

natural reason, its speculative metaphysical-theo-ontological speculation concerning the being of God, its idea of the soul as a substantial, rational form, etc. These latter points and many others have been thoroughly developed by Dooyeweerd,<sup>145</sup> and are necessary for seeing the background of the nature-grace views of eternity as they apply to God, man, and the cosmos, as well as to time, eschatology, and history.

Obviously the description given here of these views is influenced by an elaborate view of these matters on our part. In the thetical part of this dissertation a systematic presentation of our views on eternity, time, etc., will be given, at which time it would be well to refer back to this section. A general survey of the nature-grace thinking on these points was necessary to show the background for the critical points in Dooyeweerd, since he shares the nature-grace thinking presented here. Before evidence is given to this it is necessary to emphasize the wide-spread character of these views so that Dooyeweerd's synthesis on these points might be put in proper perspective.

<sup>145</sup>. See footnote 93 of this chapter.

### CHAPTER 3

#### SPECIFIC CRITIQUE AND EVIDENCE OF SYNTHESIS ON THE PROBLEM OF GOD'S ETERNITY, MAN'S ETERNITY, AND TIME

The transcendental critical thinking of Dooyeweerd is founded in a vision concerning God's eternity, creaturely eternity, and time, and his vision on these points is controlled by the religious ground-motive of nature-grace. There is no quarrel with the central thrust of the transcendental critique, i.e., that theoretical thinking is not autonomous, and that the autonomy of theoretical thought is the result of an absolutizing of theoretical thinking, which absolutization is caused by a prior religious, central commitment. The central choice of position which controls the direction of our theorizing is of a religious character. However, the transcendental critique itself in its steps and three basic problems as Dooyeweerd outlines them, cannot be followed any longer. The very statement of the details of this critique betrays the influence of nature-grace. It could be agreed with Dooyeweerd that the gegenstand relation is of central importance and must always be clearly distinguished from naive experience. But to some extent, even in the formulation of the gegenstand relation, the nature-grace influence comes to expression. Vollenhoven has recently stressed the importance of the gegenstand relation.<sup>1</sup> This is important since he sees clearly the nature-grace influence on Dooyeweerd. Although he does not refer to his criticism in these terms, his thinking differs precisely from

<sup>1</sup>. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," pp. 6, 11, 14.

Dooyeweerd's at the points where it seems that the nature-grace influence is the strongest. Vellenheven clearly rejects the transcendent, supra-temporal character of the selfhood and yet wants jealously to maintain the gegenstand relation of theoretical thought. This is totally impossible for Dooyeweerd. The third part of the transcendental critique especially, presupposes a transcendent point above the temporal horizon with its cosmic diversity, if self-reflection and a totality view, time consciousness, and intermedial synthesis are to be achieved. It is to be one of our theses that to work in terms of the transcendental critique the way Dooyeweerd sets it up involves one in the nature-grace influence in his thinking. This critique compels one to accept his nature-grace vision on the points of created eternity and time. The setting or placing or formulation of the problem (probleemstelling) of the transcendental critique must be challenged since it presupposes nature-grace thinking in Dooyeweerd.

Transcendental critical thinking serves two basic uses in Dooyeweerd. First, it serves the reformatioinal use of seeking to expose, "lay bare," the religious grund-motive behind the autonomy of theoretical thought. It seeks to show immanence thinking from the inner nature of theoretical thought itself, that theoretical thought has religious presuppositions and presupposita, i.e., that there is a religious choice of position and commitment directing and underlying theoretical thought, and thus it seeks to expose autonomy. Its reformatioinal value is consequently seen in that it seeks to cut off all speculative metaphysics and theo-entological speculation. Christian transcendental critical thinking is anti-speculative, anti-metaphysical thinking. This is its great emphasis. It seeks to show that in its various expressions

speculative metaphysics is based on the dogmatic and uncritical postulate of the autonomy of theoretical thought. This is Dooyeweerd's intention and the reformatioinal line.

A second use of the transcendental critique is more important for this dissertation. The transcendental critique serves to cover up the nature-grace influence on Dooyeweerd and the specific ontology type which lies at the basis of his formulation of the steps of the transcendental critique itself. Dooyeweerd, like Kant, wants to demand that theoretical thought be modest. This modesty in Kant, as Dooyeweerd has repeatedly emphasized, is a mask. It seems that there is a masking of a deeper problem via the transcendental critique which can also be found in Dooyeweerd. In other words, there is a certain amount of skepsis<sup>2</sup> involved in transcendental critical thinking as Dooyeweerd explicates it. For example, by stating that time is the transcendental horizon of theoretical thought, he protects himself from all penetration of the nature-grace motive. It could be agreed that cosmic time is the transcendental horizon of theoretical thought, but for Dooyeweerd this implies a distinct view of time which is immediately correlated to the transcendent religious horizon. Created eternity is elevated beyond the reach of thought, especially theoretical thought. Time, for instance, in our view, should not be limited to our earthly temporal horizon, but rather, it ought to be maintained that all that is created is temporal and all that is temporal is created. In Dooyeweerd's view there is an undue restriction placed on theoretical thought because his idea of cosmic time

2. By skepsis is meant an attitude of disbelief that does not make full use of the Word of God and the perspective found in the Scriptures. It unduly restricts the significance of the Scriptures for theorizing by falling into minimal biblical reflection and usage.

is limited to the earthly. In this way the supra-temporal, central, religious realm is one which increasingly takes the importance, and the temporal earthly world is only seen as the expression field of the eternal, both in its divine and creaturely sense. In this way, if he was operating with a scholastic view of created eternity, it could never be analyzed by theoretical thought, since theoretical thought is strictly limited to the temporal earthly horizon as Dooyeweerd sets it up. As a matter of fact, cosmic time is always to be seen in strict correlation to created eternity in Dooyeweerd's system. As an alternative to this, one could maintain that if what is central or religious is included in cosmic time, then that does not imply at all that it can be made into a gegenstand of theoretical thought, since theoretical thought can still be religiously directed. The heart of man is not analyzable, not because it transcends the temporal horizon, but because it is the ground<sup>3</sup> of theoretical thinking which cannot be turned back upon by theoretical thinking unless the ground itself be relinquished and another ground be taken. Many facets of created reality, all of which are completely subject to time and within the time horizon, are completely unfathomable to theoretical thinking, e.g., Christ in his human nature,<sup>4</sup> animals,<sup>5</sup>

3. By "ground" it is meant that it is the necessary basis for any concept or idea, and that one can conceive religion without being religiously determined, so that one is necessarily involved in a regressus ad infinitum. See Popma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte (Kampen: J. H. Kek, 1956), pp. 92-93, 110-111. Popma, in contrast to Dooyeweerd, believes one cannot even have an idea of religion (p. 93). Cf. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 57.
4. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, I, p. 58, concerns the image of God in man and mystery in general.
5. Popma, De Beedschap van het Boek Job (Gees: Oesterbaan & Le Cointre, 1957), *passim*. Popma finds in God's pointing out to Job his stupidity, the unfathomable depth of wisdom in the animal world and the impenetrable mystery which all animals present us with. Also, Levensbeschouwing, VII, index under dierenwereld.

the heart, the church, sacrament,<sup>6</sup> and angels. They are mysterious and unfathomable for different reasons. There is no need, therefore, to restrict the temporal to the "earthly" as Dooyeweerd does, and also no need for correlating the temporal to the central sphere of created eternity. If we follow Dooyeweerd here, we are left wholly in the dark as to what angelic beings are like, what heaven is all about, and all of the riches of Word-revelation concerning these central points does not sufficiently direct our perspective. This is an example of skepticism that seems to be implied in the transcendental method. By holding to the importance of this central supra-temporal sphere and by calling it the central sphere of occurrence, he succeeds in hiding the nature-grace influence from being exposed. It means that Dooyeweerd, by his own principles of transcendental critical thinking, cannot speak about the central supra-temporal sphere. To this principle he is quite consistent and consequently it is very hard to detect the nature-grace influence concerning his view of created eternity and religious transcendence, since he cannot describe it theoretically according to his own principles. Dooyeweerd therefore can point to any attempt to lay his thinking open at these points as a violation of critical thinking, or any attempt to describe this transcendent realm in the past history of theology or philosophy, as metaphysical speculation. It seems, however, that he violates his own critical method enough on these points for one to see the influence at the bottom of his transcendental critique. If one compares Dooyeweerd with Diemer on these points one can see a marked

6. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, IV, pp. 48ff. This feature that things within the time horizon are mysterious and unfathomable is the stress of Popma throughout his whole 7 volumes.

difference. Whether there is a real difference between these men on the points of God's eternity, time, or created eternity, is able to be doubted. But one thing seems clear, and that is that Diemer is much more speculative on these points than Dooyeweerd would ever be. If one would try to show Dooyeweerd's views by criticizing Diemer's views on the same points, Dooyeweerd would undoubtedly disavow Diemer's views as being speculative metaphysics. Nevertheless, the same structure is in Dooyeweerd, though masked, and this masking is due to his stress on carrying forth consistently transcendental critical thinking.

In order to point out carefully the nature-grace perspective influencing the formulation of the steps in the transcendental critique, it will be necessary to hunt for small clues in Dooyeweerd's idea of created eternity and God's eternity in order to reconstruct accurately his vision. There are only clues, because as has been intimated, it is in accordance with his critical thinking not to speculate about these matters of created eternity and the new earth. Nevertheless, it will be shown that Dooyeweerd has a definite view of these matters, which although mostly unexpressed, control his transcendental critique, method, and thinking.

That Dooyeweerd has the older, more scholastic view of eternal life comes out clearly in what he writes following the death of his friend, Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm. He writes, "Midden in zijn arbeid nam God hem op 76 jarigen leeftijd weg, zonder ziekbed, zonder doodstrijd in een haast onmerkbare overglijding uit het tijdelijk naar het eeuwig leven."<sup>7</sup> [underlining mine] Here we see what seems to be a scholastic view of eternal life. Eternal life is looked at here as something one enters

7. Dooyeweerd, "Ter nagedachtenis van mijn vriend Prof. Dr. Ph. Kohnstamm," p. 11.

when one leaves the temporal. It misconceives the range of the temporal. In contrast to this misconception, there is every reason also to think of the dead in Christ who are with Christ in heaven, as mysterious as it might be, to be completely subject to time and even to have time consciousness. What is more, it is the uniform testimony of the New Testament that eternal life is received through faith already before death, e.g., "Whosoever believeth in me hath eternal life and hath passed from death unto life and shall never die."<sup>8</sup> Popma says that eternal life is dated. It has nothing to do with leaving the temporal. What is more, the temporal can never be left, not at death, nor on the new earth after the judgment. We shall see how this thought of Dooyeweerd fits with his idea that the heart of man is not subject to temporal death, but is, by its nature, eternal and incorruptible (onvergankelijk). Here we see the nature-grace postulate, that "time is for a time," that time ceases to be in effect at death. We could extend the application of this postulate to Dooyeweerd and say that for him the temporal functions are for a time, or the temporal function mantle is for a time. Since Dooyeweerd believes in a resurrection of the dead, the body of believers, it would seem, must be also a non-temporal body or a so-called "spiritual" or "glorified body," i.e., one fit for eternal life as opposed to the temporal which man leaves at death as he "glides over into eternal life." This alone is actually all that is needed to show the nature-grace construction in Dooyeweerd's thinking on these matters.

A very important passage which bears on this subject is to be found

8. John 5:24, 25; 6:40; 11:24-26; 3:16-18. See also Levensbeschouwing, VII, index under leven, eeuwig; leven, nieuw; for a running critique of the scholastic view of eternal life.

when Dooyeweerd deals with the meaning of "het aevum in de wijsbegeerde der wetsidee." He says,

Het is nu duidelijk, dat deze opvatting van het 'aevum' onmiddelijk verband houdt met de Aristotelische opvatting van eeuwigheid en tijd, en met de Aristotelische opvatting van 'ziel' en 'lichaam'. Is de tijd slechts de maat der beweging, dan kunnen de 'animae intellectivae' als zoodanig, d.i. naar haar wezen, niet aan den tijd onderworpen zijn.

Op het Christelijk transcendentiestandpunt is deze opvatting moeilijk te aanvaarden, omdat hier het centrum van de menschelijke natuur niet in de 'rede' kan worden gezocht en dus ook de menschelijke ziel, de 'inwendige mensch' of het 'hart' van 's mensen bestaan, niet langer als hypostase van een uit den tijdelijkem kosmischen samenhang geabstraheerd functiecomplex kan worden gevatt.

Ik zou nechtans den term 'aevum' in den zin van een tussenteestand tusschen tijd en eeuwigheid, gaarne willen overnemen. Ik meen, dat daartegen te minder, bewaar kan bestaan, omdat hij in desen zin juist in den Christelijken gedachtengang is opgekomen, die beheeft gevoelde aan een onderscheiding tusschen het beven-tijdelijke in creatuurlijken zin en de eeuwigheid in den zin van het zijn Geda.

In het menschelijk zelfbewustzijn als centrum der religieuze concentratie aller tijdelijke functies ontmoeten wij dan inderdaad het beven-tijdelijke in den zin van het aevum. Dit aevum is dus als actuelle teestand niets anders dan de creaturlijke concentrering van het tijdelijke op de eeuwigheid in religieuze transcendering van de tijds-grens.

Waar in het hart de eeuw gelegd is, behoert deze aevum-teestand tot de ingeschaven structuur van ons zelfheid, die zich telkens moet actualiseren, wanneer ons zelfbewustzijn in religieuze concentratie werkzaam is, zelfs al openbaart het aevum-bewustzijn zich in een afvallige richting, doordat het het eeuwige in den tijd zoekt. Immers ook de vergeddelijking van het tijdelijke is slechts in religieuze transcendering van de tijdsgrans mogelijk, al blijft deze transcendering, als concentratie der tijdelijke functies, haar band aan die tijdsgrans behouden. In dit leven is de aevum-teestand dus steeds aan den tijd gebonden. Een speculatie over den aevum-teestand bij de scheiding van ziel en lichaam, of bij de engelen, is wijsgeerig envruchtbaar, en 'meteorica et vacua speculatie' in Calvijn's taal gesproken, omdat het hier gaat over 'verbergheden', die ons nog niet openbaard zijn. Al ons veerstellingen, begrippen, en ideën zijn in dit leven in den tijd gebonden, en ook ons zelfbewustzijn blijft op den tijdsberizonen betrekken, al transcenderet het den tijd in het aevum.<sup>9</sup>

The whole quotation has been given because it is our intention to draw more than one conclusion from this passage, and also so that the reader may see the context in which these points come out. In line with what has been stressed, we again meet the phrase, "in this life" (in dit leven). This phrase, in the light of the quotation, shows how Dooyeweerd views time. This sentence from the quotation, "In this life the condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand) is bound... to time" has meaning only if one supposes that at some future date it will not be bound to time. We have already seen this to be the case when he speaks of "gliding over out of the temporal into eternal life." Here again we encounter the thought that the life to come is not bound to time. This definitely is a Greek idea. What also appears from this quotation is that Dooyeweerd is looking for an intermediate condition (tussentoestand) between time and God's eternity. From this article it is patent that this notion was developed by the scholastic nature-grace thinkers, and Dooyeweerd even admits the similarity of his notion to the scholastic one, although he tries to set himself off from Boethius and Aquinas.<sup>10</sup> However, the very thought of a non-temporal intermediate condition (tussentoestand), no matter how one seeks to Christianize it, is already a nature-grace construct. It automatically brings with it the idea that something created is non-temporal and therefore eternal. This implies a restriction of the time idea, order idea, and law idea and brings another order, law, and world idea into juxtaposition with an "earthly" order idea, time idea, and law idea. Two order ideas, law ideas, and the idea of created time and created

10. Ibid., pp. 2-4.

9. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het immanentiestandpunt," Phil. Ref., IV (1939), pp. 4-5.

eternity are constitutive elements in nature-grace thinking.

Dooyeweerd stresses that "in this life" the condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand) is always bound to time. Here we see the important stress on the correlation of created eternity and time. This thought must never be de-emphasized if the true importance of created eternity in Dooyeweerd is to be understood. It means two things: first, without this correlation no time consciousness is possible for man. It is precisely from his created eternity consciousness that man achieves time consciousness and that he can know as his own, his body, i.e., his temporal function mantle which he leaves at death and which is subject to decay and temporality. Man has a time consciousness because he has an eternity consciousness, but he would have neither if he were only in time and not (in his heart) eternal and above cosmic time. In this same article he says,

Wanneer wij in het diepste concentratiepunt van ons bestaan den tijd niet te boven gingen, dan zou ook ons bewustzijn noodzakelijk in den tijd spreken, en daarmee de mogelijkheid der religieuze zelf-concentratie ontberen. Het zou geen tijdsprobleem kunnen, want tot wezenlijk probleem wordt de tijd er niet, wanneer wij distanctie tegenever hem kunnen nemen in het boven-tijdelijke, dat wij in het diepste van ons wezen ervaren. Slechts omdat de eeuw (het aevum) in 's menschen hart gelegd is, terwijl hij met geheel zijn functionmantel in den tijd besloten is, kan hij ook wezenlijk tijdsbesef hebben. Ging hij existentieel in den tijd op, dan zou hij ook het waarachtig tijdsbesef missen.

Nu is het boven-tijdelijk concentratiepunt in het zelf-bewustzijn, dat zich slechts in de religieuze concentrering van al onze functies op de eeuwigheid kan actualiseeren, nog niet zelven eeuwig te noemen.

Waar op dit punt veel misverstand in zake mijn opvatting is geresen, dien ik daarbij een oogenblik nader stil te staan. Reeds in de Christelijke synthesephilosophie uit den tijd der patristiek en scholastiek werd de noodzakelijkheid ingezien tusschen tijd en ware eeuwigheid een tusschentestand aan te nemen, een aeternitas creata, welke met den term werd aangeduid.<sup>11</sup>

11. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

In a footnote dealing with the phrase in this quote, "de eeuw (het aevum) in 's menschen hart gelegd is," Dooyeweerd says, "Ik laat thans in het midden of de bekende tekst van Prediker 3:11 in dezen zin moet worden verklaard. De geheele Heilige Schrift leert ons immers, dat het eeuwigheidsbesef aan 's menschen hart is ingeschapen."<sup>12</sup> This eternity consciousness not only provides man with the possibility of time consciousness, but enables one, as we have seen earlier, to have a totality view of the cosmos.<sup>13</sup> We have also seen that unless he participates in the totality of meaning which is supra-temporal and eternal in a created sense (i.e., characterized by het aevum) intermodal synthesis cannot be completed. To this is to be added that man would also not be able to have veritable self-knowledge since it is in the true condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand) that he is vis à vis his eternal Origin. To be added to this is the very important facet that cosmological and cosmic consciousness depend on this created eternity of the heart.<sup>14</sup> This shows the importance of the heart being supra-temporal if man is to be man. Man's consciousness enters the temporal by means of intuition and man's body is completely enclosed in the temporal except for the one transcendent point, or center of consciousness, which never can get into time, precisely because eternity has been laid in it and its nature is to be transcendent; that this center can never be temporal is clear because it only is meaning if it is subjected to the central unity of law, the law of love which as unity

12. Ibid., p. 2, footnote 1.

13. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 8, 11, 30-32, especially footnote 1 on p. 30.

14. Ibid., II, pp. 447-448, here referred to as the transcendent self-hood which we shall see is identical with the eternity in the heart of man which makes him transcendent in his center.

is the totality and fullness of the law on the law side. This means that it also cannot be temporal since all diversity of law proceeds from this transcendent unity of law precisely by being refracted through the prism of time. That the heart can never be temporal but is transcendent and only enters through intuition and has its body in time, comes out clearly when Dooyeweerd says that "de vergoddelijking van het tijdelijke is slechts in religieuze transcendering van de tijdsgrans mogelijk, al blijft deze transcendering, als concentratie der tijdelijke functies, haar band aan die tijdsgrans behouden."<sup>15</sup> This should make it clear that transcending is not an activity through which the selfhood moves from within the time horizon to beyond the time horizon, so that if the activity stopped it would fall back into the time horizon. Even the deification of the temporal is done by the selfhood from its transcendent position towards the temporal. The selfhood is held in existence by its concentration law which guarantees its transcendent position even in apostasy.<sup>16</sup> It is from this transcendent position that transcendence is possible. From the point of view of theoretical thought subject always to the transcendental horizon of cosmic time, we can see that our selfhood transcends cosmic time, that is, is above cosmic time, is transcendent. Our selfhood in the supra-temporal, and therefore transcendent, directs the temporal towards itself as root unity, that is, it concentrates it by drawing and directing its lower temporal bodily functions in creaturely concentration. This means that

15. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieen op het immanentiestandpunt," p. 5.

16. This fact comes out in his account of the opening process led by apostate faith in a disharmonious way which proves to be the result of the central tendency of the heart to absolutize. This shows that it retains its transcendent structure even when directed to the temporal. A New Critique, II, pp. 322-323.

by directing the lower to itself, the selfhood as root unity is directing the temporal to the eternal which in this case is the Origin. But the temporal is only centered or concentrated on the eternal Origin through the transcendent root unity, the selfhood, which is the individual concentration point.<sup>17</sup> This concentration is actualized in self-reflection which is a religious act and which must be repeatedly actualized. Apostate theoretical thought fails to see its real transcendent concentration point in the selfhood because that selfhood is seeking to actualize itself by concentrating on the temporal. This means that apostate thought cannot help but absolutize one of the temporal aspects since this apostate thought is finally thought directed by the concentrating, absolutizing apostate ego or selfhood which is seeking its Origin and rest in the restless temporal meaning dynamics. Since apostate thought is not directed above the temporal it does not arrive at true transcendental self-reflection and time consciousness and seeks also its root unity as well as its Origin in an aspect.<sup>18</sup>

A second thing which is involved, because the condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand) is bound and correlated to time in this life, is that all our "voorstellingen begrippen en ideeen" are bound to time, and therefore our knowledge of the condition of created eternity is completely limited to the time horizon. This means that "in this life" there should be no speculation concerning the condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand) at the time of the separation of soul and body, i.e., at death when the incorruptible (onvergankelijke) soul or selfhood

17. Ibid., I, p. 59. The individual selfhood can be called a concentration point and a root unity although the Archimedean point is always individual and supra-individual.

