before the judgment day. In this view, heaven before the judgment day is held to be eternal, i.e., non-temporal. From this speculation, tied in very closely with the idea of God's eternity as an eternal now, comes all manner of speculation. For example, Kuyper held that dead believers with Christ have no time consciousness but have a heavenly eternal perspective on the nearness of the parousia.¹¹⁵ From

113. For the general influence of Cullmann on Berkouwer and the present scene in philosophy and theology, see Jager, op. cit., passim.

114. For the various senses of the word "heaven" in the Bible and for a study of all the facets which have played a part in the history of scholastic theology, see the index of Levensbeschouwing, VII, under hemel, hemel tegenover aarde, hemels, hemelse dingen. See also Scheenheaven, The Wrath of Heaven (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), passim.

115. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, I, pp. 248ff.; III, pp. 36, 98-99; VII, pp. 236ff.. Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 122-131, 278, footnote. Jager, op. cit., pp. 199-207.

this scholastic perspective the notion of the heavenly eternal perspective of God and the saints serves as a hermeneutic for interpreting all the New Testament statements about the consciousness of the Christian in respect to the nearness of the parousia. The speculative thinking denies the time consciousness of angels and demons (fallen angels), although Scripture uniformly witnesses to the opposite.¹¹⁶ Since angels and demons are supposed to have inhabited the eternal supra-natural heavenly world they have the view of eternity, or what, speculatively, is often called "God's point of view."¹¹⁷ God's point of view is his point of view of his eternal present in which there is no succession from future to past, and this point of view is in an analogous fashion applied to angels, demons, and departed saints, always of course in a creaturely mode.¹¹⁸

In this conception the important relation of heaven and earth in Scripture is radically misconstrued. In this way the Christian ground-motive of Word-revelation in respect to the creation, as a cosmic law order and cosmic time, is restricted drastically to the temporal earthly horizon. Cosmic time and the cosmic law order are not seen as enforcing and holding for¹¹⁹ all the created, both heavenly and earthly, creatures.¹²⁰

116. Popma, op. cit., pp. 228ff.; Levensbeschouwing, VII, p. 236.

117. Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 125-131, 285ff.

118. Stellingwerff, op. cit., passim. On p. 116 the analogy idea between God and man's eternity is criticized. His article is a good summary on the subject as a whole and the footnotes introduce one to the labyrinth of questions involved.

119. For the significance of the phrase "holding for" see Vollenhoven, Hoofdlijnen der Lexica (Kampen: J. H. Kek, 1948), pp. 27-29.

120. This important stress in Vollenhoven has been in contradistinction to Dooyeweerd from the beginning. See Vollenhoven, College Dictaat, Isagogè Philosophiae (Amsterdam: THEA, n.d.), pp. 15-16, 88-90. Jager, op. cit., passim, especially "Bijbels licht over het eeuwige leven," pp. 455-578. Also, Schoonhoven, op. cit., passim.

The idea of an eternal heaven in contradistinction to a temporal earth implies the acceptance of two world orders, generally also called natural and supra-natural. This latter conception is completely foreign to the ground-motive of Word-revelation in respect to creation. In the scriptural revelation concerning creation, the creative world-ordering Word of God, with its ordinances, commands, and laws, embraces the heavens and the earth as one cosmic order and subjects all created beings to time. Heaven, in Genesis 1:1, embraces all possible senses of the word "heaven" as it is further explicated and revealed in Scripture. In all of Scripture, heaven and earth and their interrelations are seen as directed by and subjected to one Word of God which orders, directs, and holds as law for all created. The creation account points to this central ground-motive of creation and gives direction and content to the theoretical ground-idea of law which is the central hypothesis for theoretical thought. This cosmic scope of the created world-order and time can never be restricted to holding only for the temporal earthly cosmos. The scriptural ground-motive of creation directs our thinking to see heaven and earth as involved in one all-embracing cosmic time, with one cosmic genetic unfolding process (het grote wordingsproces),¹²¹ having one history.¹²² The wide influence of nature-grace thinking, in which heaven is conceived of as eternal in contrast to earthly temporal existence, is found in many places. The word "spiritual" quite often has the

121. Dooyeweerd, Inleiding tot de Encyclopaedie der Rechtswetenschap (Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, n.d.), p. 79.

