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## **Sign and motif of the creature**

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### **INTRODUCTION**

This writing aims to address the character of fundamental criticism for our time, which can be the only basis for discussion concerning the foundations of creaturely existence. It does not pretend to speak about it in the only correct way. It does want to draw attention to the depth of the question. After all, this question concerns the authority to speak the last (first) word, a question and a word among the words of our time.

It is intended to be philosophical and wants to philosophise. It therefore necessarily asks the reader as the first question whether it is worth his while to make this journey of philosophising. Has wandering in the mist not already been too tiring?

It is calculated for the reader who has questions and wants to decide for himself how he will help search for answers and in what order he wants to read along. That is why this writing tries to accompany him to the end, counting on being able to learn where it has fallen short in that intention.

Spring 1965

[9]

**They have made their banners for signs. We no longer see our banners**

Who does not remember the situation described in the 74th psalm from the years 1940-1945? For some time, the discussion around a book like *Honest to God*, however judged, has drawn our attention to those verses in yet another way, while an American professor in his inaugural oration made the cautionary observation that, for the time being, Christianity may have to be more mindful of 'survival' than the possibilities of missionary expansion.

Are they lamentations from a mid-20th-century situation? That which has been, will be...

The ends of time reach us, but precisely but precisely because they are those ends, their termination falls outside any estimation. And consequently, also any positioning on the line of time.

What signs are we talking about then?

The ends of the ages are those ages of the end, which have been prepared and introduced, which have been shown their way, from the ages of the psalm. We no longer see our signs, as it is said. Who are the 'we', to whom this 'our' refers?

This we do know: the people of Israel, national, and as such on their way to their destination. Opposed on that road and threatened with being cut off from its destination.

Is there a connection to us, here at the ends of the centuries? Or is it just an analogy, a symbol, a pre-sign?

We see into the reality of the 20th century, of its midst and beyond, all around us. One can do this in different ways, and many have done it in as many ways. We must do it in our way.

[10]

To the scriptures, it was asked. From the scriptures and finally focused on her. We started by quoting her words. But what is she, what does she want, where does she stand, what does she speak about, where is she heading - with us, through the previous centuries, through the centuries whose end we are touching, where is she heading, with those centuries?

Can I have an answer ready on this question?

One thing is certain: I am on the road and on the move. What is with that movement, I will have to find out, i.e. I cannot escape expressing what I mean to know about it through my *life*.

That I cannot escape it is a consequence of my being-in-motion. Having to account for it is built into that movement.

It is built into the movement.

We just asked the question about being in this movement with regard to Scripture. Can this be so: establishing that I am set in motion, this before all else; that I, in motion, am at the same time on the path of calculation and reflection, also in motion; and that in this my movement what Scripture says goes along with it?

## Chapter I

### SITUATION AND PROBLEM OF DIALECTICS.

#### **The question of Origin movement and dialectics.**

What is the alternative? Is there anything 'ready' to be held before or against the movement in which I am fundamentally included?

Our order of thought bears a philosophical character.

Undoubtedly, without ordering - if only intuitively - no legitimate thoughts. Philosophical ordering, however, is a very deliberate one. It is as intentional as the ordering that every science demands. But it reaches further, deeper. It reaches down to foundations, where the movement comes into play, of which we spoke. And then this is the difficulty, that ordering is also included in that movement.

Can I speak in order about this movement while I am included in it? Behold the philosophical question, the first in its order, posed to every reflection, driving it into self-reflection, which has kept the dialectic of Western philosophising in motion and, as soon as it is brought into confrontation with Scripture, *forces* it to choose.

The dialectic of Western philosophising has been kept in motion der the question whether I can speak about the fundamental movement we are referring to orderly from that movement itself. I.e. that the former, that of the Western philosophical dialectic, is a dependent movement. <sup>1</sup>

The difficulty will prove to be this, that if I want to think about the dialectics of Western philosophising, I will immediately be thrown back to the question behind it [12]. And that, arriving there, I will just as immediately find the Western philosophical dialectic facing me.

Two dialectics, then: one<sup>2</sup> between the real origin movement and a dialectic of the second order, i.e. of Western philosophising, the other as an internal dialectic of this philosophising. But with this great difficulty, that *within* the first the second asserts its claims of *being* first. And with this complication, that in the process it disguises its dialectical character in a dialectic of, now, the third degree.

The fundamental and decisive question for us will be how Scripture asserts itself in this movement of 'dialectics'. And in what sense the word 'assert' applies here.

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'dialectics' with its multiple nuanced signification becomes the special object of our investigation in the following.

<sup>2</sup> Whether it may in truth be called 'dialectical' remains to be seen later.

## Terms

Meanwhile, questions may have arisen against the preceding argument. They may and will have arisen against what seemed to be uncontroversial: the fundamentally dynamic nature of our life reality. Many will, with us, not want to know about rejection of this apriori. But we will nevertheless need to know well what it is all about. For even with the use of the *term* ('movement' or 'dynamism') we find ourselves, in terms of language, in the middle of problematics, which we may not have thought about much yet.

We face a similar difficulty with our talk of 'dialectic' and dialectical. In the eyes of some, this term may seem more difficult to digest than 'movement', but this is because it has emerged from the normal use of a foreign language within, among others, the Dutch into [13] a specifically theoretical meaning. Those who have not theorised much are more likely to bump into this than a word that carries a common meaning with us like, in this case, 'movement'.

We have allowed both terms into our introduction without apology, because they had to make sense in the context of the introductory argument before they could be accessible for analysis. A tacit comparison of each of the terms in their very different usage makes this obvious. We need to know which usage we have come to.

This meaning in the use of the terms we use will be dealt with later. As soon as we agree on the meaning, it will be possible to exchange thoughts on the then clear meaning.

For the moment, moreover, this addressing of *language-use* still has a purpose of its own.

The whole world of thought from which we speak, even as yet without a complete choice of theses and mainly in question form, has in the main become alien to the present Western cultural world. Undoubtedly, a lot of literature, whether from everyday life or from the philosophical, theological or special scientific spheres, still appears in continental Western Europe that deals with the questions we have raised and related to them. The culture, however, which from after the last war has dominated and come to dominate the Anglo-Saxon and Communist part of the world, and thus gradually the awakening populations, has deliberately turned away from this.

Purposeful is different from deliberate in the spirit of the old philosophies. The goal is practical in this case. It consists in controlling, using all available [14] scientific and technical means, 'matter' and, through it, man.

The only philosophy this objective still needs is one that declares all other philosophising impossible in a way that is parallel to, or rather a continuation of, the method used in the mid-19th century. There may have been a reaction to it then, but today we have a material and intellectual apparatus at our disposal, which seems to be able to remove any resistance once and for all.

It is quite obvious, from where a philosophy that can grant this clearing service, without being aware of it itself across the board, must choose its basis. It draws its attention to the 'signs'. It is telling. An irony of history exhibits itself here. The mastery of and by means of the 'language' sign becomes the negative 'Chiffer' of what once held the teleology of humanist

reflection as a promise of ascent. *Our* use of language, especially in the spirit of our last sentence, acquires the definitive mark of its curse.

We now see a programme gradually taking shape. To start with, we will have to make a responsible front to two sides.

The first front will concern 'philosophy', but therein that attitude to life, which does not want to put up any other front than the front of the material harvest of the world and everything that belongs to it. It does not even want to see a true sense of language attributed to anything that tries to speak 'above' it. On the other front, we will have to face the dialectics as such, within which, despite its protests, we will also find the direction of usefulness.

A choice will present itself.

Do we want to start by recognising the founding [15] 'dialectical' character of every exchange of ideas and thus start it ourselves from within the dialectic, waiting to see where we end up?

Or is it foreseeable that we will soon find ourselves thrown back on a movement - which we have already mentioned several times - in a pregnant sense original - which, because it is original, *cannot* contain *any* dialectics?

This will then give rise to the curious phenomenon that an adherence at all costs to a fundamentally dialectical character of our reality will turn out to be at the expense of understanding the fundamental 'dynamics'.

As a matter of course, we are now forced to deal first of all with the further meaning of the competing terms.

### **Frontiers of scientific dialectics**

We want to start with the one of the two terms (movement or 'dynamics', and 'dialectics'), which as a term is apparently furthest away from us. And we want to look at it first in its 'third' meaning, as indicated later. We do this because it is precisely in this sense that it is closest to us. Following the remark made at the beginning, that the word 'dialectic' has been taken from its language of origin into theoretical use with us, we must now say that this use has itself been 'used' to set up *theoretical* reasoning as theoretical reasoning.

Because dialectics means reasoning. As in a conversation, in which one can understand each other within the rules of conversation used at home, but must come to a full understanding. In a real conversation there is something in common: the language used, the [16] common interest and the desire to come to an understanding. At the same time, there is a distance or difference that gives rise to the conversation.

In our intended 'third' sense, the conversational partners are, on the one hand, the theoretical thing to be investigated, often called 'object' or 'Gegenstand' within the conversation, on the other, the researcher in his actual thinking. The conversation takes place in the special sciences and likewise in philosophy. This makes no difference to the rules of conversation, as long as the researcher is the same. After all, only his insight into the nature of those rules decides on their use. In any case, however they may be composed, they include logical thinking that is strictly disclosed and cannot be infringed, but which also does not have the exclusive right to speak.

The conversation itself consists of putting questions to the 'object' to be investigated and listening to its answer. It is clear, however, that now within such scientific 'conversation' the questions from outside immediately begin to intrude. For the 'answer', which the researcher believes to obtain from his 'Gegenstand', is and remains composed of the contributions of each of the participants, only one of whom is active. The other, the thing to be investigated, remains passive, though not malleable at the will of the investigator.

Already at this point, there is the need for choice. Where is the limit of mutual contributions? Is the 'object' inherently independent of its inquiring interlocutor? If not, is there a unilateral dependence or are both partners, each in their own way and in mutual connection, dependent on a comprehensive agency? How can the latter be brought into focus?

In the use of hypothesis and experiment [17] to search for a proper 'method' of approximation, at least the suspicion of interdependence emerges, with behind it the twilight of a horizon, which calls for even greater thoughtfulness and makes false modesty as dangerous as dogmatic-scientific hubris. Yes, modesty might, under circumstances, turn out to be the child of hubris here.

Proximity of need to choose always means proximity of borders. And whoever wants to take care to stay away from border choices can be sure to cross the avoided border before he knows it. He then has little choice but to make a fruitless attempt to move the boundary marks himself.

This is what we meet with those, who want the dynamics and thus the 'dialectic' *to merge* into a supposedly purely *theoretical* conversation between the scientific researcher and his 'object' (dialectic of the third degree). One made a choice, which *preceded* scientific enquiry. One did not want to consider the questions about existence of dependence in any sense; they are outside the scientific - i.e. for the voters of this choice the only justifiable - sense. One has declared independence and thus out.

When a nation (see our contemporary history) declares its independence, it does so only against the background of weighing up the power relations around it, from which it can benefit and to which it itself can possibly make a contribution; this is also the case when considering rebellion or revolution.

We have already pointed out that the 'positivist' school of thought of the 19th century met with another setback from philosophy. However, this did not make it disappear. Rather, the [18] opposite seems to be the case today. And we pointed out the underlying power relations in the scientific-methodological, technical and economic-political field. This connection between the practice of life and the way of thinking clearly shows how the thinking sector itself is no more than a part of the whole practical constellation of life.

When boundary questions arise within that sector, one may blindfold oneself with the delusion of pure science and even deny proximity of boundaries, they are there nonetheless. In our case, the delusion has even grown out of the safe delusion of those boundaries. What would one still have to ask with sense behind what was rationalised against the background of sensory perception and generally sanctioned language communication in a mathematical-logical reasoning! After all, one does not *want to* go any further and will not reproach another if he thinks he sees more sense. But the other person should not try to penetrate science with this pretence.

It is true, and we observe with genuine interest not only the activity within the 'internal' scientific field, but also, and above all, the ongoing attempts to shut out the view of borders. Nevertheless, from the outside we think we see the silent penetration of borders continuing, and this cannot be scientifically forbidden.

Indeed, a theoretical defence of, but also against limits necessarily takes place on the basis of criteria for the discussion in question. One may wish to impose them unilaterally, but as long as one maintains the title of science, one will come up against an unavoidable residual question at the end of the use of self-recognised criteria, [19] namely whether the sense of scientific thinking as such - understood in whatever sense, incidentally - is of *scientific* origin, i.e. can be determined by thinking originally. Neither of the two mutually exclusive answers can be of a scientific nature.

In the declaration of independence referred to above, one can try to put this residual question out of the proceedings as unscientific in itself, but this is tantamount to an oath being returned by a witness in court, with which the battle in the proceedings must end to the detriment of the one who refuses. As far as our case is concerned, we will then have to observe a silent boundary violation: the concealed *belief* in the exclusive competence of theoretical thinking with regard to scientific questions has invaded the supposedly purely theoretical field.

One will have to understand each other well in this respect. No more than any other belief can we reject the belief observed here within the context of scientific discussion. We will only have to methodically take each other's faith into account. But this means: instead of ignoring or abstracting from boundaries, considering them and keeping them open. This is the only way to have *honest* discussions. A moment ago we spoke of the rule of the game of logical thinking that is strictly accessible and cannot be violated, but which also does not have exclusive legal rights.

**The deeper level of the so-called 'metaphysical' dialectic.**

In all deference to the internal-dialectical structure of scientific thought, we have thus [20] opposed the absorption of scientific practice, and therein then knowledge acquisition-in a general sense, into method dialectics. This method dialectic in the sense described above was for the philosophy under discussion, in its close connection with and 'birth' from the business attitude to life, in the theoretical field the faithful reflection and expression of the dialectic that is fundamental in the total sense: man goes 'to things' by means of his intellect, in order first to control them, and with its instrument, all of life.

That it found its rise in this way and within such a context in the 20th century is due to the final crisis, after the prelude of the 19th century, not only in philosophy, but in the *foundations* of the humanist philosophy of life and the world. Within humanism, the described way of philosophising now finds (although it has definitively abandoned its philosophical connection to it) for the time being still a philosophy opposite to itself, which has tried to maintain the reflection on the root of this philosophy. For us, the latter philosophy will provide an important demonstration material for describing and searching for the deepest level, where the Western mind has sought a foothold for its contemplation and which it will probably explore with some interest for some time to come. It concerns the ancient area of 'metaphysical' dialectics.

Neopositivist and analytic philosophy may turn its back on so-called metaphysics as a meaningless enterprise from its interest focused exclusively on special scientific and technical practice, but the latter at least gives its polar opponent a place in its space of orientation. For its part, it will hardly grant the title of 'philosophy' to its businesslike opponent, if at all, [21] but it will not be able to get rid of her, because the Western-humanist dialectic of origin, indeed more than this alone, connects the two, and precisely within the space of tension that comes into view here, the pressing questions take place, which pragmatic thinking has tried to write off, but which, as we have already seen, do not leave that thinking alone.

After the dialectic 'in third degree' - within which pragmatist philosophical thinking thought to have secured the patent of its scientific character - we shall have to discuss the deeper dialectic, of which the one already discussed also turns out to be only an expression.

What dialectics means in our intended wider and deeper sense will become clear within the space of the mode of philosophising still to come, albeit primarily in its border zone. But even now we must warn in good time against possible misunderstanding in the use of the term.

We tried - following the original meaning of the word - to bring the dialectic-of-the-third-degree under the image of a conversation, in this case between the researcher and the researched. We ourselves observed the 'technique' of this conversation from the outside. Entirely differently, however, one can also try to identify with the 'active' interlocutor, the researcher, and then not out of interest in the investigated 'object', but in the investigative activity. To understand that investigative activity, however, one must take into account the object, to which it is directed. But that 'object' now becomes no more than a field, a running or obstacle course, on which one follows the, with its scientific obstacles a strenuous conversation, 'subject' compassionately [22] and thinking along the way to its laborious victory.

The image we use here already shows that in the latter dialectic we are far removed from the rigid and subservient scientific character of pragmatic thinking. For once one has turned one's gaze to human subjectivity, even when one wishes to observe as scrupulously as possible the powers - and thus responsible duties - of logical reasoning, broader questions than the modal-logical *ones logically* come into view. And these more-than-logical questions come into view because of the influence they will exert *within* scientific questioning. Taking account of the 'penetration' of boundaries (genitivus objectivus) can no longer be neglected. As we saw above, pragmatism thought it could nevertheless *decide to* do so, but this does not help to rise above the situation of the bare "declaration" of independence or of the litigant refusing a decisive oath imposed by the judge.

However, this is by no means to say that the method openly presented as 'dialectical', in which one follows the 'subjectivity' in an activity, which successively sets and overcomes the obstacles posed as 'object', brings us face to face with the bottom of the deeper and in truth emerging dialectic.

As a contemporary heiress of the related systems of the first half of the last century in this respect, we may mark phenomenological philosophy, in particular the philosophy of existence. The phenomenological dialectic continues to be announced as that between the human subject (Dasein, pour-soi, existence) and its 'world'. It can take different forms and we may refer to the introductory chapter of *Creation Revelation and Philosophy* for some of them. However, we now want to draw attention to the fundamental dialectic, which drives the intra-scientific dialectic and manifests itself in the latter.

For the theoretical dialectic, although addressed as "oppositional" thinking only in peripheral paragraphs of phenomenologising philosophy, nevertheless rules the philosophical-phenomenological dialectic itself in the logically-closing form of an extremely systematised theoretical thinking. Only the logic used is different from that of the positivist-analytic school. The philosophy that focuses on subjectivity has realised in its part and in its own way - what the others did not want to see - that the integral insight into the reality of life determines the insight into the place and nature of its logical facet and that whoever claims the opposite is deceiving himself and others.

Yet phenomenological philosophy (today) also appears in the form of the logical "reasoning" between the "subjectivity" with which the philosopher seems to identify for the time being, and everything that could be an "object" in any sense. Although we want to avoid going too deeply into the work of leading philosophers in general, we cannot refrain from quoting one of Martin Heidegger's most characteristic and significant statements, when he says that philosophy "has fixed the end of the thread of every philosophical question where it springs from and where it returns to" (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 38).

That which we have to be attentive to is that Heidegger - and this marks the polar distance from [24] the analytics - wants to attach the leitmotif of questioning somewhere. For positivism, such utterance 'makes no sense'. After all, if one wants to talk about philosophy there, this has to be done scientifically in the sense intended by (neo-)positivism (cum analytic

philosophy). Thereby, no further sense may be asked for than that, which is presupposed in sense-rationalising and semantic communication. The questions that even now intrude across the borders, already seen above, are systematically excluded.

For Heidegger and the other philosophies of continental Western Europe, however, there can be no philosophy without such 'questions'. In this case, the question is hooked into existential subjectivity. This, however, 'experiences' itself in the dialectical contact with the 'objectivities' of its 'world', and from the experiences of this contact it gets to know itself. Among all that exists, she is the only one equipped with 'Seinsverständnis'.

This 'Verständnis' does not mean theoretical knowledge in the first instance; this would only exist at a certain distance, as a result of abstraction, and we are very sensitive to this view. We also know the way in which Heidegger arrived at his philosophical questioning; he expressly mentions it on the spot by bringing up the name of Edmund Husserl, his teacher. For him, it was all about theoretical thinking in the first instance, and in the end this remained, even in the evolution of his philosophising, the basic denominator under which he placed man's relations with the objectivities on which he focused. Where in Heidegger's phenomenologising we find subjectivity as 'existence', with Husserl we found the 'ego cogito'.

[25] Now it is remarkable, that this 'cogito' (I think...) throughout the history of Western science and philosophy - despite the appearance to the contrary in writers such as Rousseau, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Bergson and others - has always provided the basis for subjectivity in the philosophical-dialectical relationship. So the question arises, where with Heidegger (it applied and applies proportionately to all those who did not, or did not explicitly, put it first), this 'cogito' now functions and in what way. For it is only by asking and pursuing this question that we can track down the leitmotif indicated above and face the claims of the more-than-logical dialectic of Western philosophy to its rightful place.

The first, answer to be given to the question is quite simple. In the thesis of the 'Seinsverständnis', we automatically see the 'cogito' functioning. Under the name of 'Consciousness in general'<sup>3</sup>, 'conscience', etc., it ends up in the same place with all philosophers of existence. But, whereas with Husserl, as with all his predecessors, it represented a thinking c.a. operating equally for everyone, for the philosophy of existence it means the consciousness of the one-off decision each time. The assumption of this awareness, however, also shows an intensification towards the traditional idea of thought *completion*.

**The dialectic of philosophy directed towards subjectivity is also enclosed by logical reasoning.**

However, we were on the road to seeking the fundamental dialectic, which occurs in philosophical thought with the explicit or tacit pretence of primal or origin movement. We designated it in Anglo-Saxon philosophy as the rational [26] controlling going 'to the things'. There it appeared to be fundamentally hidden in a 'dialectic of the third degree'.

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<sup>3</sup> *Trans.* This phrase translates the German: 'Bewusstsein überhaupt'

The latter was the theoretical dialectic between mind and scientific 'object'.

We have already noted that the philosophy of existence openly assigns it a particular place, namely in the life sector of the theoretical practice of science. That is indeed where it belongs, including the boundary questions discussed.

Does this mean, however, that the - in the eye of analytic philosophy 'metaphysical' - philosophy of existence has released itself from the shackles it has left within its confines to a, specifically theoretical, thinking? We had already given an answer. Consequently, the first and true existentialist Kierkegaard did not want to be a 'philosopher'.

Through its grafting onto phenomenological-wise thinking after Husserl and Scheler, the philosophy of existence has abandoned the original idea of 'existence' and shown that it too speaks from the centuries-old dialectics of origin of Western philosophising, further from post-medieval humanism. That she too, therefore, takes sides in the struggle for the primal movement of truth by putting a *primal* duality first. And at present - this is to her credit, in our view - without turning away from the questions concerning the all-encompassing (more than can be grasped by 'science') *sense*.

So for it, philosophy is not just more than science, but fundamentally more than *theoretical* thinking. The question for us is whether the limits set to it within the existentialist-phenomenological systematics can be recognised, or whether philosophy itself - in spite of itself and driven by a structural force that is stronger than it recognises - seems to have joined those limits. The question becomes all the more pressing as in its last stages of development, outstripped by pragmatism, it starts to speak more and more of a thinking that listens to its 'being', a belief in *reason* that is decisive, a subjectivity bound to its pre-objective fields, finally to an underlying 'Nature', etc.

However, since, in principle, instead of ignoring them like its opponent, it concentrates on the questions of borders, we can foresee that the battle for these borders will take place around the point of attachment of the "guiding thread" described later.

The difference, however, between the father of the idea of existence in the subjective sense and the philosophy of existence is this, that Kierkegaard put himself "existentially" before the face of God and then lived this in his relationships on earth. Philosophy of existence, on the other hand, in the line of phenomenology, takes a primary position towards the things of the world until the acquisition of self (being) knowledge, in order to enter into deeper (higher) contemplation only afterwards and along the path of this horizontal-dialectical fundamental relationship. How does this come about?

For our part, we can answer immediately: the cause can be sought in nothing but the 'existential' choice - in the sense of choice of origin - of the philosopher in this case. Before turning to 'philosophising', he has, in the wake of Western philosophy and science, *opted* for the originality of abstract reasoning, and *through this choice* he has from the outset grasped the *dynamics* of origin as a *dialectic* of origin. Unlike neopositivist and analytic philosophising, the existence philosopher fundamentally accounts for the *form* of the dialectic. [28] He

accounts for its 'point of attachment' and its phenomenological form. He stretches the thread logically as tightly between the two poles as none of his 'metaphysical' predecessors have been able to do. Like them, he gives no account of the choice before the duality with which he begins.

For the antinomies with which he too is consequently confronted, we refer again to *Revelation of Creation and Philosophy* (VII); we are not concerned here with focusing on theoretical and philosophical explanations.

We have arrived at the decisive demarcation line, where the fundamental dynamics of *creation* confronts the pretensions and philosophical dialectics *within* that creation.

Only in this place have we clearly arrived there, for if it turns out that even the philosophy of existence, despite its pretence, has capitulated to abstract reasoning, then it has not been able to live up to its claim of rising above it.

Already in *Creation Revelation and Philosophy* we pointed out that the method of transcendental critique we indicated there, and which we ourselves often follow, will not be able to bring the parties together in the end, notwithstanding the closed nature of the immanent argument, because the residual question as to the validity of the logical criterion of reasoning is logically unanswerable for both. Indeed, for the prevailing philosophies, each in its own way, this yardstick as such is the final answer. And we are the first to agree that only *this answer* itself *is no longer under* rational control, but the philosophical process from which the *final* question is born.

[29]

For the philosophy of existence, the continuous use of the yardstick is all the more striking because it wants to determine man by his *position in being* and the "point of attachment" must therefore remain understood within it, in other words, surrendered to it. Only in *being*, however, can the idea of risky freedom remain anchored. Around this, in itself dialectical, question therefore circles all the searching of the so-called second period in the problems of the 'Kehre', the 'ambiguïté', the *critique de la raison dialectique*, etc.

Again and again, the question of 'attachment' arises and always the answer turns out to be determined by a demand, contradictory in itself: *autonomous self-awareness*, whereby this 'awareness' represents the philosopher's reflective thought-volunteering as the norm, which cannot be asked back.

In this norm itself an original dissolution principle pervades, since existentialist autonomy by definition cannot be other than momentarily solipsistic, and the consciousness of the philosopher likewise by definition cannot present itself other than with the claim of (albeit 'teleologically' oriented) *universally valid* constancy.

### **The levels of dialectics**

Several levels of dialectics were encountered. Most on the surface was the 'conversation' of science as such, recognised as the only valid one by the positivist directions and officially referred to a sector of life of its own by the contemplative philosophies.

Meanwhile, beneath this theoretical dialectic a deeper one extended. For (neo-)positivism, it was that of practical autonomous mastery of education in science, technology, economics, politics [30] and whatever can be useful to it. We have already discussed the theoretical border crossings and related contradictions, but in practice this philosophical impasse is reflected in the opposing, at best balanced, élites within the dominating spheres of life and the materialistic self-interest-oriented world.

In existentialist philosophy, the dialectic was found in the first instance in the interaction between the autonomous consciousness, also consciousness of autonomy, and the field in which this autonomy, c.q. disillusioned, is experienced, as 'world', 'en-soi', 'champ phénoménal', etc. Against the dogmatism of the 'system', this philosophy places the once-only 'choice', but its autonomous individuality turned out to be in a *deeper* dialectical tension with the ('teleologically' directed) universal valid statement of the philosopher and thus to result in a new 'system'.

It was the primal humanist urge for freedom, which in the latter case had triggered the rethinking, in the face of the threatening effect of pragmatic control.

The dialectical tension inherent to humanism of origin between its two, simultaneously presupposing and cancelling, poles of absolute freedom and continuous control has, after the theoretical prelude of the 17th, 18th and partly 19th centuries, arrived at an eminently practical final stage.

This is of great importance, because it shows that the philosophical and intellectual struggle of the previous centuries also arose out of *life* and concerned life. Only the historical integration process, in which humanism had begun to take the lead, had not yet progressed far enough for its influence to be fully felt.

In the practical tensions of our days, as just described, Western 'culture' is in the process of dissolving in both directions. And this is all the more significant since non-Western peoples, uprooted from their basis of life, appear to eagerly accept the results of Western pragmatism and the positivism associated with it. What remains of Western reflection is left to itself in its own environment and outside it remains forever without understanding or influence.

### **Dialectics as a fundamental movement of humanism**

Finally, what should we say about this basic dialectic, initially expressed in a philosophical way but now emerging in the fullness of life, whose future forms cannot be foreseen?

We have called her 'humanist'. This she will not remain.

Humanist culture, which over three centuries has made the West what it was and is, has entered into the joint heritage of ancient and Christian civilisation. From the former it derived its intellectual faith, from the latter its motif of freedom, which transformed the 'freedom of the Christian man' into an original freedom of the 'rational' man. In this 'rational' the fundamental motif of the Hellenistic world spoke with a new, secularised, élan.

Autonomous freedom and intellectually pragmatic mastery. This is what the humanist dialectic looks like today. In each of the two - still - prevailing directions, we saw both poles of tension at work, but one within a constantly shrinking field of forces.

This is not to say that in the control drive of the [32] pragmatist attitude to life, the delusion of autonomy is not the never-ending stimulus. However, it is gradually being kept less awake by the old-humanist idea of 'freedom'.

Despite the propagandistic pretence of this idea shortly after the last war, its course has generally been tragic. However, this tragedy was contained in its origins from the outset. Finally, it definitively gave way to the overpowering drive for control born of it.

This ultimate 'dead end' of the foundational dialectic of humanism now makes us ask about the basic meaning expressed by it.

This basic meaning originally marked itself as a 'turning away from'. Initially, it was an opposition to any idea of imposed authority. The medieval combination of scholastic-church and scriptural authority in philosophy of life and world view figured directly as such authority. The 'resistance' expressed itself to a large extent in philosophy and the flourishing science, while in the practical field the struggle for political and religious freedom received its impulses from elsewhere. The actual 'humanist' movement continued to seek its bed amidst the various currents of civilisational development.

When, around the last half of the eighteenth century, it began to show itself more clearly in practice, a new internal resistance, especially against its own mathematical dogmatism, had already made its mark in its philosophy and theory of state. It found a provisional consolidation through the French Revolution in the 'dogmatics of freedom' of the great idealist systems.

The nineteenth century presented the curious phenomenon that from now on 'resistance' began to move in the opposite [33] direction, *against* the classical humanist idea of the supremacy of the 'mind' as the religious domain of the rational free personality.

