[155]

VOEGELIN ON UNBELIEF AND REVOLUTION

Bernard Zylstra

Anti-Revolutionaire Staatkunde 46 (1976) 5/6, pp. 155-165.

Eric Voegelin's **From Enlightenment to Revolution**, published last year,[1] is undoubtedly one of the most outstanding parallels to Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer's **Unbelief and Revolution**, published in 1847.

Voegelin was born in Cologne, studied at the University of Vienna where he was an assistant to Hans Kelsen and entered the United States in 1938 as a fugitive from Nazism. After teaching at several universities here he returned to Germany in 1958 to found the Institute for Political Research at the University of Munich. After his retirement he became a member of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University in California. **Order and History**, of which four volumes have been published, is the most significant of his numerous publications. **From Enlightenment to Revolution** was written twenty-five years ago as part of an extensive series on the history of political ideas in the West. This series was never published in its entirety since Voegelin shifted from an analysis of the history of ideas to an analysis of the history of order and the order of history. But Professor John H. Hallowell of Duke University in North Carolina persuaded Voegelin to publish this part in order to shed light on that most significant century — the Enlightenment and its consequence — Revolution.

In this essay I will attempt to trace some of Voegelin's themes in this book in order to show that Groen van Prinsterer's insights into the relation between religion, civilization and the social order in general, and the relation between apostasy from the Christian religion and the subsequent revolutionary direction of the "modern age" in particular are shared by one of the most knowledgeable historians of our generation. In doing this I will be more concerned with similarities in approach than with dissimilarities. Some obvious differences should be kept in mind. Groen van Prinsterer was a Protestant in the Calvinian tradition; Voegelin has close affinities with Roman Catholicism, though he seemingly prefers to be viewed as a pre-Reformation Christian. Groen van Prinsterer's thought was characterized by

[1] Eric Voegelin. **From Enlightenment to Revolution**. Edited by John H Hallowell. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1975.

certain Platonizing trends; these are also present in Voegelin, and more distinctly so.

[156]

The spiritual crisis of the West

Voegelin, like Groen van Prinsterer, views the Enlightenment period as one of the major contributing forces to *the spiritual crisis* of western civilization. One of the *symptoms* of this crisis is line reduction of man and his life to the level of material and utilitarian existence through the degeneration of the intellectual and spiritual substance of man (page 95). The *structure* of this crisis is "that of a gradual decomposition of civilizational values, consummated historically by repeated upheavals which destroy, or intend to destroy, the social bearers of the condemned values. Between the upheavals we find periods of stabilization at the respective levels of destruction" (143). One of the peculiar consequences of the crisis is "the necessity of substituting for transcendental reality an intraworldly evocation which is supposed to fulfill the functions of transcendental reality for the immature type of man" (95).

The failures of Christianity

Voegelin describes the Enlightenment as an apostatic revolt which formally abolished Christianity as "the authoritatively unifying spiritual substance of mankind" and which "released a movement of ideas which would shape decisively the political structure of the "West." (3) In his penetrating critique of the Age of Reason, Voegelin is not blind to the weaknesses of Christianity which contributed to the rise of the Enlightenment world view. In the first place, Voegelin argues, Christianity should have come to grips with the new political and national forces of the late medieval period rather than subject them to the power of the Church institution. The resulting struggle ended with the relegation of the Church as spiritual institution to the private sphere, while the autonomous political institutions achieved the monopoly of the public realm. "This privatization of the spirit left the field open for a respiritualization of the public sphere from other sources, in the forms of nationalism, humanitarianism, economism both liberal and socialist, biologism and psychologism. The growth of a plurality of counter spirits and counter churches [here Voegelin places the Reformation movements – BZ] to the traditional spiritual institutions is the most fateful consequence of the failure of the Church to find a compromise with the new

pluralistic world of politics." (20) In the second place, the Church did not adequately cope with the advancement of science. As a result we are confronted with "the spiritual devastation wrought by the wide-spread conviction that the rational-scientific approach could be a substitute for the spiritual integration of personality." (20f) This creates the problem that the Church is losing its leadership, not only the leadership of the civilizational process itself, but the leadership of the spirit. Finally, there was the unresolved conflict between Christian symbolism and its rational, historical critique. The language of Christianity has become a 'myth' as a "consequence of the penetration of our world by a rationalism which destroys the transcendental meanings of symbols taken from the world of the senses." (21) These symbols thus lose their revelatory character. The [157] Church, until recently, showed admirable wisdom in resisting a modernistic, rationalistic interpretation of its symbols, but it was helpless in dealing actively with the attack. "Obviously it is a task that would require a new Thomas rather than a neo-Thomist." (22)