122. For this stress see Levensbeschouwing, VII, index under "tijd," pp. 409-410, "paradijs," p. 394, "geschiedenis," p. 369, "hemel tegen-over aarde," p. 373. Also, Popma, Calvinistische Geschiedsbeschouwing (Franeker: T. Wever, 1945), passim.

idea of eternity with this heavenly sense involved in it.¹²³ Consequently, a spiritual resurrected body came to be conceived of as a non-fleshly, heavenly-adapted eternal body,¹²⁴ sexless,¹²⁵ unable to eat,¹²⁶ like the angels,¹²⁷ that is, eternal, supra-natural.

The most important single consequence of this view of heaven as eternal is the all-controlling direction that was exercised by this nature-grace ground-motive on the reformatory ground-motive of the Word of God in respect to the kingdom of God, the hope of believers, and in eschatology or last things. Eschatology and the kingdom of God were verticalized and supra-naturalized. The creational cosmic law-order and cosmic time with their future perspective of the new earth and new heaven were relativized, restricted, and transcended in an other-worldly, heavenly, eternal direction. The second heavenly supra-natural world-order also transformed the biblical ground-motive of redemption as restoration and renewal. In this second unbiblical world-order eschatology culminated in the beatific vision of God in a heavenly eternal sense. This vision could be attained immediately at death, when man was to become

123. It is interesting to note the frequency of use of this term throughout Dooyeweerd's writings. In this broad usage he shows his close relationship to Kuyper.

124. For a critique of this view and a biblical perspective see Lynn Boelink, The Resurrection of the Flesh (Amsterdam: Jacob van Campen, 1962); Levensbeschouwing, passim; Vollenhoven, Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte, p. 45; Popma, "Bestaat er een Bijbelse doedsproblematiek?" Corr. bladen, XXV (March 1961), pp. 1-5.

125. Stellingwerff, op. cit., p. 111.

126. Ibid., p. 111; Popma, "Maag en spijs," Corr. bladen, XX (June 1956), pp. 5-7.

127. In this connection Matthew 22:30 has been the source of all manner of speculation in which man was viewed as being like an angel at the resurrection, rather than in the precise respect mentioned by our Lord. Nature-grace thinkers regard angels as created eternal spirits without bodies, and therefore man's body must become angel-like, "spiritual," non-fleshly, at the resurrection. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, II, pp. 304-308; Popma, "Uitbreiding van het wetenschaps 'begrip'," Corr. bladen, XXV (March 1961), pp. 14-19.

eternal. Since eternity was reached immediately at death, this meant that the perspective of the resurrection of believers at the judgment day tended to be regarded as an unnecessary addition to this state, and thus it became secondary. The meaning and ground-motive of Word-revelation in respect to the restorative, renewing cosmic significance of Christ's resurrection for man, the earth, and heaven, was lost.¹²⁸ For example, the problem which the Thomistic thinker has in relating the resurrection of the body to the beatific vision (which problem in no way eluded Protestant scholasticism) betrays this verticalizing of eschatology. Popma has shown most convincingly how this view of creaturely eternity, as applied to the realm of heaven, filtered into the life of Christendom (e.g., in hymnology and in cherished expressions of Christians, "he died and went to his eternal abode," or "he died and went to eternity").¹²⁹ Popma also points out in great detail how this view of eternity always involves a depreciation of time as a creation of God. This view, in one way or another, identifies time with corruptibility and imperfection, and contrasts it with the incorruptible, angelic, changeless, and perfect eternity of heaven, before the judgment day. In this way, heaven before the judgment day is given attributes which in no way allow for the perspective of Word-revelation in its ground-motive of redemption

128. Popma, "De zin der geschiedenis," Corr. bladen, XXIII (March 1959), pp. 19-26; Popma, "Tijd en geschiedenis," pp. 12-16; Popma, "Geloof en geschiedenis," Corr. bladen, XVIII (Dec. 1954), pp. 28-31.