The antagonism of the possessing and non-possessing classes began to emerge, far beyond that between the ruling and controlled sections of the population before the Revolution; the desire for economic equality dwarfed the political freedom and equality-before-the-law that had been won.

In place of the rational spirit of freedom, reason, which serves technical and economic progress, took the lead in philosophy and science, with which philosophy itself automatically began to clear the field.

The rise of the phenomenological 'reflection' associated with historicism could hardly be called 'resistance' any more, while the philosophical exponent of the pragmatist attitude to life operating against it today, on the other hand, shows quite a lot of vehemence.

In this course of the fundamental dialectic of the humanistic world, a definitive reversal of its inner direction can be discerned, which gives reason to speak of a post-humanistic world. Western man is convinced of the establishment of his autonomy to such an extent that he

only needs to be concerned about the utmost *control* of life and no longer wants to be concerned about anything else. Herewith, the opposition to recognition of any extraterrestrial authority imposing its 'order' on the world has become final and no longer an issue for discussion.

That many, even from economically or politically influential circles, still say they recognise such authority in their private existence or on special occasions does not detract from the decisive direction. [34]

This direction, viz. of the tacitly autonomous mastery of formation in science, technology, economics, politics, works straight ahead, but *takes no* direction other than on the autonomous man, *who* rules. The action emanates from him and returns to him. It shows the back and forth "conversation" between *man* and what he *does* to establish his autonomous intentions.

The still reflective humanist philosophy of existence therefore has no other sense in this than that of the autonomous annihilation ability to discover, insofar as it has not itself, in union with extreme-political currents, begun to show rapprochement to the mental attitudes living out of pragmatism.

The dead-end basic dialectic of humanist-religious life practice, as it has shown itself in science, philosophy and praxis, took its place in the fundamental *dynamics* governing human reality, as a consequence of Western man's choice of thesis in the autonomy of his rational intelligence as the alleged nitgangspan of his total *life movement*.

### **The question of the grounds of the dialectic**

Here we have indicated the, if one wants to call it subjective, direction taken by the drive for sovereignty born of the basic humanist principle. It turned out to be that of repeated rejection and dialectical retrogression. But now the important question demands attention: where is the *source* of the *movement* that enabled man to 'take directions'? After all, direction presupposes movement.

Could this *movement* also have come from man, i.e. rational man? Besides the deliberate silence of the positivist thinkers, we know the implicit [35] attempt of the later philosophy of reflection to answer the question of the origin of movement.

The idea of 'freie Thathandlung', that of the transitory absolute world-spirit, however equally speculative-dialectical in nature and effect, are far behind us. Is there any actual 'movement' in the passage of 'thrown' humanity through the choices of its 'possibilities'? They are choices each time for an enforced future. The 'guiding thread', along which the movement takes place, is consciously confirmed in the vacuum of being, which bears the inscription 'freedom'. *Realistically*, however, it turns out to be indissolubly fixed in the 'objective' end of all possibilities. The movement towards the future is movement towards freedom, enriched with property in the class struggle or not, but in any case final and immobile. And insofar as the movement is transferred in final reflection to the idea of being itself, the "free" prophet listening in the vacuum remains only the moment in which he hears the order to jump off, which can only mean the end of a movement that was never started by and for himself.

There are in fact only two kinds of real movement being discussed here, namely that of man's practical dealings with his affairs, and the thought movement in which he, if need be, takes the trouble to account for these dealings and his place in them. So the answer to our question whether there can be movement in the true sense of the word will depend only on whether we have to see the dialectical dynamism that has been notified as that movement behind which it is no longer possible to ask for movement in return.

With the raising of this question, the problems addressed merely return. They appeared to meet together in the transcendental problem of the philosopher's position. [36]

The time when, in recognition of this position, one struggled with the problems of the endless retreat of reflexion is gone forever. There are only three possibilities to account for a dialectical origin-duality: either to take it for granted in one's own way (positivism, etc.), or to let the philosopher enter the dialectical stage as the leader in the triumphal march of the spirit (humanist idealism), or to give him his place alongside every subjectivity in the present moment of existential choice (existentialist phenomenology). Husserl, who, among moderns, was the one who most and first grappled with the problem, is in a sense the hub of all these solutions, which becomes all the more accentuated as a result of his final idea of the teleology of philosophising.

After what has been said before (see *Revelation of Creation and Philosophy*), we do not want to repeat the differences between the existentialist thinkers, which can be traced back to the nuances of their concepts of origin. Merleau-Ponty, who apparently penetrated the most artlessly into the pending questions, and for the time being resolved them in the present, in the midst of the shadows of past and future, sees them, along with the whole dialectic, as finally resting in a depth that can no longer be accounted for phenomenologically.

To the latter he gives, as it were opposite to Heidegger's later, semi-mythological, 'being'-idea, the name 'Nature', and in doing so he indeed highlights the limits of dialectical dynamics. Whether he thus returns, as he believes and which we think we must dispute, to the proximity of Husserl's intentions, we will also leave for the moment.

However, the understanding of the depth layer, on which one strikes, [37] is entirely determined from the original (dialectical) duality. It is *boundary* idea for thinking from that duality. Duality itself *served* the sovereignty of *thought*.

We are only grateful to Western philosophy of reflection for bringing these limits into sharp focus. Its historical task accomplished here cannot be undone by today's pragmatist refusal to assign any meaning to it. That to which pragmatism devotes its attention was only secondary to the philosophy of existence and of no significance to us in the first instance. Its methods may serve us at times, but not for equal *purposes*.

The *philosophical* work of both directions has drawn our interest to the in itself dialectical 'residue' of phenomenological 'reduction' in all the forms it has assumed. It shows us the lost autonomous thinker who, whether positivist or phenomenological, continues to go down as a victim in his own controlling systematics. Who, despite all assertions of philosophical imperfection, correctability, sometimes even with a systematically consistently given

prospect of capitulation, nevertheless wants to continue to have the *last word in* respect of the total content of his proclamation. And when Heidegger notes that the 'Scheitern' could be a beneficent thing for thinking too (at least not the worst), this can only apply within the frame of a 'being'-*thinking*, which pronounces it as a lasting judgement.

### **The as originally accepted duality of being and knowing.**

The duality which thus *remained*, despite all either business or existential reflection as the basis of the dialectical, [38] supposedly fundamental, dynamic through all times, is a figure of human autonomous thinking. The idea of autonomy changed, took on an aggressive humanist character after a defensive antique. Thinking continued to *rule*, of this unconsciously, respectively overconsciously.

The transition from the defensive to the offensive phase could not have been made without the interim period of the Church Fathers and the Middle Ages. We have already seen that the permanent Western idea of autonomous thinking after the transitional phase retained the Hellenic legacy of the priority of reason, but took from the Christian faith the idea of *original* freedom with a direct inversion of its basic sense.

What, then, happened to the idea of *thought* in what some consider the most Christian period, that it could maintain itself in priority, maintain itself *against true freedom*, indeed put the latter out of sight?

In other words, how has the fundamental figure of the dialectic of thought, through all its nuances until now, been able to continue to impose itself as a fundamental *dynamic*? And worse, how can it happen today that Christians seem to be on their organisational and public last retreat against this 'spirit of the world'?

How has thinking, given as a means to serve, been able, even in spite of the philosophical capitulation of the idea of autonomy from humanist idealism, to carry on its *reign* without significant opposition from the followers of Christ to the pure pragmatism of today? How did it also get the chance *to impose* itself as a means to cultivate the *belief* of the autonomy of Western [39] man and to penetrate all over the globe in this function?

We do not ask this with a view to man in his waste, because, creatively speaking, the relations are clear enough to that end. After all, the map drawn by systematised thinking points the way to man's shining triumph over nature, and so on. We ask in view of those who call themselves Christians and dream of a new earth.

One may claim the opposite of the classical philosophers from the age that likes to call itself critical, but in any case they were so critical that they gave account of their basic assumption in self-evidence. This was the *rational* world order and it was it, which created the guarantee for the intellect, if used *according to* its order, to know what is rational. The normative example for this knowing was the divine self-review, with which human philosophical thought was in communion. However, the question remained open as to the legitimacy of the relationship between this human thinking of the philosopher, which pronounced decisively on the totality of being, and this totality itself, which after all included the divine and human intellect at the same time. How could the *individual* philosophical mind, normed by divine

thinking, be *understood* together with the intellectus archetypus *within* Being, and at the same time pronounce definitively on this Being?

However, the question could not be addressed as long as that concerning individualisation in relation to contemporary thought could not be adequately brought into question. The latter, after all, unilaterally bore the metaphysical *character of form*, while individuality had its origin in, or at least was related to, the principle of 'matter', opposite to form and also metaphysical.

[40]

When the Middle Ages accepted this antique metaphysics within the doctrine of creation and tried to adapt to it, this unthought-out relationship between the actual thinking of the philosopher and the "rational order of being" did not only apply to the sphere of "nature", but inevitably reached over to the sphere of "supernature" (also constructed by thinking). This realm, which was presented as a higher 'form completion' of 'nature', would be knowable from biblical revelation and namely through faith as a special gift of grace to the *intellect*.

Thus, theoretically, a double division of the existing took place, firstly between the natural and the supernatural domain and, secondly, between being (ontic) and 'noetic' (actual 'knowing'). This second dichotomy applied both in the domain of 'nature' and that of 'supernature'. In the lower tier, the philosopher acted in the highest instance, in the upper tier, the ecclesiastical theologian, as the expert. The unanswerable critical question about 'knowing', both understood in 'being' and judged from outside, now presented itself to both levels. There was no higher authority for criticism than the rational order of being, to which knowing, also rational, only had to adapt itself.

That this uncritical acceptance of what had once been the rational god of thought of the ancients was diametrically opposed to the knowledge about which the Gospel and the apostle Paul had spoken goes without saying. Within the ecclesiastical unitary culture of the Middle Ages, there was no other possibility for immanent criticism than the modally logical one, while decisions [41] on discrepancies in the sphere of supernaturalism or between this sphere and that of nature that threatened to rise above it fell to the highest, i.e. ecclesiastical, authority.

It is remarkable, to say the least, that even after the demise of the medieval unified culture and the conquest of the 'lower level' by humanist philosophy and science, theology continued to maintain the dualism of being and knowing as a tacit philosophical basis for the 'supernature' and, despite the henceforth absence of a supreme decision-making authority in concreto, reserved for itself the last valid verdict on the boundaries of nature and supernature.

### **The philosophical-theological spectator stand.**

What is at stake with this is no small matter. In the first place, as the reader in the company of the critical-existential thinkers will have understood, it was a *fiction* to want to trace the truth by adapting human noesis to an 'ontic' order. For this 'order' itself was the product of a 'noetic' *ontological* thinking. The 'being'-order of the noetic sphere had remained uncritical and this became all the more dangerous, the more the 'in-self', c.q. 'objective', 'ontic' threatened to be identified with creation as revelation.

Secondly, with the inheritance of this 'rule of the game' of thought and exchange, the decision on the answer to the question of fundamental dynamics had been permanently accepted.

When in our time, on the one hand, theologians marvel at leaving the paths traditionally trodden for and by themselves, on the other, many of them seem to get out of breath in an attempt to stay "in front", the cause of this sad spectacle [42] lies only in the collapse of the noetic pillars of the spectator's stand.

They had thought they could let the fundamental dynamics play out in front of this tribune, not realising they themselves were part of it. In other words: they had not questioned the hereditary rule of play; they had thought they could keep control of the game under this rule; they had found in the logic of knowledge the power of movement itself, to which they only had to give direction in order to follow the path of truth.

That theology of our century, which has given up the old counter-rights to the sciences of 'nature-étage' in exchange for recognition of its own access to the modern *universitas scientiarum*, has by no means broken with the old rule of play, but has kept its position within it open by means of the 'paradox' of concealed revelation, the existentialist 'Seinsverständnis', etc. However, it has *not* bought this submission with the approval of what it likes to call its 'Stand', thus *selfishly* maintaining the old double dichotomy (noetic-ontic, nature-super-nature).

Only here, again *self-possessed* and now under the pressure and subjectivising historicising philosophy, the initiative of the dialectical movement is placed in the hands of the ('existential') Subject.

In other words: just as in ancient philosophy and theology the primacy of a creation-order ('being'-order), with its requirement of adaptation of the noesis and its doctrine of *analogia entis*, determined the trajectory of basic dynamics, so in what has been called dialectical theology this was done by the core principle of existential choice. Such theology thus found itself a) in the same difficulty as we have outlined with regard to the philosophy of existence [43] and which found its seat in the internally antinomian position of the philosopher who speaks the last, exclusive, word; b) in the second-power antinomy of a *definitive* (theological) philosophical (and thus 'natural') exposition of the earthly theologian vs.v. the as non-committal, and thus never 'definitive', ('super-natural') action of God.

Summarising old and new, we must conclude that both the synthetic nature-supernatural conception and the various forms given to it have collectively remained in the first instance subject to the onto-logical scheme with its *primary* duality of knowing and being. In the older theology this is explicitly expressed, in the others it takes place between the subjectivity of the theologising philosopher, which by definition expresses itself with general, exclusive and continuous validity, *and* all *described* subjectivity (including that of the theologian himself), which characterises itself as individual and instantaneous, if not generally valid, 'existence'.

In both, the beginning of the supposed basic dynamics appears to lie in the 'noetic' sphere, either declared to be obliged to adapt or hidden in the presupposed existence. As a dynamic, it remains subject to the game rule of straightforward, or with the help of the figure of the

'paradox' etc., contradictorily directed, logical thinking and thus, either in the old or in the new sense of dialectical character. That is to say, according to our description given at the beginning, that it, with the whole of Western philosophy, continues to run between two poles, one of which constantly points the movement in progress back to the other, leaving the question of the origin of the movement that makes the dialectic possible unanswered.

[44]

Or, in the image of a moment ago, one has nestled oneself in the gallery of some theology and thought to be able to observe the primordial movement in its old or new dialectical form from there. They thought they could pass judgement on this movement, which was considered most original, condemn its opponents, assign philosophy and science their place, launch or reject an ethics, and so on.

This stand is then also the speaking stand for the first and last word. From there, one continues to watch the unending spectacle and speak one's Western thought-words about it; there is only one thing one does not see and therefore does not utter, viz. that one is included in the spectacle. A theoretical recognition of this is powerless to clarify the real situation; only when the stand collapses does a path to reflection become available, which is not to say it will be gone.

## Chapter II

### THE EXTREME APPROACH TO AND NECESSARY CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIAN THOUGHT IN KARL JASPERS' PHILOSOPHISCHE GLAUBE.

#### Jaspers' 'philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung'.

So we are still asking for the movement, which encompasses *everything*.

With this question, we find ourselves in the dialectic between a putative primal movement - as we have now tried to approach it in ion distinct ways - *and* the in truth fundamental creation dynamic.

The philosopher Karl Jaspers, who disputes with the Christian faith and thus seeks a connection with it, is a deeply serious philosopher, asking the question in his book *Der philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung*. Both because of the seriousness with which he seeks the connection and because of the honesty and depth of his vision, we feel obliged to account for his intentions before continuing the argument in a positive way. This may also enlighten us as we seek our own way in the Western community of thought.

As for the title of his book, one has to pay attention to the use of the term 'angesichts'. Would he, by his own account, have used the conjunction 'und' in its place, this would give the impression that a position could be taken over revelation and philosophical faith, which Jaspers rejects. He is concerned with the 'meeting' of the two. The possibility must be explored even without the two being able to coincide; in any case, [46] Jaspers himself, though representative of philosophical belief, remains 'concerned' by revelation. In the most serious mutual approach imaginable, both parties must try to find each other, above the impotence of ecclesiastical hierarchies and the darkening of what is essential by the enlightened influence of science and others, on the way back to the eternal origin.

This communication can only be freely sought from a common ground. The ground can only be clarity of thought, truthfulness and a "gemeinsames Grundwissen", according to the Vorwort. It is clear that it is within this last element that the question arises with which we are concerned, i.e. that of the dynamics of existence as it moves fundamentally. Will it emerge in the desired mutual encounter or will the "dialectic" between supposedly fundamental dialectics and fundamental dynamics emerge at some point?

To understand Jaspers, we have to distance ourselves polar from the basic form of ontological duality just discussed in the form handed down by the ancient world. However, only polar, i.e. that the idea, which had originally given the discussed form to the supposedly fundamental dialectic, has maintained itself in the Western heritage. We already considered this in the examples cited from the philosophy of existence.

For Jaspers, too, the crucial question is how man, philosophising through being, which includes himself, can gain an overview or insight into the totality of existence. For him, however, 'being' has the fundamental character of *history*. Following in the footsteps of the

idealistic philosophical dialectics of the early nineteenth century, the philosophy of existence of the first half of our century, reflecting on the freedom of human [47] subjectivity, has grasped the *totality* of meaning under the historical umbrella. Jaspers' problem statement speaks clearly from the following paragraph of his Introduction (p. 27): "Wir können nicht als Erkennende ausserhalb oder über dem Ganzen stehen. Gesamtüberblicke der *Geschichte* sind bestenfalls Schemata einer Idee des Ganzen. Aber auch diese Idee des Ganzen ist niemals die Wirklichkeit der *Geschichte* selber" ["We cannot stand as cognisers outside or above the whole. Overall views of *history* are at best schemata of an idea of the whole. But even this idea of the whole is never the reality of *history* itself"] (ital: v. us, M.).

The origin of the world is incomprehensible. With every search in every field - matter, life, sense, consciousness - the horizon continuously recedes and the jumps between these levels of our very existence remain without explanation; yet more than all our knowing, we are ourselves. However: *how do* we find ourselves, how the origin from which we *are* ourselves? But at the same time Jaspers' answer fixes the direction of our search in the two *focal* points discovered first: I am *thinking*, I am *free*. The combination of the ancient heritage with the fundamentally humanist impulse as discussed earlier is clearly evident.

Freedom, however, Jaspers says, I cannot emerge through an absolute freedom, which I would be myself, i.e. through arbitrariness. Yet I transcend 'the world' without being able to swerve into a second world, which is not there. "In Formen dieser Welt als Chiffern kommt uns zum Bewusstsein, was aus unserer eigentlichen Herkunft uns anspricht, auf sie weist, uns ihr verbindet" ["In forms of this world as ciphers, we become aware of what speaks to us from our actual origin, points to it, connects us to it"] (p. 32). It is around these 'Chiffern' that it will ultimately turn out to be between Jaspers and us.

Unapologetically, Jaspers gives us his thoughts on what 'Revelation' might be. By no "knowing" can one have knowledge of it. [48] Only belief in *revelation* can be spoken of as a reality. But this too can only be valid for the community of believers, never in general. Nevertheless, revelation faith also affects the non-believer, because for the believer it is an *existential* impulse. It should therefore be taken seriously; moreover, in Christianity it was a thinking faith. If it enters the realm of scientific competence with claims such as, for example, bodily resurrection, it is automatically subject to scientific criticism. For philosophy, Revelation becomes *Chiffer*. However, philosophy opposes theological dogmatism.

One must duly distinguish between revelatory faith and faith as such: "Glaube ist die Kraft, in der ich mir gewiss bin aus einem Grunde, den ich wohl bewahren, aber nicht herstellen kann. Glaube kann das Umegreifende heissen, das Ganze... Glaube ist der Grund vor aller Erkenntnis. Er wird im Erkennen heller, aber nie bewiesen" ["Faith is the strength in which I am certain for a reason that I can preserve, but not create. Faith can be called the comprehensive, the whole... Faith is the ground before all knowledge. It becomes clearer in cognition, but never proven"] (pp. 49/50).

As far as Christian faith is concerned, for Jaspers a specific antinomy is connected to it: the single human being is dependent on God's grace to be able to believe and yet he is required to believe (p. 51). And revelation itself can only rely on revelation, jop nothing outside it, for

its support. Even philosophical faith cannot fall back on anything else, by which it could be founded. "Wo es dem Menschen wirklich Ernst wird, da ist es sein Wagnis und Schicksal, woraufhin und wodurch er leben will". ["Where man becomes really serious, it is his risk and destiny, what he wants to live for and through"] (p. 64).

Jaspers thus seems willing to push forward to the limits in the discussion. Meanwhile, we do well to keep the two indicated focal points in mind. When Jaspers again briefly repeats his exposition [49] on 'Die Weisen des Umgreifenden' from 'Von der Wahrheit'? it is striking, how his description of 'existence' chooses its fulcrum (p. 118) in Western duality, as we find it in originally hereditary formation in Jaspers' 'Consciousness in general'. "Schon das Bewusstsein überhaupt ist das Dreisein: das *Subjekt* des 'ich denke' ist auf *Gegenstände* gerichtet und ist darin auf sich selbst bezogen im *Selbstbewusstsein*. In dieser Struktur liegt existentiell eine tiefere: Existenz ist das *Selbst*, das sich zu sich selbst verhält und darin sich auf die *Macht* bezogen weisz, durch die es gesetzt ist (Kierkegaard). Sie ist Freiheit", ["Consciousness in general is threefold: the subject of 'I think' is directed towards objects and is therein related to itself in self-consciousness. This structure contains a deeper existential structure: Existence is the self that relates to itself and therein knows itself to be related to the power by which it is set (Kierkegaard). It is freedom"] according to Jaspers and he continues: "nicht ohne die Transzendenz, durch die sie sich geschenkt weisz" ["not without the transcendence through which it knows itself to be a gift"].

We note that the existential *freedom* of subjectivity with Jaspers, as the *root of* his philosophical humanist conception to be sharply distinguished from being involved in the 'objects' of the world (world, Gegenstand, idea), is constituted by the given anchoring of this freedom in the relation to 'transcendence'. For therein lies the reason for his explicit connection of believing and philosophising.

Without wishing to criticise or agree with Kierkegaard, we would like to raise the question whether Jaspers' suggestion concerning this relationship can be accepted. Is Kierkegaard's real calling to account by the God he both fears and loves identical, if only in form, with the agency, which in Jaspers' philosophy must restore the subject from its bondage to 'the world' to *its own* freedom? Is there a ground on which both thinkers can communicate in the direction of '*the truth*'?

For Jaspers, "transcendence" is the all-encompassing, reality only for existence in the experience of its freedom. "Existenz ist der *je Einzelne*, als [50] ses Selbst, unvertretbar und unersetzbar" ["Existence is the individual, as self, unjustifiable and irreplaceable"]. She is "das Zusichkommen des Selbst in der Zeit als ein Gegenwartigwerden von Ewigem" ["the arrival of the self in time as a becoming present of the eternal"]. However, it is equally characterised by the necessity of communication with the other 'Selbst', which then also finds itself. Jaspers does not recognise the possible objection that we should not touch the unfathomable through reflexion because it would then be disturbed at the same time. On the contrary - provided one truly acts inwardly in one's thinking as 'Denken im Sich-selbst-offenbar-werden' ['Thinking in becoming self-revealing'] - this only makes the original all the more real for us. The 'ground', however, is not accessible to any searching enquiry.

Jaspers reiterates (p. 123): "Das Grundwissen dessen, wie wir uns in der Welt finden, verzichtet auf ein Totalwissen, *das es nicht gibt*" ["The basic knowledge of how we find ourselves in the world renounces a total *knowledge that does not exist*"] (ital. v. us. M.), and with this statement finds himself, along with us, in opposition to the self-assurance of ontisch-noetic duality.<sup>4</sup>

So the decisive question will be how humanity can collectively enter the orbits of this 'Basic knowlegde'.<sup>5</sup> This is not a question of 'knowing something' in the usual sense (e.g. what God is, what the foundation of the world, eternal being, happening, etc. is); it is an attempt to discover what we find ourselves in and how we find ourselves in all this. Then follows the remarkable and for us weighty statement (p. 130): "Dieser Grundtatbestand, dasz etwas erscheint (oder anders: sich zeigt, sich offenbart, da ist, [51] Sprache wird) ist, so gewisz er gegenwaertig ist, so sehr im Ganzen das Geheimnis" ["This basic fact, that something appears (or in other words: shows itself, reveals itself, is there, becomes language) is, as certain as it is present, the mystery as a whole"].

Yet, according to Jaspers, we can only approach the limits attainable herein by a kind of fundamental operation, which must pass through thinking in Gegenstands-relation. It has to be repeated again and again and from different subjective positions towards different 'objects', until we have acquired the in truth 'philosophical' insight that no position bound in 'Subject-Object-Split'<sup>6</sup> can be satisfied; on the contrary, that we will know ourselves, with everything, to be encompassed by the 'Encompassing'<sup>7</sup> and dependent on it alone, even though the very utterance of that thought will not be able to avoid an *appearance of* objectification, which in turn has to be broken. Only in this way will the deception and objectifying onto-logi (in "Seins-aussagen") disappear and the awareness of our *freedom* (as Nicht-durch-sich-selbst-Sein) provide us with the space in which man, this eye and light in the dark universe, can make place and meaning of what is appear.

The 'Basic knowlegde' to be processed by the 'Fundamental operation'<sup>8</sup> gives man the existential awareness of 'transcending' (freely transcending) all that exists. Meanwhile, he can only have this 'subjective' existential awareness as the flip side of the awareness of knowing oneself bestowed by 'transcendence'. Of the latter, Jaspers says, it is the 'object-side' of that whose 'subject-side' is called 'existence'. This relationship, however, can only be *experienced* existentially, in its reality cannot be 'stated'.

The author does not want to impose his mode of thought and expression. It would be utopian to present it as a kind of basic structure in which all those who, like him, are completely

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<sup>4</sup> Needless to say, such 'Totalwissen' must be distinguished from the idea of perfect theoretical knowledge, which is never realised in practice, but always has to be the guiding principle of thought and functions at the level of consciousness. For ancient and frontier humanist thought, the idea of perfect theoretical knowledge coincided with total knowledge, as opposed to 'supernature' with an appeal to Spiritual Enlightenment.

<sup>5</sup> *Trans.* This translates the German phrase 'Grundwissen'.

<sup>6</sup> *Trans.* This translates the German phrase 'Subjekt-Objekt-Spaltung'

<sup>7</sup> *Trans.* This translates the German word 'Umgreifende'.

<sup>8</sup> *Trans.* This translates the German phrase 'Grundoperation'.

sincere and 'existentially' willing, [52] could find each other. He is only concerned with trying a way for communication of such, because the 'Basic knowlegde' (and on this point it is comparable to science) cannot be closed. 'Das Wort des Wissens darf den Entschlusz der Wirklichkeit nicht ersetzen' ['The word of knowledge must not replace the resolution of reality'] (p. 149). Only in the practice of *life* does philosophy come to its true witness.

We will therefore not be able to come to each other through the power of thought or by discussing religious *content*. Jaspers does not want to be accused of being driven by faith in his philosophy in the same way as those he opposes. Certainly there is a belief, but with no pretence of 'knowing'. 'Er ist der Glaube, der sagt: Wahrheit ist was verbindet' ['He is the faith that says: truth is what connects'] (p. 150).

Which then is the power, which, stronger than myself, from within me urges me to understand myself and com- municate with all at the same time?

From the search for the 'Grundwissen das Bedin-gung eines allgemeinen Sichverbindens ist' ['Basic knowledge is the condition of a general connection'], Jaspers gives a preliminary answer to the question of that inner power. If we call it 'Reason'<sup>9</sup> ['*Vernunft*'], it is certainly essential but not conclusively designated by that name; it points to that which stands 'quer zur Zeit', the point of attraction from and towards which the meaning of truth reveals itself in concrete historical forms.

Reason [*Vernunft*], Jaspers has said earlier (p. 127), does *in* us what transcendence does in Being as such; inwardly it (Reason) encompasses all that is encompassing. In philosophy it is the highest, but it is nothing in itself alone. In our life it resists every absolutisation and correlate repulsion of the other, i.e. it resists every disintegration of the unity of the existing. Therefore, [53] itself shows no given order (system), it is 'becoming' as it goes along. It does not take a step without the 'mind', but does not rest in it, on the contrary drives it to go further. It should not be categorised in a subject-object duality, but it is present in everything that has to be subjectivity or objectivity on some other account. It cannot be permanently placed anywhere and connects everything, creates the space of movement in which philosophising has to find its path.

This space of movement of philosophical Glaube is a matter of great importance. Will it, like physical space, be determined by the movement whose trajectory it forms? If the trajectory indicated turns out to be the 'Reason', which has always been decisive in philosophy, we understand that the movement will be 'destructive' and wish to know what freedom this trajectory will leave to the movement of freedom itself.

Since Jaspers' dispute with the faith in revelation concerns the meaning of the content of *revelation*, in which dispute he faces mainly theology and church hierarchy, we understand in advance that the role and the very idea of 'Reason' will need clarification. This will have to deal with the meaning of content (of revelation) at the same time, while reflection will have

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<sup>9</sup> *Trans.* Mekkes often uses the German word 'Vernunft' which we will translate as Reason. It is always capitalised in the German and so can be identified in English as Reason with the capital. Where the German appears at the start of a sentence we will leave the German in parenthesis.

to constantly guard against the threat posed by nature-supernatural dualism, which renders it powerless.

### Chiffren and 'Gegenstand' der theologie

A hopeful beginning of touch is offered to us in Jaspers' doctrine of the 'Chiffren'.

The Chiffren are marks on the path of existence towards its freedom, which it has in 'transcendence'. They are the 'Gegenstände' from which, on the road [54] of selfhood to 'Basic knowledge', Consciousness in general makes use when performing the 'Fundamental operation' as described above. In their meaning they are diametrically opposed to revelatory contents, which suggested or represent transcendence 'in the flesh' [*leibhaftige*].<sup>10</sup> Previously they were the last instance from which everything had to be understood; today they themselves have to *be understood*. Whether at this moment and within certain limits truth speaks *through* them is decided by philosophising and the life-praxis of existence. The latter *I* always remain myself in being given to myself from my transcendent origin, against which, however, I can also rebel and thereby fall down to my dark 'Nature'.