Inversion of history

These evident failures of Christianity should challenge Christians to eliminate them, not to abolish Christianity itself. This was the intent of the Enlightenment. Voegelin's interpretation of the way in which the eighteenth century *philosophes* attempted to realize this intent is distinctly parallel to Groen van Prinsterer's, who speaks of the revolution as *the inversion of the (divine) order of reality*.[2]

Voegelin similarly speaks of the entire development of thought from the start of the modern era through Nietzsche, Marx, Freud and Lenin, in terms of a process of inversion, of turning matters upside down.[3] His first illustration is taken from the area of historical reflection, where he compares Bossuet, the last Augustinian historian, with Voltaire, the first popular modern sophist. In Bossuet's Christian system, the universality of history is

---

2 Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer. *Unbelief and Revolution: Lecture XI*. Edited and translated by Harry Van Dyke. (Amsterdam: The Groen van Prinsterer Fund, 1973). p. xvii, where he speaks of "this pernicious school (which) systematically overturned the foundations of truth and law in order to erect airy castles." In *Unbelief and Revolution; Lectures VIII and IX* (same publisher, 1975), Groen describes the typical *philosophe* thus: "By inverting the order of things he proves himself a true revolutionary…" (p. 24)

3 For a popular formulation of the process of inversion, which Voegelin often describes as modern gnosticism, sec his *Science, Politics and Gnosticism* (Chicago; Henry Regnery, 1968). Voegelin describes this process of inversion as gnosticism because of the rejection of this order of being or the creation order which it implies. In this connection see Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion (Boston, 1963), especially the last chapter dealing with gnosticism and existentialism.

constituted through the idea of creation and the descent of mankind from Adam as described in the "sacred history" of Israel. With the moderns, the center of universality is shifted from the sacred to the profane level. This shift implies the first revolutionary turning of tables: "the construction of history will, in the future, not be subordinated to the spiritual drama of humanity, but … Christianity will be understood as an event in history." (7) This secularization of history is accompanied by a new conception of historical development which, in the words of Voltaire, concerns "the extinction, the renaissance and the progress of the human spirit (*l'ésprit humain*)." These words are reminiscent of the Biblical fall, redemption, and final consummation. But their content is immanent, intramundane. "The *ésprit humain* and its changes have become the object of general history. The transcendental pneuma of Christ is replaced by the intramundane spirit of man, and the change of heart by the change of opinion. The *corpus mysticum Christi* has given way to the *corpus mysticum humanitatis*." (10)

[158]

The notion of the extinction, renaissance and progress of the human spirit if, a secular equivalent: of the gnostic conception of the thirteenth century Joachim of Flora, whose third Realm of the Spirit would follow the Realms of the Father and the Son.[4] This notion is a prelude to the later speculations on the law of three stages of history in Comte, Marx, and Hitler (*dritte Reich!*). Invariably, the three stages are phases of progress. The content of progress differs from thinker to thinker. In Joachim the last stage is marked by spiritual communion without the burdens of institutions and organizations.

In the secular versions the basic movement of intraworldly "progress" descends from the deification of reason and intellect in Voltaire and Comte to the deification of the material, animal basis of existence in Marx. The modern welfare state is the provisional end point of this descent, this "progress."