129. Dooyeweerd, "Ter nagedachtenis van mijn vriend Prof. Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm," Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte, (Sept. 1952), p. 11. Dooyeweerd says, "Midden in zijn arbeid nam God hem op 76 jarigen leeftijd weg, zonder ziekbed, zonder doodstrijd in een haast onmerkbare overglijding uit het tijdelijk naar het eeuwig leven."

and restoration of the earthly creation. In this way eschatology is supernaturalized, veiled, and made almost ineffective. Vollenhoven and Popma have pointed out that this tendency to deprecate time is rooted deeply in pagan antiquity.

Since succession and change, in this scholastic view, are identified with corruption and imperfection, the temporal earthly cosmos is not conceived of as man's everlasting final home. Rather, true "spirituality" and piety is to be seen only in desiring one's eternal, incorruptible home. In this sense all the references in Scripture in respect to these matters are made ineffective and are not re-forming in their direction; e.g., "laying your treasures in heaven," "citizenship in heaven," etc.¹³⁰ This revamping and redirecting of the biblical ground-motive concerning the kingdom of God and the future, is of great importance for Christian philosophy and especially relates to Dooyeweerd's views of the direction of cosmic time. This leads us into a third general corollary of the consensus which can be found in nature-grace thinking in respect to eternity and time.

The third corollary is directly related to the eternity of God and the eternity of heaven, but functions in different ways for different scholastics. It deals with the idea that "time is for a time," the idea that time and history will cease at the judgment. In this view eternity is thought to begin immediately after the judgment. This is found almost uniformly in all nature-grace thinkers and is correlated immediately with eternity as heaven. Nature-grace accommodating thinking is here trying to re-interpret, minimize, and even do away with the

¹³⁰ Popma, "Burgerschap," *Phil. Ref.*, VII (1942), *passim*.

ground-motive of Word-revelation, which points to the present and future restoration and renewal of the whole cosmos; the earth (including the kingdoms of animals, plants, things, and man) and heaven, in all its senses. The state immediately succeeding parousia is identified with the state which believers have at death in heaven. The two stages of history are mythologically melted into one. An exception to the view that time and history cease at the judgment day is the view that time goes on endlessly as a place of judgment. This view, which occurs very infrequently, is found in Boethius. Boethius, in semi-mystical fashion, enables man to transcend time through intellectualistic contemplation¹³¹ to the heavens which are above the controlling bands of fate¹³² that endlessly rule time on earth. Here eschatology is completely verticalized, time is the realm of soul-less bodies in hell-like punishment.¹³³ This thinking of Boethius, that time goes on endlessly as a kind of hell, is apparently tied to his purely cosmological, dualistic thinking, in which he seems to think of time as without beginning, as well as endless.¹³⁴ But this conception of Boethius is not at all the view of most nature-grace thinkers. For the vast majority of them, time and history cease with the judgment day and created eternity continues or begins.

Some interesting variations present themselves at this point. In some Reformed scholastics, who in contrast to Roman Catholic scholastics, emphasize the future dimension of the eschaton and deprecate the present realized dimension, the complex of ideas involving cessation of time

¹³¹ Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 116-122, 125-126. Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962), pp. 104, 114.

¹³² Boethius, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

¹³³ Ibid., pp. 39, 82-87.

¹³⁴ Ibid., pp. 65, 70, 92, 115-116.

and history and the beginning of eternity at the judgment have played a great role.