18. Ibid., II, pp. 323-325.

glides over into eternal life, or concerning the aevum or created eternity of the angels. The reason given is that "het hier gaat over 'verborgenheden' die ons nog niet geopenbaard zijn." Here it is clear that Dooyeweerd regards the angels as characterized by the condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand), that he regards them also, as well as the soul or heart after death, as supra-temporal, eternal in the creaturely sense, but warns that as yet we do not know enough about this state since enough has still not been revealed and because we are still bound to time and in this life. Here many points dealt with so far in this dissertation come clear. It is a common constituent of all nature-grace thinking that angels are regarded as not subject to time, in spite of the clear testimony of Scripture to the contrary. Popma has repeatedly emphasized the time consciousness of demons and the un-fallen angels.<sup>19</sup> It is simply inconceivable that one can deny that the angels are subject to cosmic time especially when one looks at the book of Revelation. Here in vision, John sees the heavenly throne from which the judgments issue and are carried out by the angels. The heavenly creatures are on tiptoe waiting for the coming wrath of God, waiting for the opening of the seals. Perhaps one of the best intimations of the strong time awareness of heavenly creatures is in Revelation 10:6. This is the text which is the locus classicus for the idea that time ceases and eternity begins at the judgment day. It speaks of the fact that "there shall be time no longer." In the context of the opening of the seals it obviously refers to the fact that there will be no more postponement of the display of God's final wrath. It is time now for the

19. See footnote 116 of chapter 2 of this dissertation.

seventh seal; there will be no more time or delay or postponement, but as the prophets have declared, the "mystery of God should be finished."<sup>20</sup> This text, which has been appealed to so repeatedly in Reformed and Catholic scholasticism, has nothing to do at all with the cessation of cosmic time so that eternity might begin. But it does clearly underscore the time consciousness of the heavenly creatures and their awareness of events, and indicates precisely the opposite of what it has been supposed to. This, along with Revelation 6:10 which speaks of the departed saints, beheaded, but asking under the altar "how long," shows unmistakably that Scripture does not hesitate in the least to think of the heavenly angels and departed saints as subjected to cosmic time and historical events and of these creatures as having a strong time consciousness in this state. It is true that these passages are not straight narrative and the book is filled with apocalyptic images, but it is the burden of this whole book to show the interrelation of Christ to his people and to history as a whole, so that his people on earth might be comforted to know that Christ directs their earthly lives and history as a whole. In the beginning of this chapter it was remarked that Dooyeweerd's critical thinking serves also the use of masking the nature-grace influence which lies hidden in his view of created eternity and time in addition to the reformational use of cutting off speculative metaphysical thinking. Here we see a good example of this. On the one hand he stresses that there can be no speculation about the aevum condition of the angels because there is not yet enough revelation and because our "thinking, representations, and ideas are bound to time," and

20. See footnote 139 of chapter 2 of this dissertation.

on the other hand he assumes that angels are eternal, or are characterized by aevum which is clearly a nature-grace speculative notion which Scripture in no way countenances. It is speculative metaphysical in the extreme to think of angels as participants in a condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand) and thus not in time.<sup>21</sup> In the history of scholastic theology the notion that angels did not have bodies and other speculative notions which were inherited from the Greek theo-ontological tradition, were said to come from the text that speaks of them as "ministering spirits."<sup>22</sup> Popma points out that there is no reason to speak of angels as being characterized as non-bodily and the presumption is stronger that they ought to be thought of as being in possession of bodies.<sup>23</sup> But in any case, that they are eternal in a created sense is so interwoven with the nature-grace perspective on these points that it is astounding that Dooyeweerd did not see this. In another place in the same article we have been discussing, he speaks of Thomas' idea of the aevum of the angels without seeing the full speculative depths of the whole idea.

On the one hand, Dooyeweerd employs a speculative view of aevum and even applies it to angels, and on the other hand, he says we cannot know anything about them and that it is speculative to try. It is here that the transcendental critical method, that hides and covers and makes it difficult to pin Dooyeweerd down, now shows the second use of the method quite clearly. The emphasis on cutting off speculation concerning even angels and departed saints could be appreciated if Dooyeweerd did not make this aevum condition of the selfhood so all important

21. Popma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte, pp. 76-80.

22. Hebrews 1:14.

23. Popma, op. cit., pp. 14, 83-85.

for his Christian transcendence standpoint. This condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand) controls his whole transcendental method and in turn he uses the transcendental method to cut off all access to the speculative notion of aevum. How does he know at all that angels partake of created eternity unless, via the "in and out method" of exegesis,<sup>24</sup> he has read this into the Scriptures and then read it out again. For as Dooyeweerd himself stresses, Scripture comes to us in our temporal, integral, naive experience and speaks to us in all our functions in the language of time, and according to Dooyeweerd, according to the order of time of faith (geloofs-tijdsorde). Nowhere is there the slightest hint that aevum applies to angels in Scripture. Here we see a hermeneutic for looking at biblical texts, one which seems to have a point elevated above the time order (tijdsorde) as it is seen in faith, the point of view of the transcendent selfhood in its immediate<sup>25</sup> relation to the eternal Origin and from which it can perceive the central nature of Word-revelation. It would seem from this point one is able to say that when the Scriptures speak to us in the language of time about angels and heaven, it is only pointing to the eternal.<sup>26</sup> This religious hermeneutic and its relation to the order of time of faith (geloofs-tijdsorde) will be dealt with in more depth later, but for now it should be clear that the transcendental method can serve the use of hiding nature-grace influence.

24. Vollenhoven, "Nieuwe philosophie (1961-1962) Monarchianisme (voor het irrationalisme)" (Amsterdam: mimeo, 1962), p. 7. Vollenhoven Kort Overzicht van de Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte (Amsterdam: THEJA, n.d.), pp. 22-23.

25. The idea of "immediacy" in Dooyeweerd, as in Kuyper before him, is quite important and will be dealt with later.

26. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 33.

So far it has been shown that Dooyeweerd operates with a typically scholastic view of eternal life, a notion which involves leaving the temporal and entering into eternal life. From what has been said in the section in which a global oversight of nature-grace thinking on these points was presented, we can see that an outline is emerging which definitely shows that he is under the nature-grace ground-motive concerning his notion of eternal life. The same applies to his idea of the restriction of time to the "earthly" cosmos and his consequent attributing of the aevum condition to angels. The phrase "in this life" shows clearly that Dooyeweerd is operating with the general notion that time ceases and is only for this life, and that the aevum condition, which is as yet still hidden in its fullness because of lack of revelation concerning it, only is entered into at death and in the future. The whole nature-grace complex concerning heaven as non-temporal, leaving time, and no future perspective for cosmic time because a created eternity is substituted for cosmic time, is clearly and unmistakably present. It will be shown that these notions follow from an implicit idea of God's eternity as an "eternal present" and the whole nature-grace schema will be clear.

It can now be said however that the intermediate condition (tussen-toestand) or aevum which brings with it "eternity consciousness" is exceedingly central as a background for his theoretical, philosophic systematics and for his transcendental critique.

These points will be established in still further detail and from slightly different angles since to establish these points is vital to our whole critique. In an interesting article from his early years, Dooyeweerd says,

Achter alle subjectsfuncties, welke de mensch in de orderscheiden wetskringen bezit schuilt de religieuze persoonlijkheid of ikheid, welke het eeuwig wezen van den mensch uitmaakt [Underlining mine] en ook, schoon zelve onder geen wetsbegrip te vatten, den wil draagt. De verdorvenheid van dit fundament alier subjectsfuncties maakt ons, tenzij wij door Gods geest in Christus wedergebooren zijn, onbekwaam tot eenig goed en geneigd tot alle kwaad.

De wedergeboorte anderzijds is het werk van den Heiligen Geest en evenmin als eenig ander van Gods werken onder de wet te vatten.

Toch openbaart dit werk Gods, dat den wortel van alle menschelike subjectsfuncties verandert, zich ook in den wereldsamenhang van onza bedeling, als vrije scheppende inwerking Gods in ons dage- lijksch leven en werken.<sup>27</sup>

Here he clearly states that the "religious personality or I-ness constitutes the eternal essence of man." This comes at a time before Dooyeweerd had written his article in which he developed his idea of aevum. Here, and as we shall see in further quotations from this article, he has still not developed his idea of cosmic time, and he also operates far more uncritically with his idea of created eternity. The notion that the I-ness or religious personality constitutes the eternal essence of man shows clearly, at least, that there is a clear duality in man between the eternal essence and the temporal body. It also points out the fact that at death the aevum condition, although Dooyeweerd stresses that we know little here, applies not to the body which is subject to temporal death, but applies rather to the eternal essence of man, the religious personality or I-ness. This is mentioned now to show a basis in the text of Dooyeweerd for a conclusion which was drawn earlier (pp. 137-138) without explicit textual support in Dooyeweerd, namely

27. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde, (driemaandelijksch orgaan) II (1928), pp. 76-77.

that he regards the aeulum condition as applying to the soul rather than the body.

In an earlier section an attempt has been made to show that one should not conclude that Dooyeweerd necessarily has a dualism because of his stress on the eternal essence and temporal body which constitute man.<sup>28</sup> It was stressed there that it is rather to be looked at as a duality since he is monistic, and that the duality is in terms of two primal contrasts which are always correlated in man. This is mentioned here because we now want to show that this rather sharp duality present in an early article continues throughout his later writing and that it has even been somewhat developed. We are seeking to confirm the basic thesis that the idea of created eternity in nature-grace fashion is abiding, central, and present, even up to recent times.

When Dooyeweerd speaks of the scriptural view of the heart, he quite often brings to one's attention that the soul is not subject to "temporal death." For example, he says,

Waar de Schrift in praeminent religieuzen zijn over de menschelijke ziel of geest spreekt, doet ze ons deze steeds zien als het hart van heel het tijdelijk bestaan, waaruit alle uitgangen van het tijdelijke leven zijn. In het tijdelijk bestaan leert de Schrift nergens een dichotomie 'redelijke ziel' en 'materielichaam', maar ze vat dit tijdelijk bestaan in zijn geheel als lichaam, dat bij den dood wordt afgelegd. Daarentegen is 's menschen geest of ziel als religieuze wortel van het lichaam volgens de openbaring der Schrift niet aan den tijdelijken (doch buiten Christus Jezus aan den eeuwighen) dood onderworpen, omdat hij inderdaad alle tijdelijke dingen te boven gaat.<sup>29</sup>

In another instance he writes,

De 'ziel' van 's menschen bestaan, die naar het getuigenis der Schrift door den tijdelijken dood niet

28. See pages 45-48, 56-58 of this dissertation.

29. Dooyeweerd, "De leer van den mensch in de W.d.W.," p. 135.

getroffen wordt maar ook na de aflegging van het 'lichaam', d.i. van heel den tijdelijken, in individualiteits-structuur besloten bestaansvorm, blijft voortbestaan, is de religieuze wortel de menschelijke existentie, door de Schrift ook wel de 'inwendige mensch' of het 'hart' van den mensch genoemd, 'waaruit alle uitgangen des levens zijn' en 'waarin de eeuwigheid gelegd is'. Zij is, gelijk Kuyper het in zijn Stonelezingen over het Calvinisme uitdrukt, 'dat punt in ons bewustzijn waar ons leven nog ongedeeld bleef en nog in zijn eenheid ligt samengevat'. Dat concentratiepunt ligt volgens Kuyper 'niet in de gespreide stengels, maar in den wortel, waarop alle stengels uitschoten'. En dat punt kan nu niet anders liggen dan in de tegenstelling tusschen al het eindige in ons menschelijk leven en het oneindige, dat er achter ligt. Daar alleen is de gemeenschappelijk bron, van waaruit de verschillende stroomen van ons menschelijk leven opkomen en zich verdeelen'. En dat gebruikt ook Kuyper niet alleen het beeld van den religieuze wortel, maar ook dat van het brandpunt: 'Persoonlijk ervaren wij dan ook gedurig, hoe in het diepst van ons gewoed, op het punt waar dit gewoed zich voor den Eeuwige ontsluit, alle stralen van ons leven als in één brandpunt samenvallen, en alleen daar die harmonie herwinnen, die ze in het leven zoo telkens en zoo pijnlijk verliezen'.<sup>30</sup>

Dooyeweerd gives his counterpart to the scholastic notions of the simplicity, indivisibility, and imperishability of the soul when he says,

Eenvoudig, ondeelbaar en onvergankelijk [underlining mine] blijft de ziel als transcendent geestelijk religieus centrum van het menschelijke bestaan, dat heel het lichaam in zijn tijdelijke structuur besluit en het menschelijk karakter opdrukt. Maar deze ziel is niet als zoodanig, maar slechts in haar tijdelijke openbaringen in het vergankelijke lichaam voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek vatbaar, omdat zij voor-onderstelde van alle wetenschappelijke werkzaamheid is.<sup>31</sup>

These are common formulations and they occur in other places.<sup>32</sup>

What we are seeking to establish in these quotations is that they strongly suggest that the soul is indestructible and exists on after death

30. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," pp. 181-182.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
32. Dooyeweerd, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip," p. 35. Also, Vernieuwing en Bezinning (Zutphen: J. B. Van den Brink, 1963), p. 42.

precisely because of its nature as created eternity. Therefore, he says that it is not subject to temporal death. These characteristics given the soul are precisely those of created eternity or of the aevum condition. One could say that the eternity or aevum, in its creaturely sense, is characterized by indivisibility, indestructibility, and simplicity. This is so because time is the principle of cosmic diversity.<sup>33</sup> For these reasons Dooyeweerd often speaks of religion, the transcendent sphere, as being undifferentiated, or before differentiation. It is precisely for this reason that no concept of the heart is possible since concepts presuppose the logical and the non-logical aspects, and in the transcendent root unity there is no longer present any distinction between the logical function and the non-logical bodily function.<sup>34</sup> Diversity is strictly limited to the earthly temporal cosmos and all that is above the earthly is not diversified, but rather, full, unified, undifferentiated, indivisible, simple, and indestructible, and partakes of eternity in a creaturely sense, or in the divine sense as applied to God.<sup>35</sup> We can see that when earlier Dooyeweerd spoke of the fact that the religious personality or I-ness comprises the eternal essence of man he was setting forth what was to remain an

33. Dooyeweerd, "De leer der analogie in de Thomistische wijsbegeerte en in de W.d.W.," Phil. Ref., VII (1941), p. 48. He clearly states that the time order brings the diversity of aspects into existence. Also, A New Critique, I, pp. 16-19, 1-5, 106. See also footnote 31 of chapter 2 of this dissertation.

34. Dooyeweerd, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip." This article contains one of the clearest applications of the transcendental method. Also, A New Critique, I, pp. 1-5, 106.

35. Dooyeweerd uses time as a boundary line. A New Critique, I, p. 102. This is interesting because the law is the boundary line between God and man. There are two fundamental boundaries (grenzen) to his system. Time as a boundary line divides the creation into its two basic contrasts, eternity and time, while the law is the boundary between the sovereign Creator and subjected creation.

essential feature of his thinking throughout his life. When he spoke earlier of the fact that in this life we do not know what aevum will be like at the separation of soul and body and in respect to the angels because we are in this life bound to time, we clearly see that he regards the heart or soul as in possession of the condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand). We therefore do not know what this eternity of the soul will be like after death because it is beyond our concepts, but there can be no doubt about the aevum characteristic of the soul or heart after death. It is precisely because of this characteristic that it is not subject to "temporal death" and lives on without the body, and is indestructible and does not perish.

It seems that aevum in respect to the heart of man becomes "eternal life" after death for believers. In contrast to Dooyeweerd, one must maintain that the idea of "eternal life" can only be applied to believers, for it is the opposite of "eternal death." Also, it must be maintained that according to Scripture "eternal life" is the possession of the whole man already "in this life," i.e., before death, before believers go to be with Christ. Dooyeweerd too closely identifies aevum which is in contrast to this temporal life with eternal life, and he does this in such a way that it is only entered into when the soul glides over into eternal life. For him eternal death ought to be the direction of the aevum condition as it is directed away from God at death, but the Scriptures say that one who does not believe is condemned already in this life. For Dooyeweerd, however, the aevum condition is the nature of the selfhood whether it is believing or unbelieving. As a situation or condition aevum is creaturely concentrating on the eternity of the Origin, and this very concentrating is only possible because the selfhood is eternal

in a creaturely sense, that is, transcendent. Dooyeweerd explains the apostate absolutizing of the temporal, or seeking the eternal in the temporal, by the presence of this condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand). Since for Dooyeweerd aevum is a structural characteristic of the selfhood of Christians and non-Christians alike, we can conclude that this aevum condition "in this life," that is, before death in the case of Christians, is not yet to be called eternal life, but rather becomes eternal life when the "indestructible" soul puts off its body at death. Then the believing man is strictly in aevum and this is the same as in eternal life. At the resurrection of the dead the "spiritual body" would then be added to the indestructible soul and thus the body would also partake of aevum. In contrast to this it has been pointed out that Dooyeweerd must maintain two directions to the aevum condition, namely, eternal life and eternal death, but this is not emphasized.

As we have seen, this idea of non-temporal, indivisible eternity applies to the soul after death, before death while still in the body, and to the angels, and thus this aevum forming an intermediate condition (tussentoestand) between temporal diversity and God's eternity is characteristic of nature-grace thinking.

Dooyeweerd has made quite an effort to Christianize his view of the heart or soul and to set it off from the scholastic views and the nature-freedom views concerning the soul. For example, he deals at length with this point in his article, "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch substantiebegrip." He tries especially to set off his view from the immortality of the soul as it is related to the form-pole of the form-matter motive of Greek thinking.<sup>36</sup> He makes every effort in

36. Especially pp. 34ff. in part II of this article.

this article not to have his view of the heart confused with the idea of the substantial soul of scholastic philosophy. He simply believes that the Scriptures teach the simplicity, indivisibility, indestructibility, and the created eternity of the soul, and then not only on the basis of Ecclesiastes 3:11, but also from the whole of the Scriptures. Berkouwer, in defense of Dooyeweerd, tries to do justice to the fact that Dooyeweerd's new dichotomy has nothing at all to do with the traditional whole-part scheme and substantial soul of the scholastics. Berkouwer's emphasis on the difference of Dooyeweerd's view is fair to Dooyeweerd in general, but he views him a little too much through the light of his own position. He rightly defends Dooyeweerd against Spier's surmise to the effect that the supra-temporality of the heart would also involve some sort of super-creatureliness.<sup>37</sup> As Berkouwer has rightly seen, this is wholly foreign to Dooyeweerd. Berkouwer is also correct when he points out that Dooyeweerd does not view the supra-temporality of the heart in the sense of an added "gift" or "brown," nor does he wish a "relation" between God and an independent and self-enclosed and self-existing man, a relation which would be added to man's humanness.<sup>38</sup> He is also correct over against Popma who suggests that aevum always implies an aeternitas participata notion.<sup>39</sup> He rightfully stresses that Dooyeweerd, in speaking of the heart, intends not a deeper part of man, but rather the whole man with all his temporal functions in his religious concentration, i.e., in his relation to God.<sup>40</sup> He is in error

37. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), pp. 260-263.

38. Ibid., p. 261.

39. Ibid., p. 262.

40. Ibid., p. 263.

though, when he says, "He (Dooyeweerd) does not mean to place eternity (aevum) and time neatly next to each other."<sup>41</sup> However, contrary to Berkouwer, Dooyeweerd does do just this, although the word "neatly" prejudices the matter somewhat. Berkouwer does not do full justice to the scope of this idea of aevum. We have already seen that Dooyeweerd ascribes it to the angels, although he does not speculate much about this. But much more, Dooyeweerd also applies the notion of aevum to the fact of religion as a supra-temporal, central sphere of occurrence, to the fact of leaving the temporal at death, to the fact of the heart after it has laid off its temporal cloak, to the body, to the fact of man having an eternal destination, and to the fact of a supra-temporal root community. Berkouwer obviously has not studied the broader use of the term "supra-temporality" in Dooyeweerd's total writings, or he would not have dismissed this so quickly. Even with his defense he is hard pressed to defend some of Dooyeweerd's formulations concerning this point,<sup>42</sup> and if he were to probe more deeply, he might be less convinced. He does not deny that Dooyeweerd speaks of the selfhood as in an aevum state or having an aevum consciousness<sup>43</sup> and so his defense does not really bear on our critique. It is true, as Berkouwer stresses, that Dooyeweerd views the heart of man only in its three central relations, but as a converging center of all the functions it is not identical with its body, for otherwise the distinction of heart and body would have no meaning. It is also true that the heart is the whole man in central relation to God, but the I-ness is only the center of consciousness,

41. Ibid., p. 263.

42. Ibid., pp. 262-263.

43. Ibid., p. 263.

otherwise there would be no sense to the term "center." It is precisely as transcendent center that the heart can be characterized as in an aevum condition. This is not an attempt to read into Dooyeweerd's idea of the heart the scholastic view of substance, but it is not fair to Dooyeweerd to stress simply the idea of relation or the act of transcendence. The heart is under or subjected to the supra-temporal central law of love which is also the law of concentration, but it is not that law itself. Because of this the aevum situation is a permanent state or situation for the heart, and the acts of actualization, transcendence, and concentration, as well as this permanent situation or condition on the subject side presuppose the structural permanence of the law of concentration which conditions that which is on the subject side. Berkouwer tends to represent transcendence as a "rising above" modal diversity.<sup>44</sup>

44. Ibid., pp. 260, footnote 39, 261. This point of rising above or "transcending" needs to be very clear. Dooyeweerd regards only the center of consciousness to be transcendent and supra-temporal. Man's selfhood only is transcendent and because of this all man's consciousness except for this transcendent center is found "in this life" within time and the temporal horizon. For this reason when one speaks of the supra-temporal heart one is not speaking in Dooyeweerd's system as if man were half in time and half in eternity. All the diversity of his acts and the whole act structure *enkaptically* interwoven with the other three individuality structures make the body an integral structure for consciousness to express itself. Because it is only a point, a concentration point which can hardly be called a substance in any classical sense, a point which only exists in its three relations to God, fellowman, and the temporal, and does not stand in itself, one can easily see why Dooyeweerd can speak of man transcending the diversity of his acts and functions in his heart or soul or I-ness or selfhood. This is natural since Dooyeweerd stresses that man is in time with his consciousness with all that this involves time and time again, e.g., A New Critique, I, pp. 23, 24, 31, and especially III, p. 89, where he says, "The human body is man himself in the structural whole of his temporal appearance. And the human soul, in its pregnant religious sense is man himself in the radical unity of his spiritual existence, which transcends all temporal structures." Also, III, pp. 477-479. With this stress in mind one can understand why Dooyeweerd can speak of man transcending time since man himself in his temporal appearance is in time, and yet he transcends time,

This is a false representation of what Dooyeweerd intends here. The heart transcends the diversity because it is transcendent to the diversity, in fact, the diversity of functions is a refraction of the individual transcendent root unity, the heart. From the point of view of the immanent temporal functions, the heart transcends them, but the heart is always above the diversity, it does not "rise above" diversity, for this presupposes that at some point it is in the diversity. If this were true, Dooyeweerd would never designate the heart as transcendent as Berkouwer says he does.<sup>45</sup> We have seen that creaturely concentrating is initiated from the starting point or point of departure (uitgangspunt) in the transcendent supra-temporal heart. It is a concentrating of the temporal functions upon the selfhood, by the selfhood itself. Dooyeweerd's whole transcendental critique rests on the fact that theoretical thought cannot direct itself because it is only temporal and it does not exist abstracted from the transcendent aeon of the selfhood that directs it, and then redirects and expresses itself in this temporal instrument, theoretical thought.<sup>46</sup> It is for this reason that theoretical autonomy

that is, he is not qualified by a temporal function like other individuality structures but he has a transcendent center above time which directs him in all his diverse acts and functions. So he can be said to rise above and transcend, but, and this is the point, the center does not rise above from in time to above time. Man transcends time because he is transcendent in his root and center, i.e., heart. That heart as center can never be reduced to a function or functional complex and so can never be thought of as immanent in the temporal horizon. Man's temporal consciousness escapes (ontsnappen), as Popma phrases it in his own position, because it structurally is not wholly in it. This must be seen in all Dooyeweerd's statements in which it is stressed that man rises above, and it must always be remembered that he speaks of the heart as transcendent, and therefore, imperishable, eternal, aeon, and as the root of all temporal functional refractions.