As soon as man came to conscious reflection on his existence, he threw off the identification of (tangible) reality and Chiffer. 'Der Glaube will Reinheit' ['Faith wants purity'].

It is in - never 'provable' - freedom that existence aims at transcendence. Transcendence-oriented *thinking* does always take place in a 'Subject-Object-Split', within which each 'Object' can be Chiffer<sup>11</sup>, but 'was von Freiheit in Zeichen gesagt wird, ist keinem Verstande verständlich, sondern nur dem Selbstsein der Existenz, die sich darin wiedererkennt' ['what is said of freedom in symbols is not comprehensible to any intellect, but only to the selfhood of existence, which recognises itself in it'] (p. 158). In such a direction, above what we can know of 'nature', we understand our nature-ness, above our freedom-ness in various ways, our freedom (bestowed by transcendence) as origin, above our temporal alternations our 'eternal' identity. It is in the Chiffren, however, that we can act on it and communicate with each other. This is where the [55] tolerance of philosophising towards religious cult finds its ground.

Jaspers is afraid of two extremes: of losing the awareness of the true, only to be experienced in freedom, disclosure by the never embodied [*leibhaft*] transcendence to a making into religious reality (content of revelation) of what can only be Chiffer, and of undergoing any reflection on our radical freedom in the pragmatist attitude to life, often accompanied by a 'Wissenschaftsaberglaube'.

'Die Wahrheit der Chiffren', Jaspers concludes his positive account of their meaning (p. 173), 'bezeugt sich durch keine Erkenntnis, keine Einsicht, sondern allein durch ihre erhellende Kraft in der existentiellen Geschichte des je Einzelnen' ['tests to itself through no knowledge,

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<sup>10</sup> *Trans.* Mekkes uses the German 'leibhaft' 'leibhaftig' and 'leibhaftigkeit'. The latter will be translated as 'Corporality'. The former two will be translated in various ways and so will be preserved in the text in parenthesis.

<sup>11</sup> For the sake of completeness, clean familiarity assumed: the Chiffer 'speaks' and in this goes far beyond a, merely representative, 'symbol'; however, a symbol can become Chiffer.

no insight, but solely through its illuminating power in the existential history of the individual'].

With these details, Jaspers has enlightened us on the basic sense he assigned to 'Basic knowlegde'. His doctrine of Chiffern remains, above and beyond this, of great importance and can serve our argument to the same extent. However, we sought far more than that to understand the truly fundamental dynamics.

It is no coincidence that Jaspers takes the first illustrative material for his polemic, which seeks communication, from the theological doctrine of the sacraments of his Basle colleague Karl Barth, based on his 1929 essays. For us, it is as little a question of an all-round assessment of Barth as it is of Jaspers; in this case it is a question of a certain idea of theology by Jaspers, an impression of what appears in his polemic, without testing the correctness of the representation of Barth's ideas.

Jaspers wants to contrast his intention with 'Chiffer' and 'faith' with the signs of theology. He reasons as follows (pp. 175ff) :

Theology states, that in the 'signs' [56] revelatory 'reality?' is proclaimed. But then they are not concerned with 'transcendence', but with the intermediate reality in time and space. This reality is said to be simultaneously God and man in Jesus Christ. The signs aim to meet reality of transcendence and reality in the world together. That such an identity cannot exist is reflected in the fact that in signs the theologian speaks of the temporal reality of the act of revelation rather than of 'transcendence'. But, seen this way, revelation can never be revelation of transcendence and is therefore not 'revelation'; or rather: it reveals two 'transcendences', of which the same is said in the theology of 'concealed revelation'.

As ambiguous as it is with the signified thing, it is with the signs as such. While everything can be Chiffer of Transcendence, theology isolates certain signs from creation for the sacramental purpose. But then the, according to theology hidden, God can *no longer* be hidden. One takes a questionable approach to the "making of 'image or likeness' prohibited by God Himself".

Jaspers concludes, speaking from his own observation of worship: 'Does the cult count as Chiffer, then the solemnity, the seriousness, the weight, but in floating freedom, yet in full force, seemed to me possible. However, does the experienced apply as the reality of God, then it seemed possible to me as magic, that is, a causality without causality, a reality without reality' ['Does the cult count as Chiffer, then the solemnity, the seriousness, the weight, but in suspended freedom, yet in full force, seemed possible to me. However, does the experienced apply as the reality of God, then it seemed to me to be like magic, that is, a causality without causality, a reality without reality'] (p. 178).

The faith, of which theology speaks, obtains only the affirmed. For him, in that moment, transcendence is *existentially* truth, and the 'sign' its Chiffer. However, she then becomes an impossible 'Gegenstand eines Glaubens'.

[57]

It seems to us that in the encounter between this (impossible) *Gegenstand* and Jaspers' 'transcendence', we mutually have to observe a certain reserve. The equal use of the term '*Gegenstand*' by humanistic philosophy and theology may prompt caution.

For Jaspers, the '*Gegenstand*' belongs home in the 'Subject-Object-Split' of the 'Consciousness in general'. Recorded from there, it can become Chiffer of the 'Encompassing', ultimately through its existential deepening on the path of freedom.

Meanwhile, we have formed our own opinion on subject-object duality as such and have seen it appear within the humanist worldview as the fundamental figure of the intellectshypostasis impregnated with the religious motif of controlling autonomy in alternating philosophical forms. In Jaspers' thought world, it is the fourfold expression of the 'Inner conflict of Being'<sup>12</sup> (*Dasein* and world, thought and *Gegenstand*, mind and idea, existentic and transcendence). This 'thought' world, however, consistently appears as *Gegenstand* in opposition to philosophical subjectivity, so that, as we saw, the dialectical tension between the position of the philosopher as such on the one hand and his subjectivity within his philosophy on the other, appears in the critical gaze.

Within the philosophy of existence and the theology contested by Jaspers, this similarly leads to unresolvable tensions. As long as the theologian continues to speak about the content of God's '*revelation*' as a '*state of being*' of theology and at the same time highlights its concealment character as a description of its unapproachable sovereignty, he produces the internally *antinomian* dialectic between the desired maintenance of the scientific character of theology and its professed (sovereign) concealment, which goes beyond his theological dialectic. It is the theological statement, which has 'logically' laid down the latter - commonly valid - word in its alleged 'paradox'.

This '*ver-gegenstandlichen*' of revelation is clearly seen by Jaspers and it provides him with the point of attack for his accusation of 'corporeality'.<sup>13</sup> Such, in Jaspers' view, belongs to the being level of Consciousness in general, and, where the theologian maintains the pretence of scientific discussion, his paradox remains for Jaspers - rightly! - an unacceptable spell of power, which can at most provide a Chiffer for an existence elevated to its transcendence. But with the latter, such theological idea of revelation has lost both its scientific meaning in the strict sense and its sacramental meaning in theological eyes.

Jaspers' discussion with dialectical theology is particularly interesting because the latter is most closely related to his 'existential' thinking. Jaspers does not have this point of contact with the rationalising theology of Protestant scholasticism, but in relation to it he is all the more justified the less it has accounted for its position and the place of its '*Gegenstand*' vis-à-vis the rational '*being*'-order along critical lines.

All the more obvious, meanwhile, is the dominating place which, against his own admission, Consciousness in general in Jaspers' philosophy *actually* occupies as the basis of origin of his

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<sup>12</sup> *Trans.* This translates the German phrase '*Zerrissenheit des Seins*'. Mekkes occasionally also just uses the German '*Zerrissenheit*' and we will silently translate it 'inner conflict'.

<sup>13</sup> *Trans.* This translated the German word '*Leibhaftigkeit*'.

own theory of being, and which must necessitate an examination of the true meaning of his figure of 'Reason' within existence.

[59]

### **The ground antinomy of faith and reason in Jaspers' philosophische Glaube.**

Jaspers says (p. 189) that neither philosophical faith nor revelatory faith have an analogy with the basic form of 'oppositional' knowledge. The latter is based on definable presuppositions (= hypotheses), which it makes itself aware of. These bear changeable character. In its sense, they are never content of faith. By contrast, the presupposition of philosophical and revelatory faith is the 'experience of origin', which cannot be formulated as a presupposition. The thinking of faith 'ist in der Schwebe von Bestimmbarkeiten, er selber unbedingt ohne Bestimmbarkeit' ['is in the suspension of determinabilities, he himself is unconditionally without determinability']. And then follows the more or less stunning statement: 'Er (i.e. faith) erscheint immer im Denken und in der Lebenspraxis, im Denken der 'Sache' und in der sie denkenden Persönlichkeit'. ['It (namely, faith) always appears in thinking and in the practice of life, in the thinking of the 'thing' and in the personality that thinks it"].

We are the first to agree with this and also believe that this defines the line of Jaspers' thought. But: does this 'erscheint immer im Denken' ['always appears in thought'] then have nothing to do with gegenstandliche Erkennen, or rather: does the latter have nothing to do with 'Erscheinen'?

We think we grasp what Jaspers is trying to express here, unclarified. The 'Content' of faith distinction cannot be formulated theoretically as actual faith distinction. Yet it is present with, or rather 'in', faith everywhere.

But...: does it then have nothing to do with the 'hypotheses' of Consciousness in general, does gegenstandliche thinking thus have nothing to do with faith discernment?

Jaspers will reply that the orientation of theoretical thinking and remaining 'in der Schwebe' (scl. in the 'Chiffren') cannot be reconciled. If this is so [60], then at this point the ground tension, which, under the guise of the thesis of the 'Inner conflict of Being', dominates Jaspers' philosophical thought, i.e. the presupposition of the exclusive universality of the 'Reason' in (also his own) philosophising against the drive for freedom of (also his own) existence, which cannot fit itself under any 'bestimmbare Voraussetzung' (not even of the universality of a philosophical statement about existence).

In this tension we encounter the *definitive limit* of philosophical Glaube, to which Jaspers has just testified, that it 'sich *ohne Grenze* und Abschluss in jeder seiner Bestimmtheiten des Aussprechens der Infragestellung aus(setzt) (curs. v. us. M.), while revelatory faith is 'begründet' 'durch Héren der Worte' and has its fixed objective reality content, which first gives sanction to the believer's existential decision (which is therefore no longer a wagon in freedom).

Jaspers clearly sees the circular course of all totality thinking. It inevitably returns to its own origins; for him, this is the inevitability of the dialectical origin movement. In philosophical

thinking, however, every reasoning circle is always broken by a new one until the experience of the groundlessness in everything that remains to be thought. The circles thus lead back to the seriousness and self-responsibility of existence here and now. Revelatory faith, however, closes itself off "in sich zufrieden" in its salvation at the bottom of its "reality". In doing so, it breaks off 'communication'. Philosophical faith remains open.

Meanwhile, this staying open appears to have a limit that does not depend on one's own choice. It cannot reach further than the described, unbreakable ground tension in the circle of more than [61] philosophical dialectics, which is the *origin* condition for philosophical faith as such. This nevertheless cannot break through the tension between freedom and Reason bound to 'reason'.

### **The Struggle of Chifferrn and Reason<sup>14</sup>**

The 'Chifferrn' (lt.: secret signs), of which Jaspers speaks and which we would call, in an entirely different sense, the *signs* of creation revelation, are for him the references, within concrete reality, to the existential vocation of freedom. They must remain Chifferrn, cannot impose anything directly on us, because this is contrary to what they have to reveal, viz. freedom.

They must be experienced on our part, interpretatively, but this rejects an interpretation that would precede experience; interpretation itself is part of experience. Within 'Consciousness in general', what acts as a Chiffer can be included in an act of recognition in many ways and this can also serve to enrich the form of the sign. But in this process it is not a Chiffer. The *choice* of the Chifferrn, which includes the ready following, is a matter of existence.

This choice is in the fullest sense individual and can only mean a choice for - transcendent - *freedom*. It means the opposite of arbitrariness, it has the character of religious respect for the one thing that makes man human and as such can be the only *law* for all freedom without being allowed to bear that name. For law, taken in an absolute sense, excludes freedom.

The Chifferrn are everywhere and in everything, and the existential choices (with interpretations embedded in them) are unlimited, There is thus a 'Kampf der Chifferrn'. This leads to immense limits of tension, It is not possible, [62] gens from here to survey the battlefield; this would mean putting oneself in the place of transcendence, which is impossible. "Erst wenn die Distanzierung vom Kampf sich verbindet mit der Freiheit des Hineinspringens in den Kampf, gewinnen wir die uns mgliche ganze Freiheit" ["Only when distancing ourselves from the struggle is combined with the freedom of jumping into the struggle do we gain the full freedom possible to us"] (p. 204).

The struggle is in reality a struggle of people in choosing and following the various (differently interpreted and thus generated) Chifferrn on the path of freedom ('transcendence'); it can only be decided by existential choice. There is no 'objective' end to be seen. Those who attempt this remain caught up in the endlessness of pronouncing judgements. Then an unconquerable opposition to those who want to keep the paths of freedom open arises, and here Jaspers himself also openly encounters limits. One party maintains: your firm assertion

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<sup>14</sup> In the original: Kampf der Chifferrn en.

means evading the very seriousness of your liberation; the other: you evade the truth by invoking an unobjectifiable truth of your existence. Along with a possible willingness to communicate, there is the surprise of feeling permanently misunderstood by the other. Yet, says Jaspers (p. 209), this only happens if one now wants to formulate the contradiction itself in general terms again. "Die Wirklichkeit der Menschen fügt sich aber nicht irgendeinem Schema alternativer Begriffe. Der *Mensch*, der sich zu einem formulierten Prinzip ohne Einschränkung zu bekennen scheint, *ist doch immer mehr* als das, was in solchem Akte geschieht" ["But the reality of *human beings* does not conform to any scheme of alternative concepts. The human being who seems to profess a formulated Principle without Restriction *is always more* than what happens in such an act"] (ital. v. us. , M.).

Do we detect here something of the 'being affected' that Jaspers intended to clarify in the title of his work with the term 'angesichts'?

However, we have been warned against relative optimism, [63] when Jaspers, a few pages before, rejected the theologians' claim to progress in knowledge of the foundations of faith by relegating the Pauline statement 'no one can lay a foundation other than that which has been laid' to a subservient means of battle in the undecided struggle. He would be right if he meant to deny to theology as a science the progressive opening of the knowledge of faith. But from his use of the word of Scripture as such in such a context, we only encounter the irreconcilable tension in the grounds of Jaspers' philosophising, between the anchoring of his idea of 'Reason' in what he himself calls the 'Consciousness in general' (subject of the relationship of state) and the existentialist idea of freedom as 'transcendence'. It is existentially impossible for him to see the naming of the only foundation other than as theologically fixed 'Bekenntnis', which can at most become Chiffer for an existence in its time, but could never *call it* transcendence itself.

Can Jaspers' word that man is more than he tries to formulate in a principle be taken so seriously? Can this word only be relied upon from the formulations of 'Reason' as the trajectory of the energy of freedom directed towards the idea of transcendence?

### **The path of Chiffern in the antinomian dialectical intertwining of 'existence' and 'Consciousness in general'.**

In his catalogue of Chiffern (pp. 213-384), Jaspers draws us the way they show us. He distinguishes them into Chiffern der transcendence, in which all that has been said about God plays its part; Chiffern der immanentie, speaking in nature and history; Chiffern der existentielle situations, in which the question of good and evil, salvation and calamity, is the main issue. All [64] fundamental questions, which have found their place in philosophy, from the earliest to the most modern, are discussed and in this Jaspers' book, like all his previous works, is the example of philosophising in depth, in the Western continental tradition. Where, however, we are concerned with the fundamental principle of Jaspers' philosophy 'angesichts' the faith of revelation, we want, after our confrontation so far, to turn to this subject. It now takes us to what Jaspers has called the 'Chiffer des Logos des Seins', and from there to the 'Jenseits aller Chiffern'.

In distinction from the Asian experience of being, the author says, that of the West bore pre-eminently the mark of logos in its 'ontology' (term first from the mid-17th century). Here, thought as such is already transcendence as deified pure thought, in which man participates.

There is no more mystery that cannot be solved. There are different ontologies, but the acceptance of the logos principle itself is a basic *conviction*. Again and again, in Western thought, this fundamental conviction returns in varying forms. It stems from the desire to order what is by knowing. But the question remains whether the ordered is not ultimately supported by chaos. Traces of this lie unrecognisable to observant thinking. But everywhere, albeit only through man, we also meet Reason.

That is why we can hope to work in the world after all. However, it does not allow us to arrive at a comprehensive reason. The desire for an all-embracing knowledge has frequently captivated man. However, 'Ordnung ist nicht nur Ordnung, sondern auch des nie völlig geordneten' ['Order is not just order, but order of the never fully ordered']. Therefore, the logos of being is merely Chiffer. Were we to ignore the designed [65] ontologies, we would be ignorantly entangled in its dogmatism. In existential seriousness, we have to break them in the direction of transcendence, and this is through the realisation of the 'Basic knowlegde' previously described. In it, the 'Totalwissen', which used to close itself off in ontology, becomes an unclosable 'Vergewisserung' that remains in motion. 'Das Fundamentalwissen wird zum orientierenden Wissen' ['Fundamental knowledge becomes orientating knowledge'] (p. 306). It imagines itself, not in the middle of being, but in that middle where we find ourselves.

One cannot avoid a 'Basic knowlegde'. If one tries to do so, it is there anyway, but unclearly and unsteadily. If one confidently chooses the 'Grundwissen des Umgreifenden' ['Basic knowledge of the encompassing'], one remains in the mobility of freedom. This does not lead to compelling emotions like the choice of a one-sided Chiffer; it is sober, an 'Act of Reason'<sup>15</sup>, 'Hervorbringung und Werkzeug der Vernunft' ['Production and tool of Reason']. Its *power* lies not in this knowing as such, but in the Self, which lives from it. It is like the pure light, in which there is no object yet. It can be misused as an ordering principle, but then it would no longer even speak as 'Chiffer'.

The fundamental knowing of the 'Encompassing' thus stands in the 'Reason', but works from the existential Self. It works out of and through existence, as it focuses 'vernünftig' on freedom. Gegenstandlich there is nothing to see in the doing of this *choice*. Meanwhile: the universally valid thinking subject of the 'Consciousness in general' (see p. 396) is always present wherever there is thought. It pervades joint subjectivity with its light, so that thereby "*jede Weise des Umgreifenden erst hell wird*" ["*every way of embracing first becomes light*"] (ital. v. us, M.).

A few pages later (pp. 432/33), Jaspers talks about methodological certainty in philosophising. [66] it puts us in distance from everything we experience or do with the mind ('Geist') or existentially, and only in such reflexion do we become true and free, free and therefore true.

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<sup>15</sup> *Trans.* This translates the German phrase 'Akt der Vernunft'. Mekkes also uses the German phrase 'Akt des Philosophierens' which will be translated as 'Act of Philosophising'.

This methodological thinking works through... mind (p. 436ff). However, reason can never be ordered as a critical agency above original thinking. 'Hier liegt eine Frage an den Sinn der Reflexion des philosophischen Denkens auf sich selbst' ['Here lies a question about the meaning of the reflection of philosophical thought on itself']. It turns out to be the familiar, always recurring, question to, 'answering the last questions', philosophy. The distancing reflexion should 'liberate' thinking from the reflexionless identification with itself, but reason, which wants to scrutinise the methods of this reflexion in a generally valid way, does not itself understand what actually happens in 'Thinking', which does use reason, but goes beyond it when that thinking is carried out as speculation, 'Existenz-erhellung', reading der Chiffren. Thus, this criticising body would stand under what it judges but does not understand.

Jaspers resolves the impending antinomy by declaring, that critically reflective distancing is not already created by reason, but avails itself of it, not unlike speculative thinking. 'Die methodologische Distanzierung ist ein Akt des Philosophierens selber, nicht einer bloßen Ratio, die sich überlegen dünkt' ['Methodological distancing is an act of philosophising itself, not of a mere rationality that thinks itself superior'].

Taking into account Jaspers' terminology, as it derives from his view, we are prepared to honour his intention with this statement. However, the question then shifts to the meaning of the 'Act of Philosophising'.

Jaspers' answer we find in the following confession: "Die Grenze des methodologischen Bewusstseins liegt dort, wo das Wesentliche nicht mehr objektivierend [67] unter Kriterien dieses Bewusstseins bestimmbar wird. Dieses Wesentliche ist die Transzendenz als solche, ist die Existenz in ihrer jeweiligen Einzigkeit, ist die Einheit von Einzelem und Allgemeinem des Selbstseins" ["The limit of methodological consciousness lies where the essential can no longer be determined objectively [67] under the criteria of this consciousness. This essential is transcendence as such, is existence in its respective uniqueness, is the unity of the individual and the general of selfhood"].

But with this, the tension between Reason and transcendence, Consciousness in general and existence, now presents itself definitively. And despite the predominance of existential choice as the concretisation of transcendental freedom, all the clarity of the 'Reason' created therein as a dynamic space of freedom turns out, in the end, to actually originate from the generally valid thinking of the 'Consciousness in general', which, in the service of Jaspers' supra-philosophical urge for freedom and the belief in reason, dictates the unity of the individual and the general of selfhood in a 'Act of Philosophising' in a manner that is only generally valid. Any unrepeatable 'Geschichtlichkeit' or 'Existenz', unwilling to accept this dictate, is thus placed outside the community founded by Reason. Not following faith in its general validity (i.e. of in its Dienst standing general validity of Consciousness in general) Jaspers, for his part, calls a 'Kommunikationsabbruch' from the consciousness of a truth, which fundamentally excludes other truths and must itself be branded as untruth by meaningful philosophising. Methodologically distancing reflexion does not appear to be able to 'free' Jaspers' thinking from identification with itself.

A final attempt to pose the internal philosophical problem, otherwise remaining in the line of humanising philosophy from idealism onwards, appears in Jaspers' distinction of philosophy as doctrine and philosophical thinking as inner action. As doctrine, philosophy can demonstrate and refer. It can bring horizons into the light and thence beyond 'knowing' [68] to create space through Chiffren thinking. This only means liberation from not fully conscious living. Whether from this awareness man realises freedom, he decides in his (himself) *self* (wanting to be).

Philosophical thinking as inner action has to re-establish itself each time from slipping into a contemplative attitude. Thinking one cannot 'have' anything. Thus, being existentially awake, one finds oneself in philosophy on the path of *liberation*, where one does not evade responsibility for the truth by professing a religious *content*, but accepts it in theoretical and practical communication.

Thus, philosophically, man finds himself on the road where, along the tracks of 'Reason', freedom (his individually-existent, at the same time generally transcendent freedom) meets him. In this dialectical composition it can only be a path of universal communication, on which *all those* who are serious about the truth will have to meet. On this path, in his last phase of life, Jaspers also invites the revelation believer.

### **'Transcendence' and Gegenstand der theologie.**

The reciprocal position is not difficult to construct after the above.

In Jaspers' view, for the one who believes in Christian revelation, there is only a choice of one, all other defining, 'Chiffer', the personal God of the Bible, moreover 'in the flesh' ['*leibhaftig*'] displayed in Jesus the crucified and risen one. For Jaspers' philosophical belief, we are dealing with an absolutisation of this Chiffer, whose Chiffer structure has been historically and philosophically researched and described by Jaspers beforehand (sub Chiffren der transcendence).

[69]

The philosophical faith, oriented towards the space of freedom, can see in the idea of revelation no more than 'Chiffren'. Very remarkably, Jaspers notes here (p. 483, ital. v. us. M.): '... ist zwar ein Nebengrund die Aufklärung, die auf ihrem Wege *weisz*, was sie *weisz* und nicht *weisz*. Wesentlich aber ist die vom philsophischen Glauben erfahrene Wirklichkeit der Transzendenz selber in ihrer Verborgenheit' ['... the Enlightenment is indeed a secondary reason, which in its way knows what it knows and does not know. What is essential, however, is the reality of transcendence itself in its hiddenness as experienced by philsosophical faith']. The fundamental tension seems clearly expressed.

However, Jaspers' critique of Karl Barth (p. 485 ff.), which again hits the mark against the Old Scholastic, is particularly instructive in the face of the pretence of theology. Karl Barth wrote (1957) of Jaspers' idea of transcendence: '.... jene inhaltslose, unfruchtbare, im Grunde tief langweilige sogenannte "Transzendenz", die dann statt als echtes Gegenüber, als ganz und wahrhaft Anderes, als eigentliches Draußen und Drüben viel besser als illusionärer Reflex der menschlichen Freiheit, als deren Projektion in einen leeren Raum der Gegenstandslosigkeit

interpretiert werden wird' ['... that meaningless, barren, basically deeply boring so-called "transcendence", which instead of being a real counter-liberty, a whole and true Other, a real Outside and Beyond, will then be much better interpreted as an illusionary reflex of human freedom, as its projection into an empty space of non-objectivity'].

To this Jaspers replies: 'Richtig aber ist, dass wohl die Chiffer, aber nicht die Transzendenz ein 'Gegenüber' ist. Denn als ein Gegenüber, sei es als Gegenstand des Denkbareins, sei es als Leibhaftigkeit für die Sinne, ist sie einem Denken, in dem ich lebe, in der Tat verschwunden, Denn sie würde ganz verschleiert sein in solchen Gegenständlichkeiten, ohne die sie für Barth tief langweilig ist. Für mich sind die Chiffern schwebend, ständig neu zu befragen, darin aber die Sprache von der Wirklichkeit der Transzendenz her, die die Wirklichkeit der Existenz trifft. Sie löschen nicht aus in eindeutiger Unterwerfung unter eindeutige Offenbarungsakte. Der Gedanke eines Gegenüber als 'wahrhaft Anderes, als eigentliches Drauszen und Druben' wirkt [70] im philosophischen Denken, alsob es eine Blasphemie der Transzendenz sei' [But it is true that the chiffer, but not transcendence, is an 'opposite'. For as a counterpart, be it as an object of thinking, be it as embodied for the senses, it has indeed disappeared from the thinking in which I live, for it would be completely veiled in such objectivities, without which it is deeply boring for Barth. For me, the ciphers are floating, constantly to be questioned anew, but within them the language of the reality of transcendence, which meets the reality of existence. They do not extinguish in unambiguous submission to unambiguous acts of revelation. The thought of an opposite as "truly Other, as actual Outside and Beyond" has the effect [70] in philosophical thought as if it were a blasphemy of transcendence'].

Barth has tried to correct the anticontological theologies, which may or may not have been intentionally based on the high medieval theme of nature-super-nature, by a theory of analogy embroidered on the existentialist pattern, in which, however, the identification of God and His revelation with the theological state once again forms the core. Instead of being a supernatural gift to the intellect, faith now figures as a non-committal gift of God to the theologising existence, in which the term 'theology' is meant in the broadest sense, but can nevertheless only be understood in correlation with the concept of 'Gegenstand'.

The mutual position of respectively the theological and philosophical believer does become difficult from here. For Jaspers, the term 'Gegenstand' belongs to the being level of the Consciousness in general. When we think or speak about the, together subject and object, 'Encompassing', we cannot (see Jaspers' idea of the Grundwissen) do it again other than in an objectifying way. Meanwhile, we know, that the 'Encompassing of all encompassings' in truth transcends all objectification.

From *this point* of view, is there too much to reproach Barth's theological use of the term 'Gegenstand'? Jaspers would probably accept it, taking into account a level correction (e.g. *ip.v.* the term 'Gegenstand', which belongs to Consciousness in general, the more general term of 'objectivity'), were it not for the fact that with Barth, as opposed to Jaspers' 'empty' transcendence, it is loaded with 'Corporality'. What, however, of the allegation of blasphemy in the 'Gegenüber' [Opposite, counterpart], in the 'wahrhaft Anderes, als eigentliches Drauszen und Druben' ['truly Other than actual Outside and Beyond']? How [71] does the 'Gegenüber' (Gegenstand?) relate to the 'Other' ['Anderes'], the 'Outside and Beyond'?

['Drauszen und Drüben']? How does the 'Encompassing of all Encompassings' of Jaspers relate to Barth's 'Other', which can be abstractly but never concretely objectified? Where does the horizontal (human), where the vertical (transcendent) relationship lie for both?

Barth's uncritical adoption of the term "Gegenstand" in discussion with his theology leads to the same difficulties as wherever the philosophical presuppositions of theology are critically examined. It is all the more serious against a theology that claims to have to pave the way to the existential understanding of the Word of God in Scripture.

For on the one hand: 'Der Gegenstand der theologischen Wissenschaft erlaubt es dem, der sich auf sie einlässt, *nicht*, sich ihm gegenüber zu distanzieren ... Die Frage: was er mit diesem Gegenstand anfangen solle? wurde völlig sekundär gegenüber der anderen was er denn tun solle, da dieser Gegenstand offenbar etwas mit ihm anzufangen gedacht und schon angefangen hat?' ['The object of theological science does not allow the one who engages in it to distance himself from it ... The question: what should he do with this object? became completely secondary to the other question: what should he do, since this object obviously intended to do something with him and has already begun to do so?'] (Karl Barth: *Einführung in die Evangelische Theologie* 1962, p. 85). So are we dealing here with a 'Gegenstand', a 'Gegenüber', a 'Outside and Beyond', as Jaspers thought and rejected? According to Barth's meaning, apparently not. Doch ter anderer zijde: 'Was ist Theologie? ... sie ist Wissenschaft in Erkenntnis jenes in Gottes Werk gesprochenen Wortes Gottes, Wissenschaft in der Schule der jenes Wort Gottes bezeugenden heiligen Schrift, Wissenschaft in der Bemühung um die der durch jenes Wort Gottes berufenen Gemeinde unausweichlich gestellte Wahrheitsfrage. So und nur so - im Uebrigen wirklich voraussetzungslos - erfüllt sie ihren Begriff als menschliche Logik des göttlichen Logos' ['What is theology? ... it is science in the knowledge of the Word of God spoken in God's work, science in the school of the Holy Scriptures that testify to that Word of God, science in the endeavour to answer the question of truth inevitably posed to the church called by that Word of God. In this way and only in this way - incidentally without any real presuppositions - does it fulfil its concept as the human logic of the divine Logos'] (t.a.p. pp. 58/59 ital. v. us, M.). Finally: "Wie kommt [72] die Theologie dazu, Theologie, menschliche Logik des göttlichen Logos zu sein? Antwort: sie kommt gar nicht dazu. Es kann ihr aber widerfahren, dass dieser Geist zu ihr und über sie kommt, und dass sie sich dann seiner nicht erwehrt, ... iam nur eben Folge leistet' ['How does [72] theology come to be theology, the human logic of the divine Logos? Answer: it does not come to it at all. But it can happen to it that this spirit comes to it and through it, and that it then does not resist it, ... iam just following it'] (p. 65).