The eternity that is thought to begin at judgment day for man is often without duration and always a successionless, eternal present. The notion of change as in the second corollary is here also identified with corruptibility and therefore eliminated.¹³⁵ All historical development or unfolding of any kind is eliminated.¹³⁶ The whole cosmic law order and cosmic time is replaced by a world-order which is eternal in character and radically discontinuous with the creational law order and

135. Popma gives a survey of various Reformed scholastics who have held this view; "De zin der geschiedenis," pp. 19-26; Levensbeschouwing, II, pp. 309-344; Wijsgemeente en Anthropologie, pp. 69, 241-283; Nadenken over de Tijd, p. 134. Also found in Jager, op. cit., p. 251.

136. This view is present in Geerhardus Vos. For the influence of the late Aristotle on Vos see Grace and Glory (Grand Rapids: The Reformed Press, 1922), chapter 6, "Heavenly Mindedness," pp. 133-155. Here the use of the word "transcendent" shows the dualistic, purely cosmological thinking. For his use of eternity and time see The Pauline Eschatology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), pp. 40-41, 71, chapter 12, "The Eternal State," pp. 288-316. On p. 290 there is a good emphasis of allowing for duration and divisibility of time units, but Vos consistently eliminates all change and development from the eternal state and so runs into problems with his own good emphasis. On p. 331 there is a good emphasis but betrays somewhat of the tension. In ISBE (International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia) James Orr, ed. (Chicago: Howard-Severance Co., 1915), Vol. II, p. 990, Vos' view of heaven is tied too much with his idea of the supra-natural and transcendental and so the perspective of the new earth suffers. The tension is manifested in his regarding too much under the term "heaven" by which he has in mind changelessness, although he is forced to recognize eternal life as involving endless time and the new earth. The tension between nature-grace and the reformational line comes out when he says, "The central abode of the redeemed will be in heaven although the renewed earth will remain accessible to them as a part of the inheritance" (p. 991). He depreciates the new earth and temporality as the future horizon by lifting it to the supra-natural, changeless, transcendent, heavenly sphere. In "The Eschatological Aspect of the Pauline Conception of the Spirit," Biblical and Theological Studies, by members of the faculty of Princeton Theol. Seminary (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912), pp. 235-259, the supra-natural heavenly is definitely regarded as another world order which is a sure sign of nature-grace influence.

cosmic time. The reformational ground-motive of God's faithfulness to the law order and cosmic time in the process of redemption and re-creation, despite the fall of man, is suppressed. The new earth, in typically 17th and 18th century Lutheran scholasticism, is not a restored, renewed, and refined old earth.¹³⁷ A good feature in some of these Reformed scholastics is that the term "heaven," in practice, often means the new earth subjected to a radically new world order having hardly any continuity to the creation and time. This feature is good because it is less of a spiritualization than is found in those conceptions in which heaven means eternity, as no longer on earth, as in the second corollary.

Some attempts have been made by Reformed scholastics to soften this notion of a timeless successionless, eternal existence on the new earth after the judgment day. Very recent attempts try to describe the notion of this existence as a "duration without succession." Popma has subjected this description to a devastating critique in many of his works, but especially in Nadenken over de Tijd.¹³⁸ After pointing out that duration can never occur without succession, he points to the evidence that this notion of duration without succession is very characteristic of psychotic pathological experience uncovered by psychotherapy. It must be said, however, that it at least holds to an endless duration although it is immediately made meaningless by the fact that it is said to be without succession.

137. For a discussion of this and striking confirmation of the view being presented here see Berkouwer, Dogmatische Studien: Wederkomst, I, Hoofdstuk VII, "De nieuwe aarde," pp. 266-299.

138. For critique of K. Runia who advocates this view of "duration without succession," see Popma, Nadenken over de Tijd, pp. 102-138.