Where Dooyeweerd would speak of the absolutization of a given aspect of human experience, Voegelin speaks of a continous change within the

[4] For Voegelin's interpretation of Joachim, see his *The New Science of Politics* (The University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 110ff; and *Science, Politics and Gnosticism*, pp. 92ff. For the most recent discussion of the meaning of the continuity of Gnosticism in history, see Voegelin's *The Ecumenic Age*, which constitutes vol. 4 of *Order and History* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), especially the Introduction (pages 1-58).

process of secularization "in accordance with the stratum of human nature that commands the attention of the time and becomes the object of the process of deification." (13)

The inversion in history presupposes an inversion therefore in the respective conceptions of human nature. "The rapid descent from reason, through technical and planning intellect, to the economic, psychological and biological levels of human nature, as the dominants in the image of man, is a strong contrast to the imposing stability of the Christian anthropology through eighteen centuries. Once the transcendental anchorage is surrendered, the descent from the rational to the animal nature, so it seems, is inevitable." (l3)[5] In this connection we recall that Groen van Prinsterer had already detected a constant process of radicalization in the theory and practice of revolution."[6] Voegelin develops the theme of the instability of intraworldly sacred histories as a characteristic trait of the new age. He is of the opinion that Bossuet, in his interpretation of the 'heresies' of the Reformation, already pointed to the reasons for this instability. It is a consequence of the *initial* [159] revolutionary break: "once the authority of the tradition is broken by the individual innovator, the style of individual innovation determines the further course of variations." (l4) Voegelin does not here distinguish between Luther and Calvin on the one hand and the anabaptists and seventeenth century Puritans on the other hand.[7]

As a consequence of the initial break, western man has in principle turned his back upon the past in order to realize progress in the future. Here lies the problem of "the Left" in the modern age. The Left, writes Kolakowski, "is a movement of negation toward the existent world."[8]

---

5 One of the most penetrating analyses of modernity's reduction of man to the animal level of existence, notably in the line of development from Locke, Adam Smith, to Marx, can be found in Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (The University of Chicago Press, 1958), part III.

6 Cf. *Unbelief and Revolution: Lectures VIII and IX*, p, 17: "The principle of this vaunted philosophy was the sovereignty of Reason, and the outcome was apostasy from god and materialism. That such an outcome was inevitable once the principle had been accepted is demonstrable from the genealogy of the ideas."

7 In *The New Science of Politics*, ch. V, Voegelin discusses "Gnostic Revolution — The Puritan Case." He reads the individualistic and revolutionary themes of mid-seventeenth century Puritanism *back* into the conceptions of Luther and especially Calvin, whose *Institutes* he describes as "the first deliberately created Gnostic koran." (p. 119) This interpretation entirely overlooks Calvin's dependence upon the church fathers and his conception of nature as an order of God. It also neglects basic differences between the early reformers and the revival of individualistic-subjectivistic forms of Christianity in the seventeenth century, notably in England.

8 Leszek Kolakowski. *Towards a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today*. (New York: Grove Press, 1968), p. 68.

But this ever recurring innovation-as-negation creates a real problem for the innovators, namely that of establishing a spiritual community between individual intellectuals. Bossuet pointed to this problem in the tension between authority of the Church and the "individualism" of the reformers. The perfect truth revealed by God has been replaced by the weak production of the human mind so that, with typically modern Christians like Newton, the knowledge of the external world, particularly in astronomy and physics, sets the standard for all our knowledge, including the knowledge of God. Thus the *existence of God* has become a *human persuasion* which has to be filled with a certain satisfying content to make it *useful*. The real problem with being a Christian in the modern age, therefore, is to avoid filling belief with a subjective, pleasing utilitarian content. At any rate, the dividing of Christendom in numerous factions, each pursuing a different utilitarian content of "faith," is paralleled by the divisions in the political and social realm. Voegelin points out that established communities are continuously dissolved by the competition of new foundations until the multiplicity of sects, schools, parties, factions, movements and communes is reached which characterized Europe before the outbreak of violence in our time. (15)

Inversion in human nature.

As I already mentioned above, the Enlightenment led to a second major inversion, namely in our understanding of the direction or goal of man's existence on earth. In a discussion of Helvetius and the heritage of Pascal, Voegelin shows that Helvetius, as a typical representative of the Age of Reason, is no longer capable of understanding the spiritual essence of human life before God since he accepts passions as the only moving forces of human existence.