Thus: theology nevertheless science, with a 'Gegenstand' ('Gegenüber') in the usual sense - not to say: a theologically-noetic sphere with an 'ontic' hereditary necessary to adaequatio against it. But: the 'truly Other', the 'actual Outside and Beyond' from elsewhere in the 'Gegenstand' of 'theology' inserted in it: 'es kann ihr aber widerfahren' ['but it can happen to her'].

In contrast to Jaspers' ascent from the horizontal subject-object relationship to the 'Umgreifende aller Umgreifenden' as Transcendence, Barth's conception descends the transcendent Spirit of God in theology. Barth has accused Jaspers' idea of transcendence of

being nothing more than a projection of an illusion in an empty space of 'Gegenstandslosigkeit'. Barth's theological Gegenstand is *present* in the actual and active engagement of the object of his activity, *the theologian*. We understand what Barth means to suggest, but not the crossing of roles in the theological 'Gegenstandsrelation', because of two and one:

Or it concerns a concrete supremacy of Transcendence over the theologian in his preoccupation with his 'Gegenstand', but then the 'Gegenüber' c.a. carries the elements of what Jaspers calls blasphemy. How can the Word of the Sovereign of Sovereigns, i.e. the nearby Word of His love, be "Gegenstand" and "Wissenschaft"?

Or we are really dealing with a science, but then it has *as its* horizon only the idea (or 'Chiffer') of the concrete fullness (Jaspers' idea [73] of the 'Encompassing'), from which it has abstracted its Gegenstand.

### **Impossibility of the dispute between Jaspers and Barth.**

In the ambiguous concept of the theological 'state' (c.q. 'object of theology'), the necessary antinomy emerges, in which a theology must entangle itself, which wants to be both a science of revelation and more than science; in other words: which wants to act scientifically about this revelation and to proclaim from it. Jaspers sees blasphemy here, because that which for himself and the theology being criticised is equally 'existence' is immanent to temporal existence and finds its untransferable responsibility there, but only in being freely given to itself by 'transcendence'. This is therefore for existence both the furthest and the closest, as the most intimate relationship of being that carries all other relations. The universally valid 'Bewusstsein überhaupt' with its 'Gegenstand' is the polar opposite of this. The 'Gegenstand' has the universally valid character of object for intellectual knowledge; as such it can, as we saw, help to open up a Chiffer but never make it a Chiffer, not even a 'Chiffer'. Reading the Chiffers is the prerogative of existence, which meets its transcendence in it, which gives it to itself and makes it free.

For the theologian, too, theology as a science belongs to temporal existence, but it derives its genesis from that which not only transcends this temporal existence but signifies its meaning. When Barth introduces the theological state of affairs as charged with divine authority and activity, the question must arise from whence they arrived at the state of affairs. [74] 'Es kann', we saw, '*ihr (theology) widerfahren, dass dieser Geist zu ihr und über sie kommt*' ['It can', we say, 'befall to *her (theology)* that this spirit comes to *her* and through *her*'] (ital. v. us, M.). The critical question then remains, however, *where* the Spirit *touches* theology. In the Gegenstand? It would be no less than magic. We have no hesitation in pronouncing, with Jaspers: 'sie (the transcendence, i.e. the revelation of the Spirit of God) wurde ganz verschleiert sein in solchen Gegenständlichkeiten' ['it (the transcendence, i.e. the revelation of the Spirit of God) was completely veiled in such objects'], namely as 'objects' for mind or senses. In the theologising existence? But then we must raise with Jaspers the question of the meaning of 'Gegenüber', of 'Outside and Beyond'. Which concepts we can no more accept than Outside and Beyond of a supernatural nature, which is not taught by the revelation of God and cannot be found by any science, even if it were theo-logy. Scientific philosophical or

theological thinking cannot reach higher than the idea of the 'Encompassing' from Jaspers' and Barth's 'Subject-Object-Split'.

Although we do not want to overlook the element of imagery in Barth's mentioned use of the term 'Gegenstand', this use of the word cannot be justified with this. The discussion on this eminently philosophically aprioric matter, in which the term in question plays the central role, will not be able to avoid a precise indication of its meaning. All the less so since Jaspers, in his structures of transcendence and Grundwissen, has challenged theology (old and new) to open up its foundations in the way described.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten, how in Jaspers' representation the concept of 'Gegenstand' is also not precisely defined in its sense and is [75] encumbered with the secondary meaning of objectivity as 'Corporality', albeit that Barth's reproach ('leere Raum der Gegenstandslosigkeit') had contributed to this.

Both, Jaspers and Barth, are linked in what for Jaspers represents the idea of Reason, as it can only be real on the substrate of the 'Consciousness in general'. 'Wir können nur in Gegenständlichkeiten sprechen' ['We can only speak in terms of objects'], says Jaspers (p. 124). 'Ungegenständliches Sprechen und Denken gibt es nicht' ['There is no such thing as non-objective speaking and thinking']. When Barth discusses theology, he assumes the Gegenstandsrelation as the emblem and structure of science.

Jaspers, meanwhile, has understood that always the thing, about which it is 'gegenständlich', exceeds the Gegenstand ('Wir sprechen von etwas, das als Gegenstand nicht das zeigt, was durch ihn gegenwärtig werden soll' '... im Gegenständlichen und im Subjekt schwingt mit ein Übergegenständliches und Übersubjektives' ['We speak of something that as an object does not show what is to become present through it' '... in the object and in the subject there resonates a super-objective and a super-subjective']). If it is about the "Umgreifende" itself, which we can also only bring to attention in "Grundwissen" in a "gegenständlichen" form, then we can only have the intention here, at the outset, "dieses Objektivierte, Vergegenständlichte rückgängig zu machen".

Barth meets this thought theologically. After his statement about theology as 'menschliche Logik des göttlichen Logos' ['human logic of the divine Logos'], quoted later (Einf. id. Ev. Th. pp. 58/59), he lets follow: 'So und nur so hat sie - von aussen gesehen tatsächlich in der freien Luft schwebend - Grund, Recht und Ziel. Die Macht in der sie existiert, ist die... *verborgene* Macht' ['Thus and only thus does it - seen from the outside, actually floating in free air - have reason, right and purpose. The power in which it exists is the... *hidden* power'].

'Von aussen gesehen' ['Seen from the outside'], i.e. seen from inside the boundaries drawn by Reason. Jaspers speaks: 'Durch das zwar falsche, aber unumgängliche Verfahren selber möchten wir uns des Umgreifenden vergewissern' ['Through the false but inevitable process itself, we want to make sure of what is being embraced'] [76] (t.a.p.). It was about the Verfahren of the transient vergegenständlichen in Grundwissen, 'unumgänglich' from the

Consciousness in general *uit gezien*, 'falschend' from the Umgreifende, which is conscious to *existence*.

Jaspers 'defends' transcendence against the inevitable approach from the Consciousness in general, Barth religiously secures scientifically acting theology by allowing its (genstandliche) 'Propositions' to be delivered up without any preconditions to the power that confronts it in the Gegenstand.

Barth secures scientifically acting theology religiously by leaving her (gegenstandliche) 'Propositions' without any preconditions at the mercy of the power that meets it in the Gegenstand.

Despite all transformation and new filling, the theological legacy of the determination of knowledge from the 'Gegenstand' (formerly the noesis from being) has been accepted, while Jaspers seems to revolt against the supremacy of the scheme. We saw once and again how he too remains subject to the fundamental motif therein by his necessary foundation of the all-connecting 'Reason' in the 'Consciousness in general'. And we could perhaps, using Jaspers' important figure of the 'Chiffer', express ourselves in such a way that under the *vigueur* of the idea of transcendence for Jaspers the Chiffern, recognised by means of the Consciousness in general, receive its meaning through existence; while with Barth the theological 'Proposition', as scientifically formed concepts, receive their Chiffer meaning through a theologically qualified 'lack of preconditions', filled by the power of divine revelation. The latter meanwhile remains opposite the theological existence in the position of (albeit over-powerful) 'Gegenstand' (cf. Barth p. 85 etc. etc.).

Clearly, this is not a name, but a rank-of-scientific. What hinders Barth in Jaspers' philosophical reasoning is the [77] refusal of any real 'gegenstandlich' character ('Gegenstandslosigkeit') in his idea of transcendence found through 'Basic knowledge'.

What Jaspers opposes in Barth's theology - and proportionately more so in old-school orthodox theology - is precisely this insistence on the idea of Gegenstand, however theologically transformed, which prevents a touch in mutual *transcendental* critique.

We have to note with regard to this state of affairs that no criticism bound by 'Reason' can be capable of bringing the transcendental boundaries *truly* into view. And we have no hesitation in attributing a relative advantage to Jaspers when he has in any case seen that even a critique bound by reason (the bond of all 'Umgreifenden') proclaimed to the 'existence' idea of freedom points above *any* 'Gegenstandsrelation' (of a universally valid Consciousness in general): "Der *Einzelne* kann nur die Denkungsart *seines* Glaubens aussprechen, wie *ich* es in diesem Buche versuche" ["The *Individual* can only express the way of thinking of his faith, as I try to do in this book"] (p. 500 ital. v. us, M.)

Whoever *wants to* continue to speak of 'Gegenstand' cannot, by any 'paradoxical' precautions, escape criticism, which has brought the sphere, Gegenstand and knowing subjectivity together, into view. In this case: whoever wants to continue to give theology the

last word, however it may be, will see his theological Proposition, of whatever content, return to the earth *from which* they were spoken.

The 'Chiffren' of creation revelation cannot be outlined by theology, which, after all, can only be creaturely. This includes the structure of science, of philosophical and theological thinking. Does it correspond to what 'Gegenstandsrelatie' [78] suggests, to what 'Basic knowlegde' thinks it has understood?

**'Basic knowlegde' cannot bring the origins into view.**

The structure of science. It is that which is accomplished for Jaspers in the 'Consciousness in general', which is put before us in Barth's theology in Gegenstands-relation. We saw how Jaspers, in order to reach 'knowledge', wants to rise above it. Thereby human reflection passes from science to philosophy and discovers on its way the Chiffren, which point in the direction of freedom. For Barth, that which he presented as a Gegenstandsrelation remains intact with the descendency from above.

Two kinds of 'Basic knowlegde' exist for Jaspers. The first shows itself in the ontologies and world views, which today belong to the great Chiffren. The second, the true, the Grundwissen of the 'Encompassing', is not a Chiffer (pp. 306/7). "Denn das Grundwissen dessen, in dem wir uns finden, ist das nie vollendete, vielmehr in der Bewegung bleibende Bewusstsein, das im Denken uns die jeweils mögliche Freiheit gibt". "Das Grundwissen ist ein Wissen, in dem sich die Räume öffnen, die Ursprünge hell werden, in dem aber noch nichts geschichtlich Konkretes, noch nicht erfüllte Wahrheit, noch nicht Existenz und Transzendenz selber sprechen" ['For the basic knowledge of that in which we find ourselves is the consciousness that is never completed, but rather remains in motion, which gives us the possible freedom in thinking'. 'Basic knowledge is a knowledge in which the spaces open up, the origins become clear, but in which nothing historically concrete, truth not yet fulfilled, existence and transcendence themselves do not yet speak'].

It is along this path of Basic knowledge proper that Jaspers' appreciation arises for the functioning of revelation according to its 'Content', in which it shows itself as an inspiring Chiffer for the faithful on their own way to the freedom of transcendence. However, the faithful themselves cannot accept it as a Chiffer, but must accept it as fulfilment-in-itself [79]. No theologian, Jaspers learns (p. 505), would be able to join the change of revelation in Chiffer; it would destroy the foundation of his believing and thinking. Jaspers replies: perhaps today's theologians cannot, "who nicht selten historische Forscher, als Theologen späte Epigonen sind. Sie halten glaubend fest, ohne in ihrer Glaubenskraft noch das Pneuma zu spüren ..." ["who are not infrequently historical researchers, as theologians late epigones. They hold on believing, without yet tracing the pneuma in their power of faith ..."]

And at this point we are going to understand threefold, namely:

1st that, according to Jaspers, only philosophical activity, carried out *by Reason* through reason, can pave the only path of freedom, i.e. that the trajectory of *movement* unilaterally gives direction to the movement of freedom and, in the philosopher's thinking itself, is its final sense-determining *norm*;

2nd that the dispute between Jaspers and the theologians must remain without prospect, since the movement of freedom in both parties appears to be equally *bound* to the one track with its inescapable station of rational 'Gegenstandlichkeit';

3rd, that Jaspers' in itself so fruitful doctrine of the Chiffren can only really start to mean something, when it is detached from the 'Subject-Object-Split' dictated by the priority of 'Reason' as a starting point of philosophical reasoning, in order to open the door both philosophically and theologically for the Pneuma that makes us alive.

The attentive reader will have noticed how between the Basel discussants the question was on the agenda, which we have continued to raise throughout - and not least by quoting this discussion itself - that of dynamics, which is the driving force of all human dynamics. How this question has [80] developed between the philosopher and the theologian from the remaining reflection within the contemporary world on human freedom versus pragmatic control tendencies. How both have not succumbed to the compromise, which, however mutually nuanced, ultimately seems to present itself with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and even Heidegger, from nearer or further away. How as a result, in their thinking, the idea of freedom, instead of more or less openly *resting* in a dialectic, acquires a hypostasis that seems to rise above the horizontal trajectories of self-sufficient thinking and is far removed from any flat-out independence of 'dialectics of the third degree'. Yes, that the dynamics of the grounds, on which our interest can only focus in the end, even acquires a name with them in "Transcendence" as bestowing freedom and in God revealing himself in hiddenness.

On the road to this freedom, man, for his part, finds himself in his existence reading and interpreting the Chiffren, or expecting the 'befallen'<sup>16</sup> in the theological Gegenstand.

However, we have shown how the hopeful indication in the direction of a truly vertical force of movement is nullified by the primary positioning of the 'Subject-Object-Split', in fact born out of the 'Consciousness in general', resp. by the fixation of that which befalls in the theological Gegenstand, i.e. in the also primary positioning of the same 'Splitting'. Thus we saw the dynamics of origin in both dissolving itself in the original dialectical relationship between *freedom* (c.q. 'Sovereignty') and 'reasonable' *bondage*.

At the beginning of our argument, we stated that in that which we then provisionally termed the dialectic between the dynamics of origin and the internal dialectic of [81] Western philosophy, the latter claims to be the *former*. That is to say, then, that no further inquiry could be made behind *this* dialectic.

We have now found this clearly demonstrated in the Jaspers-Barth discussion, a discussion which as such was enclosed by the tensions in the basic dialectical motif of the West and thus could not reach an outcome. It is now close to our hearts because it was a meeting of "philosophical faith" and revelatory faith. Both for the discussants among themselves and for us vis-à-vis them, the stumbling block lay in their mutual adherence to the dialectic of reason, which - as we have stated from the start - forms the unquestionable core of all dialectical relations, but which itself took its shape from the dialectic of Western philosophical reflection

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<sup>16</sup> Trans. This translates the German word 'widerfahren'.

that presented itself as its origin. With Barth, as in the whole Western theological tradition, it was moreover crossed by the nature-supernatural motif, which in this case produced the, in itself again dialectical, idea of 'befallen'.

Yet both one and the other wanted to rise above this 'bound' movement, and we discovered that Jaspers' opening up of 'freedom', aimed at transcendence with the help of the Chiffren, seemed to rise above the horizontal plane rather than Barth's 'Gegenstand', which secured its religious position *in* this plane along the path of 'paradox'.

That is why, before going into the content of a theoretical (if one likes: 'rational') discussion, we always first ask the question about the structure of this discussion. And since, including his 'Inner conflict', Being *in his 'transcendence'* [82] *comprises* everything for Jaspers, we think we are entitled to ask which Chiffer of this Transcendence in the structure of such thinking, in total *freedom thinking (philosophische Glaube)*, shows itself. Jaspers' freedom-thinking, meanwhile, is drawn together in the (authentic) 'Basic knowlegde' which, bound to 'Gegenstand-lichkeit', *knows*, from above, to be directed towards the never-to-be-vergegenständlichen 'All-encompassing'. Of this Basic knowledge, Jaspers says: "Das Grundwissen des Umgreifenden ist keine Chiffer" ['The basic knowledge of the encompassing is not a chiffer'] (p. 307) and we know his motivation.

The exchange of views with Jaspers will therefore have to focus again and again on Basic knowledge. And here it is not the "Fundamental operation" described that stands in the way of a mutual approach. That, like everywhere else, our thinking about the "Allumgreifende" is also a thinking "about", but in this case also knowing how our thinking cannot include this "Encompassing", but *is encompassed* by it along with everything else, we believe we have shown clearly enough, especially in considering Jaspers' opposition to Karl Barth. The problem of 'Basic knowlegde', as we have already described in relation to the 'Act of Philosophising', lies in the dialectic it contains between 'Grund' and 'Wissen', which, as we have seen, exhibits an internally antinomian tension. Jaspers has once again put his intentions sharply into words, when he speaks (p. 153) of thinking in Chiffren: 'was immer ist und geschieht, was wir selbst sind, was Transzendenz ist, alles erscheint im Spiegel des Bewusstseins überhaupt' ['whatever is and happens, what we ourselves are, what transcendence is, everything appears in the mirror of consciousness at all']. Im Spiegel. What does this mean? The expression again makes it sharply clear, that this 'mirror of consciousness' is the focal point of philosophising activity, in whatever way, incidentally, that activity may be a believing one. That [83] it could therefore never itself *be one of the Chiffren*. But it then raises the question of the real nature of the subjectivity that this mirror exploits.

The simplest information in this respect Jaspers gives us in 'Von der Wahrheit' (1947, pp. 65 ff.), in particular where he says of the relationship between Dasein and Consciousness in general: "Als lebendiges Dasein, das wir in dem Umereifenden des Weltseins sind, werden wir uns empirisch erforschbar, indem wir uns zum Gegenstand werden, sehen uns getrennt als eine in jeweils besondere Individuen zerspaltene Wirklichkeit dieses Daseins. - Als Bewusstsein überhaupt vollziehen wir als das in allem Bewusstsein überhaupt Identische die Akte des Denkens, durch die wir Identisches wissen, aber werden uns selber nicht Gegenstand.

Als Bewusstsein lebendigen Daseins sind wir in der Enge der Vereinzelung des Wirklichen gehalten, umgreifend nur als unser jeweiliges Dasein. - Als Bewusstsein überhaupt nehmen wir teil an einem Unwirklichen, aber Gultigen, der allgemeingültigen Wahrheit. Wir sind als solches Bewusstsein ein grenzenlos Umgreifendes".

[‘As the living Dasein that we are in the immaturity of world-being, we become empirically analysable by becoming an object, we see ourselves separately as a reality of this Dasein split into particular individuals. - As consciousness in general, as the identical in all consciousness, we perform the acts of thinking through which we know the identical, but we do not become an object ourselves.

As consciousness of living existence we are held in the narrowness of the isolation of the real, encompassing only our respective existence. - As consciousness in general, we participate in an unreal, but valid, universal truth. As such a consciousness, we are a ‘boundless encompassing’].

From Jaspers' thesis der ‘Inner conflict of Being’ he must speak thus, and we think we understand that the pre-scientifically existing Dasein could explore itself individually as ‘Gegenstand’, but that the subjectivity in the Consciousness in general is pushed beyond the possibilities of the individual into a universality of general validity. In both cases, the subjectivity is called ‘we’ and the lack of elucidation concerning this meaningful term can only result from the apriori-dialectic thesis of the Inner conflict of Being.

One thing is certain: this ‘we’ is not reflected in a Gegenstand of the Consciousness in general. Jaspers [84] has locally exhausted himself in description of the decisive distinction between the individual concrete character of Dasein versus the generalised and nonconcrete character of Consciousness in general, but we are left with two difficulties: *a* in Jaspers' latest book we have found that *everything* – including “what we ourselves are” – appears to us in the mirror of the Consciousness in general, in Jaspers' earlier work, that we as Consciousness in general ourselves do not become Gegenstand; *b* the expression “we”, i.c. junction of questions, is not interpreted, but brought in from the pre-scientific thinking of the philosopher in his philosophical discourses.

*We are*, albeit sharing in the ‘Inner conflict’, among other things, also Consciousness in general. Everything (‘was immer ist und geschieht, was wir selbst sind...’ [‘whatever is and happens, what we ourselves are...’]) appears in this mirror. How can this be reconciled with the statement, that precisely as Consciousness in general we find no reflection?

The ‘we’ finds its fulfilment in Reason-communication, which, however, cannot take place other than in the tension between Reason and existence, di. in the tension of the basic motif. It shows itself concretely only in the multiplicity of the human individual ‘Dasein’. The pull of universality which (with the help of Reason) finds its destination in the all-embracing ‘transcendence’, and polar opposes both Dasein and the individuality-oriented existence, is represented in the movement towards its destination by the Consciousness in general. Or rather: opposite the idea of existence, which in Jaspers' philosophy represents the religious pole of individual freedom, with Dasein as its real exponent and transcendence as its [85] ‘plenitudo’, stands realiter the controlling general validity of the Consciousness in general.

As such, it is not only the real father of all community-building Reason acts, but also of Jaspers' philosophy *as* philosophy, which Jaspers' assertion of only individual validity of his statement of faith (Der phil. Gl. angesichts der Off. p. 500, see above) polar cancels. For this reason, it must stop at being mentioned as a 'mirror', without any clarification concerning the mirroring subjectivity ('we'?). The 'Knowledge' in Basic knowledge, handling this mirror, is thus qualified in a very specific, theoretical way, it consequently determines the further quality of the 'Fundamental operation' and makes us doubt the possibility of reaching the 'grounds' in this way.

The Basic knowledge is not a Chiffer, because it is not an ontological Totalwissen, i.e. it does not produce a rounded 'Gegenstand', within which the ken-activity itself would also, wrongly, be guaranteed its place; because it must confine itself to opening up spaces and examining origins. After all, it is a Basic knowledge 'des Sichfindens im Umgreifenden'. "In der Chiffer eines Ganzen des Seins wäre der Sinn des Grundwissens verkehrt" ["In der Chiffer eines Ganzen des Seins wäre der Sinn des Grundwissens verkehrt"] (p. 308).

Jaspers does not want to know about his stotality, i.e. as a possible ontological Gegenstand. He feels the danger threatening himself in this respect as well, as evidenced by what he (p. 308) before the words just quoted: "Wurden etwa die Weisen des Umgreifenden, deren Gesamtheit sich in einem Schema, unangemessen und vorübergehend, darstellen lässt, zu einem Organismus des Seins, so wäre wieder eine Ontologie entstanden" ["If, for example, the ways of encompassing, whose totality is represented in a schema, inadequate and temporary, became an organism of being, an ontology would have emerged again"]. Jaspers believes, by the motif [86] of actual inner conflict, to have adequately secured himself against any ontologism, and in the technical sense of the history of philosophy we do not find it with him. He says of his 'Basic knowlegde', that it has fixed itself on nothing, "der Ordnung wie dem Chaos gleicherweise offen" ['equally open to order and chaos']. It is meanwhile a *knowing*, which in the mirror of Consciousness in general has identified and authorised itself; it leaves no existence free, to evade *this 'knowing'*. It does not allow the laying of a ground other than the one laid, viz. the '*Reason*'. It is for this reason that we must not ask about the Chiffer, which the *structure* of theoretical thinking might exhibit. The 'Knowledge' of the Basic knowledge is the final ground and what it cannot 'know', *cannot be known*. Against such an origin, how could a controlling, criticising, 'structure' maintain itself as a Chiffer of what this knowing would transcend?

In truth, it is not an 'ontology' like 'Totalwissen', against which a Basic knowledge must oppose within the world of thought of the philosophy of existence. Truth is about *origins*. In the 'philosophische Glaube', they lie between the positive and negative *omniscience* of Reason and the existentially free ground in transcendence, over which the philosopher retains ultimate control in his Bewusstsein.

It is therefore the absolutisation of the 'Gegenstandsrelation', the 'Vergegenständlichung', so feared by Jaspers himself, that stands in the way of a true realisation of freedom in reading the Chiffer script of the cosmos. The freedom of truth tolerates neither philosophical nor theological control, tolerates no attachment to any originality of [87] scientific or supposedly more-than-scientific 'Reason'.

The, deeply embedded in the Western philosophical tradition, Subjekt-Objekt-Spaltung obscures the view of the origins. No 'Basic knowlegde' can bring them into view.

### **Communication?**

So is Jaspers' invitation to carry out the 'Fundamental operation' a shot in the dark? We know that it aims to raise the gaze *above* the horizontal plane in a philosophically informed manner. We saw that we have no objection to the 'objectification' element it contains. We gave Jaspers' transcending appeal priority over Barth's paradoxical descending.

However, in order to do justice to the 'dialectic' between the claims of the Western dialectic of origin and the dynamics from which it too first derives its origins, we will have to respond once more to Jaspers' invitation to search for communication, tying in with the possibilities he himself envisaged, seriously accounting for his difficulties.

Two extremes are to be avoided for Jaspers in existential believing: volatilisation in abstract speculation and 'Verleiblichung' in superstition. When following the straight path, it turns out to be 'substantially' enlightened by the 'Chiffern', 'formally' assured and justified in thought by the 'Basic knowlegde'. Now that we have examined what the latter can mean for us realistically, we can hear Jaspers further. From the myths via a moral civilisation, man rises in his self-liberation to the idea of the one god, and thence to his final liberation, once [88] the one and personal god is recognised as 'Chiffer'. This last stage may be called the ascent from god to deity, from the Chiffern to there from where all Chiffern become talk, to the Truth for which thought stands still.

Then I stop taking my chiffer-god for the god that applies to all, using him for my own striving, equating him with my own reason, then I stop trying to capture the one moment of deep experience of freedom for good. Freedom is the path of liberation itself, provided it is not liberation from something, but positive liberation from an origin.

On the side of the revelation believers, Jaspers still sees some chance of communicating with Protestantism in its relative freedom. In a few individuals, the mutual inner closeness between Bible believers and people can emerge in the vein of Jaspers: "Der Glaubige auf beiden Seiten hért die Chiffern, aber in dem Ernst, der als solcher das eigentlich Menschliche ist, verbindet in Wahrheit. Der Glaubende, ob philosophisch oder auf Offenbarung sich gründend, mochte nicht streiten, aber sich mitteilen" ['The believer on both sides hears the ciphers, but in the seriousness which as such is what is actually human, in truth connects. The believer, whether philosophical or based on revelation, may not argue, but may communicate'] (p. 479).

It is not against God that Jaspers wants to turn, but against human claims to represent God in any way, No denial of God turns against God-belief, but the hidden God turns against the revealed one. "Das philosophische Bewusstsein von der Wirklichkeit der Transzendenz wendet sich gegen die Realitat der Offenbarung" ["The philosophical awareness of the reality of transcendence turns against the reality of revelation"] (p. 481). "Die Philosophie ist zeitlich früher als biblische Offenbarung, sie ist existentiell ursprünglicher, weil jedem Menschen als Menschen zugänglich, sie ist fähig, auch in der Bibel Wahrheit zu héren und sich anzueignen"

["Philosophy is earlier in time than biblical revelation, it is existentially more original because it is accessible to every human being as a human being, it is capable of hearing and appropriating truth even in the Bible"]. We continue for another moment (p. 505 ff.): "Wenn die [89] Offenbarungsrealität als Chiffer gilt, dann ist sie nicht mehr herausgehoben aus der Chiffernwelt im ganzen. Sie wäre die Chiffer, die die grenzenlose Sehnsucht des Menschen, dass Gott selbst real gegenwärtig würde, einen Augenblick gleichsam als erfüllt ansehen liesze, um sogleich in die Härte und Grösze seines geschaffenen Freiseins zurückzutreten, für die Gott unerbittlich verborgen bleibt" ["If the reality of revelation is regarded as a cipher, then it is no longer singled out from the world of ciphers as a whole. It would be the cipher that allows man's boundless longing for God Himself to become present in reality to be regarded as fulfilled for a moment, so to speak, in order to immediately return to the hardness and greatness of his created freedom, for which God remains inexorably hidden"]. "Der Philosophierende möchte die Leibhaftigkeit preisgeben, weil er muss, zugunsten dessen, was von Anfang an auch ohne Leibhaftigkeit im Glaubenden zu allen Zeiten wirksam war" ["The philosopher wants to abandon corporeality because he has to, in favour of that which has been effective in the believer at all times from the beginning, even without corporeality"].