From certain texts in Scripture, especially Revelation 10:6, where it is said that "time shall be no more," nature-grace thinkers of all varieties have inferred that cosmic time will cease. This text has no bearing on this point, but rather, has reference to the fact that the time of postponement of the judgment will be no more, as can be seen clearly from the context.¹³⁹

The more the futuristic dimension of the eschaton is emphasized, the more catastrophic is the discontinuity between history before the judgment and existence on the new earth. The biblical idea of sojourning and suffering is falsely emphasized, and the kingdom with its cosmic perspective, having its "official inauguration day" at the resurrection and ascension of Christ, and driven during this present stage of history before the judgment day by the powerful, redirecting, life-giving Word of God, is lost sight of.¹⁴⁰ Increasing stress is correspondingly laid on the scholastic view of the institutional church, giving rise to different types of tensions.¹⁴¹ In some cases the view of eternity, as beginning on the new earth at judgment, is put in tension with eternity as being in heaven after death as in the second corollary, so that the so-called interim (tussentoestand) is practically eliminated. B. Telder, who emphasizes endless time and the unity of man in healthy reformational fashion, in stressing the future dimension of the eschaton, feels compelled to deny that there is any existence of believers in

139. See Vos, Pauline Eschatology, pp. 290-291; Okke Jager, op. cit., p. 513.

140. J. Douma, Algemene Genade (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1966), pp. 344-356 for a faulty limitation of the cultural task and over-stressing of sojourning.

141. J. Olthius, "Must the Church Become Secular?" International Reformed Bulletin, X (Jan. 1967), pp. 14-31.

heaven with Christ after death, before the judgment. For Telder, man is one, and therefore the whole man is said to be in the grave, sleeping in Jesus, awaiting resurrection.¹⁴² The unity of heaven and earth under one cosmic law order and in one cosmic time and history is here lost sight of somewhat. Telder's position is a refreshing breeze, with its stress on the reformational ground-motive of redemption in its cosmic perspective, in the midst of a literal jungle of misconception. Its great value is that it confirms the thinking of Berkouwer, Popma, Jager, and Scheenhoven. Mention is made of his unique emphasis on the interim state (tussentoestand) in order to underscore the increasing tension that is arising as men break with the verticalized eschatology of Thomistic scholastics and stress the futuristic, mere historical dimension of the eschaton.¹⁴³

In general, the first, second, and third corollaries have a view of eternity in common. Reformed scholasticism, which emphasized the future idea of eternity developed in the third corollary, never placed as much emphasis on the second corollary as did Roman Catholic and Lutheran scholastics. Due to the rise of Biblical theology, by which is meant, exegetical theology with a redemptive-historical emphasis, increasing attention has been placed on eschatology. With the re-examination of eschatology, and with it the historical dimension of Revelation, the view of eternity present in all three corollaries has become suspect. It is generally recognized at present that eschatology has a strong

142. B. Telder, Sterven...waar om? (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1963); Sterven...en dan? (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1960). See Popma's answer in Levensbeschouwing, III, pp. 191-235.

143. For a tracing of the shifts from present to future emphases and vice-versa as they relate to the question of time and eternity see Okke Jager, op. cit. passim.

present and future aspect. This presents Reformed scholasticism, which in general stressed the third corollary and the future dimension, with the need for a great deal of reconstruction. In the views in which the first and second corollaries were emphasized and correspondingly the present dimension of eschatology, redemptive-historical exegetical considerations have also necessitated reconstruction. In these views eternity beginning with the judgment day was generally conceived to be the natural continuation or completion of the eternity of heaven which man enjoyed after death in the beatific vision. This view in general is still the dominant one among the "plainfolk" of Christendom. In this view the future dimension of the eschaton is more spiritualized, supernaturalized, with the consequence that the new earth was for all practical purposes disregarded and heaven conceived of as a final, eternal, supra-natural home in the sky. Here the horizontal future dimension of endless, eternal life on the new earth is reduced to the vertical, supernaturalized eternity of heaven.¹⁴⁴ Reconstruction is being done on the future dimension of eschatology so long neglected in these views. Many questions are being raised about the view of eternity and time which lies at the basis.