45. Berkouwer, op. cit., p. 260, footnote 38.

46. This appears very clearly in Dooyeweerd's De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931), pp. 84-135. This is the most

is driven beyond the temporal boundary to its religious choice and starting point. If concentration is looked at as a rising above diversity in the sense Berkouwer suggests, then Dooyeweerd's aeon situation

elaborate presentation of his epistemology before the presentation of De Wijsbegeerte der Wetwetidee in 1936. It was undoubtedly in writing this book that he formulated clearly his vision of the selfhood and time as a prism. In the article, "De structuur der rechtsbeginsalen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetwetidee," which appeared the year before (1930) we have seen one of his first presentations of his definitive vision. For his statements on time and selfhood see De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer, p. 97, where he says, "De gehele innerlijk antinomie der zgn. kritische kennistheorie ligt in deze slechts-functionele opvatting van het zelfbewustzijn in nuce besloten. Het zelfbewustzijn draagt noodzakelijk tegelijk een den tijd transcenderend en den tijd immanent karakter. De dispere identiteit, welke in de self-heid beleefd wordt, is een trans-functionele, het is het zich een-dezelfde weten in en boven alle kosmisch-tijdelijke zinfuncties en het zich zijn tijdelijke zinfuncties als eigen weten." On page 93 he says, "Ons Archimedisch punt, dat ons zalfbewustzijn (de crux van alle humanistische kennistheorie!) bepaalt, doet ons de tijdelijke werkelijkheid zien als een uiterst gedifferentieerde zinbraking van de religieuze zin-volheid van onzen kosmos door het prisma van den kosmischen tijd, welken tijd wij in den religieuze wortel van ons zelfbewustzijn, in bovenlijdelijke self-heid transcenderen, doch waarin wij met al onze tijdelijke bewustzijns-en andere kosmische functies tevens immanent verkeeren. De grondnoemer, waarin wij de dispere eenheid en samenhang aller in den kosmischen tijd gebroken zinfuncties vatten, is de religieuze bovenlijdelijke zin-volheid, die geen synthetische denk-abstractie, maar de concrete zin-voleindiging der tijdelijke realiteit selve is." On p. 103 he says, "De mogelijkheid der zin-synthese is slechts op te klaren vanuit de door ons vroeger summier aangegeven opvatting i.e. de structuur van het zelfbewustzijn. Het zelfbewustzijn transcenderen den kosmischen tijd, inzooverre de individuele zelfheid deel heeft aan den religieuze wortel van het menschen-geslacht, van welks zinvolheid alle tijdelijke zin-functies (zoowel natuur- als geestesfuncties) slechts tijdelijke zinbraken zijn. Het is immanent aan den kosmischen tijd, in zooverre onze bewustzijnsfuncties in de kosmische tijdsorde zijn ingevlochten. De a-logische zinfuncties zijn niet vreemd aan het zelfbewustzijn. Ze zijn alle gezamenlijk eigen aan onze zelfheid. Alleen daarom kunnen wij ze in hare zin-wetmatigheid leeren kennen." On p. 113 he says, "De individuele zelfheid is door en door religieus, bovenlijdelijk. In de kosmische tijdsorde kan noch aan den individueelen mensch, noch aan het verband zelfheid, ikheid toekomen. Dit is het cardinale uitgangspunt voor iedere wezenlijke Christelijke beschouwing der tijdelijke samenleving. Dit betekent tegelijk de definitieve afwijzing van iedere 'metaphysische', substantialiserende opvatting van het kosmologisch dingbegrip. De mensch transcendeert in zijn individuele ikheid alle tijdelijke verbandstructuren, omdat hij

is being reduced to an act of transcendence, which is not what Dooyeweerd intends. The meaning of "transcends" is that the transcendent center stands above its immanent temporal diversity of functions and body, and therefore is above them, so that from the temporal looking to root unity it might be said to "transcend" or rise above.

Popma takes a much more dim view of Dooyeweerd's dichotomy. He has subjected Dooyeweerd's system as a whole to a running critique in his seven volume work, Levensbeschouwing. One of the obvious purposes of this work is to bring out into the open Popma's objections to Dooyeweerd's thinking. Dooyeweerd's view of body and soul has not gone without lengthy and frequent critique from various angles. Popma says,

Berkouwer wijst er op, dat Dooyeweerd in zijn wijsgerige anthropologie de idee van dichotomie aanhoudt. (De mens het beeld Gods, 1957, 285-293) en hij is van oordeel, dat Dooyeweerd daardoor niet een dualistische beschouwing voordraagt. Wij menen, dat Dooyeweerd aan een zeker dualisme niet ont-komt, als hij spreekt over 'de ziel' van 's mensen bestaan, die naar het getuigenis der Schrift door de tijdelijke dood niet getroffen wordt, maar ook na de aflegging van het 'lichaam', d.i. van heel de tijdelijke, in individualiteits-structuur besloten bestaansvorm, blijft voortbestaan (Het tijdsprobleem in de wijsgeerde der wetsidee, Phil. Ref. V (1940), p. 181). ... Het ligt in de aard van de zaak, dat we ons geen voorstelling en geen begrip kunnen vormen omtrent het bestaan en de bestaanswijze van de gestorven, voortbestaande en voortlevende mens. Het is immers juist de grondfout van de idee van een anima separata, dat zij een krachtige poging is om het onvoorstelbare voorstelbaar, en het onbegrijpelijk te maken. Een rest van die poging zit o.k. ook in de opvatting van Dooyeweerd, die wel de idee van anima separata verwerpt, maar alleen in haar vroeg-scholastische vormgeving, en in zijn handhaving van de term en de idee van een dichotomie er niet aan ontkomen kan, een, wel geheel anders gevormde, maar in de grond der zaak evenzeer dualistische gedachte 'ziel' dat wil zeggen

deel heeft aan den religieuzen wortel van het menschengeslacht, van welks zinvolheid heel de tijdelijke realiteit in natuur- en geestesfuncties slechts een tijdelijke zin-breking is." The whole of Dooyeweerd's vision of the transcendental critique, method and critical thinking as shown in these quotations is seen to be dependent on his nature-grace vision of supra-temporality or asvum eternity character of the selfhood.

een dualistisch schema van lichaam en ziel, vast te houden.

Ook in de boven aangehaalde these van Dooyeweerd zien wij een poging, het onvoorstelbare voorstelbaar, en het onbegrijpelijk te maken. De idee van de integrale eenheid van de menselijke natuur verdraagt geen enkele vorm van dichotomie in de mens-visie. Dooyeweerd verwerpt inderdaad de vroeg-en klassiek-scholastische idee van anima rationalis separata. Maar een andere anima separata komt er voor in de plaats, nl. 'de ziel' van 's mensen bestaan, die naar het getuigenis der Schrift door de tijdelijke dood niet getroffen wordt. De idee van 'tijdelijke' dood kent de Schrift niet; bij de drie opwekkingswonderen die Jezus verricht heeft, het dochertje van Jairus, de jongeman te Nain en Lazarus, spreekt de Heiland gestorven mensen toe en gebiedt hun te leven. Uit welke bestaanswijze ze tot hun leven terugkeren, zegt de Schrift niet. Deze bestaanswijze is onvoorstelbaar, onbegrijpelijk, en misschien 'structuurloos'....

Door het sterven, dat de ganze mens betreft, wordt hij gebroken, maar hij is niet oorspronkelijk, principieel, creatuurlijk breekbaar. Daarin ligt het volkomen raadselachtige van de dood, en dat blijft er ook, wanneer we samenmen, dat de dood niet alleen een lapsarische, maar ook een creatuurlijke factor bevat.<sup>47</sup>

In another volume he says,

Men kan het dualisme van lichaam en ziel verwerpen, zoals dat geleerd werd door de oude scholastiek, en toch in een nieuwe scholastiek belanden. Volgens het oude schema is het sterven dit, dat het lichaam sterft maar de ziel blijft leven, ze is onsterfelijk. Dat is een makkelijk schema, en het heeft alleen dit bezwaar dat het op de feiten niet klopt en volkomen onjuist is. Op zulk een wijze wordt de doorgang, waarvan antwoord 42 spreekt, tot een overgang gemaakt, waarbij aan de continuïteit geen recht wordt gedaan. Op deze manier moet men er toe komen, meer dan één tijdsorde aan te nemen en daardoor te vervallen in het oude dualisme van zwakke en sterke tijd. Als men het 'traditionele dualisme van lichaam en ziel' verwerpt, en dan gaat leren dat het ik, het hart, de zelfheid of hoe men het verder noemen wil, onsterfelijk is, dan is men metterdaad in de scholastiek blijven steken, of heeft men, wat op hetzelfde neerkomt, voor een nieuwe scholastiek gecapituleerd. Men kan dan gaan zeggen, dat het hart onsterfelijk is en de functies door de dood vernietigd worden, maar dit is klaarblijkelijk een poging het onbegrijpelijk te maken. Als ik zeg dat het 'ik' het menselijk 'ego' 'tijdelijk' fungeert in de onderscheiden aspecten der tijdelijke werkelijkheid', dan is geheel onduidelijk wat het woord 'tijdelijk' betekent. Is dit 'tijdelijk fungeren' een temporeel fungeren, of een voorlopig

47. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, VI, pp. 168-169.

fungeren? Is die tijdelijke werkelijkheid temporeel of voorlopig? Is het tijdelijk fungeren van een bovenlijdelijk ego iets, dat alleen als mysterie beleden kan worden, of is het een systematisch beschreven situatie? Wordt door het tijdelijk fungeren misschien juist de bovenlijdelijkheid ondersteld van datgene, dat fungeert? Of moet hier wellicht meer dan één tijdsorde aangenomen worden, met welke namen men die dan ook benoemt? Hoe dit alles zij: indien we de mens moeten zien als een samenwerkingsgeheel van onsterfelijk ego en sterfelijke functionaliteit, dan heeft het Schriftuurlijk zicht op ons sterven afgedaan.

Bovendien wrekt zich deze onderscheiding van ego en functies ook nog op andere manier in onze levens-beschouwing-en-wandel. Als ik de dood, waarop ik uitzicht heb en waar we naar toe gaan, zo opvat, dat de 'tijdelijke functies' worden vernietigd terwijl het 'ik' blijft voortbestaan (in onsterfelijkheid!), dan heb ik daarmee een dualisme in de anthropologie aanvaard, dat voor dat van de oude scholastiek niet onderdoet. Men kan het schema van hart en functies aanvaarden, zonder dat men behoefte te poneren, dat de 'functie-mantel' door de dood wordt vernietigd. Het gaat er maar om, dat we niet meer willen weten dat we weten kunnen. De dood, ook de dood als rest, symbool en onderwijsmiddel, is totaal, zodat ook het hart (of, mijntewege: ik, zelfheid, ziel, geest, of welke andere term men moge willen invoeren) daardoor wordt getroffen.<sup>48</sup>

He broadens his critique still farther when he says,

Een dualisme van tijdelijk lichaam en bovenlijdelijk 'ik' kan ons niet helpen bij het nadenken over de betekenis van ons sterven; want de gehele mens sterft. Dit wordt ons nog duidelijker als we het dualisme van tijdelijk lichaam en bovenlijdelijk 'ik' nog wat nader bekijken. Tot het tijdelijk lichaam behoort namelijk onder meer ook de geloofsfunctie. Het woord 'geloofs-functie' heeft alleen dan zin, als het genomen wordt in de betekenis van 'tijdelijke geloofs-functie', want het woord 'functie' zelve doet al een beroep op de tijd. Hierbij moeten we bedenken, dat deze tijdelijke geloofsfunctie steeds in verband staat met de als bovenlijdelijk gewaardeerde religie, naar een overbelijnd schema van tijd en eeuwigheid, dat die beide scheidt en in relatie stelt. Een minder belijnd schema, dat dichter bij de ongereduceerde ervaring staat, laat zich leiden door de overweging, dat de voorbijstromende tijd een toeschouwer 'aan de oever' onderstelt, en komt zo tot een aantrekkelijke aanduiding van de relatie van tijd en eeuwigheid, die echter het nadeel heeft dat ze een subjectivistische tijdsgedachte nadert en daaraan vermoedelijk op den duur niet zal kunnen ontkomen. We vergelijken dus twee visies: de ene die tijd en eeuwig-

48. Ibid., II, pp. 194-195.

heid in het menselijke in radicale scheidingsrelatie ziet en daarmee innerlijk tegenstrijdig is, een andere die dichter bij de ongereduceerde ervaring blijft, maar het nadeel heeft subjectivistisch te worden. Het is er ons uiteraard niet om te doen, een tussenpositie tussen deze twee op te zoeken. We kunnen evenmin volstaan met de nadelen van beide op te merken. Het dualisme van tijdelijk lichaam en bovenlijdelijk 'ik' schijnt onvermijdelijk een dualisme van twee tijdsorden te moeten aanvaarden. Want deze bovenlijdelijkheid kan niet gedacht worden als ontrokkenheid aan de tijd; dan ware elke verdere discussie overbodig. Ze kan alleen zijn hebben als een andere, ons wellicht niet nader bekende tijdsorde.

Nu is in de eerste plaats het geloof allerminst tijdelijk, in welke zin ook. Het is niet voorlopig, het kan ook niet zonder meer temporeel genoemd worden. Een beroep op 2 Cor. 4:18 is uiteraard ongeldig: 'de dingen die men ziet, zijn tijdelijk'; zulk een beroep zou eenvoudig op biblicisme neerkomen; blijkens de context gaat het hier over de voorlopigheid van het mens-buiten-zijn, de voorlopigheid en dus onhoudbaarheid van het in-het-openbaar-zijn (vgl. Rom. 2:28v). Het geloof is noch voorlopig noch zonder meer temporeel; wie in den Zoon gelooft heeft eeuwig leven.

Aan de andere kant kunnen we aan het hart of het ik of de ziel geen exclusief bovenlijdelijke aard toekennen (afgedacht nog van het mythisch karakter van deze bovenlijdelijkheid, die haar onbespreekbaar maakt in de discussie), omdat de gehele mens in de tijd van zijn geschiedenis staat, niet zijn hart en religie. Daarom spreken we van Verbondsgeschiedenis, heilsgeschiedenis en zelfs openbaringsgeschiedenis.<sup>49</sup>

In an article in the Correspondentie-bladen he brings critique from yet another angle. He says, "Het is duidelijk, dat deze opvatting inzake 'ecclesia invisibilis' en 'ecclesia visibilis' staat en valt met het rigoureuze onderscheid tussen bovenlijdelijk hart en tijdelijke existentie; ik meen, dat dit onderscheid in zijn rigoureuze vorm heden door Prof. Dooyeweerd niet wordt geponeerd."<sup>50</sup>

It is clear from these quotations that Popma sees in Dooyeweerd's thinking an ontology type which is dualistic. Not only is it dualistic

49. Ibid., II, pp. 196-197.

50. Popma, "Saecularisatie en zichtbaarheid," Corr. bladen, XXII/2 (1957), p. 36.

but it is specified to be a dualism with a dichotomy in its anthropology. This is one of the basic divisions Vollenhoven sees among dualists, that is, whether or not they have a dichotomy in their anthropology, i.e., whether or not there is a transcendent element in man. In an earlier section it was mentioned that Vollenhoven suggests that since Dooyeweerd regarded the heart or soul above the cosmos, he must be regarded as an advocate of either the doctrine of priority or as in the line of the late Aristotle.<sup>51</sup> The possibility that this other ontology type, namely, the line of the late Aristotle, might better capture some of Dooyeweerd's emphases, will be dealt with later. From the given quotations it is clear that Popma sees in Dooyeweerd a dualism with dichotomy and that he focuses his critique on the idea that the heart is supra-temporal, transcendent, in a condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand), incorruptible (onvergankelijk), and not subject to temporal death. Popma also sees that Dooyeweerd has two orders of time. He says, "Het dualisme van tijdelijk lichaam en bovenlijdelijk 'ik' schijnt onvermijdelijk een dualisme van twee tijdsorden te moeten aanvaarden."<sup>52</sup> This is the point we have been trying to establish thus far, namely that Dooyeweerd has two orders, time and created eternity, and that two orders of time are constitutive of a nature-grace position.

Since this is so crucial more evidence for this judgment from the text of Dooyeweerd will be presented. In line with what we have seen concerning the heart as eternal and incorruptible (onvergankelijk) we find a very important quote from an early article of Dooyeweerd, "Beroepsmisdaad en strafvergelding." As part of this article he has a Naschrift, "Inzake het recht der Calvinistische wetenschapsbeschouwing,"

51. See p. 24 of this dissertation.

52. Popma, Levensbeschouwing, II, p. 196.

en het misverstand eener neutral wetenschappelijke kritiek." This is one of the first places in which Dooyeweerd speaks of the Archimedean point. In this connection he also uses the term "transcendent" in clear distinction from "transcendental;" a distinction which shall in later years prove very important. This is a key article, for up to this time he had not seen the unity of the cosmos in an Archimedean point within the creation, but had found it in the providential world plan or the eternal counsel of God. He says,

Op deze vraag kan alleen de wetsidee antwoord geven, want hier moet een transcendent standpunt worden ingenomen, een Archimedisch punt boven alle bijzondere weteskrijingen van psyche, logos, ethos, recht, schoonheid, historie, enz.; het transcendentale komt niet boven de grenzen der bijzondere weteskrijingen uit. Welnu, slechts in zijn diepste kern transcendeert de menschelijke geest boven den tijdelijken wetessamenhang, slechts de religieuze kern der persoonlijkheid is het eeuwige in den mensch, niet zijn zedelijke, logische, psychische of esthetische subjectafuncties, die veelal geheel in den tijdelijken wetessamenhang zijn ingeschakeld.

De menschelijke rede in den zin der humanistische immaterialie-idee genomen, is niets dan een kosmische eenheid van logische en na-logische subjectafuncties. Hier is het gezochte Archimedisch punt niet te vinden.<sup>53</sup>

53. Dooyeweerd, "Beroepsmisdaad en strafvergelding in 't licht der wetsidee," (met Naschrift: "Inzake het recht der Calvinistische wetenschapsbeschouwing, en het misverstand eener neutral wetenschappelijke kritiek,") Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde (driemaandselijksch orgaan), II (1928), p. 425. Historically this is a very interesting quote. This is one of the first times he has seen the necessity of the Archimedean point. The stress on this point is reminiscent of his articles in the first year of the Phil. Ref. ("Het dilemma voor het Christelijk wijsgeerig denken," and "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieen...") in which his thoughts center around the need for an Archimedean point. This quote can be called the beginning of a line of thinking which can be called his transcendental critical line. It is here that his transcendental starting point is found. It is interesting in this connection that he speaks of the "transcendent standpunt" as above all special law spheres and of the human spirit as above the temporal law coherence. In this same year in an article in the Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde (1928), "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," he definitely did not have his view of cosmic time developed (pp. 11).

A few pages later in the same article he expresses a similar thought, although it is unique in the fact that he uses the term "immortal" to describe the religious kernel in man. He says,

Uit de openbaring der geddelijke waarheid over de verhouding van Schepper en Schepping, een openbaring die zich primair niet richt tot gevoel of logisch denken, tot zedelijkheids- of schoonheidsbewustzijn, doch veleer tot het eeuwige, onsterfelijke in den mensch, de religieuze kern onzer persoonlijkheid en die eerst vanuit dat religieuze centrum betrekenis verkrijgt voor ons kennen en handelen.<sup>54</sup>

We see clearly at this point the significance of the term "eternal." Dooyeweerd hardly ever refers to the religious center of man as eternal after 1936. We find in various places that he points to Ecclesiastes 3:11 to show that "eternity is laid in the heart." From 1936 he uses the term bovenlijdelijk quite consistently. In a later article in 1939<sup>55</sup> he refines his idea of eternity as applied to the religious center in man, and calls it sevum. Another important consideration is that the word "transcendent," when applied to the center, signifies

116, footnote 5; 121, footnote 86). In the quotation given in the text where he speaks of "beven der tijdelijken wets samenhang" we see that he has really broken through to his lasting vision of the transcendental method. We still do not have in the article a mention of the prism, but there is some indication of this idea being already in his mind, e.g., "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem..." p. 113. Before the quotation given in the text on p. 159 and which we have been generally discussing in this footnote, there was not a clear awareness in Dooyeweerd's thinking of the necessity of a theoretical leading idea of unity in the sense spelled out here in his writing, for what appears to be the first time. That is, up to now he had seen the theoretical idea of unity receiving its content from the biblical revelation concerning the creator's world plan. Now, however, the content of theoretic idea of unity is supplied by what he feels is the biblical idea of the religious kernel in man which is within the creation but beyond the temporal law coherence.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 430.

55. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het immanentiestandpunt," pp. 2-5.

the same as eternal. Dooyeweerd's usage of the term "transcendent," as we have seen, is applied and used right up to the present, and is often accompanied by the term "supra-temporal." Dooyeweerd uses the word "eternal" in these quotes in the same way he uses the words "supra-temporal," "bovenlijdelijk," or "transcendent" in all his writings. Wherever he uses these terms in later writings he has in mind what in his earlier writings he definitely calls "eternal." When this is borne in mind it opens up the wide range of uses that the term "eternal" or "supra-temporal" has in Dooyeweerd. We will deal with this scope of the eternal or supra-temporal shortly.

We have seen that Dooyeweerd often describes the heart as incorruptible (onvergankelijk), and not subject to temporal death. In these quotations he comes right out and declares that the religious kernel in our personality is eternal and immortal. This use of immortality is wholly foreign to the Scriptures. This has been shown by many people<sup>56</sup> to be a false use of the idea of immortality, at least the way Scripture employs the term. What is of interest here is the fact that already at this stage Dooyeweerd is quite aware that his dichotomy is quite different from the Thomistic and pagan views of the soul and body.<sup>57</sup> As we have already seen, he will call on the Scriptures for his view of the eternal in man's center, or what he often refers to as "eternity laid in man's

56. M. J. Arntzen, "Tweelei 'spel'," *Corr. bladen*, VII/5 (Dec. 1942), pp. 93-94. Berkouwer, *Man: The Image of God*, pp. 265-278. Berkouwer puts the best possible construction on the church's use of these ideas of immortality, but finds it, nevertheless, wanting. This best possible construction must also be placed on Dooyeweerd's idea, for he seeks to set it off from the substantial soul idea. See Popma, *Levensbeschouwing*, I, pp. 74ff., II, pp. 194ff.

57. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," p. 115.

heart," since he makes clear that his idea of aeulum is taught throughout the whole of Scripture. However, if this were the case he would never have applied the term "immortality" to the religious kernel in man's personality. Despite his protestations to the contrary, we see an example of the "in and out" method of exegesis, which is one of the chief methods of synthesis, according to Vollenhoven.<sup>58</sup> The question has to be raised as to what Dooyeweerd is trying to get at with his description of the heart as immortal, indestructible, and eternal. It is obvious that he is seeking to account for the presence of believers with Christ in heaven after death. This is a biblical emphasis which cannot be lost. But to account for this by speaking of the eternal and immortal in man as making out the religious kernel or center of personality and then speaking of it as not subject to temporal death, but eternal death, would seem to be clear speculation.<sup>59</sup> However to deduce from this that Dooyeweerd has a dualism with a dichotomy in his anthropology, of transcendent eternal center and non-transcendent temporal body, does not necessarily follow, as Poppma thinks. We have already seen in an earlier section<sup>60</sup> that Dooyeweerd speaks of two kinds of generations, one which is temporal, bodily, and the other which is supra-

58. See footnote 24 of this chapter.

59. This speculation is still current in Dooyeweerd. He quite often speaks of generation in time, and time as that which governs what arises and perishes. Things perish because they have no supra-temporal selfhood. See A New Critique, III, p. 65. He says, "The modal aspects of reality find their deeper identity in the central religious sphere alone. But temporal things are perishable, they do not have a supra-temporal selfhood; their thing-identity is only that of a temporal individual whole, i.e., of a relative unity in a multiplicity of functions."