But then Jaspers raises the curious question: "Können nicht doch in der Idee über einen Abgrund des Wirklichkeitsbewusstseins hinweg Philosophie und *Theologie*, in diesen Auslegungen des ursprünglichen Philosophierens und des Offenbarungsglaubens, sich treffen?" ["Can't philosophy and *theology*, in these interpretations of original philosophising and belief in revelation, meet in the idea across an abyss of awareness of reality?"] (ital. v. us, M.) Meanwhile, alongside and above clarity reciprocally, it is a matter of, "dass die *Kraft* des Glaubens... standhält" ["that the *power* of faith... endures"] (ital. idem). "Die beiden Glaubensweisen könnten verbunden sein in dem Bewusstsein jedes Einzelnen, selbst werden zu können in dem, was wir, mit Kategorien die Kategorien überschreitend, unangemessen ansprechen als 'Sinn', als 'Heil', als "das Bleibende im Verschwinden von allem" ['the lasting in the disappearance of everything'], als das was weder zeitlich noch zeitlos, sondern ewig ist. Es ist das, was, sei es als *Offenbarung*, sei es als Nichtwissen, die Unruhe in der Zeit erzeugt und mit ihr den Ernst" ["The two ways of believing could be connected in the awareness of each individual to be able to become himself in that which we, transcending categories, inappropriately address as 'meaning', as 'salvation', as 'the permanent in the disappearance of everything', as that which is neither temporal nor timeless, but eternal. It is that which, be it as *Revelation* or as not-knowing, creates restlessness in time and with it seriousness"]. It is that which, questioned, gives no answer, or to which an answer can only follow from the seriousness of the life-practice of 'existence', which cannot be separated from 'Chiffern' and 'Corporalities', in which "die Wirklichkeit des Schweigens der Transzendenz nie genügend, nie angemessen aufgefangen ist" ["the reality of the silence of transcendence is never sufficient, never adequately captured"].

These words of Jaspers - to use one of his own expressions: 'evocative'<sup>17</sup> 'beschworende' - show clearly [90] how serious he is about his call, against the prevailing pragmatism, for

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<sup>17</sup> *Trans.* This translates the German word 'beschworende' which could also mean 'conjuring' or 'invoking'.

humanists and Christians to reflect together, in contrast to what we readily speak about the 'presence of God' in unbelief. At the same time, however, they show how for him theology is first and foremost the body to which he appeals; indeed, more: that revelation through theology and theology speaking through revelation represent 'knowing', in contrast to which philosophical faith would in the last instance be 'not-knowing'. He even expects for a moment the connectedness of both modes of belief in every single person, who would thus experience his meaning-fullness.

Immediately afterwards, however, he pronounces his curse on the 'Ausschlieszlichkeitsanspruch' ['Exclusivity claim'] in Jesus' word "no one comes to the Father but through Me". "Erst wenn die Ausschlieszlichkeit fällt, kann der Glaube selbst in seiner Erscheinung wahr werden" ["Only when exclusivity falls can faith itself become true in its appearance"]. "Die eine, einzige, umfassende Geschichtlichkeit von allem, das wir sind und wissen, gründet sich nicht auf Offenbarung, sondern auf das im Menschen Gemeinsame, innerhalb dessen die Chiffren von Offenbarungen geschichtlich verschiedener Herkunft eine mannigfaltige Gestalt haben" ["The one, single, comprehensive historicity of all that we are and know is not based on revelation, but on what is common in man, within which the ciphers of revelations of historically different origins have a manifold form."].

Jaspers believes he has the history of the West on his side: only in the thirteenth century, as a result of human power claims, was the unity of ancient and Christian culture broken. Today, it is about regaining "der einst fraglosen Einheit durch die nunmehr bewusste Einheit der Unterschiedenen in der Kommunikation der sich immer auch abstosenden Pole" ["the once unquestionable unity through the now conscious unity of the different in the communication of the poles that always repel each other"] (p. 527). 'Pole' we ask. For Jaspers, this is no small matter and here we are compelled to agree: "Warum unsere Unruhe...? Weil die Chiffren zu uns sprechen, aber auch stumm bleiben können, so dass wir vor der Leere [91] ausser uns und in uns erschrecken - oder weil bestimmte Chiffren übermächtig werden und alle anderen verdunkeln - vor allem aber, weil erst im Kampf der Chiffren die Tiefen des Grundes sich zeigen, in denen Existenz auf Transzendenz bezogen ist und die Führung des Lebens gefunden wird" ["Why our restlessness...? Because the ciphers can speak to us, but they can also remain silent, so that we are frightened by the emptiness outside us and within us - or because certain ciphers become overpowering and obscure all others - but above all, because it is only in the struggle of the ciphers that the depths of the ground are revealed, in which existence is related to transcendence and the guidance of life is found."].

### **The priority of 'knowing' in Jaspers' dialectic**

We for us still ask for the movement that encompasses everything, for the dynamism on which all dialectics, from the most profound to the most pragmatic, depend, for the authenticity of dialectics as 'origin'. In the development of Western philosophy, we could hardly find a closer connection than with Jaspers, who, for his part, also puts communication first.

Jaspers has touched us deeply in the development of his theory of the 'Chiffren', He has touched us deeply when he speaks of the majestic and disturbing silence of Transcendence,

of the possibility that the Chiffern, despite the most 'orthodox' theology and reasoned philosophy, can remain 'mute'. We remind ourselves of the Master's word: no other sign will be given to this generation than that of the prophet Jonah.

We are, with Jaspers, ready to listen to the speech of the signs.

We have realised that it is easy to argue with the theologians, to whom Jaspers repeatedly turns in the first instance, about thoughts of biblical revelation. But this does not affect him, nor anyone else. They cannot become Chiffern for him, and he realises very well that for those who claim the contrary of themselves, they may as well remain mute [92] as Chiffer. The Chiffern first start speaking from the (c.q. alleged) origin. Therefore, even in our conversation with Jaspers, as we have now shown several times, it is all *about* the origin. And for his part, he does not want it to be otherwise.

Meanwhile, in what must be Jasper's origin, we have found 'dialectics'. Dialectics, however, if they are to meet the requirements set for them in philosophy, must end in synthesis. With Jaspers we have seen this standard set, but we have seen it broken in the unconcealed priority of '*knowing*' in 'Basic knowlegde'. Jaspers' 'transcendental' reflection has cast its anchor in knowing, in knowing the impersonal, non-temporal, non-concrete, 'Consciousness in general' as the only 'real' core of Reason. And this Reason turned out to be the trajectory along which the 'movement', the dialectical dynamic of freedom, moved. In other words, the non-knowing of freedom is founded in the knowing of the apriority of the rational Subjekt-Objekt-Spaltung, as this duality primary shows itself not in Dasein or on any of the other levels of the zerrissene Sein, but in the theorising 'consciousness'. And this is, including, of any theo-logising consciousness, the consciousness of man from here below - 'whose breath is in his nostrils'.

After Jaspers' sharp requisition against 'den Katholizismus' in his 'Von der Wahrheit', which brought him the accusation [93] of insincerity in his invitation to communication, he clarified his intention in his latest book. With the revelation believers, he feels he stands in the face of the 'supremacy' of transcendence and connected in yearning for freedom. He knows that from compromises, as they have been tried by an orthodox-worldly church, nothing can be expected in sincerity, contrary as they are to any existential seriousness. 'Welche' ['Which'], he asks, "sind die gemeinsamen Voraussetzungen gegenseitiger Anerkennung?" ['are the common prerequisites for mutual recognition?'] (p. 533) Noteworthy is the answer: "Der Offenbarungsglaubige muszte aus der Tatsache, dasz die Mehrheit der Menschen ihm nicht folgt, die Méglichkeit erschlieszen, dasz das, was fur ihn absolut, weil Offenbarung Gottes selber ist, nicht fur alle Menschen *verbindlich* sei. Er darf verkundigen, aber nicht erwarten, dasz die Andern seinem Glauben folgen" ['The believer in revelation should deduce from the fact that the majority of people do not follow him the possibility that what is absolute for him, because it is God's revelation itself, is not *binding* for all people. He is allowed to believe, but not to expect others to follow his faith'] (t.a.p., italics, v. us, M.).

Even the philosophical believer, losing sight of the limits of his thinking, can get lost by thinking, "Offenbarung sei absolut unmdglich, weil sie fur thn nicht méglich ist" (id.). "Fur beide haben ihre je eigenen Voraussetzungen etwas fur sie Unwiderstehliches". ['Revelation is absolutely impossible because it is not possible for them' (id.). 'For both their own

presuppositions have something irresistible for them']. But then over these, subjectivising the norm, comes the refereeing decision: 'Es bedarf der ganzen kritischen Energie *der Vernunft*, um in der eigenen Unbedingtheit die Grenzen zu sehen und festzuhalten' ['It takes all the critical Energy *of Reason* to see and hold on to the limits in one's own unconditionality'].

"Konnen beide im Dasein zusammenwirken, ohne unwahrhaftig zu werden, ohne Hintergedanken?" ['Can both co-operate in existence without becoming untruthful, without ulterior motives?'], Jaspers' concluding question.

He gives the answer himself in the last paragraph of his last work<sup>18</sup> as he believes it can only read: "Ursprunglich verschiedene Weisen der Lebenspraxis und des zu ihnen gehérenden Glaubens schlieszen [94] sich in der Tat aus: sie kénnen nicht im selben Menschen verwirklicht werden. Sie schlieszen sich aber nicht aus, wenn sie durch verschiedene Menschen in der Welt sich begegnen. Jede Geschichtlichkeit kann die andere in ihrem existentiellen Ernst lieben und sich ihr in einem Ubergreifenden verbunden wissen" ['Originally different ways of practising life and the faith that belongs to them are indeed [94] mutually exclusive: they cannot be realised in the same person. But they are not mutually exclusive when they meet in the world through different people. Each historicity can love the other in its existential seriousness and know itself to be connected to it in an overarching way'].

"In einem Ubergreifenden" ['In an overarching']. This is the term, which connects us most intimately with Jaspers and separates us most deeply from him. "Es bedarf der ganzen kritischen Energie der Vernunft" ['All the critical energy of reason is needed'], was the referee's verdict on the mutually subjective presuppositions.

We have long known what 'Reason' is for Jaspers: "Alle Weisen des Umgreifenden, im Sein selbst umgriffen von der Transzendenz, werden in uns umeriffen vom Band aller Weisen des Umgreifenden, der Vernunft" ['All ways of embracing, embraced in being itself by transcendence, are embraced in us by the bond of all ways of embracing, reason'] (p. 127).

We have followed with Jaspers the trajectory of movement of Reason in its direction on transcendental freedom. We found on that trajectory the 'Basic knowlegde' and the all-reflecting mirror of Consciousness in general, without whose 'intellect' Reason does not take a step. The road to freedom is a road of reason, the trajectory of movement *determines* the nature of movement. We have repeatedly come up against a dialectic that does not allow for a synthesis, fundamental and supra-philosophical, between *existential freedom* fulfilling itself in transcendence and rational *universality*.

**With Jaspers, the ground (origin) dialectic is encompassed by reason.**

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<sup>18</sup> I.e. his so far last in the development of his fundamental thoughts.

We are now confronted *in the last instance* with the question of dialectics as the deepest ground for movement. It will prove to be more far-reaching than the discussion we have just had.

[95] In this discussion we have already reviewed the facets of Jaspers' believing and thinking, and we did not want to separate the two as he did. With him, we have focused thinking on what points and goes beyond thinking, we have allowed ourselves to be addressed by his Chiffern. We came up against the question of whether or not Basic knowledge, i.e. authentic philosophical thinking, which in Jaspers' sense elevates itself to faith, the belief of existence in knowing oneself to be freely given by transcendence, is Chiffern. We end - confronting ourselves with Jaspers' just-revealed statement about Reason as the encompassing that encompasses *in* us all that is encompassing - with the question, critical to us, following the invitation at the end of his work (see above).

After all, what is the 'Overarching'<sup>19</sup>, in which, respecting all honest differences, we could know ourselves bound? Is this a transcendence that, beyond all philosophical and theological distinctions, *gives* us one-sidedly from itself to ourselves in freedom? But then the communication is there and need not be helped along the way by a Basic knowledge. However: like Heidegger's 'Leitfaden', discussed earlier, Jaspers' is also attached and fastened in *vernunftfied* subjectivity. It is only *Reason*, which, in the mirror of Consciousness in general, can bring the freedom referred to by Jaspers into view. The 'orbit' remains in a dialectical relationship to the *origin* of the liberating movement that cannot be synthesised. There remains *a question* behind this dialectic, the question of the *norm* of 'final discussion', It will not be able to be referred back to the dialectic of freedom and rationality again, because this was a final *answer* on the part of Karl Jaspers. An answer, [96] to which no one can deny humanistic philosophy, which went as far as it could *go* in Jaspers' philosophy, a final answer. Thus, asking the question on our part nevertheless also implies an answer, which in this case philosophically can also only be the last.

The yardstick of rationality does not bring transcendence into view. The trajectory of its 'Basic knowlegde' does not reach freedom. Existence cannot decipher through it the message of the 'Chiffern'.

The discussion with Jaspers dramatically confronted us with the core problem and fundamentally Christian philosophy and from there with that of our attitude within the Westernised world of culture.

It was put forward by Jaspers as a philosophical problem and accepted and discussed by us in that capacity. But it was not isolated to him in its philosophical sense any more than it was to us. This is *impossible* for a philosophical problem as such. Since the mid-18th century, the time when philosophy in the West was a matter for the 'learned' world has largely passed. From the very beginning, the whole thrust of our reflections, from which we have come to speak about the relationship between fundamental dynamics and supposed dialectics of origin, has been oriented towards real life. We even came to know the currently dominant

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<sup>19</sup> *Trans.* This translates the German word *Übergreifenden*.

philosophy of life and worldview as a pragmatist one, in which expression the term 'pragma' is praegnant. The philosophical thinking remaining within that philosophy of life turned out [97] to be only an exponent of the all-embracing *attitude* to life.

But even in the times when such a link could not be pointed out so directly, it still existed. After all, philosophising is one of the expressions of the full, 'practising', life. We will have to see what meaning it has and what place it occupies there. But it lives in a decided and decisive way from a central insight, from which all life takes its direction, the life that shapes philosophy and is in turn shaped by it. The Marxists made this very clear to Jaspers in particular, when Sartre, in his *Critique de la Raison dialectique*, called him the philosopher of the 'descending class'.

Sartre's philosophy, moreover, by the strict standards of the communist and Anglo-Saxon world of pragmatism, falls under the same judgment, as a futile attempt at reflection. For our part, however, we have tried to make clear that between pragmatism and 'contemplative' philosophy there can only be a *polar*<sup>20</sup> contradiction, in which both hide their inner practical basic dialectics in mutually opposite ways behind, respectively, one-sided practical, including special-scientific, mastery of '*material*' objects, and theoretical reflection on the *subjectivity present* in their objectifications.

For us, the way in which Jaspers implemented this theoretical reflexion turned out to be extremely important, since he did not hesitate to carry it through to the borders where, in our conviction, the call of transcendent Truth is heard. We felt we were faced with a choice in the 'dialectics' of the origins that had been raised from the start, and the question of the end of the possibilities of dialectics presented itself definitively.

Jaspers too had seen the question lying around; he had raised it [98] in the problem of 'Basic knowlegde'. And answered her by a *choice*. This choice had two aspects. It was choice vis-à-vis a merely horizontal dialectic on the one hand, vis-à-vis the norm en transcendental Truth on the other. In the first choice: we took his side. But this did not mean that we adopted the basis from which he had raised his choices. This basis was the indisputable priority of the 'Subject-Object-Split' and was thus already charged with the whole legacy of the autonomy of 'reason'. The meaning of this inheritance, about which we have elaborated extensively before and in the foregoing, has become increasingly clear in the development and related debate of Western philosophical thought, for those who had not previously pledged their hearts to this autonomy belief. The tension between positivist pragmatism and philosophy of existence, although the latter is dutifully ignored by the former, has finally shed the sharpest light on it.

Jaspers accepted the inheritance as indisputable, but as a great and experienced thinker came up against the same problems that Dooyeweerd had laid at the feet of the Kantian cogito in the first run-up to his transcendental critique and which had proved impossible to solve from Husserl's turn back to Descartes. Moreover, for Jaspers, unlike his predecessors, the problem carried the sharp sting of the irrefutability of the *free* existential *decision*. For Husserl, the

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<sup>20</sup> I.e. itself a contradiction which, now in the practical grounds and at the deepest level, shows the dialectic of the basic humanist motif broken forever and thus the final crisis of the West.

teleology of actual reason was, without question, identical with the teleology of freedom. For Jaspers, the tension was there and he openly made it the origin of his philosophising.

Our agreement in the counter-choice with Jaspers' first [99] decision was thus the opposite of acceptance of his choice-basis. We *reject* the priority of Subject-Object-Split, and equally for pre-theoretical and theoretical thinking.

If in his second choice - vis-à-vis ancient and contemporary philosophy - he once again finds us on his side, this agreement remains entirely limited by the proven ground antinomy. We have already said that we do not want to deny the interlocutor any right to choose his origin. He, for his part, will not be able to understand our talk about *fundamental* antinomy, because for him "antinomy" is in its sense determined by "Reason", which puts reason in its service, and for us this "Reason" is precisely included in fundamental antinomy and plays its role.

After all that we have said about Jaspers' idea of 'Basic knowlegde', we can say, using this 'key' concept, that this Basic knowledge too, appreciated in all its philosophical depth, has its value for us only in Chiffer's place and - if lifted above it - any answer to the question of its meaning must remain as guilty as, for Jaspers, the exposition, which in his opinion Barth gave on the sacramental signs.

If Basic knowledge could be ranked among the Chiffern, then, as we have already said, communication would be realised, because then 'transcendence' would speak freely and await our free response. Jaspers' doctrine of the Chiffern, already highly valued by us in relative terms, could be given its full force and a true counter-position to the pragmatism of the time would be given. However, without the negation of the priority of Subject-Object-Split, without the [100] true and complete inclusion of the spectator's stand within the rules of play of the great game of the deepest contemplation of life - to which the philosophy of existence so emphatically thought to call - the agreement in sincerity is not possible. An unconditional capitulation of Reason - theologically and philosophically - to 'transcendence' is the first demand, nay the first *invitation*, from upwards, and only along this path will Reason 'preserve its life' and existence know itself to be freely given to itself.

The doctrine of Basic knowledge followed from that of the Inner conflict of Being and this one from the inherently irreconcilable tension between reason-boundness and existential freedom in rational philosophising about freedom.

For our part, we accept Jaspers' invitation. Angesichts', it may not have been uttered in vain by one of the last and deepest philosophers of reflection of dying humanism. We can only hope that we have sufficiently accounted for the seriousness of our intentions in the foregoing.

The 'Basic knowlegde' was knowing and not-knowing concerning the ground. It was a knowing and not-knowing in the mirror of the Consciousness in general. The boundaries of knowing and not-knowing were clarified through the intervention of this mirror. Is the mirror pure? With this question we are not referring to any possible intrinsic defect, but to the mirror as such, whose relation to its user ('we') we could only get a glimpse of along the fault line of

'Inner conflict'. Above all, the mirror reflects the problem of origins and the ground antinomy arising from it.

It is not, as Jaspers supposes, an attachment to 'Corporality' with corresponding reproach of [101] 'Gegenstandslosigkeit', it is not a wanting to see the Basic knowledge 'filled', which separates us from him at the root. It is his elevating that Basic knowledge above the rank of Chiffer that makes the 'angesichts' so serious for us.

Behind the dialectic of Basic knowledge, for Jaspers there is no going back. And consequently it should be clear that in the conversation theology can help neither him nor us. It is the mirror of Consciousness in general, which not only stands between him and us, but perhaps rather separates us from a theology, which wants to point out the origins from its catheder.

The 'Reason'. The 'existence', which knows itself to be bestowed.

The former is indispensable for Jaspers to get the latter into focus. And so it is throughout the philosophy of existence, even where it rejects Jaspers' way, whether through screens of 'metaphysics' or not; so it has been for the whole of Western philosophy, even where both terms were used in seemingly entirely different senses or their Jaspersian content was placed and interpreted in entirely different ways.

What can be objected to such order of things? There is *nothing* rational to object to it, as long as one thinks one has to question "reason" about it. It remains, however, despite every attempt to purify its concept of subjectivism and individualism, to silence its name or to accommodate it elsewhere, or to elevate it openly to the throne as the universal, human reason, i.e. albeit in its furthest expansion, the distinctive mind of man.

But it was the philosophy of existence that threw us back onto the priority of 'being there'. Did not Jaspers (p. 130, we already saw it), after pointing out [102] Hobbes's wonder at *appearing* as the first thing, make the statement: 'Dieser *Grundtatbestand*, dasz etwas erscheint (oder anders: sich zeigt, *sich offenbart*, da ist, Sprache wird), ist, so gewisz er gegenwartig ist, so sehr im Ganzen das Geheimnis'. ['This *basic fact*, that something appears (or in other words: shows itself, *reveals itself*, is there, becomes language), is, as certain as it is present, the mystery as a whole'] (ital. v. us, M.)?

Immediately, however, he starts from there, pointing out the only legitimate way to know the 'miracle' in the Basic knowledge, without which we cannot be placed in the uncontrollable space 'aller Weisen des Umgreifenden'. And only 'revelation-belief' can be spoken of as empirical reality, not 'revelation' as such. (p. 34). This can only be Chiffer for philosophy.

So for Jaspers, there is a 'Basic fact'<sup>21</sup> and there is a 'Basic knowlegde'.

The 'Grundtat file' is, that something 'reveals itself'. In freedom. To us.

However, it can only be understood and thus become truly revealed through the inner organ of revelation of 'Reason', which encompasses everything in us. It provides us with the revelatory dogmatics of Jaspers' philosophical Glaube, written *for all* as the only tenable

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<sup>21</sup> Trans. This translates the German word 'Grundtatbestand'.

centre of communication. Doch ter anderer zijde: "Der Einzelne kann nur die Denkungsart seines Glaubens aussprechen, wie ich es in diesem Buche versuche" ['The individual can only express the way of thinking of his faith, as I try to do in this book'] (p. 500).

[103] Of what he called 'revelation faith', Jaspers said that, according to such revelation itself, it was only available to those who had received the grace for it. Similarly, Vernunftglaube, in its unreconciled tension with the appeal of 'transcendence' in the revelatory 'Basic fact', turns out to be accessible and acceptable only to those who know the ways of 'knowing' and of non-knowing through their 'Basic knowlegde'.

For them, the Basic knowledge cannot be a Chiffer, because it is only through the Basic knowledge itself that the Chiffers of Transcendence are unlocked. To this end, it is competent because it is born of 'Reason'.

The path to the mystery of the 'Basic fact', to knowing oneself connected in the 'Overarching'! Is it a path on which "knowing" and "not-knowing" *are known* by "knowing the ground"? Or is it a path of *dependence* on the Secret, on which the philosophically deserving figure of 'Basic knowlegde' becomes 'Chiffer' with the whole of philosophy, since it too only *appears as 'that which appears'* in the Basic fact?

#### **Jaspers' dialectical idea of origin versus the desired communication of freedom.**

For Western man it means a 'Fundamental operation' in the *deepest*<sup>22</sup> sense, to subject his 'free' knowing and not-knowing to freedom, to make it dependent on its disposal. Insofar as he takes the path of Reason, the oldest and seemingly only one pointed out to him, he certainly cannot rise above the level shown by Jaspers. But there his will to transcend in the direction of free origin is inexorably halted in the dialectic of freedom and reason that can no longer be 'ubergreifend'.

[104] How can such a 'dialectic' be avoided? Is man, even in his will to transcend, not bound to all norms which determine the meaning of his existence, and certainly not least those which give meaning to his differences? Has not philosophy always rightly also spoken of 'practical reason'?

All this is true, but the miracle is precisely that he is bound by it. Against this, modern pragmatism must rebel fiercely, and it tries to evade its dependence by turning the binding norm into an instrument of control in its own hands.

Jaspers has not digressed, he less than any other<sup>23</sup> existential philosopher. He has explicitly put the question of the norm in front of his eyes, yet it continues to point beyond itself, forcing us to a final question: does the norm for philosophising Reason proceed from the – free –

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<sup>22</sup> Heidegger's 'suggestion' that 'Thinking' as a contemplative 'action' is ultimately directed from transcendent Being, whereby 'freedom' would indeed 'dispose' of philosophical knowing and not-knowing, in no way eliminates the fundamental dialectic, of course, since the philosopher's thinking has appropriated the thinking freedom from thoughtful Being. The consequence is evident in theology, which Heidegger's freedom of thought applies to the God of Holy Scripture, under the control of theo-logical systematics.

<sup>23</sup> See previous note.

transcendence, towards which, after all, Reason, through all Inner conflict, wants to show the way to existence; is it thus a 'law of freedom'; or is it the norm proclaimed by Reason itself, which, if followed, will show transcendence, so that and because, only in this way, can it be encountered existentially?

Jaspers justified and formulated his response to this point in his treatment, discussed by us, of the reflective methodological distancing in the 'Act of Philosophising', which would only avail itself of the Consciousness in general.

As we thought we showed on the spot, he failed to eliminate the antinomy that spanned the dialectic of origin.

Nevertheless, he had touched on a weighty point and it turned out to be the 'Inner conflict', born of the basic dialectic, [105] which stood in his way, in the 'act of philosophising', of putting the distinctive consciousness in the right place and making it serve freedom.

For the *Act*<sup>24</sup> is accomplished by man in his totality. Jaspers broke down totality in inner conflict. He thought he should do this because he rightly found that totality cannot be an (ontological) 'object', since it comprises subjectivity and objectivity together. However, we have repeatedly raised the question of the right of aprioric 'Split'. From this Split there is, as we noted when considering his discussion with Barth, thinking, no other way to overcome the Split than the one pointed out by Jaspers, insofar as one does not want to keep going back and forth in a residual, ultimately semi-mythological, phenomenologism or turn into a ditto being hypostasis.

The idea of inner conflict appeared, as we saw regularly, within Jaspers's transcendental intention, now imposed by the actual priority of reason in his philosophising, from which 'transcendence' is thus designated as an idea of (existential) fulfilment. It can only give itself to the reason-believer, but, according to this idea of reason, never more than in idea. In the 'existential decision' it does not rise above the position of idea of 'practical reason'. Here lies, from Sartre's point of view, in his practical reproach mentioned above a non-negligible truth.

In his description of the totality of the 'Act of Philosophising', we are happy to concur with Jaspers in his statement (p. 436): 'Die methodologische Distanzierung ist ein Akt des Philosophierens selber, nicht einer bloßen Ratio, die sich überlegen dünkt' ['The methodological distancing is an act of philosophising itself, not of a mere ratio that dubs itself superior']. We [106] know that he followed this rule stringently. And we gladly follow him, taking into account the fundamental dialectics discussed, when he goes on to say: 'Die Grenze des methodologischen Bewusstseins liegt dort, wo das Wesentliche nicht mehr objektivierend unter Kriterien dieses Bewusstseins bestimmbar wird' ['The limit of methodological consciousness lies where the essential can no longer be determined objectively under the criteria of this consciousness']. But then follows the other statement, which leads us into the junction of the dialectic of origin: "Dieses Wesentliche ist die Transzendenz als solche, ist die Existenz in ihrer jeweiligen Einzigkeit, ist die Einheit von Einzelem und Allgemeinem des Selbstseins" ["This essence is transcendence as such, is

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<sup>24</sup> *Trans.* This translates the German *Akt*.

existence in its respective uniqueness, is the unity of the individual and the general of selfhood"].

Here transcendence is more than idea. It is animated (if one wants: filled) idea, filled namely with (animated by) that which represents man's only radical being: existence in its only possible 'Uniqueness', its true 'Selfhood'. However, presenting a philosophy among human beings, on the developmental line of and within the Western community, ipso facto excludes solipsism. Against the, especially in the pragmatizing world, overpowering 'Encompassing' of 'objectivity' (Welt, Gegenstand), the As existence isolated 'existence' has to maintain itself in that which brings all existence to fulfilment: "die Einheit von Einzelem und Allgemeinem des Selbstseins" ["the unity of the individual and the general of selfhood"]. Yet the general in the idea of transcendence remains outside the inspiration by the 'Selbstsein' and is only generated by Reason. Thus, Jaspers' transcendence, as the only forum for the communication of existences originally decisive in solitude shows, instead of unity, the real unbridgeable and foundational dialectic of self-being and generality, that is here: of freedom and universally valid 'Reason', the Reason of the 'Act of Philosophizing'.

Yet we go very far in our endorsement of Jaspers. [107] We fully accept that he *does not want a complacent 'ratio' to dominate*. Yet this is not at issue. It is about *unlocking* that ratio in *direction* on transcendence. And it is precisely *in* Jaspers' transcendence, as a result of the process of opening up towards it, that the aforementioned dialectic reveals itself, which has led reason onto the complacent track. The decisive question was therefore from where *the 'Act of Philosophizing'* originated, from where it took in its resident dialectics. With this question, the dialectical circle of the inner conflict des Seins closes and communication with those who reject the dialectical origin is out of the question.

Only one question now remains legitimate, yet it urges itself forcefully: which was the *existential* choice in favour of Reason as dialectical partner of origin in philosophizing?

Jaspers knows only one alternative to this behind all choices, but this means, as we saw earlier, in the face of philosophical faith 'Kommunikationsabbruch', and thus 'falsehood' (p. 437).