[160]

Voegelin, searching for words in the context of his Platonizing interpretation of reality, speaks here of "the inversion of the direction in which the *realissimum* of existence is to be sought." Instead of pursuing a *summum bonum*, a highest good, the protagonists of modernity are only interested in avoiding a *summum malum*, a greatest evil — which is, in the final sense, death. In terms of this inversion, the internal order of human nature becomes clear. "Whether it be the materialistic, the sensualistic, or the hedonistic variants — the strata of human nature are interpreted genetically as derivatives of a physical or biological substance at the bottom of existence. The internal structure of man is no longer ordered toward a transcendental

aim but is to be explained by the operations of physical sensibility or of a pleasure-pain mechanism. This inversion of direction becomes from now on the symbol of the anti-Christian anthropology in politics — whether it assumes the form of economic materialism, or of biologism, or of psychologism." (69)

With the elimination of a *summum bonum*, the disorder of the passions is looked upon as normal. This has immense political consequences since the perversion of order is intimately connected with the *instrumentalization of man*. Man is no longer an entity that has an existential center within itself; it has become a mechanism of pleasure, pain and passions which can be harnessed and instrumentalized by another man. "Here we are at the key point of the anti-Christian attack on the existence of man. Only when the spiritual center of man, through which man is open to the transcendental *realissimum*, is destroyed can the disorderly aggregate of passions be used as an instrument by the legislator . . . This is the new basic thesis for collectivism in all its variants, down to the contemporary forms of totalitarianism." (70) But in less extreme forms we are confronted with the same pernicious conception of human personality in the more common forms of managerial and organizational interference with the soul of man in political propaganda, commercial advertizing, and education based on a behavioristic psychology of conditioned reflexes. "This process of general education for the purpose of forming the useful member of society, while neglecting or even deliberately destroying the life of the soul, is accepted as an institution of our modern society so fully that the awareness of the demonism of such interference with the life of the soul on a social mass scale, and of the inevitably following destruction of the spiritual substance of society, is practically dead." (70)

I suppose that these words appear onesided in The Netherlands. But then we should immediately recall that the Dutch educational system is unique in the western democracies precisely because Groen van Prinsterer fought for the maintenance of a Christian direction in the educational system of the nation. Outside of the Roman Catholic community this is present only sporadically in North America, where the "public school" reigns supreme, Voegelin's description of education is typical of the main trends in public schooling in the United States and Canada.

[161]

Inversion in authority

In the Biblical view of reality, creation is subject to the authority of the Creator. Society finds its foundation in a divinely established order. The Enlightenment eliminated not only tradition but also revelation and a God-given order for creation as sources and standards of authority in society. What is to fill this vacuum? *The empirical process itself has to furnish the standards*. But what moment in the empirical process can do this? Here Voegelin develops the theme of the "authoritative present": "a special doctrine is needed to bestow grace on the present and to heighten an otherwise irrelevant situation of fact into a standard by which the past and future can be measured." (84) d'Alembert provides a good example of this general approach. He derives the idea of justice from a *situation of oppression*, "from the fundamental experience of revolt against oppression and rejects a religious or metaphysical foundation of morals." (77) Thus the sentiment of revolt overshadows the idea of order. Here, I think, Voegelin has located one of the roots of Marxism and neo-Marxism, also in its present Christian varieties such as the German political theology and the South American theology of liberation which proceed from the concrete *now* which is experienced as unjust and oppressive. What is most significant for us to realize — and we can do this more fully in the light of Voegelin's analysis — is the fact that the fundamental themes of the Enlightenment have become so pervasive in the twentieth century, both in the communist world and in the capitalist countries, that we are no longer able to distinguish them from radically different Biblical themes. As a matter of fact, in many instances we have taken over the inversions of the Enlightenment and read them back into the Scriptures. One instance of such *eisegesis* (*inlegkunde*) is the widespread habit of looking upon the exodus-theme in the Bible as prior to the creation-theme since the exodus of the people of Israel from Egypt is viewed as a (revolutionary) response to a *concrete situation* of oppression. The neglect in Christian circles of the Biblical revelation of reality as creation, as the ordered home for man subject to the good law of the Creator, as the cosmos which God so loved that he sent his only-begotten Son, is one of the indirect results of Enlightenment influence on Christian thought and practice.[9]

[9] One of the more radical and profound statements of the theology of liberation is José Miranda, *Marx and the Bible: A Critique of the Philosophy of Oppression* (New York: Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 1974). Miranda describes his conception as "uncompromising and anti-ontological actualism." (p. 44)

If then the given order *for* and *of* reality is rejected, by what standard can men respond to the experience of injustice and oppression in the "authoritative present"? Here again the notion of progress returns: science, technology and industry will supply the material goods for the welfare of all so that empirically justice is done, so that the "needs" of all are fulfilled.