60. See p. 44, footnote 6 of this dissertation.

temporal, spiritual and which applies to the center of man. There is then a created eternal generation of hearts and a temporal generation of bodies and these are always correlated and, as we have suggested, these contrasts proceed out of one source.<sup>61</sup> We shall return to this point in more detail in the next chapter where this monism will be shown to be connected to Dooyeweerd's idea of creation. Poppma's view of Dooyeweerd fails to take into account the broader use of the idea of created eternity, supra-temporality (bovenlijdelijkheid), especially as it relates to generation, and therefore he cannot do justice to Dooyeweerd's stress that the supra-temporal is dynamic and that the religious central sphere is the central sphere of occurrence. A dualism with a dichotomy is a view which brings with it the idea that the transcendent is changeless and the non-transcendent is changeable,<sup>62</sup> but, as we have just emphasized, this does not quite fit Dooyeweerd's view of the supra-temporal.

In summary thus far: assuming that what has been sketched in the section on a global oversight of nature-grace thinking (chapter 2) is correct, the following has been established: if it is true that all of the created is temporal, and all the temporal is created, and that nothing in the created can be regarded as eternal in the sense of non-temporal, then it is at least clear that Dooyeweerd regards the heart of man as created and subject to law, though not temporal, but rather, eternal in an aeulum condition and transcendent. Our view also implies that angels are subject to cosmic time and to the cosmic law order. We have shown that Dooyeweerd does not regard this to be true, but rather, restricts

61. Mention is made of monism on p. 49 of this dissertation.

62. See p. 56 of this dissertation.

time to the earthly cosmos and speaks of angels as being in an aevum state. To this supra-temporal Dooyeweerd cannot apply the designations of succession or duration since these are precisely characteristics of the temporal. Because of this supra-temporal created eternity which, in his opinion, constitutes the religious center of man, Dooyeweerd can regard man as not perishable or incorruptible, immortal, and not subject to temporal death. It has been emphasized that whatever one thinks concerning eternal life, it cannot mean non-temporal (life), since one possesses eternal life by faith the moment one believes in Christ. Eternal life is a present possession and is dateable like all other things in the creation. For this reason it is speculative to speak as Dooyeweerd does of man entering eternal life at death and as leaving the temporal. In contrast to this, it has been stressed that man can never leave the temporal behind at death, in hell, in heaven, or on the new earth, for in all historical stages he remains subject to time as an ordinance that holds everlasting. We have also shown how this view of the eternal influences Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique. This will be dealt with in more detail later. If man can leave the temporal at death, it implies that time ceases to hold for man between death and resurrection. This way of speaking of death is so typical of nature-grace thinking that one is tempted to state right at this point that it has also been shown that Dooyeweerd regards "time as being for time," or that time ceases. That Dooyeweerd also maintains the nature-grace dogma that "time is for a time" needs further confirmation to be considered definitely established. However, it can be asserted already at this point, that when Dooyeweerd describes death in terms of leaving the temporal and angels are said to have possession of aevum,

this is, to say the least, a strong presumptive argument that Dooyeweerd thinks that cosmic time will come to an end at the judgment, and aevum will begin in its full state for man. It has been stressed that eternity for the nature-grace thinkers was almost unanimously conceived of for both man and God to be a nunc aeternum, without a succession from future to past. This was the standard definition for God's eternity, and man's eternity was patterned analogously after God's eternity. These two features still remain to be shown in Dooyeweerd's thinking. To prove this, one is immediately involved in his idea of root unity or concentration point, cosmic diversity, the breadth of the application of the term "supra-temporal" and finally his neo-realism.

In the synoptic view of the ontology type which seems to be present in Dooyeweerd, the fact was spoken of that the primary contrasts in the creation are between the temporal in the lower, and the supra-temporal or created eternal in the higher. Thus far we have shown this to be true in regard to man's individual concentration point, or the center of man's temporal functioning. We have dealt with the angels somewhat, but now an attempt will be made to show still more clearly that since Dooyeweerd unduly restricts time to the earthly, he cannot regard angels as subject to the temporal horizon. It will be shown that eternity applies to much more than to the heart in his thinking, but that it constitutes the whole higher contrast in his monism, and therefore, is applied to all the created non-temporal. This involves two orders; one which governs eternity and one which governs time. This will demonstrate the influence of nature-grace on his thought.

Dooyeweerd has some interesting statements concerning angels in contexts which stress the limitation of time to the earthly. In an early

article concerned with juridical causality, which was his first real setting forth of his philosophical systematics, his idea of time is not developed and markedly differs from his idea of the prismatic idea of time of later years. In speaking of the organic coherence of law sphere in the cosmic order he says,

Uit het bovenstaande moet de noodwendige conclusie worden getrokken, dat onze wetsidee nimmer exclusief kan zijn, in dien zin, dat zij de geheele schepping omvat.

Wij kennen niet den samenhang van wetskringen, waarin b.v. de engelenwereld is besloten.

Slechts de religieuze zin bindt onze wereld aan de wereld der engelen. Slechts de religieuze zin, die zelve niet aan een bepaalden samenhang van wetskringen is gebonden, is het eeuwig moment in iederen kring van wetten, waaronder Gods souvereine wil ons gesteld heeft (Vgl. Christus' samenvatting van den religieuze zin der zedewet).

Die eeuwige zin is dus niet een wijsgeerige, zoals b.v. Husserl's "Wahrheiten an sich" of Kant's noumenale wereld. De wijsbegaerde is zelve in de religie gegrond en onder de wet gesteld.

Het uitgangspunt onzer wetsidee is een religieus uitgangspunt; in dien zin de volheid des zijns en geen wijsgeerige abstractie. ... Alle functies worden beheerscht door de kwaliteitskern, maar die kern ontspicit eerst haar zin in den organischen samenhang met haar functies. De kern is de garantie voor de souvereiniteit in eigen kring, de kern-functies waarborgen binnen den wetskring den samenhang met alle andere wetskringen.<sup>63</sup>

From a later period we have a somewhat similar idea when in speaking about the principle of contradiction he says,

If anybody is to think theoretically, he ought to begin by recognizing the validity of this principle, which is in no sense absolute and unconditioned, but rather of a cosmic-temporal character. Does this mean, that other creatures, or God himself, could set aside the principle of non-contradiction in their thought? If this question is to have a meaning, one must proceed from the supposition that God himself, or e.g., angels, also would have to think in a cosmic-temporal fashion. For, as a matter of fact, human thought is able to proceed in setting aside the principle of non-contradiction; e.g., the whole dialectic logic does so. But whoever would suppose this thought in the case of God and the angels, supposes at the same time, that they are in-

cluded in the cosmic temporal order and that they are subject to the laws that rule therein, although they can transgress them in so far as they have a norm-character. Quod absurdum!<sup>64</sup> and with respect to the sovereign God: Quod blasphemum!<sup>65</sup>

From this we can see two things: first, as we have seen before,<sup>65</sup> Dooyeweerd's law idea (wetsidee) does not view the whole creation. He goes on to point out that we do not know the coherence of law spheres in which the angels are enclosed. We have already noted that Dooyeweerd regards the angels as participating in the aevum condition although this is qualified by him by the consideration that in this life these matters remain concealed because of lack of revelation. Here we see that he regards it feasible that the angels might be subject to some kind of coherence of law spheres, but it would apparently not resemble the temporal cosmic order of law spheres. Here we have a clear pointer to two world orders. We have stressed that cosmic time as an ordinance, holds for all creation, not just the earthly. On Dooyeweerd's own basis the Scriptures always speak to our faith function according to the time order of faith (geloofs-tijdsorde) about things beyond time. It is interesting to consider here why then he even can surmise that angels would be subject to a completely unknown coherence of law spheres and that they would partake of aevum, since the Scriptures refer to the angelic world as subject to succession and angels and departed saints as having time consciousness. How could he know that angels are not subject to the temporal horizon from Scripture, when Scripture relates these matters only according to the faith order of time which partakes of succession and duration. It also appears that whatever would be the coherence of law spheres, it would not be a temporal coherence, since

63. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem . . .," p. 31.

64. Ibid., I, pp. 144-145.

65. Ibid., II, p. 53, footnote.

that is precisely the nature of the coherence of our earthly cosmos. Deeyeweerd even adds that it is absurd to suppose that angels are included in the cosmic temporal order and that they are subject to the laws that rule therein. This would seem to be speculation. To conclude from the fact that we know only a little, via revelation, about angels, to the fact that they are not subject to the cosmic temporal order is unwarranted. Scripture gives us no clear pointer to this fact but rather underscores that all of creation, heaven and earth, and all that they contain is subject to God's ordering and creative Word and law. It is from this creative and ordering Word that all began and all was subject to development, succession of events, e.g., the fall of angels, history.<sup>66</sup> Also for this reason all things that are created are subject to the law spheres and the scope of these law spheres cannot be restricted to the earthly cosmos with its planetary and starry heaven. Granted, we know very little about this, nevertheless, the creation account makes it clear that we can never get behind the temporal horizon to an aeon, created eternal, or transcendent created horizon. From Scripture it would seem we only can truly distinguish God, law, and cosmos.<sup>67</sup> The cosmos is completely temporal and is subjected to the law which is temporal as it relates to that which is subjected to it, and supra-temporal as it relates to God the sovereign, eternal creator and law giver. That the sovereign God is not subject to cosmic temporal order is self-evident since he is the creator and law giver of the creation. But that it is absurdum that angels are subject to the cosmic temporal order is

66. For the history of the angels before man's creation and fall, see Pepma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte, pp. 84-85.

67. Vollenhoven, "College systematiek - het probleem van de tijd," pp. 5, 8, 15.

a fact that Deeyeweerd must have a special revelation about, since nowhere in Scripture is there an indication that there are two cosmic coherences, one temporal, and one eternal and non-temporal. Nature-grace thinking in every one of its representatives does teach two cosmic coherences and two world orders, one being temporal and one being the created eternity of the angels and departed souls. That Deeyeweerd regards the world of angels as eternal comes out when he stresses that only the religious meaning (religiouze zin), which is the "eeuwig moment in iederen kring van wetten," binds our world to the world of the angels. Some interesting features make their appearance at this point. It is obvious from this that Deeyeweerd has not developed his idea of time fully as yet in this article.<sup>68</sup> What does he have in mind when he says that only the religious meaning binds our world to the world

68. Deeyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidoo," pp. 113-116. On p. 116, footnote 5, he says, "Tijd en ruimte zijn naar onze opvatting natuurlijk geen psychische aanschouwingsvermen in Kantiaanschen zin en nog minder logische categorieën in den zin der Marburgerschool, doch veleer elementen van wetskwaliteiten onder beheersching van de resp. souvereine kwaliteitskernen. Tijd en ruimte zijn in dezen zin dus geen subjecten, doch wetselementen (in den geometrischen kring alleen is de ruimte kwaliteitskern). Waren zij subjecten, dan zoude Kant's kritiek op de realistische opvatting inderdaad hout snijden." On p. 121, footnote 86, he says, "Ik wege er in dit verband veer waarschuwen, de kosmische erde in de wetskringen zelve als al-omvattend tijdsverband veer zulk een causalverband uit te geven. Immers als men van een kosmische tijdsorde wil spreken, moet men bedenken, dat men hier 'tijd' in een angelikalificeerden zin gebruikt, waarvan geen begrip mogelijk is. Het organisch verband der wetskringen, uitgedrukt in onze wetsidoo, kan zelve geen tijdsverband zijn, al gebruiken wij in de kosmologie de logische tijdsorde van het prius en posterius ter aanduiding van de plaats der wetskringen in de kosmische erde. De kosmische eenheid der tijdsorden beuwt sich op uit de enderscheiden gekalificeerde tijdsorden, doch is niet zelve een tijdsorde." The first real indication of his definitive view of time, in which he employs at one and the same time the idea of the prism and the notion of the heart as supra-temporal, along with the whole idea of the root unity on the law and subject sides as a created fullness and totality which is refracted, is found in "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de

of the angels? This leads us to the broader use of the idea of eternity in this article. Here we see that the religious meaning (religieuze zin) is the eternal moment (euwig moment) in each sphere of laws. The starting point of the law idea is a religious starting point which is equivalent to saying that it is an eternal starting point. In an excursus in this article, "Het probleem van de verhouding van natuur en genade in de Calvinistische wetsidee," he says some things bearing on the meaning of religion and the eternal.

Luidt het grondprobleem der humanistische wetsidee in zijn onoplosbare vorm: De harmonische verhouding te vinden tus-schen wetenschaps- en persoonlijkhedsideaal, de christelijke wetsidee betrok van meetaf de verhouding tus-schen natuur en genade in Gods wereldplan in het centrum harer belangstelling....

Zou dan de Calvinistische wetsidee tegenover dit allesheerschend grondprobleem onverschillig kunnen staan? Wel verre van daar! De martelende spanning tus-schen natuur en genade is in deze wetsidee opgeheven, maar geenszins door elimineering van een van beide, maar door harmonische ver-

methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee," Wetenschappelijke Bijdragen (Amsterdam: Dagblad en Drukkerij de Standaard, 1930). See p. 233 for the first conscious use of "zin volheid." For the use of the heart as supra-temporal, p. 242; for the idea of the supra-temporal root or Archimedean point, pp. 231-232; for supra-temporality applied to meaning totality (zin totaliteit) and meaning fullness (zin volheid), p. 252. For the historical law sphere "knooppunt van heel de geestelijke dynamisch binnen onzen kosmos," p. 257; this idea had formerly been related to predestination ("Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem..." p. 61). In contrast, in "De structuur der rechtsbeginsalen..." it is the faith aspect (geloofs aspect), p. 252. For Christ as head of the redeemed human race as fullness and meaning consummation, p. 234; also on p. 234 we have his idea of the concentration point. Here in contrast to "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem..." he thinks of time as a time order of earlier and later law spheres, p. 233. On p. 242 principles (beginselen) are regarded as temporal in contrast to the idea that the kernel of each law sphere is an "eternal" moment as on p. 31 in "Het juridisch..." In "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen..." we have the first publication of Dooyeweerd's definitive vision which will vary only a little, and this already in 1930, six years before the Wijnsbegeerte der Wetsidee publication. Somewhere between the years 1928-1930 he discovered his idea of the concentration point and cosmic time. From this point his thinking starts to find real balance and symmetry, and the emphasis moves from the stress on the wetsidee toward stress on the transcendental critique.

zoening, welke aan de Calvinistische levens- en wereldbeschouwing haar evenwichtig en verheven karakter verleent. Alles - oock het schijnbaar meest geringe in de natuur - verschijnt hier onder eeuwigheidslicht....

Maar die genade is uitsluitend Gods werk en staat niet onder wetten. De religie in haar actieve zin is geen wetskring nevens andere, gelijk recht, moral en Logos, daar ze geheel primair en universeel aan alle wetskringen ten grondslag ligt. Als passieve band tot Gods scheppers onderhouderskracht, voorzoover we zien op de wetskringen, waarin de redeloze natuur, als actieve band met God, voorzooverre we zien op die wetskringen, waarin de redelike natuur God dient...

Gods werk in het menschelijk hart is niet aan wetten gebonden en juist daarom kan de christelijke religie niet in een wetskring worden opgesloten, maar drijft ze den wedergeborene uit in de zondige wereld, om overal den strijd aan te binden voor de handhaving der goddelijke ordinantien....

Natuur en genade! Hoe is hare verhouding in onze wetsidee geschouwd? Niet de natuur als voortrap der genade, gelijk in het Rooms-Katholicisme, geen heidensch fundament onder christelijk kap. Geen in wezen onverzoende break tus-schen natuur en genade, gelijk in het Lutheranisme, maar natuur en genade in onverbreklijken, harmonischen samenzang! <sup>69</sup>

A few pages later he continues,

Eerst bij de ontsluiting der anticipatiesferen ontvangen wets- en subjectekwaliteit hun zin-ontploeting, openbaren zij zich in expansieve functie.

Die ontsluiting is slechts mogelijk met behulp van de subjectefuncties van de geanticipeerde wetskringen, die bij den mensch de eerste stimulans voor deze activiteit behooren te ontvangen uit den religieuze wortel der persoonlijkhed, doch waar het hier slechts een 'ontsluiting' betreft, moeten de anticipatiemogelijkheden in de wets- en subjectekwaliteit zelve gelegen zijn.

Haar zin-voleinding vinden wets- en subjectekwaliteit eerst wanneer het proces van de ontsluiting der anticipatiesferen geheel is voltooid en de religieuze, de eeuwige zin der wetsgedachte den geheelen wetskring heeft doortrokken, wat ongetwijfeld in deze zondige wereld buiten Christus, den vervulder der wet, niet mogelijk ware.<sup>70</sup>

Still further in this article he continues,

De 'ontsluiting der anticipatiesferen,' als actieve 'door-geestelijking' van de wetskringen, is een religieus thema in de Calvinistische levens- en wereldbeschouwing, een thema, dat

69. Dooyeweerd, "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," pp. 25-27.

70. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

zijn hoogste spanning verkrijgt door de onmetelijke kracht der in universeelen zin genomen allesbeheerschende praedestinatiegedachte. Overal, in alle wetskringen moet de religieuse zin doordringen en den zin der wetagedachte 'voleindigen,' al wordt in deze zondige bedoeeling dit ideaal nimmer vervuld, tenzij dan door Christus!<sup>71</sup>

Het behoeft niet veel betoog, dat hier slechts twee mogelijkheden bestaan: of wel men grijpt naar een transcendentie instantie (het wereldbestuur Gods, of de continuiteit en eenheid van den redelijken samenhang), of wel men voegt in een volkomen zinloos verband samen, wat toto coelo van elkander onderscheiden is.

Een causaliteitstheorie, die den laatsten weg zou inslaan, kan, dit behoeft namelijk betoog, op den naam eener wijsgeerde causaliteitstheorie geen aanspraak maken....

Zou een wijsgeerde causaliteitstheorie daarentegen naar een transcendentie instantie grijpen, dan gevoelt ieder, dat zij op het gebied der wetziden zou komen, waar de levens- en wereldbeschouwing haar souvereine rechten doet gelden. Als causaliteitstheorie in eigenlijke zin kan een dergelijke wijsgeerde theorie over den wereldsamenhang zich zeker niet aandienen, want ieder gevoelt, dat op dit gebied heel wat meer dan de causaliteitsvraag aan de orde komt, ja, dat hier de causaliteit nog alleen in een eigenaardigen transendenten zin, kan fungeren, welke met een zuiver wetenschappelijk causaliteitsbegrip niets meer dan den naam gemeen kan hebben.<sup>72</sup>

At the end of this article he says,

In 't licht der door ons aan ons stelsel ten grondslag gelegde Calvinistische wetziden daarentegen, bouwen der verschillende gequalificeerde causaliteitreeksen zich trapsgewijze boven elkander op en is geen wijsgeerde causaliteitstheorie ter wereld in staat de continuiteit van het causaalverband over de grenzen, welke de souvereiniteit in eigen kring stelt, door te voeren.

Toch moet anderzijds - en daarop dient weder de nadruk te vallen - juist deze wetziden den kosmischen, organischen samenhang tusschen de wetskringen en dus ook tusschen de causaliteitreeksen, welke daarbinnen verlopen, handhaven.

De 'volle realiteit' als kosmische subjectiviteitseenheid bouwt zich op in den organischen samenhang der subjectifunctiones, gelijk alle wetskringen individueel slechts straalbrekigen zijn van Gods wereldplan.<sup>73</sup>

We see in these quotations that religion is not enclosed in one law

sphere because God works immediately in the human heart and he is not bound to laws. In the same fashion, grace is not bound to, or does not stand under, laws. Because religion is the place where God works, it is "geheel primair en universeel," the foundation for all law spheres. It is because of this centrality that it controls all the diverse law spheres. Through this type of argumentation Dooyeweerd shows that nothing in nature can be an sich because everything temporal is driven and affected and stimulated from this root. The eternal religious meaning is the service of God in obedience to the law of love. This is the abiding unity in all diversity of spheres of laws. It is the central significance of all the special law spheres, and therefore he calls it the eternal moment in all the law spheres. As eternal moment in all the law spheres it is not identical with the nuclei guaranteeing the irreducibility of these spheres. The eternal moment, present in diverse ways in all spheres of law, is service with the whole heart. God works with the human heart which, as Dooyeweerd says, is the religious personality or I-ness which makes up the eternal essence of man, and through this work in the eternal he works through man in all the temporal. God is not bound to the diverse temporal laws, is not subject to them, but works in the created eternity of man's heart and from there he drives man to bow under all his diverse ordinances. The eternal, religious, is the fullness and unity, and this eternity is continuously expressed in all the temporal until the temporal expresses the fullness contained in the eternal. The eternal moment, or religious moment, drives the temporal law sphere to unfold itself and deepen itself, and the meaning consummation or completion of law and subject qualities are only fulfilled when the process of unfolding of the anticipatory spheres is come

71. Ibid., p. 61.

72. Ibid., pp. 83-84.

73. Ibid., p. 113.

to an end. This happens when the religious or eternal meaning of the idea of law is exhausted in complete unfolding and development of a law sphere. All of the temporal is simply the expression of the eternal, or religious, in diversity. What was in unity and fullness presses forth to be expressed in the richest diversity that is structurally possible, and then the eternal moment in the law sphere is completed and consummated. The eternal seems clearly to have three significances: first, it is the foundational and the primary, second, it is unity before or above diversity, and third, it is undifferentiated fullness which drives for its complete temporal diverse expression. As unity it has the sense of abiding throughout its diverse expressions and, therefore, it can very easily be thought to be eternal. Just as the heart of man abides as unity through all his expressions, acts, and functioning, and is called the eternal essence of man, so religion abides throughout its temporal diverse expressions. The religious or the eternal empties itself in the temporal, but the temporal, since it is successive and diverse, cannot contain the fullness and unity of the eternal.

The meaning of eternal seems to be able to be summed up like this: that which abides throughout all the diversity of expressions and yet which is not able to be exhausted in its expressions since it is the fullness and unity and totality of these expressions. Precisely because of this all its expressions desire to be reunited with it so that it alone consummates or brings unity because it abides undivided while its expressions lack this undivided and abiding character which consequently makes them temporal. This created eternity does not stand in itself, but is restless and desires to express its full potential in diversity in time, and yet its expressions never diminish its unity and fullness

since it is also totality of meaning. Angels are bound to our world because they are subject to the eternal meaning of the law as service to the sovereign God, but from the quotations given previously, it is obvious that they are not subject to the earthly coherence of diverse laws. The coherence of law spheres applicable to the angels is wholly unknown, and the only access we have to them is the fact that we in our personality are religious or have an eternal essence and therefore are not subject to the diverse law spheres in this essence. We have a bond with the angels who are eternal and not subject to our temporal world or to the coherence of diverse law spheres. Angels must partake in the eternal fullness and unity of creation to exist just as we must, but they do not exist in the diverse earthly coherence of law spheres. Our only connection with them is our own eternal essence in which God works without his being subject to laws. God works with the angels apparently in the same way. In other words, it is because of the eternal in us which constitutes our religious personality, that we have something analogous to the angels. We resemble the angels in the eternity of our essence, and therefore we have a bond with them. The similarity is in the fact that our religious eternal essence which constitutes the center of personality is not enclosed in a special law sphere. It is not subject to the coherence in the diversity of law spheres although it expresses itself in this coherence, just as the angels are not subject to this earthly coherence of law spheres. In our eternal essence we have a bond with the angels just as in our three lower individuality structures, enkeptically interwoven in our bodies, we have a bond and affinity with the thing, plant, and animal kingdoms.