If, on this critical point, we seek to approach him as closely as possible, via a figure related to him as much as possible, i.e. Kierkegaard, who is evoked by himself as an example of a Christian believing existential dialectician, we find in Jaspers, first of all, the rejection of the *content* of Kierkegaard's faith, obviously with the associated dialectic of the absurd for him. Yet in addition, the radical acceptance of his persistent choice (p. 516): "Kierkegaard folgen wir nicht.... Aber die Verwerfung für mich ist nicht die Verwerfung an sich. Sollte Kierkegaard eine mögliche Wahrheit getroffen haben? Dann aber nur für den, der auch die Konsequenzen verwirklicht". ['We do not follow Kierkegaard... But the condemnation for me is not the condemnation itself. Should Kierkegaard have hit on a possible truth? But then only for those who also realise the consequences']. Reason by no means forbids, on the contrary [108] it commands, to follow the *consequences of existential choice*. The existential choice itself is a matter of strictly personal existence and sacred to everyone, including Jaspers. "Um diese Entscheidung (i.e. by Kierkegaard) ist nicht herumzukommen. Es gibt kein Mittleres, Halbes"

['There is no getting around this decision (i.c. by Kierkegaard). There is no middle ground, no halfway house"].

It is the transcendental trait, which connects Jaspers with Kierkegaard. It is the 'connecting' Reason, which separates him from Kierkegaard: 'Kierkegaard folgen wir nicht, wenn er den einen Zug - die Menschwerdung Gottes - für das Wesen des Ganzen erklärt'...

Jaspers does not follow Kierkegaard on the decisive point of the struggle for transcendence. He cannot follow him because 'Reason' does not allow the idea of the 'Allumgreifende' to be filled, as we have just seen, other than with the dialectic of the unity of self and generality, of existential autonomy and 'vernünftige' generality. Any other filling would mean objectification, 'vergegenständlichen', and thus be out of transcendence.

For us, however, this idea of transcendence itself remained utterly dependent on the 'Act of Philosophising', which, according to its two poles of existential choice and self-controlled thinking, is inevitably led to dissolution and therefore cannot lead to the founding of communication. After all, while Reason may encompass everything in us, existence is, also for Jaspers, the decisive agency, and will ultimately, in its ascent to selfhood, seek the path of communication of free existences *in freedom*.

The true situation in Jaspers' philosophising, then, is this, that against the threats of a nihilistic irrationalism he wishes to see autonomous existential decisions normed by Reason and thus help maintain the nexus of humanity.

[109] That is also why Jaspers can appreciate the pursuit of an independent and personally responsible decision towards God in (the 'révolte' of) Christian faith, insofar as it goes up against the powers of this world, including the ecclesiastical hierarchies. It must yield as soon as its radically existential decision turns against the supremacy of 'Reason'. Jaspers does not accuse Christianity of thoughtless acceptance; on the contrary, he praises its *thinking* revelation faith. However, this allowed its transcendental orientation, i.p.v. by the open dialectical Reason, to be determined by what could only have served as Chiffre and for the Consciousness in general to be 'Gegenstand', an 'embodied' ['*leibhaftig*'] event in concrete human history.

### **The facet of discussion with K. Jaspers**

We engaged with Jaspers for quite some time for three reasons:

1st He addressed to Western Christendom the most profound challenge and invitation. To these, however, we directly responded only to a certain extent, because

2nd The litigation at issue should far and away be placed on its proper basis, whereby, before the content of the *insights* can be discussed, the place and competence of the acting bodies should be tested within its structural coherence. We should be very grateful to Jaspers for preparing such useful 'material' in this unique way and at such close quarters, but the dispute itself takes place on a broader plane than a specific discussion with Jaspers' philosophische Glaube would suggest.

3rd After the hoped-for clarification of these relations, as far as Jaspers' philosophy is concerned, [110] in particular his teaching on the meaning of the Chiffren will prove to be a point of reference of high importance.

The 'Chiffren' are thus 'objectivities', which manifest themselves on all levels of 'zerrissene' Being vis-à-vis the subjectivity occurring there, but receive their Chiffer sense only in the engagement of existence with transcendence.

The 'Basic knowlegde' required for the completion of the 'Fundamental operation' makes us realise that the 'Subject-Object-Split' in the latter relation simultaneously binds existence within its 'horizontal' concerns and is the structural basis of its choice of freedom.

In our critique we have tried to show that knowing oneself freely given by transcendence can only be guaranteed - i.e. known - for the 'existing' human being in the way described by Jaspers *by virtue of* the 'Act of Philosophising', which is the accomplishment of the 'Act of Philosophising' together with the philosopher. In other words, the 'philosophische Glaube' believes from philosophy (as described by Jaspers).

From his discourse we have noticed, that he constantly sees the supposed interlocutor believing from (Christian) theology. If this element could be dropped, then even the (hitherto Christian) cult would show the true Chiffren of transcendence and the desired communication would be there. Hence Jaspers' homage to Kierkegaard to the limits of his faith *prescriptions* and his rejection of Barth in his reproach of 'Gegenstandslosigkeit'.

For Jaspers, 'Reason' is the bright light, which lifts the 'Signen' out of the 'gegenstandliche' shell and makes them ready for Chiffren of freedom. Within the sphere of [111] theological reason, they must chill in the shadow the 'Gegenstandlichkeit' as a sign.

When we look at this presentation of the state of affairs, we find ourselves, with Jaspers, on a spiritual battlefield that is more than just a scene of conversation between him and the Christian revelation faith. We meet the whole drama of Western spiritual development in the way we thought we had to describe it at the beginning. However, we meet it in its focal point.

That we are in the focal point comes out in the hopeless dialectical confrontation of the unrepeatable horizontal reality and the transcendental appeal. Whoever wants to accommodate the latter from the former must fall back - philosophically or theologically - into the dialectic of the horizontal plane. Those who think that the appeal from above paradoxically intrudes into earthly reality from outside, are already mistaken about the *reality character* of their contemplation as such.

Gone are the days when theology could experiment with an internal purification process by shuffling myth and meaning, or when philosophy, through 'engagement' or 'Absprung' in world events, could stave off the accusation of 'metaphysics'.

The *pragmatist* 'engagement' has thoroughly eliminated anything that might still want to sign up to this surrender. The timid 'countermoves', which here or there are undertaken from logic against logic (rightly so, incidentally), are rejected only by negation. And every theology that

adapts to the humanist-religious dialectic through self-purification falls with it, in equal time and manner.

We therefore already see today attempts to construct a 'supernature' in the [112] horizontal dialectical plane itself, in which both logic-like notions from the neo-positivist camp and historicising ones from what remains of philosophy of existence for that purpose are to provide the believer with a cultural rest.

The way in which Jaspers focuses on the questions of Western culture, currently in a state of dissolution, which we provisionally share with him as the tension between its horizontal and transcendental dimension, confronts us directly with the internal questions of competence of 'thinking'. And its answer depends on understanding the dynamis of creation origins.

In the history of Western culture, this last question has concretised into the question of the mutual relationship between pre-theoretical and theoretical thinking. This does not mean that this concretisation replaces the aprioric question behind it; however, even the formulation of the question about the mutual relationship of both types of thinking cannot be understood by the majority of Western intellectuals, because for them the questioning *ends* in the origin dialectics of thinking.

More than once, we have drawn attention to the fact that within the Western cultural tradition, the standard for the discernment of thought in all its forms lies in the idea of the completion of thought as 'telos'. In the initial stage of reflection, this telos was clothed with divine dignity, which, however, only became *real* in the *contemplative* philosopher.

As the historical development made the counter-pressure of the 'Status' more and more palpable, the human telos-idea took over the position of the old 'deity' in different ways, until pragmatist methodo-logism also made this line in the practising of [113] attainments expire. However, even this does not take away from the fact that the question of fundamental dynamis had to be answered here. And that, since anything other than autonomous thinking was inconceivable, it was answered in the sense of theoretical dialectics of *origin*. Only the reflection on autonomous subjectivity now hides itself in extremely rationalised method reflection. Meanwhile, in the concept of 'method' (autonomous action versus the autonomy-challenging 'Object') the whole polar-dialectical idea of origin is compressed.

Universally speaking, man's thinking remains governed by a supposedly purely *theoretical* way of thinking. After all that has been said on this subject, it is superfluous to draw attention again to how modern philosophers, who considered theoretical activity to be of secondary importance in the face of primarily historical reflection, set up their own reflection along the same theoretical path and wanted to justify themselves only by the sanction of (reason-fuelled) reason. Any value assigned to (as yet) non-systematised thinking could only be sufficient for the time being and for everyday life, but needed, as soon as it became serious, the approval of enlightening reason.

The 'feature' of this choice remains the presupposition of subject-object duality, about which we have discussed extensively in relation to Jaspers' view, and, prior to this, speaking of

'thinking' in a merely modal sense. For the 'acts' thus mentioned in phenomenology, in which the intentional dynamics receives accent, there is no difference in this respect.

But will we be able to gain insight into the competence of thought by considering the question concerning it as a matter in itself? Under the suggestion of the rule of autonomous thought within and over Western culture - to which we are all subject - such a temptation is obvious. It is all the more obvious because our reflections also take place in the specific field of thinking; because Christian philosophising and theologising have also openly or tacitly allowed themselves to be so controlled.

And this is precisely what we think we should thank Jaspers for, that he brought this position into the limelight in the tension he showed between existential transcendence and 'Reason' founded *überhaupt* realiter in *Bewusstsein*. The 'horizontal plane', in universal humanist vein, found its representation in *rationality*.

It was the choice of the horizontal plane that led Western culture to the rationally unexplainable absolutisation of rationality, and it was the latter in turn that horizontally closed off the horizon of our culture.

The revolt of the humanist idea of freedom in Jaspers, which did not want to sign a capitulation, calls on the Christian to place the absolutisation of the modal dimension of given reality under the heading of autonomous rationality, against the background of the origin question. Is the relationship between the idea of origin of Western culture, as it emerged in its successive basic dialectics, *and* the original dynamis in truth, itself dialectical?

We know, that for a pragmatized Christianity this question has no importance. It has, with the help of the 'diesseitig' nature-supernatural scheme [115], precipitated everything related to transcendental questions into the horizontal plane of dialectics. With that, a decision has been made and no other is possible. The serious questions, with which K. Jaspers concerned himself and which should have made a theology watchful, are from the outset brought down into the horizontal dimension.

Jaspers' idea of transcendence received its impetus from the humanist motif of freedom, but remained caught in polar tension with the fundamental motif of rationality, and therefore in ongoing dialectic. A different kind of decision will therefore have to be made if we want to answer the question about the nature of the mutual relationship between the origin movements notified in philosophy. From a dialectical movement in itself, pragmatist or existentialist, *no choice* is possible.

Is this then possible from the other standpoint put forward *as a choice*, i.e. that of the dynamis, which ultimately gives all dialectics their motive power?

We had already seen that no stand remains until the last choice is considered. The norm of all choices is sanctioned and promulgated from Jaspers' side by making the choice; Jaspers has set a clear example.

Again, we agree with him in that, but not in the direction and content of that choice.

He anchored the choice in *faith*. We do the same, but for us it is not about *rational* faith, which should allow for - inwardly antinomial - rational *faith communication*.

The norm for all choices lies in the dynamics of origin itself, which gives or denies its meaning and competence to everything it sets in motion and in the direction it points to. In between, the dynamics of thought has its own place, which cannot be elevated above other movements.

Whoever rejects its *priority* has thereby implicitly rejected any resulting priority and subject-object relationship with the dialectic indwelling it, assigning it its place within the domain of (as such legitimate) abstraction.

Whoever pronounces on the dynamics of origin, however it may be, is, like said, expressing a choice of faith.

On this point, Barth blamed Jaspers for 'Gegenstandslosigkeit' and Jaspers for Barth for 'Corporality'. We saw, that to Jaspers not Gegenstandslosigkeit, but bondage within 'Reason' was transcendental critical reproach. Faith indeed knows no 'Gegenstand', while Reason remains überhaupt bound to the 'Gegenstände'-oriented Bewusstsein and thus necessarily dialectical in character. Only the abandonment of Reason as antithesis leaves faith *truly free*. Only in this freedom does it find the basic transcendental dynamics of all realities, stripped of all dialectics. These are all "carried", not by a philosophising dialectic of reason, but by the living, acting, actual distinguishing *human being*, knowing himself to be included in the vertical dynamics.

From this free choice of faith for a free opening up of life now also flows the insight into what man is *authorised* to do in his various actions, including thinking. These are not the competences of abstractions, such as "the thinking", but the competences of man with his thinking in the highly differentiated positions and relations in which he is called to live and act; a specific thinking community with its qualified [117] "thinking-acts" occupies one of the positions in between. But with all the 'competences' involved, it is still about 'service' within the universally ascending opening-up movement of the cosmos in which man is placed and with which he is thus clothed.

After our explanations about the insoluble polarity and the 'rationally' bound dialectic of origin, we will have to be guided by the faith of *freedom* when considering the real fundamental movement.

This is therefore a faith that, not starting from a horizontal duality, may no longer encounter a fundamental dialectic leading into insolubility. Complete freedom for faith means complete surrender. As long as this is not there, we do not have to deal with faith of freedom. Jaspers' faith appeared to remain bound within the dialectic of immanent, horizontal, bound to 'Consciousness in general', rationality and transcendental-existential freedom. His surrender to 'transcendence' really meant knowing oneself (re)given in autonomous rationality. The 'philosophische Glaube' ultimately represents the belief in the inner antinomial, rational-existential freedom of the *philosophical* man, the surrender of that man to himself through and in his rationality, a circling around the autonomy thus proclaimed.

Instead of being 'gegenstandslos', as Jaspers is reproached by theology, philosophical Glaube, as philosophical, has set itself an exclusive Gegenstand, and this is in its philosophy itself, to which the believer *entrusts* itself. From this trust, this philosophy is born, only to set itself as the solemn anchor of that trust.

## Chapter III

### REVELATION AND HUMAN RESPONSE IN TIME.

#### **The decisions fall into the 'pre-theoretical' distinction.**

Behind the dialectic critically considered in the foregoing, as we have seen, there is no turning back, no more original dynamics to be seen. So if we have to deny philosophical thinking our trust in finding its origins, and therefore cannot accept dialectics as an origin, we will have to take the belief of freedom consistently seriously. The path, which Jaspers crossed in his doctrine of the Chiffren, will prove to be the right route for this. However, if it is to be a path of true transcendence, it must not fall back into the circle of dialectics. Yet it cannot be detached from its connection with what we might for a moment call the 'horizontal direction' in our existence.

This raises the profound question of the meaning of opening up, of its antithesis<sup>25</sup> to any absolutisation and, *consequently*, to that of thinking, in which the West in particular has pulled the world along with it. It is the question of antithesis *and not* dialectics, or rather antithesis to the absolutisation of the here below, i.e. of the self-sufficient (in fact: "sovereign") human being.

"Ask," we said, and this includes the recognition that no theological or otherwise, maxims of a [119] "supernatural" kind can help us. That we simply have to "work our way into" earthly life; that through the means available to us there, we have to exercise the eyes of the faith of freedom; that for each of us earthly life begins to unfold its meaning with the opening of our consciousness and that the horizon of that meaning cannot be seen beyond the end of our connection with the earth.

Man experiences this interconnectedness in what has been called "time", which we have tried to form concepts of with the help of the sciences, or which we have sought to approach philosophically in ideas, which itself, however, in the face of all these attempts, maintains its unfathomable, frighteningly dynamic, silence. In the philosophy of contemporary humanism, the attempts at approximation are silenced between the poles of measuring mathesis and mythical historicisation, as a final capitulation to the inscrutability of the limits of existence, yes even of the directions, in which these limits should be sought.

The awareness of the presence of borders should penetrate us all the more powerfully. Just as the practice of human history silently avenges itself in blood and tears on man's audacity to want to make 'everything new', so Western man has also had to experience this with regard to his successive scientific 'ideals'. The abandonment of all hope in this respect by pragmatist neo-positivism cum annexis and its tragic fixation on the extreme logic and rationalisation of methods is a remarkable memorial of this today. Until the march of history snatches it from memory as well.

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<sup>25</sup> 'Her' antithesis and not antithesis "between her and.....", further may show.

If, on the other hand, we realise that the belief in true freedom cannot be held back by any dialectical obstacle, this will make our very passage through life on earth a free one. Of course under one all-important condition. And that is the fierce combat of every hidden absolutism, even if it presents itself under the mask of a doctrine of *faith*, i.e. when that which, left in its right place, can serve us is made a mask for that which we have to serve.

The outstanding example of absolutisation is found in the various degrees of theologification. Necessarily within the protected zone of a nature-super-nature dualism, which is itself born of the primary absolutisation of thought, it takes the last word on its *meaning* in its theoretical considerations of revelation. Those who have allowed themselves to be misled by this mask are rendered powerless forever in the face of all attitudes to life and science resulting from Western worship of theoretical thinking.

However, those who have been allowed to see through it know for once and for all that it is not only in science, but everywhere, that they have to contend with the results of the belief that has taken such a deep hold on Western civilisation. He has learned to understand that Western man, in all the distinctions within his life community, has been 'charged' with 'practical knowledge' of theoretical origin, whose genealogy remains out of sight, before he sets himself to individual thinking systematisation.

The *power* of the Western communal spirit, stacked by theoretical thinking, does not make its appearance to the man of our time through the gate of honour, erected for centuries before that god. Already its first, metaphysical, manifestation was of a fundamentally practical, *religious*, nature. And it has been precisely the cunningly-fatal [121] nature-supernatural model that has helped to hide its face and thereby falsify the true sense of pre-theoretical thinking.

The latter was presented as imperfect, subject to theoretical standardisation, distinguished in the sense previously described, and thus struck blind in the face of the 'pre-theoretical', religious, power of the idol. The 'supernatural' was now, if required, called to theological aid to paradoxically dialectically compensate for the a-religious consequences. What was thus completely overlooked was that systematising (legitimately theoretical) thinking was fed by pre-theoretical distinctions, which in turn had come about under the *power influence* of uncontrolled *trust* in the human intellect.

It is thus in the pre-theoretical differentiation, that one has first of all to guard, and this means at the same time the priority of the transcendental dimension over the horizontal or, more correctly, over the *modal*. In this transition of terminology, care should be taken.

Whereas in the thinking climate of philosophical 'Glaube' the *permanent* connections turned out to have been made by Reason, itself bound to the (horizontal) Consciousness in general, speaking of 'modal' in our sense can only make sense *from* the transcendental dynamics of opening up. After all, the freedom we have to deal with can only be so called if not it is bound by rationality, but 'rationality' is bound by it. In other words, if there is not a dialectical, but a truly dynamic relationship between the two.

Instead of the underlying duality and modal subject-object relationship, the unilaterally directed continuity of the fundamental opening-up movement takes its place, within which the modalities all show a mutual subject-object relationship, which is now vertically directed and cannot be brought under a modal heading. The dynamics, mentioned here, is compressed into that of man's *actions*. In each of these acts, among all of them, is also the actuality of the (pre-theoretical) distinction in function. It is fully included in the unilateral disclosure of the act as a whole and thus cannot be brought into dialectical orbit. The modal-analytic subject-object relation functioning within the theoretical act of thinking can only be observed and studied theoretically by means of abstraction via a new act of thinking as a 'Gestalt relation'. In the midst of this reality, it is strange that some people, including Christians, think they can still expect dialectics to enliven philosophical reflection, saying they can look forward to a 'functional' thinking instead of an impossible, illogical thinking. Western philosophising, as we have shown, has definitely diverged in its two poles and will no longer be capable of any synthesis, since its religious breeding ground has been exhausted. A possible inclusion of supernature in such philosophising can only accentuate this state of dissolution.

If, therefore, we desire a philosophising out of the faith of freedom, this means a break from the outset with enclosure by rationality and its dialectics, therefore equally with ontologies, which cannot be born other than from the priority of both.

Truly "functional" thinking can only take place [123] if man adds his actions, also in the "thinking" act, in surrender of faith to the dynamics which, independent of his choice, *underlies* reality and therefore demands of man the realisation of this reality. If he is willing to do so, his endlessly varied actions among men will show this positive "functioning". If he resists, as he naturally does, he will nevertheless be propelled by the driving force of creation, until for him its "time" has passed and the horizon closes.

The decisive question now is what the anti-dialectical *faith of freedom* means to us; more precisely, what this faith should be directed at. On answering this question in *life* depends the functioning of that life, the functioning of its philosophical thinking.

Misled by theologism, many Christians have thought to pursue these questions within the sphere of contemplation, even though in their discourses they spoke of the necessity of the priority of life.

After all this, it goes without saying that no practical reflection is possible without discernment, if one wants to consider it without contemplation. Yet it is precisely here that the structural primacy of 'pre-theoretical thinking' (including its influence by the *power* of theoria) asserts itself.

For the distinctions *follow* the choice of direction of man's surrender to the creative fundamental movement. The manner of 'functioning' finds its own reflection in the conscious distinction, albeit taking into account possible 'projections', repression, etc., which must not be investigated at present.

[124]

We therefore have to guard against becoming unwittingly trapped within the spell of an externally 'proclaiming' philosophising, which would in fact lead directly into (whether or not covered by theology) on-logism. Speaking in the image used earlier: we have to avoid the spectator's stand.

Speaking from the outset in distinctions, even of a theoretical nature, is inevitable within a philosophical discourse. For we begin, rather than with a clean slate, in the midst of existing distinctions and the community of life and thought, formed by it over a long period of life and within a wide living space. So it is in the midst of these distinctions that we, in our discourse, have to account for the very choice that appears in them.

The faith of *freedom*. What does the use of this term, pointing into infinity, afford in the face of the meaning laid down by humanism?

### **The horizon of time.**

The term 'faith of freedom' is not an expression of Eastern resignation, of leaving everything behind, rising above the structures of temporal life. There is no question of a leap, which would finally have the cycle of 'time' to break. But neither is there any 'Fundamental operation' in the Jaspersian sense, or any platonising combination.

The faith of freedom is not directed towards a 'state of being'; we think we have sufficiently contested such an idea in the discussion between Jaspers and Barth. Yet it functions within the horizon of temporal existence, which we have noted does not extend beyond the beginning and the end of our union with the earth. Yet [125] it is precisely the horizon *as* horizon that drives us into the questions. So it is a question of *asking* the right question, as the philosophy of our time has tried to teach us in its own way.

In her way, she has also realised that asking the fundamental question presupposes a present answer, as we have encountered when investigating the nature of the fundamental dialectic.

However, instead of looking "rationally" for the point of attachment of freedom to engage in phenomenological dialogue or, ignoring this, holding on to the rationalisation of methodological logic, we continue to look towards and into the horizon.

So this horizon, as we said, is the horizon of time, which of itself gives us neither any right nor any reason to grasp it cyclically or dialectically. It is horizon without more, i.e. it defines us by and in our situation. We know neither of our origin nor of our decay, nor of the origin and decay of the totality of nature and human history in which we live. The various ideals of science and their failure have contributed even more to making us realise this. Remarkable in this respect is the dogmatic cramp of the ever less documentable transformist theory of evolution, handed down to us by the passion of the 19th century.

What we know in the meantime is the fact that we *have come* into being and *will* perish beyond our control. These certainties *force us* to recognise the horizon in the sense that it has two sides. For it is the horizon of *sight* from where we stand, but behind that horizon the line it visually intercepts continues. Any conception of time in a total sense other than the linear one, therefore, rests on [126]

a speculative turn of thought. That the historical-dialectical would think to escape from this today, can only be attributed to the impossibility of its authors to take account of the antinomic dialectics of their own position, as we have tried to make clear in due course. And the non-speculative, positivist conceptions of time under a physical denominator, have a priori limited the horizon of knowledge of time to that of time *measurement*.

As we saw, Jaspers tried to make the gaze extend over the horizon in his idea of Basic knowledge, which could not be a Chiffer, because it was really the last source of knowledge of the truth. The dialectic contained in it, however, broke off the line of sight at the real horizon. This is expressed in Jaspers' conception of time ('Von der Wahrheit' p. 173) : "Alles Erscheinende, alles Gewusste und Bezweckte, das Vergangene und das Zukunfftige wird Dimension des jeweils geschichtlich Gegenwartigen als Sprache der Ewigkeit. Zur Gegenwart gehort es als sie selbst".

So here the existential praesens *is posited* as the vantage point to eternity and as already itself eternity, the meeting point of 'eternity' with temporal existence. It is thus posited from the philosopher's philosophical praesens and it is posited in *his* 'Basic knowlegde', towards which he has accomplished the 'Fundamental operation'. From his philosophical-existential praesens, he calls on all to now follow his decision from theirs. With a validity that has to be made real again in every 'present', but for which the one proclamation in the one moment of *Basic knowledge* of the *philosopher* qua talis is validly sufficient.

The dialectical chain is cyclically closed in this moment of revelation; the Basic knowledge has reached its bottom: eternity.

[127] Just as Jaspers rejects the so-called 'embodied' ['*leibhaftig*'] content of Christian revelation faith, in appreciation of its conscious final earnestness, the Christian, in deep appreciation of Jaspers' openness, has first of all to decide whether he will accept the content of philosophical faith resting on Basic knowledge.

We have dealt at length with the antinomy in this idea of revelation, and it remains valid beyond Jaspers' special conception. It also makes the intersection of time and eternity in the existential praesens, as we see it widely presented in various forms in the philosophy of existence, impossible. However, highlighting the antinomy cannot suffice either to reject it or to choose the opposite direction. For here we meet the very problem of fundamental dynamis, What remains in this respect for man, who rejects dialectics as a movement of origin?

Existence may itself stand helpless and hopeless<sup>26</sup> in its margin of choice of 'freedom', its possibly 'hopeless' 'possibilities' nevertheless serve philosophising (philosophically

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<sup>26</sup> To avoid misunderstanding, we note that Jaspers' philosophy does not (yet) reach such a low point in the historical order of Western philosophising, since for him the belief in freedom dominates. In its hitherto final phase, philosophy of existence has passed this point under the pressure of an 'optimistic' pragmatism. However, for the sake of the demonstration of philosophical fundamental dialectics, we will here connect for a moment with the philosophy of existence around the last war.

'believing') man as a support 'pole' of his autonomous rededialectics. What, however, if these, up to and including the theory of the last 'Absprung', *really do* escape him?

Whoever thinks he can cope with this without realising the danger of 'Verleiblichung' or 'Vergegenständlichung', will sooner or later have to discover that he should not have ignored Jaspers' warning as a sign on his path of faith. It could be that, facing the emptiness of his inner antinomic dialectic of origin, he saw himself thrown into an equally empty space of dialectics of 'supernature'.

'Corporality' Faith of freedom. Horizon.

For Jaspers, Corporeality is weighted *Gegenständlichkeit* and faith of freedom is *gegenstands-*less reason belief. What is it like for the Christian? Does he dare the adventure of *Gegenstandslosigkeit* in the struggle *against* reason belief, nevertheless taking on the - false - accusation of Corporality? To see off the time horizon, expecting.

### **Unity of revelation in time. The 'existential praesens'.**

It is well known how the Christian "linear" conception of time is objected to from two sides in our period. On the one hand, it is blamed for not keeping the transcendence of the God who disposes of time in relation to it fully in mind; on the other hand, it is precisely this transcendence that is wished to be eliminated in real terms by confining it to the plane of 'Mitmenschlichkeit' c.a. It is not our intention to oppose this in a more or less theological way, because the reasons behind these remarks ultimately originate, via philosophical presuppositions, from an a priori position on divine revelation. That is why we think we should once again define what is meant by this.

Against the religious-fundamental dialectic of nature-supernature, maintained by an autonomous thinking, the Reformation called back to the [129] unity of God's revelation in Scripture and creation. Today, this exclusively scriptural idea is threatened in its roots by a consciously secularising 'Calvinist' grouping by placing emphasis on the emancipation of world culture instead of on the restoration of unity in the Reformers' confession in this regard.

However, just as the old-style nature-supernatural scheme was an expression of man's desire for autonomy and was philosophically posited against the fundamental motif of Holy Scripture, today we see the crowbar being placed once again between what the Reformers, especially Calvin and the drafters of the Reformed confessional scriptures, had tried to restore in unity according to Scripture, out of a, in this case reactionary, cultural drive.

The crowbar is wielded, *not* from Scripture, let alone from what creation announces to us, but with the help of data from non-Christian culture and a theology tending towards synthesis with it. The consciously or semi-consciously pursued *consequence* is an 'emancipation' of Christian and non-Christian culture together, *not* from a domination by theology, church or other earthly power of Christians - on the contrary! - but, if possible, from the influence of the proclamation of Scripture itself.

Although the Reformers, especially in the Calvinist sphere of influence, may not have had the opportunity to get to the bottom of nature-supernatural dualism, after the slumps and partial

revivals of later centuries, it is now certainly more than time to continue their understanding of the sovereignty of God in the face of the regression into autonomous culturism that is taking place in the spirit of our century, in the line they have drawn.

[130]

It *pleased* God, sovereign, to reveal Himself *to* man, whom He *created* in His image. This was the beginning, and from there He proceeded. However: He did it and, as far as man was concerned, it involved him *as* the in God's image created.

Philosophy and theology have tried to explain this for the sake of struggle, and its explanation depended on the motive, which in the essence of its existence drove it. Was it the moving force of divine dynamis itself, believingly accepted? Or was it broken from the start by that of autonomous (c.q. theo-logical) reason through the notorious a priori scheme 'noetic-ontic', which continued to dominate the discussion? From which and through which it was incorporated into the dialectical development of scholastic and humanist philosophy.

After all we have said about the necessity of leaving the gallery, it is no longer obvious to go into this again now. If God creates man in His image, *how* and *where* will man find it?

Now it's once again about *learning* to ask the question.

In this context, we should recall Jaspers' discussion with Barth, which the Christian of our century cannot let pass by and whose essence we have just resumed.