[162]

In other words, material abundance supposedly will solve the problems of authority and order in society.

Inversion of the earth

This Utopian notion of material abundance entails a further inversion, namely one with reference to our understanding of the earth, man's home. In the Christian view of the world, the earth is the Lord's and fullness thereof (Psalm 24). The earth is "the gift of God to man as the field of his sustenance and of his civilizational achievement." In the Enlightenment, the problem of the earth receives a typical intramundane form as exemplified in Turgot's *Géographie politique*. Here the tribe of mankind, the *masse totale* as the secular equivalent of the Body of Christ, has the globe for its habitat, that is, as the object of increased technological exploitation by a mastery of its resources. (119) The tie that binds men together is no longer the gift of divine grace but the material fruits of the earth. The secular equivalent of unlimited grace is an infinity of material resources, to be acquired by man's conquest of the earth.

But does material progress offer a substitute for the order of society? Does it eliminate the problem of authority? Of course, it cannot! And for this reason, precisely in an age of industrial progress, spiritual regeneration is the burning question. (85) Voegelin shows how this problem has already come to the fore before the French Revolution, but that it was realized especially by St. Simon and August Comte, who attempted to find an alternative source of order and authority in a new *pouvoir spirituel* of which the bearers would be a new elite, Führer of an intraworldly political religion, often of a nationalistic kind. (lllf., and 125)

Mention of an elite places us before the modem phenomenon of the masses. In Turgot, the *masse totale* of mankind had become the substitute for the Christian idea of mankind. But in Turgot the intellectuals were the sole barriers of progress. In Condorcet's *Progrès de l'Esprit Humain* (1795), the

masses have become the object of the elite's dictatorial manipulation so that the entire human race can be the subject of progressive history — a prelude to Marx's conception of the universality of the proletariat. The basis for this expansion of the bearers of progress lies in the perfectibility of human nature, which in effect means a change in man's creaturely condition, the possibility of man's creating a new substance: "the creation of man by God, which was eliminated as a superstition, now returns as the creation of the superman through Condorcet. The intramundane hubris of self-salvation culminates logically… in the improvement on God through the creation of a man who does not need salvation." (134) Marx, in my view, is the most radical proponent in the modern age of man's self-creation and self-salvation. I therefore consider it utter folly on the part of Christians to look upon Marx [163] as a kind of forerunner to the role which the Christian religion should play in twentieth century civilization. In view of the current misunderstandings on this score it is best to do justice to Marx by quoting his own words on the matter of self-creation. In the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844) Marx wrote: "Since, however, for socialist man, the *whole of what is called world history* is nothing but the creation of man by human labor, and the emergence of nature for man, he, therefore, has the evident and irrefutable proof of his *self-creation*, of his own *origins*."[10] In this passage all of the revolutionary inversions of the Enlightenment are fused in one of the most radical counter-statements to Christian revelation that the modern age has produced.[11]

The great inversion: the Revolution of 1789

All of the "ideas" mentioned thus far could have remained precisely that: *ideas*. This, however, did not happen. Voegelin interprets the French Revolution as the first major embodiment of these philosophical and theoretical inversions in what he calls pragmatic history, that is, concrete human existence in western Europe. Like Groen van Prinsterer, Voegelin realizes that there were many partial factors – on the political, economic, and social plane — that entered into the French Revolution. But all these partial issues, he argues, "are overshadowed by the fundamental spiritual issue which the Revolution has revealed for the first: time in full clearness, namely, that the apocalypse of man is driving, by the logic of sentiment, toward the deification of intra-mundane society. The Revolution has been

[10] *Karl Marx: Early Writings*. Translated and edited by T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 166.