We can sum up our remarks on angels by saying that we have seen

that Dooyeweerd definitely says that angels partake of the condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand) which is an intermediate condition (tussentoeestand) between time and God's eternity.<sup>74</sup> We have also seen that they belong to another world order which is unknown to us "in this life." He is certain that the temporal coherence of law spheres cannot apply to the angels and that it is absurd to think so. This shows the presence of two world orders, one of created eternity (aevum) and one of time. Despite the fact that he stresses the unknown character of this other order, we have seen that he describes it in certain ways and even states that man has a bond with the world of the angels in the religious eternity which constitutes the essence of his personality. We have also seen that he regards religion, which he equates with the eternal, to have the characteristics of unity, fullness, and centrality.<sup>75</sup> These notions of his come to the fore in the solving of the relation of nature and grace and in his attempt in his law idea to bring them to a "so-called" biblical harmonious reconciliation.

In order to understand more fully the breadth of usage which the idea of supra-temporality (boventijdelijkheid) has in Dooyeweerd's recent writings, and to understand its nature and how it functions in his thought, it is necessary to bring the results of our analysis thus far to bear on an article written in his early years. What we are striving to show is the nature of supra-temporality and how it relates to time, God's eternity, and the consummation, and how ultimately his views fall into the general rubrics outlined in our chapter dealing with the survey of nature-

74. See pp. 133 ff. of this dissertation.

75. Dooyeweerd, "Der structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee," p. 49. Here the term "eternal" is applied to truth.

grace thinking and summarized there under three corollary ideas. There are some unique features to Dooyeweerd's idea of aevum or supra-temporality (boventijdelijkheid) which must be seen before we can show the clear similarity of his thinking with traditional nature-grace thinking.

The importance of Dooyeweerd's article, "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee," in terms of his total development has already been shown.<sup>76</sup> In it is one of the first statements of his vision which remains substantially unchanged. Yet there are some expressions present in this article which clearly show a connection with his manner of speaking about eternity before that time, and also some expressions which anticipate his manner of speaking about eternity after this article and which, consequently, bring clarity to his current usage. Dooyeweerd's use of supra-temporality (boventijdelijkheid) clearly goes together with his idea of time as a prism, as is seen in this article. Before this time he uses the word "eternal" to designate what he now calls supra-temporal (boventijdelijk). There are enough traces of the former usage to show what he intends by the term. The idea of meaning, breaking, and refraction is everywhere evidenced in this article. He says,

In het idealistische type der humanistische wetsidee, ... de absolute religieuze waarheid, waarvan de 'theoretische waarheid' slechts een tijdelijke zinbreking is.... Maar de religieuze instelling heerscht omgekeerd over het waarheidsbegrip, zoo zeker als de theoretische waarheid niet an-sich bestaat, maar slechts een tijdelijke straalbreking is van de absolute religieuze waarheid over de verhouding van Schepper tot schepping....

De Calvinistische wetsidee doet heel onzen tijdelijken kosmos zien als een organischen samenhang van in eigen kring souvereine wets- en subjectsfuncties, die vanaf de getalsfunctie tot de meest gecompliceerde geestesfunctie, de geloofsfunctie, een zinsbreking zijn in den kosmischen tijd van

76. See p. 169, footnote 68, of this dissertation.

den onvergankelijken, religieuzen, alle tijdelijkheid transcenderende wortel van het menschengeslacht in zijn onderworpenheid aan den eeuwigen religieuzen zin der wet: den dienst van God....

Wijl alle wetskringen gelykelyk een zin-braking zijn van den onvergankelijken aan den eeuwigen religieuzen zin der wet onderworpen wortel onzer schepping....

Al deze -ismen zijn geworteld in een humanistische wet-sidde, welke haar archimedisch punt niet in den transcendenten-religieuzen wortel onzer schepping, maar in de immanente tijdelijke en dienstgevolge relatieve redefuncties kiest....

De religieus organische instelling der Calvinistische wetsidee openbaart sich primair in de aanvaarding van een kosmische orde der wetskringen, krachtens welke dese kringen naar de meer of mindere complicatie van hun generale sinstructuur elkander in den kosmischen tijd fundeeren. De kosmische tijd is, symbolisch uitgedrukt, het prima, waardoor de onvergankelijke, boven-tijdelijke religieuzen haar straalbreking vindt in de zinfuncties der in eigen kring souvereine wetskringen....

Iedere wetskring weerspiegelt in zijn sin-structuur de zin-totaliteit van onzen kosmos, die eerst in den onvergankelijken religieuzen zin onzer schepping, gelijk ze in Christus als hoofd van het verloste menschengegaect is geopenbaard haar vervulling en zin-volheid.<sup>77</sup>

Het is niet overbodig op te merken, dat de rechtsbeginselen niet door de subjectieve redefuncties worden geschapen maar ontdekt en dat ze geen transcendenten, maar immanente gelding hebben in den kosmischen zin-samenhang.<sup>78</sup>

Het grootste gevaar, dat de gewraakte metaphysische opvatting der rechtsbeginselen voor de rechtsbeschouwing met zich brengt is dit, dat men niet een devote kniebuiging voor de eeuwige beginselen 'die niet in den tijd ingaan' het tijdelijke rechtsleven beginselloos meent te kunnen vatten en een au fond utilitaristische houding tegenover de rechtsvorming inneemt. Het begrip 'boven-tijdelijk rechtsbeginsel' is intusschen in zichzelf tegenstrijdig. 'Beginsel' betekent 'begin' en alle begin is in den tijd.

Niet het beginsel is boven-tijdelijk, maar alleen de eeuwige, religieuze zin, der wet en alle normatieve beginselen, ook die van logisch, historisch, sociaal- taal-, esthetisch, economisch, moreel en pistisch karakter zijn een tijdelijke zinbreking van dien eeuwigen zin der wet, gelijk die ons door Christus is geopenbaard. De zonde in haar boven-tijdelijkem religieuzen zin, is niet een zinfunctionele normovertrading, maar raakt het hart, den

77. Dooyeweerd, "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen en de methode der rechtswetenschap in het licht der wetsidee," pp. 230-234.  
78. Ibid., p. 241.

wortel van het menschengeslacht, zij beteekent een verwerping van den eeuwigen zin der wet, den dienst van God. Doch ze openbaart zich in den tijd in een opstandige houding tegen de zinfunctionele ordinantie, die God de Heere voor iederen wetskring gesteld heeft.<sup>79</sup>

Het moderne functionalisme vereenzelvigt in zijn strijd tegen het dingbegrip ding en substantie (in den zin der hypostaseerende metaphysica). De kosmische dingstructuur in onzen zin echter heeft met het metaphysisch substantiebegrip niets uitstaande, wijl zij het typisch-metaphysisch en hypostatisch kenmerk der boven-tijdelijkheid en onveranderlijkheid mist.<sup>80</sup>

De idee is steeds gericht op de zin-totaliteit en wijst daarmee boven de tijdelijke werkelijkheid uit naar de boven-tijdelijke religieuze zin-volheid.<sup>81</sup>  
(Underlining mine in previous selection)

From these quotations it is possible to see the full development Dooyeweerd's thinking had reached in 1930, as compared to the earlier article we discussed. We see here interesting combinations of words like "absolute religious truth" set next to theoretical truth as a "temporal meaning breaking." Again, "theoretical truth" is a refraction (tijdelijke straalbreking)<sup>82</sup> of the absolute religious truth concerning the relation of Creator to creature. Each sovereign law and subject function<sup>83</sup> is a meaning breaking or refraction in cosmic time of the incorruptible or indestructible religious, all-temporality-transcending root of the human race in its subjection to the eternal religious meaning of law, the service of God. All law spheres are simultaneously a meaning breaking of the indestructible root of our creation in subjection to the

79. Ibid., pp. 242-243.

80. Ibid., p. 249, footnote.

81. Ibid., p. 252.

82. Ibid., p. 233. This phrase occurs earlier in "Het juridisch causaliteitsproblem in 't licht der wetsidee," (p. 113) which shows the prima idea was present to some degree, but this is the first article in which it becomes central.

83. Dooyeweerd employs the term "function" in two senses which might be confusing. Function can refer to the whole modal aspect on law

eternal religious meaning of the law. The phrase "transcendent religious root" of our creation is next to "immanent temporal," the "incorruptible" or "indestructible supra-temporal" religious meaning next to "temporal meaning functions." "Meaning-totality," "meaning fulfillment," and "meaning consummation" are found in the indestructible religious meaning of our creation in Christ, our head. Principles are not supra-temporal but alone the eternal religious meaning of the law. All normative principles are a "temporal meaning refraction" of the "eternal religious meaning of the law." Sin in its supra-religious meaning touches the heart, the root of the human race, and signifies a rejection of the eternal meaning of the law, the service of God. Yet it reveals itself in time in a defiant attitude against the meaning functional ordinances, which God the Lord has placed for each law sphere. The idea is always directed to the meaning totality and points therewith above temporal reality to the supra-temporal religious meaning fullness.

We have seen in this section that Dooyeweerd in his early years applied the term "eternal" to the essence of man which constitutes his religious personality. We have seen that he also applied the term "incorruptible" (onvergankelijk) to the center or heart of man. We have also seen that in one place he uses the term "immortal" to describe the soul of man or the eternal in man. The term "immortal" is never again

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and subject sides as a meaning function of the supra-temporal religious fullness of meaning, but the term "function" can be used to designate the subject side in which subjective functions are then viewed as subjected to law spheres. As a whole the modal coherence is a functional coherence which can be abstracted and dealt with as the foundations for the typical individuality structures in which they are present in naive experience. They are always found embedded in concrete things, etc. They never exist apart from concrete things and events except ontically in thought in the theoretical gegenstand relation which is intentional.

applied to man's heart, although Dooyeweerd continues to use the adjective incorruptible (onvergankelijk) to describe the heart of man when the temporal body or mantle is left off at death. In the term "incorruptible" the term "immortal" is virtually present although he obviously tries to avoid misunderstanding with the Thomistic idea of the anima separata, and so does not employ the term "immortal."

In this article, in contrast to his previous writings, he does not refer to the transcendent subject side, either in respect to the heart or to Christ as the root of the human race, as eternal. Here he applies to the subject side the term boventijdelijkheid, which can be translated "supra-temporality" or "super-temporality."<sup>84</sup> From this time on Dooyeweerd remains true to this usage and very seldom applies the term "eternal" to the transcendent subject side of the cosmos. We have seen from the article concerning sevum, however, that he clearly means by supra-temporality (when applied to the transcendent subject side), the created

84. In regard to the English rendering of the word "boventijdelijk" as supra- or super-temporal, the English translators of A New Critique, under Dooyeweerd's supervision, consistently use supra-temporal. H. Hart in The Challenge of our Age makes a distinction between supra- and super-temporal (p. 132, footnote 41). He says that the word super-temporal refers to that which is transcendent; supra-temporal rises above time to points above. As valuable as the distinction might be in itself, in Dooyeweerd the term "boventijdelijk" occurs as a synonym for transcendent and eternal in a created sense, and as a synonym for sevum. Whether the translators should have rendered boventijdelijk as super- rather than supra- does not take away from the fact that supra-temporal means transcendent and eternal in a created sense in all Dooyeweerd's usage. There is no basis in Dooyeweerd for a distinction between supra- as referring to that which points beyond, as opposed to super- as that which is beyond time. All temporal meaning points beyond the temporal which gives expression to its meaning character. It would be confusing therefore to call temporal meaning "supra-temporal meaning" because it points beyond the temporal to the transcendent. The word "boventijdelijk" refers to that which is not temporal but to that which is transcendent and eternal. When we say it is not in time we must be careful, since all of temporal meaning is the expression and refraction in time of the eternal or transcendent. But as fullness, unity, and totality the eternal cannot be given in time, but is in time only as diversity and expression.

eternal. The significance of aevum is precisely that it is an intermediate condition (tussentoestand) between God's eternity and time. He describes the heart as having "eternity laid in it" and for that reason, as having an "eternity consciousness." The term "eternal," however, is applied to the transcendent law side throughout this article. Of interest here also is the fact that he applies the term "transcendent" to the root and to the subject side. He also uses the term "inocorruptible" to describe the root of the human race. Although this term is not used after this very often to describe the whole root community in Christ and of Christ, it is used many times to describe the individual heart of man especially in contexts in which he is describing what happens at death.<sup>85</sup> In describing the transcendent law side he speaks of it as "absolute," and this term is later used in various contexts in opposition to "the relative" which is always the temporally diverse. Absolute refers always to unity, totality, and fullness, and is set next to the relative referring to temporality and diversity.

We can now come to certain conclusions regarding the meaning of the term "supra-temporal" (boventijdelijk) as it is presently found in Dooyeweerd. The adjectives "transcendent," "eternal," "religious," "immortal," "indestructible," "aevum," "absolute," are used synonymously and refer to that which is not temporal. When in later years Dooyeweerd refers to the heart, the body of Christ as root community, religion, the fall, the cross, the Word of God as ground-motive, sin, the kingdom of God, the resurrection, Christ himself as root, the law, the consummation, as supra-temporal, he has in mind all these adjectives.<sup>86</sup> The terms

85. See pp. 144-145 of this dissertation.

86. These are some of the references found in A New Critique. There are countless examples of this usage found in his other writings.

"transcendent" and "supra-temporal" often conjoin to one another. He refers to the destination of man as "eternal" in later years, and also calls this destination supra-temporal (boventijdelijk). The eternal destination is what he calls the kingdom of God, and the kingdom of God he calls supra-temporal. To say, for example, that when Dooyeweerd uses the term "supra-temporal" to describe the heart of man or the religious root community he does not mean that they are eternal, is plainly not in line with Dooyeweerd's meaning. To say that when Dooyeweerd uses supra-temporal to refer to things above or beyond time he does not mean that they are therefore transcendent, is also plainly counter to his consistent usage of these terms.

This more consistent use of terminology relates definitely to this article in which he has found the prism figure. Once cosmic time is thought of as a law of refraction (brekingswet), Dooyeweerd has found the criterion by which he can keep his terms consistent.

Let us sum up some things at this point. From the broad usage of the terms "supra-temporal," "transcendent," and "eternal," all of which

Heart: Vol. I, pp. 20-21, 23, 31, 59, 541; Vol. II, pp. 40, 53, 57, 115, 322, 325, 469-480, 500, 531, 540, 552, 593; Vol. III, pp. 5-6, 29, 65, 88-89, 246, 296, 298-299. The body of Christ as root community: Vol. I, pp. 60-61; Vol. III, pp. 63, 169-170, 298, 303, 345, 506, 509-510, 526-527, 535, 583. Religion: Vol. I, pp. 32, 57, 328; Vol. II, pp. 148, 151, 155; Vol. III, pp. 7, 29, 246, 522, 784. Fall and sin: Vol. I, p. 102, Vol. II, pp. 363, 356. Cross: Vol. I, p. 106; Vol. II, p. 157. Word of God: Vol. I, pp. 128, 162, 175, 303; Vol. II, pp. 307, 316, 561, 563, 571, 573, 577. The kingdom: Vol. II, pp. 294-295, 337; Vol. III, p. 537. Resurrection: An application of Dooyeweerd's idea of resurrection is found in "Organic Life and the Evolutionistic World and Life View," Christian Perspectives, 1962, p. 70, by Prof. J. J. Duyvené De Wit. Christ: Vol. II, pp. 32, 34, 158, 294, 299, 305, 337, 418, 561; Vol. III, pp. 322, 525, 582, 632, 633. Law: Vol. I, pp. 60, 102, 167; Vol. II, pp. 4, 30, 35, 147, 152, 155, 156, 316, 363; Vol. III, p. 525. Consummation: Vol. II, pp. 30, 34, 35, 159, 264, 294, 335, 337; Vol. III, pp. 106, 561, 783.

are adjectives referring to the same things, we can see the breadth of this idea in Dooyeweerd. In the synoptic view of Dooyeweerd's ontology type in which we dealt with the two basic contrasts within the creation, it was mentioned that the terms "transcendent," "eternal," "supra-temporal religious" all refer to the higher contrast within the creation.<sup>87</sup> This is why Dooyeweerd can refer to the supra-temporal as sphere, to religion as a supra-temporal sphere of occurrence. We can clearly see from the breadth of application that it refers to the created eternal which is always "in this life" in strict correlation to the temporal. Only in respect to death can Dooyeweerd refer to man as "leaving the temporal" and "gliding over into eternal life." The angels partake of several and are definitely, in distinction from man, transcendent, supra-temporal, and eternal in their natures, while man is only transcendent, supra-temporal, and eternal in his center or heart. This higher contrast (the supra-temporal or eternal) is not subject to the succession of the time order.<sup>88</sup> As we have seen before, Dooyeweerd maintains that we know nothing of the law coherence which applies to angels, and that therefore it is absurd to apply the earthly temporal coherence of law spheres to them. This vision, as we have repeatedly said, is that of nature-grace.

We have come to a point where we must go into the heart of Dooyeweerd's thinking on these matters. What now is the nature of the higher contrast as Dooyeweerd points to it in his theoretical ground idea and as he gives content to this idea in the supra-theoretical religious answers? Why is it, as we have said before, that it is precisely the prism which causes Dooyeweerd's terminology to be consistent? What

87. See pp. 48ff. of this dissertation.

88. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, pp. 32-33.

is the relation of the eternal or supra-temporal contrast to the lower temporal contrast, and in line with this, why does he speak of the higher eternal as dynamic as opposed to a static Greek and modern view of the supra-temporal or eternal? What is the distinction between the created eternal and the eternity of God as it comes to expression throughout his system? The answers to these questions are related to one basic point. This point will show how all three corollaries spoken of previously are present in Dooyeweerd, and will also show the neo-realism in Dooyeweerd's thinking.

It is the nature of the transcendent, the supra-temporal, the eternal, in all its many applications that it is always unity, totality, and fullness. Because it is unity, it is undifferentiated, full, unrefracted, concentrated, and without diversity. It is totality and fullness, and therefore the unity is full, undifferentiated, concentrated. The only way that fullness and totality can simultaneously be unity is if they are thought of as an organism. Therefore the transcendent, supra-temporal, eternal is always a root. In a root, totality as fullness is contained in an undeveloped, undifferentiated, unrefracted way. The figure of light can also perform this unique function of unity, a unity which contains a totality and fullness. In his period up to the writing of "De structuur der rechtsbeginselen..." (1930) he used the figure of the organism, and after this publication the figure of light became more dominant than before. The figure of the organism is never lost, but is to be found in the recurring ideas of root, unfolding, differentiation, dynamics, etc. The figure of the organism gives better expression, it would seem, to the correlation of time and eternity while the figure of the prism gives clearer expression to the boundary between the two con-

tracts. Neither figure is adequate in itself, but both taken together cover all facets of his thinking and all his needs. It is interesting that he is opposed to looking at the cosmos using the model of the logical concept, which is a harmonious unity within diversity. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven,<sup>89</sup> were, from the very beginning, clearly opposed to rationalism and to speculative metaphysics. The Logos speculation and the analogia entis are seen by Dooyeweerd as a logicizing of the cosmos, looking at the cosmos as if it were a concept (begrip), a unity within the diversity. Dooyeweerd, in complete dependence upon Kuyper at this point, conceives of the universe as an organism of law spheres, and the figure of light completes this.<sup>90</sup> Both figures were present in Kuyper and give Dooyeweerd a beautiful expression for his opposition to all logicism, rationalism, metaphysics, and analogy of being, because both figures contain the idea of a unity which is a totality and fullness above or before or beyond diversity, rather than in diversity. Unity within diversity is then simply restricted to the immanent temporal, and rationalism in all its forms is overcome. At this point one wonders, however, whether Dooyeweerd has not fallen into an organicistic, light metaphysics in which all of the cosmos is grasped in terms of figures taken from the physical and biotic aspects. For Dooyeweerd all ground conceptions should be used analogously and receive their concentration in the root unity and Origin of the cosmos. It is precisely because of this that the predominance of these two analogies and figures seem to point to neo-realistic, organicistic light metaphysics. These figures are simply not just

89. Vollenhoven, Logos en Ratio (Kampen: J. H. Kok, n.d.), passim.

90. For all sorts of terminological similarities between Dooyeweerd and Kuyper see W. H. Velema, De Leer van de Heilige Geest bij Abraham Kuyper ('s-Gravenhage: Van Keulen, 1957), pp. 70-97, 122-143, 144-158.

images, for they cannot be easily substituted for by other analogies. Rather, they are all-controlling metaphors.

The individual heart is the fullness, totality, and unity of its diverse functions and is called the concentration point.<sup>91</sup> The root of the new human race is Christ,<sup>92</sup> according to his human nature, and the root is a root unity, the totality of meaning, and the fullness of meaning, as well as the consummation of meaning. Both of these instances refer only to the subject side of the transcendent sphere. The law of love is the unity, fullness, and totality of all diverse temporal law.<sup>93</sup> On both the law and subject sides,<sup>94</sup> there is root unity, totality, and fullness, and to all these ideas the adjectives "transcendent," "eternal," "supra-temporal," and "religious" apply. In the first root, Adam, under the law of love, was comprehended the fullness, totality, and unity of all reality which was to become, generate, differentiate, and unfold. God created the fullness, totality, and unity of the creation "in the beginning." This could not happen in time because God is not subjected to the diversity of laws and to time. In the root unity, totality, and fullness of subject, under the root unity, totality, and fullness of law, all that was created was present and finished. Time itself was comprehended in this totality of creation. Therefore, God's created act could not be in time since time itself presupposes the finished total creation of the root unity, fullness, and totality of creation. Time is an order of successive refraction, and also guarantees the earthly temporal coherence of what it refracts. The totality, fullness, and unity of totality of the

91. Dooyeweerd, op. cit. I, p. 59.

92. See p. 182, footnote 86, of this dissertation.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

created can never be given in time because totality and fullness are never successively present if they are present as unity.<sup>95</sup> Time, becoming, generation, are concerned with diversification, individuation,<sup>96</sup> and actualization of what is potentially and fully present in the eternal, supra-temporal root unity, fullness, and totality on the law and subject sides. Cosmies and mankind come together in the transcendent root unity, fullness, and totality of created meaning.<sup>97</sup> To create Adam under the law is to create all of created reality in its unity and fullness. The fall takes place in this root unity,<sup>98</sup> and therefore the whole world falls. A new root unity, fullness, and totality on the subject side is immediately substituted for the created and fallen root unity, fullness, and totality, so that entically the created will not lose its meaning character and fall into meaninglessness.<sup>99</sup> In the new root, the created and fallen world is saved, re-created, and redirected to its Origin. In the transcendent supra-temporal eternal central religious realm, creation, fall, and redemption are united as the fullness, totality, and unity of all events in time.<sup>100</sup> These events in the root, refract and unfold in time, so that all temporal diversity partakes of creation, fall, and re-creation. For this reason Dooyeweerd can refer to all three as transcendent and supra-temporal in distinction from their temporal expressions.<sup>101</sup> The central, transcendent, root unity and fullness of Word-revelation is a driving power (drijfkracht) or dunamis which creates and drives the created through time to diversification, individualization and differ-

95. Dooyeweerd, op. cit., I, p. 106; II, pp. 5-8.

96. Ibid., II, p. 418.

97. Ibid., II, pp. 6-8.

98. Ibid., II, pp. 52-53, 548-549.

99. Ibid., I, pp. 63, 100; III, p. 525.

100. Ibid., I, p. 102.

101. See p. 182, footnote 86 of this dissertation.

entiation, as well as a driving motive-power which drives the root community of the world into temporal expression and diversity, and then redirects the temporal world from above back to its true Origin. We will deal with the relation of the apostate ground-motives to Word-revelation a little later. What is in the higher contrast, the supra-temporal eternal transcendent, is always religious and that means integral and radical (from radix, meaning root).<sup>102</sup> It is radical because the higher contrast possesses unity, and integral because the unity contains the totality and fullness as in a convergent or concentration point. The creation is integral and radical because Adam was the integral and radical root. Therefore, the fall was integral and radical, Christ is integral and radical, and Word-revelation is integral and radical. This is ultimately due to the fact that the root unity on the subject side is the image of the Origin which is integral and radical. Man's eternity is in the image of the Origin which is integral and radical.<sup>103</sup> God deals directly and immediately with the integral and radical root because he is never subject to time or diversity of law. He creates, directs, and redirects the whole temporal cosmos in all its diversity of laws and subjects by creating, directing, and redirecting immediately the created root unity of the created cosmos.