Barth has, albeit in contradictory schema and in many people's judgment in irrationalist turn, kept himself within the apriority of the 'noetic-ontic' as theology and its Gegenstand, i.e. within the apriority of *theo-logy* as such, referring to it by means of the paradox the supernatural. That is to say: from the image, the image speaks out about the relationship between image and Origin. Theologically, a clear distinction is made between whether or not, the [131] more or less, the image answers to the Origin, i.e. between the insight into its revelation and the revelation itself. However, this is often expressed using the a priori schema, ignoring the normativity tacitly attributed to its own theological noesis.

How it stands with Barth's conception of Gegenstand and of gegenstandslos, and with Jaspers' equation of Gegenstand and 'Corporality'? we have heard in their mutual reproaches. These played out within the arena delineated by philosophy and theology. From this enclosure, we saw the two partners asking for the legitimisation of their figures from outside. In this, both were at the critical level where the development of Western European thought had put them. And we saw their answer in respectively the 'befallen' and the 'Fundamental operation'.

Speaking in categories of time we could say: Jaspers only follows the linear conception, but the conception itself shows the cycle of dialectics. Its (linear) point of application lies in the praesens of the knowing existence given by transcendence, but from the outset it is included in the antinomic dialectic of the 'existential'-general competence of the philosopher.

On this line there is room for the 'leibliche' person of Jesus with the persistent praesens of his choice for the transcendence of freedom. There is no place for a leibliche transcendence, which refuses to let the Fundamental operation take place to itself. Along the line of time,

Jesus' Leiblichkeit can present itself as Gegenstand and in this frame show itself to the freedom-choosing existence as Chiffer, its Dasein itself can never claim the rank of transcendence. And [132] how else could the 'image of God' be expressed than in the praesens of "'real' Existenz"? Jaspers emphatically opposes a Christian conception of leibbrous transcendence as contrary to the second commandment of the divine Law itself and thus blasphemy.

When Jaspers calls transcendence the all-embracing and Reason the all-binding from within, his 'philosophische Glaube' is perfectly consistent in this, that he disposes 'from within', on the line of time, of the (im)possibilities of God's transcendence in Christ. That, in our own terms of speaking just now, the image (created man) expresses itself 'bindingly' about its transcendent Origin. For we have seen how, in Jaspers' philosophy, the dynamics of transcendental freedom is determined by the properties of the horizontal *trajectory* of movement (the 'Reason').

This is consistent for Jaspers, but the direct opposite of Barth's actual meaning. The 'befallen' discussed by Barth is a consequence of the descending movement of 'transcendence' *towards* the timeline. There he makes it meet the Christian ('der kleine Theologe') in his theological 'Gegenstand' where, then existentially, the roles switch and the accepting man becomes the object of his Gegenstand. The purpose of the imagery is obvious, but the *abiding* denominator is theology on the timeline under the normative idea of a complete distinction within utter befallen.

It now becomes particularly difficult due to the fundamental contradiction between this time-linear denominator and the vertical-exclusive descending movement of revelation. We have previously pointed out the magical element contained in it. This element is [133] caused not by the *content* of Barth's adversarial systematics, but by the overlooking of the original and enduring immanence of theological thought in time. On this point, Jaspers has retained the lead in the debate.

Realiter both attempt, each in his own way, to transcend this immanence in the dialectical intersection of the existential praesens which, as we saw, concretises the antinomies of the mutual ideas of origin. In this 'praesens' of existentialist thought is represented, in a modern subjectively historicist way, the 'tota simul' of the Middle Ages.

The antinomy was with Jaspers in the original irreconcilability of radical freedom and rational enclosure, with Barth of transcendent sovereignty and theological-scientific correlation.

Amidst and disguised by the antinomies of critical-dialectical reason, however, the *cardo quaestionis philosophandi* is touched in the existential praesens. It is not only the point, where the subjectivity of the philosopher is critically confronted with that from his systematics, but it is this, because *in* concrete reality abstraction, from which the self in theoretical isolation first results, finds here its real (concrete) point of departure. Anyone who honestly wants to 'functionally' combat ontologism must therefore begin here. In the existential praesens, the actualisation of all modalities takes place *simultaneously*.

It is this subjective sameness-temporality expressed in the *concept* of existential praesens. Whoever overestimates his meaning *existentialistically* ends up with the antinomies of modern historicism that we have repeatedly discussed, whoever underestimates it with an uncritical ontologism or positivism.<sup>27</sup> The overestimation [134] expresses itself in absolutisation of *abstraction* from the continuous duration of time to isolated subjectively experienced 'present' as the free moment of origin of all meaning. It comes into unresolvable tension with the *general validity* of *current* abstraction that it absorbs at this moment.

The under-estimation accepts the latter as self-evident and thus incorporates both the existentially chosen start of the abstracting activity and the syntheses created within it in an idea of totality (method or ontology), which no other critical justification than the abstracting-synthesising reasoning can understand. Within humanism it is in fundamental tension with the fundamental idea of autonomy and within the older conceptions with the originality of the 'material principle'.

Underlying both the overestimation and the underestimation of the understanding of the actual praesens is the tired misunderstanding of the *simultaneity* of all modalities in this actuality.

It is in the modalities of time that its 'liden near' character is expressed and the question of the horizon is raised. We therefore use the term "linear" exclusively as a contrast to the internally related and rejected terms "cyclic" and "dialectic". It can at best be labelled 'horizontal' provisionally and in opposition to the supposed correlate and 'vertical' direction of transcendence, where there is thus no horizon to offer. This speaks convincingly from the fundamentally hopeless [135] a priori corporatisation of the theoretical Gegenstandsrelation (the scheme 'noetic-ontic'), by means of which the originally 'vertically' oriented dynamis is mutilated and turned into a 'horizontal' dialectic.

### **The antinomies of over-, resp. underaiting the 'existentiële praesens'.**

The linear character of the temporal modalities can only be understood from the origin-dynamis, which can never be understood. It is this that, hidden from the only horizontally directed gaze, expresses itself in the "horizontal" subjective movement within the modalities.

The horizontal movement, in which each praesens, 'imbued' with past and future, is propelled in its mysterious continuity, resists all analytical comprehension. Contemplation of this continuity must therefore appear to positivism of any kind as meaningless. By identifying the meaningful human being with his 'positive' thinking and reducing his reality to its physical and mathematical aspects, it tacitly reduces the continuity of temporal movement to the displacement, measured along lines of movement, of what moves. The measure can only be derived reciprocally from other, albeit 'equal-matched', movements *in* time. Neither Aristotle's inner synthesis in the human mind nor Newton's idea of an absolute time or Kant's a priori form of contemplation could have elucidated the question of 'the' time, while Bergson and Einstein brought the depth of the question more penetratingly before our attention.

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<sup>27</sup> Positivism with its modern brainchildren is objectively uncritical, yet it ignores the critical attitude with the subjective intention of leaving it behind as *irrelevant*.

One may have tried to carry out calculations to envisage a possible total duration of the physical [136] cosmos, but this 'horizon' is also cut off forwards and backwards, and with it its meaning with regard to time as such.

If, therefore, the 'existential praesens' were no more than a cross-section on the continué of nature, it would in turn remain meaningless for the histor(ist)isch thinking of the philosophy of existence. Yet without that substratum, it cannot be understood. For just as the heavenly bodies and the electrons describe their orbits in a multiplicity of revolutions in relation to the point from which measurement begins, so life proceeds, according to its duration and periods coherent with those of the material cosmos, into which it is mysteriously inserted. And without life, its progression and the periods associated with it, there can be no praesens for man, enclosing his past and future.

Yet with 'praesens' in this sense only, the *existential* 'Gegenwart', the 'pour soi' as zero point of freedom, has not been reached. For although the "now" of nature in the orbits of life and energy movement is the moment marked by *man* and therein the result of his unlocked discernment vis-à-vis the "progress" of time, man has not yet assimilated it into free living. This comes, 'as soon as' he himself must decide negatively or positively about *what* he individually (large or small) has to contribute to what *happens* in the progress of time. For this he can face 'any' moment.

Philosophy of existence has recognised this, but in its time it found itself<sup>28</sup> and in its way opposite the 'what' [137] and the 'happening'. Within the development of reflection under the religious fundamental motif of freedom and control, it has captured that meaning under the *subjective* fundamental denominator of the *event* as the expression of human choice of freedom in the successive 'situations' born of its dialectical action.

Against the objective-positivist denominator of natural time as a decisive conception of time, therefore, the subjective-historical appears in the idea of existential praesens as the denominator of contemporary conception of time. The philosophy of existence believes it can defend itself against accusations of historicism by rejecting idealist and related conceptions of history as the total summary of meaning in the passing and passing e.g. as the passage of the rational mind, since they are in flagrant contradiction with its confession of the existential decision as the origin of meaning. Nevertheless, she too has grasped the meaning of reality within the modal horizon of the free historically responsible decision and thus man as history, in tension with 'nature'.

In pre-critical philosophising, the idea of God, without or with the intervention of a 'theologia naturalis', is formed in man's image, concentrated in his intellect. The true original of this image did not appear in the limelight, but hid from the Total Reality in the thinking subjectivity of the (c.q. theologian-) philosopher. After critical idealism had accounted for the transcendental formation of ideas, the open image of God disappeared from philosophy.

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<sup>28</sup> The expression 'its time' contains the very problem appearing here regarding the 'happening' of philosophy: why now and so the philosophy of existence? However, we do not wish to raise it at this point, to avoid complication.

However, it continued to cling to it wherever it intended to pursue the idea of meaning to its origins.

[138]

The true origin, however, was always one step behind the subjectivity acting in a philosophical manner. For we found it there, where in the discussion with this internal dialectic it could no longer be asked back, i.e. in the discrepancy between the existence appearing on stage in its 'praesens' and the *universally* valid statement of the present philosopher. This discrepancy, diametrically opposed to the philosopher's intention (as a classic example, see Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, p. 519 concluding), finds its sharpest accent when he qualitate qua wants to acknowledge that his mode of philosophical presentation on the continué timeline also exhibits the existentialist-framed individual character. Indeed, this thesis cannot possibly cover itself with a claim to universal truth-telling, without which, for its part, recommended philosophising *loses* any sense of its own. In this connection, see also Jaspers' thesis (*Der phil. Gl. ang. der Offenbarung*, p. 500), mentioned earlier, on the philosophical expression of the whole sole faith of the individual.

The antinomy at the root of this existentialist thought that we have repeatedly examined is the result of the overestimation of the real meaning of the 'existential praesens' as religious surrender to the humanist ideal of freedom under a modal historical ground-name. The overestimation avenges itself in the act of overlooking the basic denominator of rationality as such, under which philosophical activity had joined a priori. The antinomy had to arise because none of the modalities of our reality can make its sense on a *modal* level from one of the others. In the matter of 'rational freedom' or 'free rationality', a final decision is inevitable, but as long as it is sought at the intended level between historical [139] intervention and rational distinction, it remains stuck in the negative sense of antinomy.

Modern positivism, which once again entrusted leadership entirely to 'logical' reason, believed it had left behind not only critical idealism, but the entire transcendental critical attitude in science, because only the 'methodical' entry into the spheres of reality accessible to intellectual mastery could make sense. With this, the last shadow of an image of God also *seemed to* have been swept away.

The underestimation of the 'existential praesens' we have mentioned now avenges itself by ignoring the inherently non-logical character of the fields of research, which an *opening up of* the method required in each case in thinking demands, and it receives its particular accent in the thesis, which is consistently inescapable for pragmatist positivism but fundamentally irreconcilable with its logicist basic position, that its thinking can only be verified by the *effect* in the objects.

Here the question of origin is not asked in principle, but is nevertheless inescapably answered at the inescapable critical point, beyond which no further questions remain open: in this case, the autonomous rationalised traffic of thought, which, however, as an *autonomy of thought*, is compromised by the own sense of the oppositional modalities that makes itself known in the question of verification, and the metaphysical answer to that question that necessarily follows.

Of course, from the side of positivist thought itself, the 'praesens' of the philosophy of existence, around which we have grouped our problem for a moment, is not under discussion and we cannot bring it into dispute against positivism, because [140] we cannot accept it in its historicist sense either. The opening up of methodically directed thinking does seize this thinking in its modal sense in an activity that makes itself felt primarily as historical formation, but this activity itself finds its root and origin in the given fundamental dynamis. In its idea of the existential praesens, the philosophy of existence was, as we saw, on the track of this fundamental force, but in it as in positivist objectivism, it remained caught up in the dialectic of the humanistic religious fundamental motif.

Our research has so far tried to show the complexity of this dialectic, including the special entanglement added to it in theologicis by the nature-supernatural motif.

The dialectic primarily appears to the distanced gaze of the philosophical observer in the *mutual* tension of the modal basic denominators of an objectifying and subjectivizing character respectively, while *within* each of the systems of basic denominators (e.g. historicism, positivism) the tension manifests itself in its own way. In the most remarkable and decisive way, however, it appears at what we could call the boundaries of *tension*, as we encountered in the 'metaphysical' thesis of practical verification from the positivist-analytical school, which in principle rejects all metaphysics, and in the critically mutually contradictory position of the subject *in* the philosophy of existence and that of the philosopher himself.

The modal-linear time movement, like any idea of time as such, resists analytical comprehension. An attempt to do so must run aground in an internally antinomian dialectic. To such attempts we must now also count a Fundamental operation in the sense of Jaspers and a paradoxically expected descending in [141] that of Barth, both of which find their real breeding ground in the modal-logical Gegenstandsrelation of 'Consciousness in general' or theology. The pragmatistpositivist idea of time is ingrained in that under practical-theoretical usefulness, through which any notion of *time* can only be verified.

For the reasons explained and taking into account the criticism given, we found a real point of contact with existentialist thinking in his concept of the existential praesens. We saw, however, how this, despite Jaspers' attempt to imbue it with 'eternity', had a modal-temporal character and there must therefore be another reason why we too nevertheless found a decisive moment touched upon here. We have already mentioned the meaning-individual reality of man's formative intervention at this point, captured by the philosophy of existence as an *integral* decision. For our part, we have admitted that in the point in time understood by this philosophy as existential praesens, the actualisation of all modalities takes place at the same time.

### **'Simultaneity' and the shift in meaning in the chosen 'basic denominators'**

But what does this 'simultaneity', unknown to the philosophy of existence in this sense, mean? It concerns the actualisation of the temporal modalities, because only in the experience of these modalities does man know about time, while conversely, only in the actualisation of his modalities does time assert itself. Primarily, this actualisation did not begin with human experience, but long before in nature. It was there from that beginning with

which the Word began its revelation and obeyed nature. It was prepared for continued actualisation by man, [142] to whom the Word wanted to address his revelation, and this by making man actualise. In his acts of creation, i.e. temporal, actualisation, man listens to the revelatory actuality of Him Who therein gave Himself to him.

The creation dynamic in the actualisation of nature remained the substrate on which the person called in the image of the Creator had to let God's revelation speak by opening it up. Is he opposed, passively or actively, the actualisation of nature nevertheless continues and consumes him.

Continuation, opening-up, are terms that can only make sense within a 'linear' idea of time. We have already rejected their identification with 'horizontal', but now have to ask *in what sense* these terms should receive their clarification. This sense cannot be of a dialectical nature, as we hope to have sufficiently discussed.

We begin with the idea of the simultaneous actualisation of the modalities, drawn together by the philosophy of existence into the modal sense moment of the existential praesens, and ask: What does man actualise here? *How does* he actualise? *Towards* what is his actualisation directed?

It is remarkable that the last question, initially answered by the philosophy of existence mainly in the direction of meaninglessness, has in its later period acquired its own content as a determination to follow the voice of Being, as social commitment, as directed by the class struggle. We have thought to detect behind this the religious influence of the dialectical opposite of the autonomous urge to control against the *défaitist* tendency of the humanist belief in freedom of the last decades, referring back to the old-humanist progression idea of the 18th and 19th centuries, which within the development of positivism remained and continues to act as a hidden urge.

The idea of progression is intrinsically historical and points towards the modal continuity of time. If taken in isolation, it can only refer to the 'event' processed by human action, but says nothing about the realisation of meaning in *what* 'happens'. One can only speak of progression in *the full* sense if the sense of reality is actualised in the *positive* direction in the *simultaneous* opening up of its modalities.

Here, then, our path definitely separates positivism and philosophy of existence. If the latter, in its second period of development, allows itself to be encompassed by a practical "critique" aimed at "commitment" in the social sense, it has not only inserted the stimulus of a historically conceived idea of progress in its "existential praesens", but has unintentionally risen above it by pointing out the direction and object of successive existential choices (or in "moments éphémères"). And Heidegger, in his 'Kehre', showed an element of securing, which also clearly points beyond *the modal-historical* sense. The root denominator meanwhile remained in function as such, i.e., continued to draw the religious gaze to itself, with the well-known consequence of the falsification of one's own modal sense and that of the other modalities.

However, there is a decisive distinction in the philosophical consequence between absolutisation of the object side and idem of the subject side of the reality of life. Positivism can continue its methodical experimentation with the help of fundamental denominators while ignoring the antinomy we have pointed out in its verification test, as long as the practical effect in the natural substrate of our [144] reality does not fail. Nature answers only for its part, but remains silent with regard to the choice of direction on the fullness of truth. In other words: man receives an answer only *in so far as* he *does not* miss the point with regard to nature, but never with regard to its transcendent potentialities, nor with regard to what it would have been able to show, if in previous stages of research the ways to do so had not been closed off, provisionally or definitively.

The situation is different in this respect with the absolutisation of the subject side, where the reflection is driven from criticism to criticism until the moment when the existential choice of philosophising itself presents itself and the philosopher must choose between comprehension by the moira (destiny) of time, the transcendental reason, the class struggle, an in its sense indeterminate world of experience as "nature" and, however, finds himself dialectically beaten back by the religious antithesis and universal objectivity, categorised as "world" in the vein of phenomenological reason.

One can still try to save oneself in the apparent compromise of functionally interpretive reason in which the archimedean starting point of subjectivity seems to be able to keep its existential, the 'objective' answer to the method in a positivising sense its verifiable character, and finally the functionally co-interpretive language in the perspective of the ages can give its fiat. Even modern scholasticism does not have to go sideways for this, since it can summon the 'supernatural' to encompass this dialectic of interpretation in new theological reflection. For the Christian, the result is then a non-committal wait-and-see attitude in the matters of the below, under the guidance of the liturgy and, in a correspondingly gaining knowledge, the theology of the 'church'.

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In all these cases we continue to have to deal with a priori basic denominator choices and their mutual dialectic, which can never allow for compromise, but points in a cautionary way towards an integral dynamis expressed in modal simultaneity. The question of the 'whither', however, finds *no* answer in the successive absolutisations attempted by man, who maintains his autonomy at all costs.

When the basic denominators of the absolutisations have blocked the view, this has been the result of the aforementioned shifts in meaning, and consequently falsifications of meaning, which have taken place as a result.

This is perhaps most sharply expressed in the isolation of the 'existential praesens', the supposed moment of eternity in time, of the philosophy of existence. As we saw, man - whose *essence* is laid down in his *existence* - appears therein as the giver of meaning, through his intervention in the historical births of 'situations'. The historical 'material' that prepares the decision *in* the situation *is nothing more* than that; that is, it represents the historical object side of the reality present.

However, it is by no means the intention of existentialist thinking to isolate the historically shaping decision from the totality of reality. On the contrary, the latter is *concentrated* in its historical aspect. From there, however, the phenomenological problems of actual consciousness (cogito, conscience, 'Thinking') and 'corporeality' now arise.

The first casts existence in the midst of its substratum in consciousness (of the historical decision) and its *superstratum* in the (conscious) opening up of that decision as directed towards (rational) freedom, and thus becomes the focus of immanent transcendental [146] criticism. The second, instead of being the last link of watertight phenomenological reasoning, becomes the demonstration stage par excellence of humanistic religious dialectics, since one is given to that which is connected as a 'substratum'? with the signifying subjectivity in unity ('smensen lichaam'), as a result of the prior (historical) isolation of 'existence', must at the same time be assigned its place in the 'world' (champ phénoménal or préobjectif) opposite it.

Of the scope of the first antinomy, the philosophy of existence could not be aware, since this had meant capitulation to a freedom other than that of reason; the second, as a result of its own dialectical capitulation to intrusive pragmatic thinking, it had to ignore.

All these shifts of meaning with resulting antinomies are finally the consequence of the primary absolutisation of theoretical thinking and the elevation of its abstract 'Gegenstandsrelation' ('dialectics of the third degree') to the fundamental structure, whereby the given reality has to be divided between the two poles of this figure. And since this primary absolutisation is of directly religious origin, propelled by the belief in man's autonomous rationality as its origin, behind which no more asking back is possible, *nothing more* can be achieved here, after immanent criticism has been issued, by philosophical thinking as such. Critical philosophical thinking can only start again in a positive constructive sense after the belief in autonomous rationality has been definitively broken and the truly dynamic meaning of creation has been seen and followed.

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### **Liberating the problem of intermodal simultaneity from inner antinomian dialectics**

So we must now ask: *how does* man actualise the revelation given to him and thus the image of God in himself?

As we have seen, with Jaspers the 'existentiële praesens' derived its transcendental ('eternity') meaning from the grasp of existence for transcendental freedom. However, the possibility of this appeared to be disjointed between this upwardly striving drive for freedom and the bondage of its origin from reason, which at its deepest found its anchor and control in the 'Consciousness in general'.

If we want to do justice to the actual correctness that Jaspers detects in the existential utterance as the 'Sprache der Ewigkeit', we will therefore have to untie it from its theoretical isolation within the historical modality, so that both existence and utterance acquire their true nature and place, involved in the simultaneity of all modalities.

The 'praesens' in time turned out to be the ('ecstatic') moment of making the integrally decisive 'choice'. The temporal modality, at issue here, was that of responsible *formation* in the continuity of 'happening', where what 'happens' itself proved to go beyond all modal boundaries.

Meanwhile, the temporal character of this praesens could already not be grasped outside its connection with the praesens in the course of 'natural time' in its distinct aspects. Nevertheless, all these aspects were jointly and 'equally-timely' qualified by the 'existential' character of the *historical* decision.

The normative aspects of this decision (e.g. social, economic, legal, religious decisions) can be understood in the philosophy of existence in their true sense only under the existential-historical aspect. The question of 'temporal' moments of these aspects cannot be raised, since they are a priori covered by the historical ground name.

However: ejected at the front door, they enter the framework of the philosophy of existence by their own ways. Why does the 'keeper' and 'guardian' of Being look forward to the passing of the time of oblivion and the dawning of the 'Heimkehr'? *Why* does he, in Nietzsche's consequence - if we may take him (Heidegger) seriously - try to discern the signs of it, even in the things that directly threaten his authentic freedom, and has he already converted himself to this anticipation? Why does Jaspers see in the 'Gegenwart' of the existential praesens the - resting - eternity and its Chiffren, which he looks forward to in all the things that move through time? Why does Sartre eagerly await the moment when history will open the perspective for a philosophy of freedom? Why do all these things, the movement through time and the expectation extending beyond it, speak *in philosophical terms*, which *as such do not* want to surrender the *enduring* validity of *this* proclamation to transience, even at the cost, as we have seen, of the evasion of the immanent antinomy?

In Jaspers' *Philosophische Glaube* we have seen the greatest attempt, embedded in the whole of Western tradition and kept strictly philosophical, to *rise above* the historical sequence of existential decisions, all in its 'praesens', into a dimension that vertically crosses the event in its historical sense. The faith aspect of his Akt des Philosophierens issued the sharpest challenge to its historical aspect. The kerugma of freedom, proclaimed by this [149] 'think' Akt, must *not* be destroyed by a historical free decision.

It is in this philosophical *act* that we are indeed *on the track of* the dimension of 'sameness-temporality', towards which the theory of existential praesens seeks the way in vain. The above analysed and 'simultaneous' absolutisation of objectivising *philosophical* thought and historical-subjective decision made into a philosophical object has, through its intrinsic antinomy, prevented the *finding of* that path.

So the way can only be found if we abandon all these absolutisations and, instead of *fleeing* prematurely from 'linear' time into a transcendental eternity-presence realised by 'Fundamental operation', get serious about the 'simultaneity' of the present in all modalities equally.

Then, however, Jaspers' appeal (p. 150) must first be taken seriously: "Daher bezeugt sich Philosophie nicht schon in einer Stringenz der gedanklichen Entfaltung, sondern erst in der *Lebenspraxis* des Denkenden" ["Therefore, philosophy does not already bear witness to itself in a stringency of intellectual development, but only in the *life practice* of the thinker"]. We immediately note questioningly: 'in der Lebenspraxis', agreed, but why 'des Denkenden'? We read further (p. 475): "Eine Grundverkehrung philosophischen Denkens ist, durch betrachtende Erkenntnis schon haben zu wollen, was nur durch eigenes inneres und duseres Handeln wirklich wird. Der philosophische Gedanke, wirklich vollzogen, ist schon ein inneres Handeln" ["A fundamental reversal of philosophical thinking is to want to have through contemplative cognition what only becomes real through one's own inner and external action. The philosophical thought, truly realised, is already an inner action"], Again we note: agreed, but: to where did Jaspers' 'betrachtende Erkenntnis' really extend? And our questions are sharpened, where we read just before: "Sie (i.e. Philosophie, M.) ist der Weg jedes Einzelnen, auf dem er sich nicht der Verantwortung vor der Wahrheit durch das Bekenntnis eines Glaubensinhalts entzieht... Bekenntnis als solches ist eine unwahre Form..." ["It (t.w. philosophy, M.) is the way of every individual in which he does not evade responsibility before the truth by professing a belief.... Confession as such is an untrue form..."].

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Here we meet Jaspers again in wrestling with pretensions of the theological 'Gegenstand', about which we have spoken and as a result of which, excluding the magic of the 'es kann ihm widerfahren' ['it can befall to him'] a priori, he cannot express himself on confession in any other way than in the sense of expressing a faith *content*. For Jaspers, this speaking out is a form of escape from freedom (der verantwoordelijke existentiële keuze), which cannot be brought into view other than along the path of philosophising as 'inneres Handeln'.

As I said, we completely agree with Jaspers in his demand to find the truth by way of *action* and this has already given us cause to emphasise Jaspers' distinction between theoretical (c.q. contemplative) and non-theoretical (c.q. acting) thinking, which was intended in principle but not implemented. That we do not accept the equation of theory and *mere* contemplation, given the reality character of the theoretical-thinking act, goes without saying, but we reject all the more strongly the equating of 'confessing' with the (for Jaspers contemplative) pronouncement of a religious content.

Every inner and outer action encloses both thinking *and* believing. In Jaspers's presentation of the *Akt des Philosophierens*, we accept the presence of both modalities. As we saw earlier, Jaspers did not succeed in purging himself of the antinomy, lying in his anchoring of the control of belief distinction in the Consciousness in general. His 'faith' therefore turned out to be aimed at a *bounded* freedom and he lacks the right, against the same background, to address this reproach to the - truly - Christian confession.

On the contrary: when Jaspers 'confesses' (p. 475): "Das höchste Wissen der Philosophie spricht sich als [151] Nichtwissen aus, das aber nicht das anfangliche, zugunsten des Wissens aufzuhebende Unwissen, sondern das auf dem Grunde allen Wissens, erst an dessen Grenzen

sich vollendende Nichtwissen ist" ["The highest knowledge of philosophy expresses itself as [151] ignorance, which, however, is not the initial ignorance to be abolished in favour of knowledge, but the ignorance that is completed at the basis of all knowledge, only at its limits"], then this is a confession der Vernunft überhaupt constituted from the Bewusstsein, and his belief in freedom appears to be *broken* in this bondage. The 'Negieren', 'Kraft der Befreiung', nevertheless takes *the last word* from this brokenness, and it can no longer complain about finding an *equally entitled*, rejecting the all-embracing competence of Reason, last word *opposite* it.

This 'opposite' is *not* a *sought-after* 'opposite', in which one person, philosophising, would like to set himself against another in a need to maintain principles once adopted. This should finally be understood. We do not share the desire for communication as expressed by Jaspers, and precisely with him, who has done this in such a profound way. However, we want to take philosophical thinking limits seriously, limits which do not coincide with the limits of (pre-theoretical, pre-philosophical) thinking, limits which inevitably raise the question of the choice of *the last word*, whether it is 'spoken' under philosophical (scientific, theological) control or without such control, but which in any case rests on a choice prior to this control.

We thus set off with Jaspers into the 'innere' and 'Auszere' action, under which the accomplishment of all thought acts, without any privilege for an 'Act of Philosophising' and, if one wishes, for an 'Akt des Glaubens', is included, and raise, within the context currently under discussion, the question of the measure of 'simultaneity' in the praesens of all modalities. It is [152] inherent to the question of time in the 'trajectory of movement' of fundamental dynamis. The yardstick in question, as we saw, cannot be found in any of the modalities among all of them. Whoever tries to do so will, as we saw, be thrown to and fro in the internally antinomian dialectic of the fundamental denominators. Sartre may accuse Jaspers of being a philosopher of the 'classe descendante', who takes refuge in an idea of transcendence, but with this Sartre's consciousness of freedom itself does not logically rise above the Sartrian reflet-reflétant, even though, dialectically, it wants to provide the utmost critique of dialectical reason (see *Critique de la Raison dialectique*, pg. 21/22, 30/31, 111). Jaspers who, as we saw, cannot keep himself free from a fundamental and antinomian dialectic either - both want to acknowledge the dialectic, but obviously see no antinomy - has not hidden the trajectory of freedom in a *merely horizontal* historicism, but has proclaimed the 'vertical' counter-pole. He explicates as far as possible the choice, which Sartre in his second period had thoughtfully implied in communist organisational activity and about which Merleau-Ponty had not failed to reproach him before (see especially *Les Aventures de la Dialectique* 1955 passim).