144. The importance of the new earth as the everlasting horizon for God's people has been emphasized by various members of the W.d.W. Vellen-heven, in Isagoge Philosophie, p. 90, says, "Ook na den dood wacht de ziel de opwekking van het lichaam, ook daarin verschillend van de engelen. En het ideaal van den Christen is dus niet 'wederkeer naar het vaderland der zielen.' Maar het bewonen van de nieuwe aarde, waarp gerechtigheid woent." A more recent statement is in "College systematisch - het probleem van de tijd," p. 11. Zuidema stresses that Occam's eschatology does not allow for the scriptural perspective of everlasting work on the new earth. De Philosophie van Occam in zijn Commentaar op de Sententia (Hilversum: 1936), p. 138. Van Riessen, in "De werkelijkheid in den teren," Corr. bladen, VI (Dec. 1941), p. 81, modifies euwigheid to eneindigheid. The transcendental direction of cosmic time and faith function point to eneindigheid and not to euwigheid as in

In summary, we see that the idea of the Greek view of God's eternity, as an eternal present, penetrated the church, finding classical theo-entelelogical expression in Beethius' definition. It serves as a perspective from which man views created eternity both in heaven (second corollary) after death and where time is not present and heaven as eternity after time ceases in the future. In the second and third corollaries the view of eternity in relationship to man and cosmos wipes out the cosmic character, i.e., including heaven and earth, of created time and the cosmic law order, and conceives of a new world law order and existence to which the eternity of God is applied by the principle of analogy of being, to man and cosmos. The eternity of cosmos and man is therefore seen in the pagan perspective of a creaturely eternal present. In this way the law-boundary between Creator and creature is broken by this theo-entelelogical thinking. This general survey of the question of eternity and time in nature-grace thinking supplements Dooyeweerd's analysis of the nature-grace ground-motive. These supplementary considerations can only be seen in their full significance in the light of the autonomy

Dooyeweerd. It is in striking contrast to this and to the work of Popma that Dooyeweerd never mentions the new earth in all his works. The kingdom of God is always the eternal and heaven. This, in light of what we have seen, is an indication that he has not extricated himself from the nature-grace perspective on these points. The work of Okke Jager, op. cit., is definitive in this whole area and especially pp. 459-578 in which many questions relating to these three areas are dealt with with a wealth of Scripture present. K. J. Popma has dealt with this subject throughout his life and has had much influence. Berkewer, in Wederkeerst..., I, Heefdstuk VII, is also confirmatory and is at points very original. Scheenheven, op. cit., confirms from a slightly different perspective. There is also a wealth of material in the old stand-by, Patrick Fairbairn, The Typeology of Scripture (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, n.d.), pp. 328-361. By surveying these men and their writings a staggering case can be made against the views mentioned and described in the first, second, and third corollaries.

natural reason, its speculative metaphysical-theo-ontological speculation concerning the being of God, its idea of the soul as a substantial, rational form, etc. These latter points and many others have been thoroughly developed by Dooyeweerd,¹⁴⁵ and are necessary for seeing the background of the nature-grace views of eternity as they apply to God, man, and the cosmos, as well as to time, eschatology, and history.

Obviously the description given here of these views is influenced by an elaborate view of these matters on our part. In the thetical part of this dissertation a systematic presentation of our views on eternity, time, etc., will be given, at which time it would be well to refer back to this section. A general survey of the nature-grace thinking on these points was necessary to show the background for the critical points in Dooyeweerd, since he shares the nature-grace thinking presented here. Before evidence is given to this it is necessary to emphasize the wide-spread character of these views so that Dooyeweerd's synthesis on these points might be put in proper perspective.

¹⁴⁵. See footnote 93 of this chapter.