The next question is the relation of the transcendent, religious, eternal, supra-temporal contrast to the temporal. As was said before, the relation of the two contrasts can best be seen under the figure of the law idea as an organism. The organism has a higher, eternal, transcendent, supra-temporal, religious side, and a temporal, diverse, individual

102. Dooyeweerd, op. cit., I, pp. 173-177.

103. Ibid., II, p. 30; III, p. 71.

side. Since the higher contrast is a root unity, the correlation between the higher and lower, eternal and temporal, is of root and branches.<sup>104</sup> No more can a root be conceived of without its diverse branches and life expressions, than can eternity, which is always the realm of root unity, be conceived of without temporal diversity of life expressions both on the law and subject sides. Eternity, as the higher contrast, is fully dynamic, and, as the root, must differentiate and unfold itself.<sup>105</sup> Eternity as fullness and totality comprehended in an undifferentiated root unity must unfold its potentiality in time, otherwise the root is dead. For this reason religion, the supra-temporal, central realm of occurrence which cannot be distinguished too sharply from the temporal historical aspect of this full occurrence, is found only in the transcendent, eternal, supra-temporal root of the cosmos.<sup>106</sup> There is no root unity in the temporal, earthly cosmos; even individuality structures are only a temporal unity within temporal diversity. Time is the principle within the cosmos.<sup>107</sup> The transcendent realm is the unity, fullness, and totality of individuality, but all individuals are only in the temporal. Time as prismatic breaking law is the pre-condition of all individualization, just as diverse modal functions are the foundation for individuality structures.<sup>108</sup> All human institutions, communities, and individuals are correlations of these two contrasts, created eternity and time. The kingdoms of things, animals, and plants have no root unity and are completely temporal,<sup>109</sup> but are meaning because they are rooted

104. *Ibid.* I, p. 175.

105. *Ibid.* II, pp. 7, 8, 418, 561.

106. *Ibid.* I, p. 32.

107. *Ibid.* II, p. 6.

108. *Ibid.* II, p. 415.

109. *Ibid.* II, p. 65.

in the eternal, supra-temporal via mankind. These three kingdoms have no eternal supra-temporal destination and can be qualified by various temporal functions, but mankind has no qualifying function, not even the pistical aspect, and so has an eternal destination.<sup>110</sup>

Here we come to a cardinal distinction. Not only is the higher contrast characterized as transcendent, supra-temporal, created eternal root unity, fullness, and totality of the created cosmos on the law and subject sides, but it is also the consummation of meaning.<sup>111</sup> As created unity, fullness, and totality it is undifferentiated and potential, and must empty itself through the prism of the time order with its breaking points (*brekingspunten*) in the nuclei of the time-order of aspects. Here concentration designates undifferentiation and potentiality. This must differentiate and individualize itself according to its rich temporal structures into an *απέραντος* of individual realization on the subject side and diversity of laws on the law side. The higher reveals (*openbaart*), manifests, and realizes itself in rich diversity of modal functions and typically qualified individual structures which govern the actual individuals and events. But diversification and individualization as expression is loss of root unity if it is ever conceived as loose from its root unity and fullness. The more it is individualized and refracted, diversified and unfolded, manifested and realized, the more it needs integration, concentration, unity, and fullness of actualization.<sup>112</sup> This is only accomplished by the transcendental direction back to the higher contrast, transcendent fullness, and root unity of

110. *Ibid.* III, p. 783.

111. See p. 182, footnote 86, of this dissertation.

112. Dooyeweerd, *op. cit.* II, pp. 299, 335, 337.

the temporal diversity and fully individualized meaning. This transcendental direction is instigated from the transcendent root which desires the diversity lost because of refraction. Here is where the priority theme is clearly evident. The temporal diversity and individuality as such needs unity and fullness, for it is nothing in itself. It does not move itself, but is moved from created potentiality into temporal diversification by and from the root. It is forced to move and it is forced to return because it is being re-concentrated or actualized from above.<sup>113</sup> Concentration in the eternal as creation in the first sense relates to potentiality, and in the second sense, concentration in the transcendental direction relates to actualization in the eternal. All of temporal meaning, which is nothing in itself, reaches its Origin when it is redirected, re-concentrated in its consummation and concentration point. This is done in Christ, the root unity of the kingdom of God. The kingdom of God cannot be given in time any more than the totality or fullness of the creation can be given in time. The consummation is transcendent, supra-temporal, and eternal as the creation proves to be. Any failure to conceive the created, eternal, transcendent, and supra-temporal out of correlation with time and out of relation to God's eternity as the final resting point, results in serious consequences.<sup>114</sup> The neo-Kantian value theory is criticized because in this theory values are hypostatized and made supra-temporal in such a way that they can never be realized in time. They seek the eternal in one of the temporal aspects

113. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 293, 303.

114. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 335-337. Here the strictly eschatological view is refuted because it does not relate the supra-temporal fullness to the effects of sin in time and to the disharmony in the opening process.

because they are blinded by autonomy. The true eternity is only made known religiously in the new eternal root of the cosmos and root of mankind under the eternal religious law of love and service to God, Christ Jesus according to his human nature. The eternal fills the temporal with diversity, drives, directs, consummates, concentrates the temporal by being its root unity, fullness, totality, and consummation. A totality view is only possible by participation in the eternal root in the transcendent, for here self-reflection is possible; since here alone is the self present since the self is the unity, fullness, of actuality of all its diverse temporal functions. The truly transcendental direction is only gained by participation in the true eternal root of the cosmos, from which we can see diversity and temporality, and to which we can direct the divergent direction of temporal consciousness to what is its true transcendent foundation and presupposita. Dooyeweerd's transcendental critical thinking, critique, and method obviously are completely determined by his view of the supra-temporal, created eternal transcendent root unity, fullness, totality, and consummation in which the ego or heart of the thinker is rooted.

In order to get some insight into the idea of God's eternity, which seems to lie at the background of Dooyeweerd's idea of religious transcendence and his idea of sevum, it will be shown that J. H. Diermer, who is very similar, if not identical to Dooyeweerd, operates with the classical nature-grace notion of God's eternity as it was developed especially by Boethius. In Natuur en Wonder, in speaking of the plan of God, he says,

In dit plan is het gehele wereldverloop in de tijd door God tot in de kleinste bijzonderheden bepaald. Deze bepaling door God is echter niet van causale aard, doch beeft de dingen in hun samenhang, in hun onderling verband,

zodat datgene, wat de mens onderscheidt als het vroegere en het latere, als oorzaak en gevolg, door God tegelijk en in één als een geheel wordt overzien en gekend. De bepaling aller dingen in Gods plan is een bepaling van eeuwigheid of van te voren, vooraf. Het planvol geheel, het besluit Gods gaat vooraf aan de uitvoering en is door God 'in den beginne' -- dat is in het Woord, in de wortel van al het geschapene -- als 'hemel en aarde' geschapen.

Dit 'van te voren' is echter een onderscheiding van het menselijk denken, dat het werken Gods slechts vatten kan met de begrippen voor en na, vroeger en later, eerst en vervolgens omdat het gebonden is aan de tijd. Terwijl veer God heefdbesluit, schepping en ontsluiting-in-het-tijdsverloop zijn en ongedeeld zijn in Zijn Woord.... Wat in werkelijkheid een samenhangend geheel is treedt voor het menselijk bewustzijn uiteen in een vlg-erde van daden, waardoor dit bewustzijn een inzicht verkrijgt in de opbouw en de gerichtheid van het geschapene.<sup>115</sup> [underlining mine in all quotations taken from this book]

In comparing a human plan and the divine plan he says,

Geheel anders staat de zaak met Gods plan. Hierbij kan niet worden gesproken van een vlg-erde van besluiten in die zin, dat God eerst een heefdbesluit en vervolgens met het oog daarop een reeks van ondergeschikte besluiten neemt, die als middelen dienen om het heefdbesluit als het eigenlijke doel te kunnen uitvoeren. Gods besluit is een geheel en dit één besluit en dat de gehele keesmes met zijn in de wortel der natuur besloten vaste erde enerzijds en zijn aan deze erde onderworpen schepselen en gebeurtenissen anderzijds. Vanaf het begin is God bezig met de uitvoering van Zijn plan, van Zijn raadsbesluit en deze uitvoering bestaat in de zesdaagse schepping der tijdelijke wereldorde en de ontsluiting van het subjectief daarin beslotene in het kosmisch tijdsverloop, in gerichtheid op de Schepper. God stelt zich geen deeleinden die Hij eerst via bepaalde middelen kan bereiken. Zijn 'doel' ligt in Hemself, in eigen heerlijkheid en volkomenheid. Aan het geschapene daarentegen heeft God opdrachten verstrekt, die in het tijdsverloop moeten worden uitgevoerd en waarvoor de kracht door God gegeven wordt. Gods werkzaamheid is - niet alleen bij de aanzankelijke en de zesdaagse scheppingsactie, doch ook bij de ontsluiting en herschepping van het toenmaals geschapene - nimmer onderworpen aan de tijdsduur. Zij bestaat vanaf de rust op de zevende dag na Zijn scheppingsactie in het ontplozen en van de zonde verlossen van het in de wortel geschapene, binnens de eenmaal gestelde werelderde.

115. Diemer, Natuur en Wonder (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1963), p. 13.

In de wortel van Gods bewustzijn schepping en herschepping één. Voor het aan de tijd gebonden bewustzijn van de mens echter staat in het plan Gods de schepping voorop en ligt hierbinnen de mogelijkheid besloten van een en van een herschepping.<sup>116</sup>

Dit allesomvattende geheel van het geschapene, deze 'hemel en aarde' zijn besloten in hun wortel, in het Woord Gods, in de Christus, voordat de zesdaagse scheppingsactie een aanvang neemt.

De schepping van dit alles, van 'hemel en aarde', is volgens de Schrift geschied 'in den beginne'. Wij hebben hier te doen met een tijdsaanduiding voor het geloof. De geschapen mens, die naar de oorsprong aller dingen zoekt, wordt hier gewezen op de scheppingsdaad Gods als het begin van alles, als de daad waardoor het geheel, de totaliteit van het geschapene in het aansijn is geroepen. Deze daad nu is geschied 'in de beginne', dat is: in het Woord Gods, in de Christus, die slechts in het geloof kan worden erkend. Jezus Christus staat niet alleen aan het einde, doch ook aan het begin van alle dingen. Hij is de absolute volheid van alle tijd, het absolute begin.... Het menschelijk bewustzijn functioneert echter in de tijd en kan derhalve de scheppende actie Gods slechts vatten indien deze wordt uiteengesteld in een aantal acten, aan elk waarvan een bepaald onderdeel van de geschapen tijd met daarin besloten bepaald scheppingsordeningen en concrete schepgelingen is toegedordend. In het scheppingsverhaal nu is de mededeling van de orde, waarin God alle dingen geschapen heeft, aangepast aan de behoeften van het menselijk verstand. De 'dagen' zijn tijdsmomenten die slechts in het geloof zijn te vatten en die de hoofdmomenten der scheppingsgeschiedenis markeren. In de 'dagen' ligt besloten wat terstond na de schepping, tijdens de ontsluiting, in het kosmisch tijdsverloop aan het daglicht zal treden. Geen enkele dezer 'dagen' is los te maken van het 'begin', waarin ze aanvankelijk alle besloten zijn en waaruit ze voor het menselijk geestesgoed te voorschijn in treden.<sup>117</sup>

In onze zienswijze wordt echter het realiteitskarakter der 'dagen' allerminst prijsgegeven. Dat gebeurt juist in de eerstgenoemde, gangbare opvatting. Waarin bestaat dan dit realiteitskarakter? zoals in het 'begin' de totaliteit

116. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

117. Ibid., pp. 16-17. For an interesting speculation concerning the nature of the days as begin momenten (beginning-moments) which are in principle undateable, see p. 17.

van het geschapene voor ons geestesoog wordt gesteld, zo in de zes 'dagen' de tijdelijke ordeningen van dit geschapene, die van de totaliteit niet zijn los te denken. Evenmin als het 'begin' zijn de 'dagen' voorbijgegaan; integendeel, ze zijn nog steeds present en actueel. Zoals het 'begin' van het geschapene continu aanwezig is in het allesomvattende geheel, zo zijn de 'dagen' present in de fundamentele structuren der verschillende rijken. Deze structuren kunnen van de concrete scheppelen en hun verbonden in het tijdsverloop niet los worden gedacht... En op deze geschiedenis wordt in het scheppingsverhaal reeds vooruitgegrepen telkens wanneer gezegd wordt - nadat eerst het scheppende Woord is genoemd - dat de aarde en de zee voorbrachten levende wezens, zich verenigvuldigend naar hun aard. De ontwikkeling, de ontsluiting der scheppelen in het tijdsverloop kan noch van de geschapen ordeningen, noch van het geheel worden los gedacht. Zoals de 'dagen' in de ordeningen steeds present zijn, zo is het 'begin' in de totaliteit, in de volheid van het plan Gods altoos aanwezig.<sup>118</sup>

In a picture which is very reminiscent of Dooyeweerd's idea of a created totality of meaning refracting itself in time, and the organism idea, he says,

Alles wat in het kosmisch tijdsverloop niet verschijnt wordt gedreven uit de wortel der natuur, waarin het bij de schepping is besloten. Niets van wat verschijnt kan worden losgemaakt van het geheel, van de planvolle samenhang der dingen, die zich uitstrekken van het begin tot het eind der tijden.<sup>119</sup>

In speaking of the view of Hugh Miller, he criticizes him for his idea of looking at the days as long periods of time. He says,

Maar daarmee doet hij onrecht aan het scheppingsverhaal, dat Gods niet aan de tijd gebonden scheppingsactie een voudig meedeelt in een bij de behoeften van het menselijk verstand passende vorm.<sup>120</sup>

In criticizing what he calls the scholastic view of Conrad Martinus, he says,

Het is echter onjuist de Schepper op diese tijdstippen boven-natuurlijkgrijpend en nieuwscheppend te laten optreden. De nieuwe orde-beginselen zijn geen onstoffelijke meta-fysische vormen, die van buiten af in de natuur komen om het

118. Ibid., pp. 17-19. For an interesting idea of "beginning" see p. 19.  
 119. Ibid., p. 20.  
 120. Ibid., p. 25.

stoffelijk gebeuren te richten, doch tijdens de goddelijke scheppingsactie gewerkt en in de wortel der natuur besloten beginselen van structuur, waarbinnen de vormontwikkeling der individuele organismen en van hun stamverbanden kan verlopen en die van de volle tijdelijke werkelijkheid der concrete organismen en van hun stamverbanden niet kan worden los gemaakt. Het resultaat der aanvankelijke en der zesdagse scheppingsactie, in de wortel besloten, ligt als één totalitaire wereldorde ten grondslag aan de natuurlijke ontsluitingsprocessen. Wanneer de ontsluiting in het tijdsverloop voor ons geestesoog begint is de scheppingsactie afgelopen, voltooid.

Wij mogen ons dus de scheppende actie Gods nimmer voorstellen als ingrijpend in het kosmisch tijdsverloop, doch moeten ons haar denken als geschied 'in den beginne' en in de zes dagen, die aan het ontsluitingsproces zijn voorafgegaan en hiervan het tot de volle totaliteit deser tijdelijke werkelijkheid behorende structuurfundament vormen in de wortel der natuur.<sup>121</sup>

In reply to Martinus, who Diemer feels makes temporal ordering separate from the root of nature, Diemer says,

Maar God werkt nimmer buiten de wortel der natuur om. Hij schijnt de ordeningen door zijn woord en besloten ze in dit Woord als in hun wortel, waaruit zijn Geest de verscheidenheid der individuele scheppelen in het tijdsverloop doet uitlopen.<sup>122</sup>

The fall is the fall in the root and man now wanders in a world of "schein"<sup>123</sup> because he has lost sight of the root. In re-creation the root again becomes visible because the Word becomes flesh. The fall has its determined place and task in God's plan.<sup>124</sup> Here appears a very strong supra-lapsarian tendency to make the goal and unity of God's plan the glory of God as a result of redemption. The created totality "in the beginning" contains potentially all that will appear and spring up as new

121. Ibid., p. 28

122. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

123. Ibid., pp. 30-32.

124. Ibid., p. 33.

in world development.<sup>125</sup> Dooyeweerd's totality of meaning which is at the same time the consummation of meaning, comes out clearly when Diemer says,

Een ontsaglijke rijkdom van planmatige betrekkingen wordt van ogenblik tot ogenblik onderhouden tussen allerlei soorten van schepselen in alle rijken der natuur en ook tussen de onderscheiden functies van ieder individueel schepsel. Alles wijst uit boven zichzelf en is gericht op een komend geheel, van waaruit de processen hun zin, en bestemming ontvangen.<sup>126</sup>

In order to avoid a supra-naturalistic understanding of God as a deus ex machina in time, he substitutes his idea of the becoming visible of a totality of re-creation in the new root. He says,

Betekent nu de erkenning dat alleen God wonderen kan werken, dat Hij bij die gebeurtenissen op een bovennatuurlijke wijze in de loop van het natuurgebeuren heeft ingegrepen? Wie deze opvatting is toegedaan gaat uit van een op zichzelf gestelde natuur en last hierin van tijd tot tijd van buiten af God als een deus ex machina handelend optreden. Deze gedachtegang is echter volkomen onschriftuurlijk. God heeft in Christus als nieuwe wortel der natuur de kosmos herschapen en daarmee de oorspronkelijke orde van het koninkrijk weer richtbaar gemaakt voor het oog van de gevallen mens. In de genoemde wortel liggen reeds voor de val de krachten besloten, die van af de val tot aan het einde der tijden de macht van Satan bestrijden en tenslotte nullen vernietigen. Dit fundamentele en centrale wonder der herschpping is in Christus voordurend present en werkzaam. De volheid van dit wonder wordt als een proces van heilsgeschiedenis door de Geest Gods uitgedreven in het kosmisch tijdsverloop, als één groot en samenhangend geheel van 'tekenen en wonderen'. Het wonder van het nieuwe zijn openbaart zich in de wonder-tekenen van het nieuwe leven en streven in alle rijken der natuur.

Teken en wonder kunnen dan ook niet van elkaar worden los gemaakt. De Schrift noemt ze op vele plaatsen in één adem. Teken en wonder verhouden zich als periferie en centrum, als buiten- en binnenzijde van één-en-deszelfde werkelijkheid der Openbaring.<sup>127</sup>

He speaks of the fact that the Biblical writers in describing the

miracles or wonders held to naive experience and simply communicated what happened without in the least trying to give an explanation of the causes of these wonders. This is the task of science.<sup>128</sup> This is the emphasis throughout the whole book. Science, and especially philosophy and theology, must lay bare and interpret the revelation given in the language of naive experience. It would appear that here we have a scientism at work, a so-called religious hermeneutic which can get to God's point of view.<sup>129</sup> It is a religious hermeneutic which only can be found in one who advocates the Calvinistic philosophy. That his position represents a grace-nature supra-lapsarian bringing together of creation and re-creation in one root in which creation is made simply into a preamble of the perfection or consummation in Christ, seems to come out quite clearly. He says,

Maar God heeft deze orde niet op zich zelf gesteld, zodat zij het feitelijk is door middel waarvan God de gewone loop der dingen tot stand brengt. Deze orde is de vaste wet, waar aan, God-Zelf zich - in Zijn verbond! - heeft willen binden bij de uitvoering van Zijn raadsplan. Dit moet niet zo worden verstaan, dat God aan deze geschapen orde zou zijn onderworpen, doch aldus, dat Hij nu Zelf de geschapen volheid dager orde uitwerkt 'om te volmaken' in Christus wat Hij begonnen is te scheppen en te herschepen in Christus. Het is God-Zelf die alles werkt in de natuur, die alles drijft uit de wortel, uit het Woord; het is Zijn Geest die alle dingen voortstuwt naar hun bestemming in de dienst van het komende koninkrijk. Alle geordende natuurverschijnselen op stoffelijk, organisch, psychisch en geestelijk gebied, wonderbaarlijk of niet wonderbaarlijk genoemd, zijn door het Woord en de Geest in de wortel der natuur besloten en worden uit deze wortel gedreven in het tijdsverloop.<sup>130</sup>

He relates all sign and wonders to the root when he says, "Christus' natuur, mens en God in-een, is de wortel waaruit al zijn wonderdaden

125. Ibid., p. 34.

126. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

127. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

128. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

129. Ibid., pp. 103-104.

130. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

voortkomen.<sup>131</sup> A clear similarity to Dooyeweerd's idea of the concentration point in Christ is to be found in Diemer, as well as his emphasis on the idea of ground-motive.<sup>132</sup> Diemer sums up what would appear to be a grace-nature supra-lapsarianism when he criticizes Spinoza.

Maar zijn critiek betreft alleen dit supra-naturalistisch wondergeloof; niet echter het schriftuurlijke geloof in het centrale wonder van Gods openbaring in Christus, waar in alle wonderen van schepping, voorzienigheid en herschepping, m.a.w. de gehele wereldorde en derhalve de ordeningen van alle dingen en gebeurtenissen in de kosmos, zowel voor als na de val, als in hun wortel zijn gesloten. De wondertekenen van schepping, voorzienigheid en herschepping, die zich afspelen in het kosmisch tijdsverloop, zijn dan ook van schriftuurlijk standpunt niets anders dan natuurlijke gebeurtenissen, die binnen de geschapen en herschapen wereldorde plaats grijpen en door de Geest Gods uit hun ordeningen binnen de wortel der natuur worden gedreven.<sup>133</sup>

The similarity of this view with Dooyeweerd's view comes out clearly when he writes,

Het is duidelijk, dat in deze beschouwingwijze het wonder volkomen is gerationaliseerd. Wij zijn hier wel ver verwijderd van de reformatorische opvatting van het wonder als de openbaring van Gods genade in Christus Jesus, zoals we bij Luther aantreffen. Leibniz heeft de orde der natuur losgemaakt van de wortel van het genus humankind, in verband waarmee zij in de aanvang is geschapen. Het menselijk geslacht is van oorsprong een wortelgemeenschap, waarin ook de orde der natuur mede is opgenomen. Voor de val was deze gemeenschap religieus geworteld in de Wet Gods; na de val is in Christus deze wortel opnieuw in zijn oorspronkelijke volkomenheid geopenbaard. In hem ligt dan ook de totaliteit der natuurlijke werkelijkheid, die niet van het menselijk geslacht kan worden gescheiden. De tegenstelling natuur - bovennatuur valt hier geheel weg, want in Christus is de naar haar subjectieve gevallen natuur hersteld in haar oorspronkelijke staat en zijn dus schepping en herschepping één.<sup>134</sup>

From this extensive survey of quotations certain points which we have been discussing in Dooyeweerd come clear. Before these points

131. Ibid., p. 56.

132. Ibid., p. 74.

133. Ibid., p. 131.

134. Ibid., p. 145.

are discussed in greater detail let it be said that there seems to be a grace-nature neo-realism in Diemer's thought. It will be shown that there is a clear supra-lapsarian tendency to get all of the creation and redemptive history into a unity and a totality view.