[11] Cf. B Zylstra. "Karl Marx: radicale humanist." Beweging 74 (augustus 1974), p. 58f.

carried by its momentum beyond the peripheral questions of governmental form to the very heart of the crisis, that is to the destruction of Western Christian civilization and to the tentative creation of a non-Christian society." (176)

Voegelin does not discuss the Revolution in its various stages in detail. But he pays considerable attention to the question of the relationship between the Revolution and the subsequent efforts at Restoration. With respect to this question he articulates a position that Groen van Prinsterer formulated already in the 1830s and 1840s, namely that the Restoration cannot be understood except as the dialectic counterpart and fulfilment of the Revolution itself. Groen van Prinstcrer put it this way: "de reactionair is een revolutionair die met zijn eigen leer in tegenspraak is" (the reactionary is a revolutionary who is in contradiction with his own doctrine).[12] Voegelin, if anything, puts the counterparts even closer together: "Restoration becomes identical with [164] completion of the Revolution." (177) He does this because he looks upon both Revolution and Restoration as historical facets in the unfolding of the underlying spiritual crisis of the West. And he asserts that if we neglect this postulate of interpretation, the concrete historical process of Revolution and Restoration becomes unintelligible.

In this light Voegelin presents an interpretation of *liberalism* that is almost identical to Groen van Prinsterer's. The liberals wish to transform the violent rhythm of Revolution and Restoration into a gentle undulation of progressive reform. Here we find the origin of the notion of a "permanent revolution" that is still proclaimed by today's liberals, notably in North America. But, says Voegelin, the clichés of permanent revolution, reform, gradualism, and peaceful change are the more dangerous because they are escapist. By means of these slogans and resultant political programs the liberals create the impression that they have solved the problems of the western spiritual crisis. In simple fact, they have only walked around it and misled the masses. Liberalism aggravates the crisis because it detracts attention from a true alternative. The liberals propose as an alternative continued material progress under the guidance of reason. But in doing so *the liberals stay at the level of man's material existence, which is precisely the basic symptom of the underlying spiritual crisis*. Voegelin puts the issue quite simply, and it pertains to the protagonists of progress in capitalist society: "on the level of pragmatic politics the alternative of intelligent

[12] H Smitskamp. *Wat heeft Groen van Prinsterer ons vandaag te zeggen?* (Den Haag: D A Daamen's, 1945), p. 55.

gradualism does not exist." (180) And the protagonists of progress in the revolutionary camp are addressed in this manner: "The revolutionary abolition of a regime that is experienced as oppressive by a powerful stratum of society will certainly satisfy the successful revolutionary group, but it is not at all a guarantee that the new group will be more fit than the old one to discharge the obligations of rulership competently. Spiritual disorder is not the privilege of a ruling class." (180f)

Voegelin does not in this book develop an alternative to the mind of the Enlightenment and its revolutionary results. He does articulate this briefly: "The true alternative would be the restoration of spiritual substance in the ruling groups of a society, with the consequent restoration of the moral strength in creating a just social order." (180) Voegelin finds the sources for that "spiritual substance" in classical Greek philosophy and in the Christian religion. We have already noted that Groen, too, had a great interest in Plato.[13]

[165]

But the great historical significance of Groen van Prinsterer lies in the fact that he, an historian and statesman, showed a direction Christians can follow in post-Enlightenment culture. Western culture, now in global context, can find its spiritual foundations again if the insights of Groen van Prinsterer — largely confirmed by the analysis of men like Voegelin — were shared by the leaders of our civilization. That, to me, is the meaning of reflection on Groen's career at the centennial of his death.

[13] Johan Zwaan argues that Groen van Prinsterer's dependence upon Plato has been highly overrated. See his *Groen van Prinsterer en de klassieke oudheid* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1973). See also J. P. A. Mekkes. "Groen van Prinsterer in de historie," *Antirevolutionaire staatkunde*, vol. 17 (1947), who writes this about Groen's "love" for Plato: "Onder dit gezichtspunt lettend op Groen's geeteshouding, vragen wij er de aandacht voor, hoe hij nadrukkelijk positie kiest tegen het anti-realisme, de sophisterij zijner dagen. Dat hij daartegenover opneemt voor de realistische wereldbeschouwing en wijsbegeerte, die immers een boven het subjectief inzicht verheven *wets*orde beoogt te erkennen en daarmee blijk geeft, minder diep te zijn afgevallen dan de sophistiek, die het met haar "mening" dacht af te kunnen." (p. 117) A similar appreciative critique, but then more pointed. Can be made of Voegelin.