In order to accomplish this, Diemer begins from a clearly scholastic view of God's eternity as an eternal present. The plan of God, as we shall see also in Kuyper's supra-lapsarianism, is centered in the Word of God, the Son, who is given the Augustinian title of the first words of Genesis, "in the beginning." "In the beginning" means in the Word, i.e., the Son; God made heaven and earth and therefore creation is supra-temporal and does not end in cosmic time. There is a constant emphasis on the "spiritual eye," by which one sees all diversity as one. Faith and naive experience follow the succession of the faith order of time, but there is another way of looking at the diversity which faith sees. When we take God's point of view we see that all miracles are natural and normal. When we have the point of view of the spiritual eye which is really, it would seem, the point of view of God's eternal counsel, all diversity is one. Creation and re-creation are one. God sees all in one eternal glance in his counsel, his Son. God acts once, and all that is, unfolds, according to a fixed order in rich diversity, which is known by the spiritual eye to be the becoming visible of what already existed in the root of nature, or what is almost identical, the eternal plan of God. This spiritual eye, which sees things as one, that is, that sees things as they really are for God and not as they appear to naive experience and faith which are bound to the order of time in the faith aspect, proves in the last analysis to be the scientific eye. An implication from this viewing of God's eternity as a perfect possession of

infinite life, all at once, in an eternal present, is the scholastic idea that God's knowledge is intuitive, that is, one eternal present glance where there is no movement, no transition from future to past, and in which all events are synthetically present. In contrast to this, we would say that we can get no clear concept of God's eternity. We must as simply as possible repeat the manifold ways in which Scripture speaks of God. If we were to try to conceptualize this, there would be far more evidence that God should be conceived as simply older than the creation, that his eternity is a long line rather than an eternal now. But neither of these analogies can be said to grasp what the Scriptures are revealing to us. Diemer clearly works with the idea that for God all things are present. As we have seen in chapter 2 of this dissertation ("global oversight"), this view of eternity always has extreme difficulty relating God to the cosmos. This comes out in Diemer's speaking of the root of the cosmos. God works with the root and only with the root. But by working with the root he works immediately on the whole of creation in its unfolding toward the kingdom because all of reality is in this root as a totality and fullness. For God there is no distinction between creation, fall, and redemption. They are one in Christ, in the Word, the root. The succession of events is due to time and the unfolding of what is contained all at once in the root. He tries to avoid a Christomorphism<sup>135</sup> by speaking of a new root replacing the old root, but then the stress is placed so completely on grace and the new root that the new root is regarded as the more original root, the one in which the creation always existed. The historical reality of creation

135. For the use and meaning of this term see Velema, De Leer van de Heilige Geest bij Abraham Kuyper, p. 237.

and fall before the intervention of Christ cannot receive full justice and proper emphasis. Historical events and temporal unfolding are constantly spoken of as a "becoming visible" of what takes place in the new root where all is one and undifferentiated. The idea of a supra-temporal root<sup>136</sup> is viewed as analogous to the unity of all in the eternal present of God's counsel. In the eternal, whether in God's plan or in the created, transcendent, supra-temporal root of the cosmos, all is one, is unity and undifferentiated, is not spread out, and has not yet partaken of succession. In the transcendent root there is concentration, undifferentiation, and this must mean that all is present. Therefore there is no succession and therefore no future and past. The created totality in the root is eternal and the only meaning that can be given to this created eternity, both in Diemer as well as in Dooyeweerd, is the thought of a present containing all, and then all at once, since it is always a unity. What confirms this is that Diemer, as well as Dooyeweerd, regards this totality of meaning to be the created realization of the eternal plan of God. It is the whole plan concentrated in Christ. The whole of creation and re-creation are in this totality, and its eternity necessarily must resemble the eternity character of God's plan or will. The key to the idea of an Archimedean point is the scholastic view of God's eternity as an eternal, perfect possession of life all at once. This is the pattern for the created totality, fullness, and unity of the creation. This is why it must be eternal, transcendent, supra-temporal. To be the created, immanent reduplication of the eternal will and world plan as a totality, fullness, and unity, it must be all at

136. Diemer, Natur en Wonder, pp. 115-116, 121.

once; that is, an eternal present like God's eternal plan is assumed to be.

There is a slightly different emphasis in Dooyeweerd concerning the nature of the totality of meaning, and this brings with it an insight into the type of neo-realism which we are seeking to describe in Dooyeweerd. It seems that from Dooyeweerd's polemic against neo-Platonism and Augustine's idea of creation in the Word, i.e., "in the beginning" in the Son,<sup>137</sup> that he might be somewhat hesitant to accept Diemer's formulation of this. However, Dooyeweerd does show a similarity with Kuyper's and Diemer's idea of creation in the Word. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that Christ, in his divine nature as the Word, created the world.<sup>138</sup> He also stresses the fact that creation is supra-temporal and takes place "in the beginning." He nowhere explicitly says that the phrase "in the beginning" refers to Christ so that "in the beginning" would mean in the Son, as Diemer would say. However, there is a strong presumption that this is what Dooyeweerd means by stating that God's created acts are not temporal but supra-temporal and "in the beginning." His emphasis that God created the cosmos through the Word is quite typical of Kuyper's view of the Word as the concentration point.<sup>139</sup> Rather than emphasizing the agency of all the persons of the Godhood in creation,

which Scripture does, the Word is singled out as the unity of God and cosmos. Dooyeweerd's stressing of the creation in the Word shows strong connections with the supra-lapsarian position of Kuyper.

It might seem like a sudden shift to describe Dooyeweerd as grace-nature after describing him in terms of having nature-grace influence on him. By nature-grace is meant the older designation which then can develop into grace-nature. Dooyeweerd has shown that nature-grace is a dialectical ground-motive with basic poles. This means that either the grace pole or the nature pole can have the emphasis. The more modern thinkers, especially since Barth, have shifted to the grace pole.<sup>140</sup> Nature-grace then is used as the broader, older designation, so that within this general rubric Dooyeweerd can be considered nature-grace, having the emphasis on grace rather than nature. This grace-nature influence is centered in his idea of the Archimedean point and in the idea of Christ as the new root. Without a root creation, the earthly temporal world would fall into nothing.<sup>141</sup> When he says, Christ is the new root of the creation, it seems that he is saying that the creation only has existence in him, that Christ is the ontic ground of creation, the only possibility for the continued existence of things. Diemer and S. G. de Graaf have the same emphasis.<sup>142</sup> For Dooyeweerd the old root

137. See p. 101, footnote 85, of this dissertation.

138. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, I, p. 175; II, p. 563.

139. Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie," pp. 115-116. Notice the stress on the creation of God through the Word and also the "in the beginning" emphasis. If we correlate this with the quote found in A New Critique, II, p. 563, then we have a strong presumption that creation is in the Son, i.e., "in the beginning" meaning in the Son. In any case we have a strong case for the mediatorial role of the Son in creation which shows a strong affinity to Kuyper's idea of Christ as creation Mediator. For development and critique of this idea see Velema, op.cit., pp. 71-97, 219-225. See also p. 101, footnote 86, of this dissertation.

140. For the distinction between grace-nature and nature-grace see Zuidema, Inleiding in de Filosofie, pp. 2-7, 9-10, 61; also Zuidema, Konfrontatie met Karl Barth (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1963), pp. 195-207. The whole book contrasts Thomas' nature-grace with Barth's grace-nature.

141. This is tied to the semi-contradictory feature of the ontology type. For the importance of the supra-temporal focus which guarantees the meaning character of creation see A New Critique, II, p. 30.

142. S. K. de Graaf, "De genade Gods en de structuur der gansche schepping," Phil. Ref., I (1936); Christus en de Wereld (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1939). There is an important chapter in this book, "Genade

of the creation and fallen human race is supra-temporal, transcendent, and continues to exist until the consummation. In the supra-temporal realm there is the central battle, and it is a dynamic sphere of occurrence from which the struggle in time takes its issue.<sup>143</sup> But the old root is no longer the ontic ground. The new root takes over completely the ontic foundation for existence. Grace holds creation in existence. Existence is in Christ.<sup>144</sup> The key reasons for this grace-nature view are to be found in the theo-ontological tradition. In the definition of God's eternity as an eternal present, scholastic and Greek theo-ontology tried to get a totality and unity view. All of diversity and succession could be seen as one if the point of view of God was gained. This speculative lust for a totality view or a unity view was embodied among the supra-lapsarian scholastic Reformed theologians of which Kuyper reigned supreme.<sup>145</sup> To see creation and redemption in one root, as one in the plan of God, to fit the fall into the unity of God's plan, and to vindicate the sovereignty of God over evil, was a great motivation of the supra-lapsarians.

The problem of unity was Dooyeweerd's basic problem until 1930. This comes out in various ways. He started with the idea of sphere sovereignty and spoke of the fact that the sovereign spheres were all in a cosmic organism of law sphere. The unity of these diverse law spheres

en natuur," pp. 72-113, where he deals with the root idea and the concentration point. For an interesting critique on de Graaf's view of common grace and his views see Popma, "Algemeene en bijzondere genade," *Corr. bladen*, XXI/2 (1957).

143. Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, I, p. 32.

144. *Ibid.*, pp. 522-523.

145. See Berkouwer, *Divine Election* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960), pp. 254-277, for a sympathetic discussion of supra- and infra-lapsarian. See also Velema, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-69. For a critical view of Kuyper's supra-lapsarianism see J. Douma, *Algemeene Genade* (Goes: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1966).

was not then thought to be in a created totality, fullness, and root unity, but directly in the eternal counsel of God à la Kuyper. The reconciliation of the diverse spheres was in the mystery of God's eternal providential world plan. This formulation did not satisfy Dooyeweerd because it did not enable the thinker to be a participant in the totality of meaning of the cosmos which was needed if a totality-unity-view of the earthly diversity was to be gained.<sup>146</sup> The great discovery<sup>147</sup> was the idea of the new root, which was a strong emphasis in Kuyper.<sup>148</sup> Man could not participate in the new root of the cosmos and this new root was the totality, fullness, and unity of God's eternal counsel in the creation. Before this discovery Dooyeweerd could hardly speak of man as participant in the eternal counsel. After, however, he could speak of being participant in Christ. The new root takes over the place that the eternal counsel had in former years. The new root, as we have seen, because it is totality, fullness, and unity in one, must have an analogous eternal character to God's eternal plan which is unity, fullness, and totality. Man must have an eternal heart to be a participant in this created, eternal, transcendent root of the cosmos. In this way the creation cannot be fully temporal because room has to be made in it for a created

146. This need for unity was paramount for Dooyeweerd. For a few of his references before 1930 see "Vraag en antwoord," *Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde*, I (driemaandelijksch orgaan) (1927), p. 292; "Het oude probleem der Christelijk staatkunde," *Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde*, II (1926), pp. 64ff.; "Leugen en waarheid over het Calvinisme," *Nederland en Oranje*, VI (1925), p. 90; "De oorsprong van de anti-thees tusschen Christelijke en humanistische wetssciede..." *Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde*, I (driemaandelijksch orgaan) (1927), pp. 77ff. and especially p. 88. This is a very important early systematic work; many of the problems discussed are already present in this article. See also "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetssciede."

147. Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, I, pp. v-ix ("Foreword abbreviated to the first edition").

148. See Velema, *op. cit.* *passim*.

totality and fullness of creation. The only way this can be done is to concentrate this totality and fullness of the creation into a concentrated and undifferentiated point or root unity. This means that it is also not temporal but resembles God's eternal counsel. The creation has two sides always in strict correlation (created eternity and earthly cosmic time) and these alone give one an integral and meaning-full cosmos.

The scholastics' idea of the unity of God follows the same pattern as their idea of God's eternity. The nature-grace idea of the "eternal present" carries with it a notion that God always works in the present of his eternity. Time is often thought of as moving nows, restlessly imitating the fullness of God's eternal now. Dooyeweerd views it as completely impossible to regard God as subject to the temporal laws.<sup>149</sup> By this he means that to speak of God as creating different things in succession is to subject him to time, and to make him into a Greek demiurge. His view of the immanence of God's coming into time is rather unique. With Kuyper he would rather speak of God as acting immediately on the root. In this way God is not subject to time because the root of the cosmos is eternal like God. The root of the cosmos is the image of God, and it is integral or radical, i.e., central or eternal.<sup>150</sup> God acts directly on the root, the heart of the cosmos, and from there to the temporal branches.<sup>151</sup> By regenerating the root he regenerates the whole. By creating the root he creates the whole. Revelation in the root must penetrate into the temporal, so God's revelation always has the central transcen-

149. Dooyeweerd, "Schepping en evolutie," pp. 113-120 (especially 118); "De oorsprong van de anti-theze tusschen Christelijke en humanistische wetsidee," p. 78; "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem...," pp. 26-27.

150. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, III, p. 69; II, p. 307.

151. Ibid., I, p. 175.

dent-eternal sense, and the immanent-temporal sense in strict correlation.<sup>152</sup> This idea of the immediate working of God on the root is a carry-over from Kuyper's regeneration theology.<sup>153</sup> Because God is an eternal present he can never be subject to succession and, in this sense, in time. There must be an eternal root which is an eternal present through which God works on the whole of the temporal world in one eternal act. Notice the stress in Diermer and Dooyeweerd on the oneness of God's acts. This is the supra-lapsarian tendency to see all the creation and its history in a unified totality view. In order to do this creation and fall are reduced to re-creation. The standpoint is taken in redemptive grace, in the new root. The center of grace is in Christ. Christ as center is eternal, therefore at death man can be fully like the angels. Becoming spiritual like the spiritual root,<sup>154</sup> he becomes asvum. He does this by leaving the temporal. The idea of created eternity means an implicit depreciation of time.

The neo-realism of Dooyeweerd comes out precisely in the fact that the eternity consciousness is the consciousness of totality, fullness, and unity by which all time with its rich diversity is judged. There is here a participation idea. By participation in the eternity of the creation the diversity of the temporal is understood, thought is given its transcendental direction. The fullness of meaning is the foundation for all the temporal refracted functions of meaning.<sup>155</sup> Because of our po-

152. Ibid., II, pp. 561, 563.

153. Popma, Wijsbegeerte en Anthropologie, p. 44; see also the index to Levensbeschouwing (vol. VII), p. 303, under wedergeboorte and wedergeboorte theologie.

154. It would be an interesting study to trace Dooyeweerd's many uses of the term "spiritual" and its Kuyperian background. See Velema, op. cit.

155. This comes out clearly in A New Critique, II, pp. 53-54.

sition in the created eternal side of the creation in which we have eternity consciousness, we get God's point of view, the point of view of the angels, the point of view of the eternal counsel. We get distance from the temporal earthly cosmos, or as Kuyper said, a standing in a non-cosmos; we have an Archimedean point ( $\pi\eta\omega\sigma\tau\omega$ ) from which to get an overview.<sup>156</sup> This distance is a created analogy to God's point of view. It is however, a point of view of the theo-ontological tradition. From this point of view, nature and grace are one, common grace is rooted in Christ, and creation is consummated in redemption, the goal of creation according to the eternal counsel. The new root eclipses the old root which proved to be only temporary.

Some of this description Dooyeweerd would probably not allow in virtue of his transcendental critical method. It has been pointed out that it masks and hides the grace-nature construct at the root of his world view. The neo-realism comes out in the fact that the law for the temporal cosmos is supra-temporal and transcendent and behind the temporal cosmos. The law of love for God and man is always regarded as strictly supra-temporal and transcendent. By this transcendent law to which alone the root is subject, alone with the hearts of all men in the root, the temporal is judged. All law holding for the temporal is temporal<sup>157</sup> and time itself is a law order, a boundary. Dooyeweerd definitely has two boundary ideas.<sup>158</sup> The one is the boundary between God and heart and the other is the boundary between the temporal functions and the heart. All diversity is only known by participation and obedience

156. Kuyper, Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godegeleerdheid, II, p. 59.

157. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," p. 99.

158. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, p. 552.

to the transcendent central eternal law. This law is the fullness, totality, and unity of all diverse law, which is simply the refraction of this transcendent law.

We have tried to show that both corollaries 1 and 2 described in chapter 2 of this dissertation are present in Dooyeweerd. Now it will be shown that the 3rd corollary found in nature-grace thinking concerning God's eternity and created eternity and time is also present in Dooyeweerd.

In chapter 2 of this dissertation it was emphasized that it is almost a standard conception of nature-grace thinking that time is thought to be for a time, i.e., that time is regarded as coming to an end. We tried to show that time is thought to cease in order that another order, that of created eternity, might exist. Created eternity, as was mentioned before, is generally thought to be present already in heaven, so it might be more accurate to say that these thinkers think of time ceasing so that the higher order or created eternity might exist alone without the double existence of time and created eternity. Perfection is viewed as becoming eternal, as opposed to the temporal, with which corruptibility is associated. In contrast to this we have noted the importance of distinguishing time from corruptibility which is not necessarily related to time, since time is a good creature of God. We noted the importance of the new earth as the central goal and horizon for all God's future dealings as well as man's endless temporal life after the judgment day. We emphasized the importance of God dwelling on the new earth so that given with the new earth is the idea of heaven on earth. We pointed to the importance of world history as moving to this reconciliation of heaven and earth, to the day when paradise would be regained, when God in his Son would walk and talk with the new human race upon the new

earth through all the periods of time and history, after the judgment. We noted the importance of seeing that heaven as it exists now is not the final abode of departed saints, but is a provisional place. We mentioned the imperfection of this place and the great perspective of the resurrection of the dead as preparing for everlasting life on the new earth, i.e., this earth restored and renewed.<sup>159</sup>

On the other hand, when time is thought to cease or when there is any thought of leaving the temporal at death, this perspective is lost and another takes its place. We have seen that Dooyeweerd's idea of aevum, the supra-temporal, is very important to his position, and that it is in accordance with the nature-grace tradition. It has been shown that the idea of eternity as a unified existence is opposed to temporality with its refraction, diversity, and succession. We have tried to show by a comparison with his disciple Diemer, that this idea of created eternity is demanded because of an implicit idea of God's eternity as an eternal present.

When time is thought to cease and eternity is thought then to exist alone, without time, eschatology is bound to be verticalized and shifted to another order. We showed how Dooyeweerd applies the terms "eternal" and "supra-temporal" to the idea of the eschaton and to the consummation.<sup>160</sup> We will now survey some of the evidence to be found in Dooyeweerd in order to confirm what has been already surmised when we dealt with his idea that man, at death, becomes participant, like the

159. On this point Diemer has a healthier emphasis than Dooyeweerd. See Natuur en Wonder, pp. 88, 108.

160. See p. 182, footnote 86, of this dissertation.

angels, in the condition of created eternity (aevum-toestand), and can be said to glide over into eternal life; that is, that for Dooyeweerd time is regarded as ceasing and that the eschaton has become eternity in nature-grace fashion. After showing this we will try to sketch how this view of time as ceasing involves a verticalization of eschatology and influences his construction of the directions of cosmic time. This will be only dealt with in sketch form and will be taken up along with the problem of the concentration point in chapter 4.

In Inleiding tot de Encyclopaedie der Rechtswetenschap Dooyeweerd discusses the general importance of the pistical aspect.

De Heilige Schrift (vgl. 2 Cor. 5:7; Rom. 8:24; I Cor. 13:12) wijst ons duidelijk op het tijdelijk grenskarakter ook van het waarachtig Christ-geloof hier op de aarde, dat zal worden vervuld in de volle religieuze aanschouwing, in het 'zien van aangezicht tot aangezicht'. Althans de modale geloofs-functie blijft van tijdelijk karakter. De vervulling van het geloof, de volle geloofs-aanschouwing daarentegen is eerst in de eeuwigheid in uitzicht gesteld. En de ware Vaste Grond van het geloof is uiteraard in volstrekte zin boven de tijd verheven, daar hij slechts in God zelf, als de Absolute Bron der Waarheid, te vinden is....

Deze modale structuur der pistis wordt volstrekt miskend, zo men het karakter van het geloof als laatste grensfunctie, d.w.z. zijn ommiddellijke betrokkenheid op de transcendentie wortel en de Oorsprong der schepping, niet gevatt heeft.<sup>161</sup>

In a similar vein he says,

And in both cases it is obvious that the function of faith cannot be identified with the religious root of temporal existence or in the words of the Ecclesiastes, with the heart from which spring the issues of life. Believing, logical distinction, feeling, etc. are temporal functions delimited from one another in law-spheres of mutually irreducible meaning-modalities. But the religious root of our entire existence is not a function; religion is not enclosed in a temporal law sphere.

Holy Scripture clearly points out the temporal limiting character of true Christian faith, which will find its fulfillment in the religious 'vision face to face in the *βλέπειν πρὸς προσώπον*'.

161. Dooyeweerd, Inleiding tot de Encyclopaedie der Rechtswetenschap, p. 88.

Only in the 'heart' does the function of faith find its religious concentration, and from this spiritual root of our existence the direction of our believing is determined. True Christian faith is directed to the religious fulness of God's Revelation in Christ Jesus, to the invisible, super-temporal wealth bestowed on us in the Redeemer. But, as a function, it is not super-temporal itself, since it is interwoven with the whole temporal coherence of our existence.<sup>162</sup> [Underlining mine in this series of quotations]

Dooyeweerd points to a similar idea in a paragraph entitled "The eschatological aspect of cosmic time in faith."

To be sure, cosmic time has its limiting aspect in faith and there is a temporal order and duration in the special meaning of the latter. The modal meaning of faith, as we shall see in the second volume, is by its nature related to divine revelation. In this eschatological aspect of time, faith groups the eschaton, and in general, that which is or happens beyond the limits of cosmic time. In this special sense are to be understood the 'days of creation', the initial words of the book of Genesis, the order in which regeneration precedes conversion, etc.

Theology will always need this limiting aspect of time in which the cosmic temporal order is indissolubly connected with the revealed supra-temporal realm. However, I cannot agree with the tendency of some modern Christian theologians, who identify the eschatological aspect of time with the historical and reject the supra-temporal central sphere of human existence and of divine revelation.<sup>163</sup>

When speaking of the church he says,

However, the organization of historical power on which the Church-institution is based, directly expresses the transcendental limiting character of this societal relationship. This character does not even offer a provisional resting-point to thought but directly points beyond time to the transcendent root of the ecclesia visibilis, i.e. to Christ's Kingdom in the hearts of men. The whole temporal Church-institution is founded in the historical power of Christ as the incarnate Word. It is the historical power of 'the sword of the Divine Word' by which faith is directly grasped as the revelation of Christ's transcendent fulness of power, of His kingship over the whole world....

According to its transcendental limiting character, the ecclesiastical organization of power does not allow of territorial boundaries like that of the State. Its historical

162. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, II, pp. 298-299.

163. Ibid., I, p. 33.

task revealed by Christ himself, is to gain the spiritual dominion over all nations and peoples. As will appear later on, this does not exclude the formation of local churches. But through its limiting position between time and eternity the Church's historical world-dominion is radically distinguished from any other meta-historically qualified organization of power. Its sole qualification is the unshakable power of Christ's Word and Spirit.<sup>164</sup>

In speaking of the internal deepening of the marriage bond by the formation of a family, he says,

The central religious interweaving of the human egos is independent of temporal bonds, although the converse is not true. There is no doubt that the selfhoods of the conjugal partners are for all eternity interwoven in the new root of life, Christ Jesus, if they are really united in Him. This is the religious fulness of meaning of marriage. But in this religious inter-wovenness Christian marriage partners become aware of belonging to one another, not as husband and wife in the temporal marriage bond, but as children of one Father in Christ Jesus. Here on earth they may only belong to each other 'as though they did not'. For temporal ties, even the most intense in this life are perishable; the invisible union with Christ is eternal.<sup>165</sup>

To be brought into correlation with the preceding quotation is another in which the connection of the anticipatory or transcendental direction of cosmic time with the idea of eternity is brought out. In speaking of the family, he says,

In this natural community, the normative tie of love between the members of a family cannot be identified with the religious meaningfulness of love in the corpus Christi, notwithstanding its ultimate reference to the latter in the anticipatory direction of cosmic time.<sup>166</sup>

At the end of the third volume he has this to say,

In the radical community of the human race according to the divine order of creation, man is not qualified as a 'rational-moral being', but only by his kingly position as the personal religious creaturely center of the whole

164. Ibid., III, p. 537.

165. Ibid., III, p. 322.

166. Ibid., III, p. 269.

earthly cosmos. In him the rational-moral functions also find their concentration and through him the entire temporal world is included both in apostasy and in salvation. All things, beings, and factual relations qualified by a temporal modal function are transitory, the temporal bonds of love included. But man has an eternal destination....<sup>167</sup>

The accuracy of our description of Dooyeweerd's views concerning aevum, the supra-temporal, and God's eternity is given striking confirmation in these quotations. The phrases upon which we will concentrate our analysis have been underlined.

At an earlier point in this chapter we discussed the statement of Dooyeweerd in which he described death as a gliding over out of the temporal into eternal life.<sup>168</sup> There was at this point in the analysis a strong presumption that the eschaton was the eternal as opposed to the temporal which will come to an end. There was a presumption that he regarded time to be for a time, yet it could have been possible from this quotation for someone to contend that perhaps at the resurrection of the dead Dooyeweerd could say that time was resumed, i.e., when the heart was rejoined with the body. From these quotations we are now considering it is quite clear that he has the very ancient notion of eternity, which is definitely a constitutive feature of nature-grace. K. J. Popma has laboured long and hard to show precisely the deeply pagan and speculative character of this notion, and it is one of the contentions that reoccurs throughout all his writings. It could be said to constitute a central theme in his thinking.

Dooyeweerd speaks very clearly concerning faith in terms of the contrasts, "here on the earth," and "seeing face to face in full re-

167. *Ibid.*, III, p. 783.

168. See pp. 131ff. of this dissertation.

ligious sight." We have seen that for Dooyeweerd the full religious sight is always supra-temporal. For faith "here on the earth" is also placed in contrast to "in eternity." Dooyeweerd is obviously speaking about the eschatological context which is connected with the seeing of God at the coming of his Son to earth. It is interesting to note that the religious fulfilling of faith is identified with what is first fulfilled in eternity. The modal faith function is only of a temporal character, and Dooyeweerd underscores the word "temporal." It would seem that he means that this temporal modal faith function is only for a time, that is, while we are "here on the earth." That he views the modal function of faith in this way was confirmed in my mind after a personal interview with him.<sup>169</sup> It is clear, however, that this temporal-faith-function is temporal, i.e., it holds while we are "here on earth" and it will not be necessary when we have full religious sight face to face "in eternity." Temporal faith is, as it were, sublimated in the religious. With the idea that the temporal-faith-function is temporal, that is, for a while, it is also implied that all temporal functions are for a time.<sup>170</sup> Dooyeweerd gives the same answer to the question of what would be the functional law coherence of the resurrected body on the new earth as he gives to this question when it is addressed to the angels. In our opinion, there is much more room for hesitation concerning angels,<sup>171</sup> but with the resurrection body there can be no hesitation. It is given with the scriptural ground-motive of Word-revela-

169. See p. 6, footnote 6, and p. 85, footnote 59, of this dissertation.

170. See an interesting discussion on this point, "Enkele losse grepen uit de discussie ter jaarvergadering 1956," *Corres. bladen*, XX (June 1956), pp. 41-43.

171. Popma, *Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte*, pp. 84-85.

tion that there is identity between the body raised and the body buried. To draw a radical discontinuity between these bodies is to do violence to the idea of resurrection as restoral, re-creation, and renewal. To say that in eternity there will not be our temporal bodily functions is exceedingly dangerous. To plead ignorance concerning the problem or to say that it is a speculative question, is not the exercise of a believing, transcendental critical thinking, but is skepsis. To replace the temporal order with an eschatological eternity of perfection is not only to have two world orders and time orders, it is in one stroke to make us ignorant of what the Scriptures portray concerning the glorious inheritance of God's people. As mysterious and unspeakable as this future is, faith is not left in ignorance of the prospect that awaits. This is another example of how, on one hand, Dooyeweerd is not willing to allow himself any room for a believing perspective towards the future via his transcendental critical thinking, and yet he employs an eminently pagan idea of eternity, taking it over for his idea of time. If the fulfillment of faith only is "first in eternity placed in prospect" and the modal-faith-function is only temporal, for a time, then we are left wholly in the dark as to the future as the Scriptures speak to us. The modal functions for Dooyeweerd are eminently of a temporal nature. He underscores this when he writes,

Wanneer de modale aspecten zelve tijds-aspecten zijn, dan is ook hun onderlinge volgorde in den tijd een wesenlijke tijdsorde. En deze volgorde moet zich dan ook in de modale structuur van ieder aspect uitdrukken. Wanneer men de vroeger uiteengezette onderscheiding en correlatie tusschen tijds-orde en tijdsduur goed in zich heeft opgenomen, zal men met het inzicht in het wesenlijk tijds karakter dezer volgorde geen moeite meer hebben. Al is de orde der modale aspecten zelve constant in den tijd, evenals deze aspecten zelve naar hun modale structuur, zoo doet dit aan het tijdelijk karakter dezer orde als zoodanig geen afbreuk. Zij is immers een be-

standdeel van de tijdelijke wereldorde, in Gods scheppingsplan vervat, en mag op geenerlei wijze als van eeuwigheidskarakter worden beschouwd, of althans als een orde, welke den tijd zou transcendereen.<sup>172</sup>

Time as an order and the modal functions with it are clearly thought of as being left behind, as running their course when man enters the eschatological perfection which is described as "in eternity."

Eschatology, for Dooyeweerd, is mostly seen as the beatific vision, of a seeing God face to face which is of a religious supra-temporal character, and which is first possible "in eternity." This idea of the beatific vision is clearly not free from the beatific vision as it is central in nature-grace thinking.<sup>173</sup> Dooyeweerd tries to set himself off somewhat from the idea of an intellectualistic view of the beatific vision as it is found in Thomism. This vision is religious in nature for Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd is a strong opponent of rationalism and intellectualism, but the real similarity to Thomas, i.e., the idea of the eternity character of the beatific vision, is left unchallenged. Dooyeweerd has not reformed his eschatology nearly enough.<sup>174</sup>

The other quotations given simply confirm this exegesis, and put it beyond reasonable doubt. He speaks of the conjugal partners "being for all eternity interwoven in the new root of life, Christ Jesus." This

172. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," p. 199.

173. Dooyeweerd tries to set himself off from any view of the beatific vision which stems from the form principle of the form-matter ground-motive. See "De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip," passim. For an interesting survey of this subject see Berkouwer, De Wederkomst van Christus, II, pp. 154-192.

174. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.," pp. 180-181. Here he mentions sevum in Thomas and Boethius with no criticism. There is almost completely uncritical acceptance of it. See also "Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieen...," pp. 68-69. Notice here the term "created eternity" which is seldom employed but warrants our labeling of bovenlijdelijk as the supra-temporal.

is the religious fullness of marriage. The marriage relation is sublimated in the religious fullness of marriage as we saw that faith was sublimated in religious seeing face to face. Dooyeweerd quotes from Matthew 22:30 and Mark 12:25 in this connection,<sup>175</sup> where Christ speaks of our similarity to angels in the respect that there will be no marriage situation. Nature-grace thinking has used this text to show that men will become angels since they will become eternal and no longer temporal. The phrase in this quote, "for all eternity interwoven" definitely must refer to the final eschatological eternity because he quotes texts which speak of the time of the resurrection and the final stage of the kingdom.

Dooyeweerd goes further and makes the point that "all temporal ties are perishable," but "the invisible union with Christ is eternal." What could "eternal" mean here other than lasting as opposed to temporal ties which are perishable. In the context, the perishability of the marriage tie is illustrated by the references to Matthew 22:30 and Mark 12:25, and are we not to think that he is saying that all temporal ties pass away (not only marriage), and only the religious central interwovenness lasts forever, that is, "for all eternity." Popma has shown that these texts in no way imply that family ties will cease, but rather they will be continued, friendship relations and social relations will be restored and furthered, and there will be differences in offices and positions, along with differences of reward on the new earth. This whole passage is symptomatic of how he views eschatology and last things. The same feature comes out when he speaks of the church, as an institute being

"in a limiting position between eternity and time." Dooyeweerd often speaks of faith as the "open window to eternity."<sup>176</sup> By eternity he does not only mean the eternity of God, which of course is involved, but he has in mind the idea of created eternity also. Faith immediately points to the religious supra-temporal root. Faith is the open window to created eternity as well as the eternity of God. It is through this open window that God's eternity shines into the temporal world. Faith is the open window to the eschaton and in general that which takes place above time in "the central realm of occurrence," the supra-temporal.<sup>177</sup> The whole of the eschaton is verticalized. Dooyeweerd nowhere makes mention of the new heavens and new earth, which is, to say the least, a striking omission in the light of his mammoth corpus. But it is not striking when we see that for him the religious consummation, the fullness of meaning is transcendent, eternal, religious, supra-temporal, and is only achieved "first in eternity." The horizontal direction of history toward the new earth is blocked and history and meaning is verticalized. The future is sublimated in the religious transcendent eternal supra-temporal consummation, and this is an eternal present where all succession does not apply, because even our faith function is only temporal, and all ties "on the earth," "in this life" are temporal, i.e., for a while and perishable. This view of eternity is completely controlling for his view of the transcendental direction as well as the foundational directions of time. As we have seen from these quotations, the transcendental direction is the vertical direction towards eternity, towards the

175. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, III, p. 332.

176. Ibid., II, p. 302. See also "De crisis der humanistische staatsleer...", p. 95.

177. Ibid., I, pp. 32-33.

supra-temporal, towards the religious central realm, and towards the transcendent. The transcendental direction is the direction to perfection, and perfection is eternity, and eternity is fullness, fulfillment, consummation, actualization, unity, and full possession. Temporal meaning is restless because it lacks eternity, that is, fullness and root unity. Created eternity is restless because it did not call itself into existence, and therefore it stands not in itself but stands out of itself and points to the  $\alpha\rho\chi\gamma$  of all meaning. This is why the created eternal or supra-temporal is dynamic and not static.<sup>178</sup> It points to the fully-at-rest Origin. God's eternity is the place of rest for all meaning, and this notion of eternity and time is based on the whole theo-ontology speculative tradition.<sup>179</sup> In contrast to temporal meaning, the created eternal, the supra-temporal, which is full and unified, does not perish, but nevertheless dynamically points to the eternity of the  $\alpha\rho\chi\gamma$ . The structure of temporal meaning disappears in its transcendental direction. It perishes as temporal and survives as religious fullness in the transcendent, imperishable religious consummation which is "in eternity." Structure goes up in direction and is reduced to direction. Reality is reduced to religious pointing towards that which is at rest. The real and lasting meaning of the temporal is in the eternal supra-temporal fullness. All temporal societal relationship ties perish but the union with Christ is eternal. That the eschaton is vertical is clear when Dooyeweerd speaks of "faith as grouping the eschaton and in general, that which is or happens beyond the limits of time." The supra-tem-

178. Ibid., I, p. 32.

179. See pp. 107-124 of this dissertation.

poral central sphere of human existence and divine revelation which Dooyeweerd says some theologians reject, is, contrary to Dooyeweerd, rightly rejected by them because it is clearly nothing other than the created eternity of the scholastics and is a pistical fantasy which veils the Word of God concerning the future and makes void the Word of God by its strong power of tradition. It would seem that the reformatory line in Dooyeweerd can only be continued when his speculative idea of eternity, taken over undoubtedly unconsciously from his early years, is abandoned. Due to his great intellect he has been consistent and has so well protected this foundation from critical analysis that it threatens as a Freudkörper the existence of the W.d.W. as a philosophical school.<sup>180</sup>

Assuming that these ideas of eternity are to be rejected, let us scan what also is most vitally connected with this notion of created eternity. One thing is extremely clear, and that is that the idea of time as a prism is intrinsically connected with his notion of created eternity. The supra-temporal totality and unity of meaning are refracted. What is above the prism is eternal, what is below the prism is diverse and temporal. If there is only God's law and the temporal cosmos, and there is no created eternal realm or contrast to the created cosmos,

180. Maarten Vrieze in a lecture given at the First Annual Conference for Reformatory Higher Learning, at Trinity College, Jan. 1969, in speaking about the philosophy of sociology, came to this conclusion: "To speak of man transcending in his heart the temporal reality is not only dangerous, it is wrong." (Trinity Christian College mimeo, p. 18) See also Zuidema, "Vollenhoven en de reformatie der wijsbegeerte," Phil. Ref., XXVIII (1963). Here he makes interesting comments on Vollenhoven's rejection of Dooyeweerd's idea of any "bestaanddeel in de menselijke structuur, dat bovenlijdelijk zou zijn." On p. 136 there is a description of Vollenhoven's view of transcendence which would be acceptable to our way of thinking.

then the idea of time as a law of refraction (*brekingswet*) must be rejected. Along with this the nuclei of the time order which guarantees the sphere sovereignty of each modal function and sphere are called points of refraction (*brekingspunten*) by Dooyeweerd, something like the old pagan adage, "the teeth of time," and must be modified. The two directions of time are determined by these points of refraction.<sup>181</sup> What breaks to the left, one might say, is the foundational direction, and what breaks to the right (one could use above and below) is the transcendental anticipatory or eschatological direction toward the eternal.<sup>182</sup> Consequently, if one rejects the idea of created eternity and the idea of the prism, he rejects cosmic time as a time order of before and after of modal aspects, with points of refraction. The whole dynamics of meaning, the opening process, disclosure, positivization, etc., must all come under review. To speak about the value or lack of value of the transcendental critical method in Dooyeweerd is not to the point, since this whole method hangs from top to bottom upon his idea of created eternity. The problem of states of affairs, intermodal synthesis, and intuition are all affected by this notion of eternity and supra-temporality because the transcendental direction is intrinsically involved in all these other problems. More basic is the meaning character of created reality as Dooyeweerd describes it. Temporal earthly existence is only for a time and this is speculation in the extreme. Structure is bound to be reduced to direction, the eschaton is bound to be realized in a successionless eternity,

181. Dooyeweerd, "Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W." This article is of supreme importance for Dooyeweerd's whole systematics, because his development is most complete in it. Much of our criticism comes from analysis of this article. For points of refraction (*brekingspunten*) see pp. 197-201.

182. Ibid., for transcendental and foundational directions see pp. 201ff.

and the eschatology is bound to be verticalized. When the possibility is allowed for time to cease, the believer has stepped away from under the ground-motive directing Word of God because God's Word restores and renews the temporal cosmos; and God holds himself faithful by oath to the prospect that the meek shall inherit this earth. A nihilism results when time is thought to cease. This nihilism obviously is not Dooyeweerd's intention, but is an unmistakable consequence of the notion that time ceases and eternity exists alone in a created sense.

It is possible that when one begins to study Dooyeweerd's thinking one feels that he resembles modern theology with its geschiedte-historie split. Dooyeweerd, however, does not want to be confused with modern theology on this point. One of the few times that it is possible to detect aggravation in his writings is when it is suggested that this might be the case.<sup>183</sup> It is not accurate to say this concerning Dooyeweerd. His view of religious transcendence and supra-temporality is much more in the Reformed scholastic tradition, and then of the neo-realistic grace-nature wing. Since his view of religious transcendence and the supra-temporal is grace-nature, it is quite supra-lapsarian, like Kuyper's before him. Although one cannot think that Dooyeweerd employs a geschiedte-historie type dualism or duality, this dualistic split historically is

183. Dooyeweerd, "De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner's boek 'Das Gebot und die Ordnungen!'" Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde, III (1935). Here he makes an attempt to distinguish himself from dialectical theology. Dialectical theology makes an absolute chasm between "Christ the Word made Flesh" and the historical Jesus figure and between the "tijdelijke gestalte en eeuwige inhoud van het Woord Gods" (p. 364). Here we see that Dooyeweerd, although he makes this unwarranted distinction between temporal and eternal, nevertheless, always insists on strict correlation between the temporal form and the eternal content of the Word of God (pp. 336-339). See also, "Van Peursen's critische vragen..." p. 114.

related to the nature-grace dualism. It is a complicated and more dangerous stepchild of the grace-nature wing of nature-grace thinking.

Barth is strongly supra-lapsarian and has a Christomonistic type of grace-nature thinking. Velema has shown that this Christomonism is present in Kuyper,<sup>184</sup> that S. G. de Graaf did not wholly escape this, and that Dooyeweerd<sup>185</sup> also fits this general mold. From a wholly different direction we have tried to confirm this analysis of Velema.

What seems to be a basic cause for Dooyeweerd's construction is his view of the relation of God to the cosmos. God relates to the temporal earthly cosmos via the created eternity of the transcendent religious root. In this way God's revelation enters the whole cosmos via the root. The branches are not an sich, do not stand in themselves, but need the root as the root needs God. This way he shows the dependence of all individual, diverse, temporal, earthly meaning on its transcendent, spiritual, religious, supra-temporal root unity. He stresses from the beginning that God cannot come into the diverse and temporal, because somehow this means for Dooyeweerd that one is making God subject to his own laws, which for Dooyeweerd, as for any Christian, is absurd.<sup>186</sup> These problematics which Dooyeweerd sets up are not unique to him, they are the problematics intrinsic to thinking of God's eternity as an "eternal now." It comes out in the assum doctrine of the scholastics in which man was elevated above temporality in order to have confrontation with

184. Velema, op. cit., p. 233.

185. Ibid., pp. 237-238.

186. Dooyeweerd, De Beteekenis der Wetssidee voor Rechtswetenschap en Rechtsfilosofie, p. 66; "Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem...", p. 27; "Schelling en evolutie," pp. 117-118.

God, as well as in men like Kierkegaard with his "incognito, king and the maid" paradox problem. The notion of the "eternal now" is common to both.

Why then does one hold to this "eternal now" notion? The deepest reasons are rooted in the fact that this notion is a unity, totality, and fullness perspective by which one can judge succession, diversity, time, and change. It is deeply rooted in the pagan theo-ontological tradition, going back before Parmenides and even into primitive religions with their holy-prefane dualism.<sup>187</sup> It is this "eternal now" idea which is the basic tool of all the Christomonistic grace-nature thinkers. It has been employed by all neo-Platonic neo-realists, and six types of Monarchians who were also neo-realists.<sup>188</sup> It is involved in the supra-lapsarian concern with the unity of the counsel of God. It is really trying to take an Archimedean point out of the created world. This is why Dooyeweerd divides the creation into earthly temporal and eternal contrasts, because he clearly sees that the neo-Platonic point of view of the eternal ideas in the mind of God, held also by Kuyper and Bavinck, is part of the metaphysical theo-ontological speculative tradition. But it is only a slight degree better and far harder to detect when one takes the point of view of created eternity. This eternity consciousness is the old speculation of an "eternal now" in new garb. The "sense of divinity" and the "seed of religion" of Calvin is also not free from this speculation.<sup>189</sup> Dooyeweerd is very fond of Calvin's idea but

187. See pp. 108-114 of this dissertation.

188. Vollenhoven, "Nieuwe filosofie (1961-1962) Monarchianisme."

189. See the first chapter of Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, where he speaks of an innate idea of God and an innate sense of divinity. The whole idea of innate ideas is of pagan inheritance as Vollenhoven has shown. See p. 42, footnote 4, of this dissertation. See also my book review in The Westminster Theological Journal, XXXI (Nov. 1968), pp. 101-109.

goes much further than Calvin here. This point of view of the supra-temporal, that of an eternity consciousness because "eternity is laid in one's heart," is just simply the point of view of God involved in the "eternal now" of the scholastics, only now pared down to a creaturely size. The image of God as centered in the eternity of the heart of man (which makes it an integral, radical analogy or image of God) is an undue restriction of the image of God to the heart. This image idea is also not a complete break with the analogy of being (*analogia entis*) despite Dooyeweerd's protestation and efforts to the contrary, simply because the point of similarity is in the "eternity laid in man's heart" which is central to this idea of analogy of being.

Although there is a difficulty in expressing God's relation to the cosmos and time if one tries to determine it theoretically by using transcendental critical thinking, one has no difficulty if one holds closely to the Scriptural way of representing God in his dealing with the creation. All formulations of this problem in terms of immanence and transcendence of God, in time, yet not only in time but above time, are all rather dangerous. Dooyeweerd is guilty of a kind of demythologizing of Scripture when he speaks of God's dealing with the cosmos immediately through a supra-temporal root and only from thence to the temporal branches. As Dooyeweerd once advised me in respect to theology, that "theologians should stick to the texts," it seems as if he has definitely violated that rule with his construction of aeon or created eternity. This is an attempt to get a unity view by going behind the text, and it involves a construction of the way God must deal with the cosmos. This created eternity point of view is not separated from his idea of the religious central ground-motive of Word-revelation. This idea has great

value if it is divested of Dooyeweerd's scholastic view of eternity which definitely structures and influences what he means by a ground-motive.<sup>190</sup>

This created eternity idea as root and as concentration point for God's dealing with the cosmos as well as the cosmos' relation to God, is involved very closely with Kuyper's regeneration theology. Dooyeweerd corrects Kuyper's idea of regeneration without the Word to a regeneration in the supra-temporal created eternal root through the central transcendent Word as power (dunamis). This precedes all temporal expression or refraction of the Word in the incarnation, or in Scripture, or in preaching, which are only temporal expressions of what happens in the mystic root of the cosmos. As in Kuyper, there is a central listening of the heart, a knowledge of the heart, and this only in the transcendent heart of the world and of each man, that is, in the eternity laid in the heart. This is why the supra-temporal is the central realm of confrontation and revelation, why it is the central realm of occurrence. This, however, does not stay in the root or heart, but this root is stirred, moved, and must express itself in the temporal branches which are never separate from their root. It is from this transcendent root that the whole dynamics of temporal meaning are instigated and directed. We have seen that there is most probably a doctrine of priority at work here. If Kuyper is to be called semi-mystic<sup>191</sup> then Dooyeweerd cannot escape this classification either, since he is almost identical to Kuyper on these

190. The same problem of eternity and time is involved in Dooyeweerd's idea of Word-revelation. The relation of ground-motive and Scripture is set in terms of supra-temporal and temporal which brings with it duality, which is confusing to say the least. See p. 225, footnote 183, of this dissertation.

191. Popma, *Levensbeschouwing*, IV, pp. 202-203, 219, 245, 343-391; also the index, vol. VII, under mystiek.

points.<sup>192</sup>

With this we conclude this section, our basic critical work is completed. If our analysis concerning time and eternity in Dooyeweerd's thought is correct, it brings with it a need for disentangling the influence of this grace-nature construction from the predominating reformational ground-motive at work. In the next chapter some areas will be suggested where the influence of this view of eternity is most felt, and by means of the proposed ontology type an attempt will be made to gather together some of the more problematic areas. The key for a program of disentangling these strands of synthesis from the reformational emphasis has already been presented, although a detailed outworking of this program far exceeds the compass of this dissertation.

192. Dooyeweerd, "Kuyper's wetenschapsleer," passim, and "Wat de W.d.W. aan Dr. Kuyper te danken heeft," De Reformatie, (1937) pp. 63-65.