However, this explication could not necessarily extend beyond the dialectic with Jaspers, but (thanks to the control of Reason), 'acting', causes him to get stuck on the 'simultaneity' of the modalities in the 'Gegenwart' (the 'existential praesen').

Dissolution of the modalities from the bondage of the fundamentally antinomian dialectic, in which they are entangled both with Jaspers and with Sartre through the *belief in reason* as [153] *the last word*, can thus only take place from another '*last word*'.

As we look forward to the last word of freedom, we universally find around us the tradition of Western European philosophy, as it has sought to encompass the totality from Parmenides onwards, first in its metaphysical, then in its ontologising systems. Humanist idealism from Kant to Hegel directed its *critical* philosophy against these systems and called Western reflection back to knowing and historically-dialectical subjectivity. Following in Kierkegaard's footsteps, the philosophy of existence was directed against the rational *systematicity* of this dialectic with its basic denominator and total history. She did not want to completely reject the term "ontology" for herself, but did not want to arouse the suspicion that she, too, was referring to a closed rational "system". However, when she tried to make Kierkegaard's prophecy 'phenomenological' fruitful for philosophy, she ran the risk from the start of encountering a similar criticism as the one she had directed against critical idealism and the 'uncritical' philosophies that preceded it. While idealism tried to substitute historical subjectivity for the human subject, which had previously solidified into a philosophical object, the philosophy of existence in its turn found itself in the antinomies of 'existence' of the designing philosopher discussed above. Around the ancient 'thinking of being' of the Hellenes, the chain of criticism necessarily had to close ever more tightly.

Thus, on the one hand, in the consequence of Kierkegaard's indictment, man in his originality was increasingly extrapolated<sup>29</sup> *outside* the closed ring [154] of reasoning, on the other hand, on the part of 'analytic' and positivist thinking, the possibility of determining 'objectivity' also disappeared more and more from view and was gradually replaced by the advance of the subjective 'model' with its hypotheses, experiments and formulations, bound by the teleological law of perfection.

The humanist ideal of personality, which for a moment - albeit tragically - revived as 'personalism' with the philosophy of existence, finally capitulated under this state of affairs, as we have already noted, to the forces of its religious opposite. On the other side, in principle, there is no longer any question of a *scientific* ideal, but the scientific urge for control has placed itself entirely in the service of 'action'. Regarding the situation of Western philosophy or rather of the entire Western attitude towards reality, Heidegger has long ago and rightly spoken of "Holzwege".

Behind all this run-down of proud humanist thought, which in its critical run-up thought it had done away with the old metaphysics, the *given* reality makes itself felt ever more keenly towards both poles of the absolutised theoretical-thinking relationship. It makes itself felt in its theoretical intangibility. Western thought is thus, as long as it does not intend to leave behind its religious principle of autonomy, thrown back on its last pretensions to truth, in other words on its last possible scientific word, in the hypostasis of the 'model' or 'the method', just mentioned [155]. It is the last possible word of a *dialectic* that has in fact passed beyond its reflection. Its pragmatic verification test is entirely in line with the situation outlined. In the place of logical 'objectivity', practical efficiency has taken its place, in the place

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<sup>29</sup> Not to be identified with the expression coming from other schools of thought, 'man as an eccentric being', which can be transiently placed on the line to be followed by us, but is not permanent in its ultimate scope.

of responsibly decisive 'existence', the experimental subject as autonomous archimedean zero point of activity. Behind both poles, the *meaning* of reality as such increasingly eludes the ever finer evolving 'approach'. This is only in accordance with its 'given' nature and *should* make clear to man that he is entirely dependent on the *choice of direction* to be taken *without* primarily setting an autonomous goal to be achieved. Where the refinement of logical and experimental instruments of knowledge seems to make the cause the ground of the supposed 'Gegenstand' recede proportionally further, and the philosophical-critical sharpest possible indication of decisive subjectivity cannot escape inner antinomy, the question of the truly transcendental direction of freedom and of the freeing last word now arises as a necessity to search for the basis of 'givenness'.

Philosophy has not been able to discover its basis; it has not been able to grasp its metaphysical givenness and has not been willing to accept it critically. It has sought its own basis in the movement of dialectics to the extreme. She *did not* want to *be* pointed in a 'direction'. Her last word was in the end, as Jaspers rightly pointed out, on the basis of knowing, a non-knowing.

The meaning of the 'Chiffren' known in its 'Gegenstandlichkeit' remains meaningless to the analysing and positivising scientific community and, in the philosophy of existence, on behalf of the philosophically bound [156] 'existence'. The final 'decision' may end in the abyssal 'leap', but this 'abyss' is also included by the 'thinking of being'.

As the question of communication - which after all cannot remain without a decision, albeit shifted to the deepest possible level - became and becomes a problem, the meaning of not-knowing will have to be grasped all the more sharply. Being and non-being, taken beyond their metaphysical meaning in an existential philosophical sense, may remain intertwined in an endless dialectic of contradiction and identity, this dialectic itself represents the thinking-of-being (non-being). With the non-thinking of the dialectic of being, its polarity has lapsed. This does not mean that I cannot think this dialectic,<sup>30</sup> but that in fact I do not think it, because I have chosen against this thinking (the dialectic in question) rather than against thinking it. So the question is: what makes me choose for or against thinking this dialectic, and the answer cannot be other than that in the one case the consequence of the thinkingly untraceable, religious, dialectic of human autonomy and rationality in the history of Western philosophical self-reflection forces the choice more, while the opposite choice also results from a thinkingly untraceable decision in the grounds of human existence.

However, a distinction remains. The choice *against* the consequences of autonomous thinking will not be understood by those who have opted for the latter, in philosophy [157] both on the analytic-positivist wing and on the for the time being opposite, as a consequence of *religious* tradition.

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. already Jaspers' 'Philosophie' 2nd ed., 1948, p. 713: "Beides wird durch Denken erreicht, das im Sichüberschlagen zum Nichtdenkenkönnen als Denken transzendiert, indem es sich aufhebt" ["Both are achieved through thinking, which transcends itself as thinking by cancelling itself out and becoming non-thinking"]. See also further t.a.p.

The not-knowing of philosophy completed at the limits of all knowing and on the ground of this knowing, with Jaspers, as its highest knowing, falls, against his intentions, under the questions of the 'dialectics of being' just discussed. The Nichtwissen, about which Jaspers pretends to speak, is that concerning an 'Etwas' at the end of the transcendental 'Act of Philosophising', as to which, according to him, Christian transcendence faith would adhere; in other words: the 'Corporality' of transcendence. In doing so, Jaspers moves in similar lanes to Heidegger in his earlier reproach about the salvaging of Christians' belief in a creative God as origin. Both themselves thrust transcendently forward into the (for us – only - 'gegenstandliche',<sup>31</sup> therefore abstract) identity of being and non-being, about which there is indeed nothing to know on the basis of a 'Consciousness in general'.

In relation to said 'Etwas', Jaspers concludes to non-being. Against the non-being of the individualities, the universal being<sup>32</sup> *remains*, which, dialectically-transcendent, coincides with the 'Nichts' and can be experienced on both sides by the individual 'Dasein'. Within Jaspers' own world of thought (and to an important degree within that of the philosophy of existence integrally), the question now is, whether he sees what he sees in Christian belief as faith under 'Corporality', has sufficiently understood and thought through from the roots of this philosophy of life when, according to his conclusions, he cannot but regard what he calls 'Corporality' as an 'Etwas', which could at most be an important 'Chiffer' for the transcendence (of Being/non-being).

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If, partly due to theological misunderstanding, this should not be the case, then such an obstacle should certainly be removed. Apart from that, however, we continue to stand for the dialectic of being as a dialectic of thinking ('being' of thinking), which in turn is a thinking of the dialectic (thinking of 'being'), behind which twofold dialectic in its various historical metamorphoses from Parmenides onwards, and in spite of Heidegger et al, 'rational' cannot be asked back.

The possibilities of this dialectic as the last word decide the impossibilities of 'knowing', its *impossibilities* over those of *non-knowing*.

If the 'Etwas' at issue is not 'etwas' and, in the highest instance, contests Jaspers' 'Reason' as its 'thinking-of-being', this does not threaten the discussion, let alone end it, but its rules of play are called into question and the tribunal of Reason among the discussants is demolished. That is, *as a* tribunal; scope and competence of the 'rational' criterion itself come into question.

The putative 'Etwas' will not submit to any 'subject-object' relation of immanent place nor any attribution of rank, and thus will solve the whole dialectic of thinking and being (non-being). It will find for itself the exclusive competence to point out the direction of freedom sought in vain within the confines of 'Reason'. It will do this by setting the dynamis of completion at the origin of the trajectory of time, in the place of the no longer questionable

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<sup>31</sup> I.e. with principle elimination of the 'Fundamental operation'.

<sup>32</sup> See note 5.

but internally antinomian dialectic of reason. With this, any right to speak of *Etwas*, 'Corporality', Chiffer [159] or Fundamental operation with respect to him has lapsed and the claim in a complete interchange of roles is clearly stated.

The conversation, meanwhile, is between people who, as soon as they leave behind the idea of universally valid Reason, have no primordial competence to contribute and, set in time, need only ask for the true *praesens* of 'sameness'.

The dimension where we place ourselves after all that has been discussed, in *casu* as far as possible with Jaspers, is the *transcendental* one.

### **The 'sameness' and the transcendental time unit.**

In full recognition of what it brought to light objectively, we are aware, with this choice, not to expect an outcome of a primarily objectivising thinking. After all, this turned out to depend, either 'metaphysically' or analytically-positivising, in every respect on transcendental presuppositions, while, either uncritically or under pretence that they lead methodically to nothing, one had definitively rejected any thought of them.

For us, however, we take no direction *through* or *on* a transcendental *thinking*, but direction *in* the transcendental *action* with connected, theoretically distinct, thinking. It is in this transcendental action - in the broadest sense - that the origin dynamics of creation, on the substrate and in the extension of its physical and biotic energies, comes to manifest expression. Acts of thought as such only appear *in the consequence* of human actions and other acts as an outgrowth of the conscious discernment residing therein. The, if one wants to call it functional, character of the creature is expressed, as we have already seen, in the dynamics of action. Theoretical thinking only functions properly insofar as it shows itself to be [160] conscious of being subject to this transcendental dynamic in the universality of its act structure. This is the first test of the thinker's subjective choice of position, the *first* condition for a *truly* open exchange of ideas. Especially Karl Jaspers fulfilled this condition, insofar as it was *possible* for him; the bond of Reason set insurmountable limits.

Yet even in this way the problem, which we call the 'modal simultaneity' problem, has not yet found a solution, despite an initial transcendental choice of direction. After all, 'transcendental' in this context does not just mean avoiding the apostasy of direction to an (immanent) '*etwas*', as Jaspers reproached Barth, but also avoiding a apostasy to any kind of dialectic of *modalities* of man's temporal existence among themselves, in the vein of Jaspers' 'Act of Philosophising', controlled by reason and as such '*vernünftig*' led by reason. Choosing a transcendental direction cannot suffice with following the urge to rise above subject-object bondage. The choice of *direction* comes first and cannot *depend* on a 'Fundamental operation' to be carried out, because then - and in a *different* direction - direction *has already been chosen*.

For our part, therefore, we now pose the question: what in earnest does the *self-given* knowing of existence mean? The reader will have understood that we in no way doubt the seriousness of Jaspers' problem and the path he points out in it. However, freedom 'giving' transcendence itself could not free itself from the internal bonds of Reason. The *idea* of

transcendence was in transcendental direction the extreme to which Jaspers, if he wanted to remain taken seriously within the circle of autonomous philosophising, [161] could come. The term 'given' therefore remains 'Reason-bound'; the 'existential' of existential choice gets its relief only against the background of the philosophical rationality tradition.

Since the beginnings of scholasticism, sovereign meaning-making and being-of-thinking have been identified with each other within an all-embracing rational frame of being, and theology has not least contributed to this, it requires a truly superhuman tension and effort to come to terms with the *freedom* of being granted to oneself. It goes without saying that this has nothing to do with an a-logical, let alone antilogical, freedom. It means: a completely *super-rational* being of that which, by exclusion, may be called freedom. This must be said for Western man and for those who, half aware of its origins, want to share the fruits of Western culture. Above reason, i.e. above all that which arises from the intellect, is performed on the intellect, is controlled by the intellect, wholly or in part.

To know oneself endowed by true 'Transcendence' can only mean: being placed on the transcendental line of equivalence, with one's face turned upwards, before the modal temporalities can be brought into view. The 'present' of physical, biological, historically tested time measurement cannot find its meaning outside the line that transcendently binds all these 'present' together and makes them part of human action, under its endlessly differentiated point of view and purposes pursued from there.

It is this truth that every special science has to firmly envisage when talking about 'time'. However, even all special sciences together [162] will continue to lose track of time beyond the 'total' temporality that can only be found, and then only *currently*, in human action and the reflection (consciousness, discernment) associated with it. The viewpoint under which, in a specific sense, the action is carried out (social, legal, economic, political, scientific) is irrelevant in this respect. This dynamis springs from its origin, in terms of human action in each individual human being in the fullness of his humanity as it is linked to that of the others, each time resting on an individual and untransferably subjective decision, made consciously or unconsciously. The latter has rightly been accentuated by the philosophy of existence. This decision, however, is decision from given freedom. So what does this mean in contrast to the view of the philosophy of existence? The points of view, under which man acts in time, are indeed endlessly varied according to the multitude of structures given to him, and within which he is given to himself, by Transcendence. If it is serious about this bestowed being, these structures cannot diverge from one another. Emerging from one root, they will have to be directed towards one destination, given from that root. It is this direction that determines the praesens in each time facet and consequently their intermodal simultaneity. Only from here can one speak of a modal praesen (e.g. the historical-existential) as truly simultaneous with every other modal praesen.

The sense expressed here is intensified as soon as we look at the differentiation of the convergent structures of the [163] various human actions just mentioned. It was already impossible to grasp the modal succession without at the same time seeing its meaning in the interconnectedness of all the modalities of the *same* action. Man performs his *different* actions in modal temporal *order*, an order that cannot be measured against any of the modal

temporal orders on its own. It is the order of a supramodal decision-making to actualise 'now'. And it is from this 'praesens', that the intermodal (consequently: modal) simultaneity is fixed. Whatever differentiated character these actions may have among themselves and whatever the modal time distance of their completion, they continue to manifest their unity as *human* actions in the convergent search of the intermodal transcendental time dimension. And it is in this convergent differentiation that the bestowed and bestowing *freedom* finds its expression.

It is the order of a supramodal decision-making to actualization 'now'. And it is from this 'present' that the intermodal (thereby: modal) simultaneity is fixed. Whatever differentiated character these actions may show among themselves and whatever the modal time distance of their completion may be, they continue to manifest their unity as human action in the convergent search of the intermodal transcendental time dimension. And it is in this convergent differentiation that the given and bestowing freedom finds its expression.

### **Review of the road of dialectics**

It is not unintentionally – though not with premeditation – that we have sought a fairly close connection with the expressions of Karl Jaspers. We believe that the core of what is at stake between Western philosophy and scriptural thought has been expressed most accurately in his work, especially his last work, from the integral point of view of this philosophy. For us, the dispute was between the conception of the true dynamis of origin and the dialectics that wanted to take its place, but which nevertheless could only draw the possibility of an internal and external dialectic from *its* driving force.

[164]

We successively met several dialectics, viz.

*Being and Non-being*, encompassed by *thought*.

Thinking of Being (and non-being) versus Being of Thinking, producing: Noetic-Ontic.

All encompassed by the fundamentally religious dialectic of rational calculability and contingency.

Further:

Kensubjectivity (consciousness) - Gegenstand.

(Conscious) Existence - field of (phenomenological) decision space.

Archimedean point of logical modelling - field of pragmatic control.

All encompassed by the fundamentally religious dialectic of rational autonomy and autonomous rationality.

The dialectics of the second group, under the religious humanist impulse of human sovereignty, grew out of those of the first, under 'critical' continuation of the old undercurrent especially in the primary hypostasis of the autonomy of the intellect.

The theoretically abstracted subject-object relation of the analytical modality of theoretical thought-acts, which - in the abstract - reveals a logical dialectic<sup>33</sup>, is the underlying methodical framework of religiously driven philosophical origin dialectics, as examined above.

In the last half of the 20th century, this development found its consummation in the no longer possible mutual *theoretical* dialectic of the practical fundamental contradiction of ever more retreating reflection on freedom and consistently implemented pragmatism, as highlighted continuously above.

We now have to give a definitive answer to the [165] question we started with, i.e. whether the relationship between the *real* origin movement and the religious dialectic which, as a philosophical origin dialectic, seeks to dominate Western culture, is *itself* dialectical, yes or no.

The answer will have to be found around the thesis of givenness in the sense of revelation.

Givenness and dialectics are incompatible.

Dialectics has been the refuge in which the Western intellectual has allowed himself to be stowed away and thrown to and fro between the poles of his supposedly autonomous activity. In the end, he pretended to be willing to accept any risk that the dialectic would bring upon him and reproached those who rejected it for their lack of intellectual and moral courage. There was one decisive risk, which he *did not* take and feared above all else, and that was the sacrificium intellectus to below any possibility of paradox, as we have discussed.

He has not wanted to understand that there is nothing to sacrifice outside the realm of the worshipped god. His only excuse for this short-sightedness was the construction of a 'supernature' that he had found in the sanctuary of reason. However, he failed to see that it had been a product of 'reason' itself and could therefore only intensify and incite the pain and play of dialectics.

It is meanwhile utterly impossible to make givenness, by whatever 'Basic knowlegde', plausible for a rationality, which in *truth does not* allow itself to be deprived of the first and last word. To the detriment of every conceivable dialectic, the intellect will search for all conceivable ground nodes in order to escape capitulation to the creaturely given. It will make the continuity of its thinking break through every antinomy [166] until the, no longer questionable, ground of the denied religious presupposition of the autonomy of reason is reached. In our discussions on this point above, we hope to have sufficiently illustrated this course of events. Dialectics turned out to be the appropriate means for the attempt to escape from the fundamental contradiction, and this cannot but be considered consistent, since the religious driving force of this reflection itself shows no dynamics other than the dialectical one. As said, it was that of autonomous rationality and rational autonomy.

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<sup>33</sup> Formerly called 'dialectics' of the third degree by us.

Rational autonomy thus takes the place of givenness as a dynamis of origin and chooses the dialectically structured path of theoretical thinking (the theoretical Gegenstandsrelation) as its accompanying means of revelation.

### **The transcendental sense of belief imposes itself on all.**

The primary terms at issue will now have to take their place on our part.

"Philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung" ['Philosophical faith in the face of revelation'] is a formulation, which we accept as perfectly consistent on Jaspers' part and, as far as the 'angesichts' is concerned, particularly appreciate. Indeed, for him it comes down to 'believing'. Seen from the perspective of rational-autonomous philosophical subjectivity, it can only be about *believing* freely, about *knowing* oneself to be given. And in 'angesichts' he has expressed the close *communicative* involvement of this faith in what he values in the dispensations of Christian belief.

However, it could not succeed in reaching an agreement concerning the *level* of meeting of this knowing-non-knowing faith on the one hand and revelation as [167] revelation on the other, as the title of Jaspers' book suggested. The cause of this lay in the question of the scope of the measure of level-height. For Jaspers, this had to be the 'Reason' founded in the 'Consciousness in general'. The yardstick ends where rational knowing has reached the end of its orbit in its dialectic with rational freedom. Together the two pronounce it their joint last possible word: transcendence. In a strict sense it already belongs to the sphere of nonknowing, but also with regard to knowing about its *presence* there, indeed precisely in this, it shows itself as the focal point of fundamental dialectics. Der philosophische Glaube' is the belief in the exclusivity of this dialectic.

The Christian faith invited to communicate by Jaspers, on the other hand, cannot accept this standard of the rational dialectic of freedom as the measure of the level required for communication. His "faith"? wants to bring the Christian wholeheartedly into thought and speech contact with Jaspers' "philosophische Glaube", since the Christian himself is behind this desire, therefore behind this contact, and he knows himself to be "in solidarity" with all people in weakness and lack of faith. From this point of view, in line with Jaspers' claim, he experiences the same respect for everyone's sincere faith as he asks for his own honest intentions. What he cannot do, however, *at any price*, is believe in the redialectic founded and untranscendable by Jaspers.

Jaspers' philosophische Glaube is born of the philosophical reflection, which he has expressed throughout his oeuvre, and in a sharply concentrated manner in *this work*, as a result of his rational freedom thinking, proclaimed in the name of Truth. In it, he [168] has spoken the 'last word'<sup>34</sup> along dialectical lines. The choice of this dialectic, however far removed from its temporary beginnings and occurring in modern form, was in the age-old line of Western *acceptance* of the 'Rational' word.

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<sup>34</sup> The reader will have understood sufficiently how this term in no way suggests that any philosopher, let alone at a certain moment in time, would think he possesses a closed wisdom. On this point with regard to Jaspers, see also *Creation Revelation and Philosophy*, p. 28, note

This *acceptance* itself was *not* of rational origin, nor has it ever been able to indicate one in all its development. And only after *this* has been established, *beyond* the rational criterion *that no longer* applies here, on the level really sought, can a comparison be made that can exist for the forum of truth. Here we are in the zone of the *given*, which *as such* is offered for acceptance to the (structurally belonging to the given) 'faith', either i.e. the concrete faith of autonomous rationality (phil. Glaube) or that of God's creation.

*For acceptance*, i.e. to *know*. Reason has no measure to delimit zones of knowing and non-knowing against each other. Only the teleological worship of *theoretical* thinking as completely distinct and the measure of all distinctions has led us astray. As we have already noted, man *learns* to know in his actions, on condition, however, that these actions take the right direction.

*Will take*', because this is what has to be learned in the first place. Man will thereby, in neither practical nor theoretical activity, originally find an objectivity (c.q. world) *opposite* him, which he brings closer to himself by functional or operational means [169]. This representation rests on primary abstraction of the analytical modality with the secondary denominators of mathematical, physical, linguistic or, as far as continental Western European philosophy still in force is concerned, historical nature, operationally required within such abstraction.

As long as someone thinks she must search for the direction of truth within modal timeframes, she remains, as we saw, trapped in the dialectic between logical thinking and its basic denominators, since the given creatureliness of logical modality *within* the individuality structure of *theoretical thought-acts* - which given has been *a priori absolutised* - exhibits this architecture of an analytic-synthetic dialogue. In other words: within this absolutisation we find, according to the needs of the philosophical stage of development of non-Christian philosophy, the instrumental wrapping of the 'dialectics of the third degree'.

However, the choice of direction in no way takes place as such between getting lost 'horizontally', *as one chooses*, in basic denominators chosen from theoretical thinking or, equally as one chooses, taking the right, transcendental, course. When we have rejected the rule of the game dictated by thinking presented as autonomous, this in no way heralds the preparation of our own autonomous choice of rule of the game for ourselves and others. Choosing the modal absolutisations cannot mean, therefore, that the transcendental path has thereby fallen out of sight. On the contrary: the transcendental direction *imposes itself on everyone*. One *must* begin to walk in it and does so.

It is this state of affairs, precisely, that shows itself in reason-belief. The whole idea of the 'Act of Philosophising', transcending subject-object duality, found its basis in the supposedly exclusive reliability of this duality. Outside the sphere of influence of its dialectical tension in the 'Fundamental operation', there was no longer any 'knowing'. The *transcendental* line is seemingly followed only by the faith of freedom. In reality, however, this faith of freedom was utterly *bound* by another *faith* which, as just argued, had accepted its no longer rationally demonstrable norm in 'reason', which, rejecting this title, can only be recognised by us as one of the modalities of man's immanent temporal existence. The creature-given possibility for this deception concerning the universal bond in and through the 'Reason' lies only in the

originally *mutual involvement* of *all* modalities, which Western man, in order to *anchor* his confidence, had resorted in the first place to his distinctive entry into nature. That this is a going against the *transcendental* norm remains hidden from the reason-believer as a result of his spontaneous *surrender* to the relevant absolutisation, surrender as the hallmark of faith par excellence.

Thus, the believer in reason does not perceive that he is bound as such under the meaning-defining transcendental norm of faith, and possibly only the pole of his specific rededialectic (e.g. Jaspers: freedom) opposite to thought - but now with the help of a 'Fundamental operation' that has become necessary - appears under the illumination of the sense of faith.

It is this meaning, meanwhile, that points *everyone* in the transcendental direction and *forces them* to go there. It is rather incomprehensible that Western man has not [171] realised this instead of being surprised at the opposite.

### **The sovereignty of freedom and the limits of knowing and non-knowing.**

Jaspers sharply discerned this compulsion when he wanted to make a last fundamental confession of his humanist faith, and in the history of Western philosophy this should be given careful attention before it threatens to sink into a religious dialectic of myth and pragmatism. God will not protect it from this, for His faithfulness does not secure apostasy from the path once pointed out for salvation. Jaspers gave the final consequence to the historical-genealogical connection between Christian faith and humanism and rightly saw this connection along the trajectory of *freedom*. Within the span of 'Reason', in opposition to Christian faith, he has invoked this connection. And he has spoken of the 'signs'.

He focused on the problem *of* signs, and for him it concerned that of 'Basic knowlegde', which could not be a sign itself and thus claimed all signs for itself. The Basic knowledge was the *knowing* of rational freedom.

How entirely different is the meaning of Jaspers' Chiffren from that of the symbols of pragmatist philosophies, though they mutually meet in the polar tension of both reason's beliefs. The latter consciously deny the depth dimension of their signs, although they too cannot shake it off. They consider themselves to be only thinkingly placed in the midst of life's diversity and say they have no pretensions to be able to encompass it thinkingly. In the meantime, this thinking deals with the areas *of* life (belonging to the various disciplines) [172] and sees itself forced into *universal* methodology by the law of continuity of analysis. The most far-reaching adaptation of this to the diverse objects cannot detract from this, only sharpen the antinomies that present themselves in the search for the infamous verification test.

Jaspers drew the transcendental trajectory of freedom through his Chiffren. He pointed out its modal as well as individual character, albeit under illumination by the basic motif that drives him, and highlighted the limits on which a scientific continuity that considers itself autonomous had to run aground. Continuity is reserved for the 'Act of Philosophising'. It carries the autonomy of the rationally transcendental movement.

Opposed to both dialectics of origin is the continué dynamis of signs, of *the* sign of creation. In this dynamis we meet the sovereignty of *freedom*. Its trajectory is the linear creaturely time we have been talking about, as it shows itself to man in time in the midst of the different aspects and in the totality of its transcendental direction.

To man in time, i.e. *under* the law (sense) of time, within which he can only look *upwards*, without ever being able to look down on it thinking from above. He cannot do this, neither in the pretended modesty of an interpretative dialectic nor in a pragmatic methodology that rivals its modesty. For the boundaries, which demarcate this modesty by setting the 'critical boundary' between knowing and not-knowing, escape the control of time-bound theoretical knowing.

In whatever dialectic man tries to establish his modesty in this respect, it is precisely because of this attempt [173] that his (humanly speaking: unintentional) immodesty always reappears. The sole cause of this is that the boundaries *are* determined over his head, and in such a way that he is obliged to *know* when this does *not* fit within his chosen dialectic of origin, obliged on pain of being *stranded* in the knowing that was imposed on him by this dialectic.

## Chapter IV

### THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM VERSUS THE 'ORIGIN' DIALECTIC.

#### **Dialectics and direction of freedom**

The transcendental law of belief is imposed on man as the law of creation dynamics. It is only from these dynamics that dialectics derive their interpolary mobility. It finds its rightful place within the framework of the fundamental dynamics; the most striking example of this structural dialectic can be found in the analytical modality of theoretical thought, which we have discussed several times. But even the absolutisation of dialectics as a movement of origin can only live on *given* dynamics. The fallen belief lives by the grace of the norm that determines the meaning of belief.

It is from this point of view that we can only speak of 'structure'. The concept of structure in modern 'positivist' science has an entirely subjectivist character, arising as it does from the natural scientific method of experimenting with the help of hypotheses. As soon as this method is used outside the boundaries of the original field of study, we come up against the boundaries to which Jaspers assigned a place in his doctrine of the Chiffren and which we have come to know as modal boundaries. Since modern science, from its principle of religious autonomy, cannot accept any given limits and in its sharp reaction against continental Western European philosophy of reflection, ignores the latter's arguments, it reduces the concept of structure to a constructive auxiliary hypothesis [175] for the provisional scientific ordering of the facts. The facts themselves are regarded as functional and ever-to-be-determined manifestations of an unknowable reality, of which nothing can definitively be said except that it functions.

We have repeatedly pointed out how, in the logical-analytical subject-object relationship with its successive encompassings, which is made independent by theoretical thinking, both the subject and the object pole have gradually receded. The scientific 'modesty' just discussed gives way to its not-knowing in the corporatisation of the dialectic of methods, ignoring every sign of creation. But behind its not-knowing, reality itself looms ever more palpably clear, with its *imposed structure* that can *never* be found by *theoretical means*.

And with this we are again faced in a specific way with the problem of *time*. Edmund Husserl, in his idea of the teleology of philosophising, saw, in the place of the ancient 'ideal' reality, as the guiding perspective of theoretical thinking still the further penetration into the (phenomenologically grasped) givens. He rightly pointed out, with and after Dilthey father of the last philosophy of reflection, that only concentration on 'subjectivity' could help us preserve direction. People did not listen to him and, carried away in pragmatic pursuit of success and effect, scattered endlessly in the 'objectivities'. Only one point remained fixed: autonomous logic *as* thinking. There is no place today for ideals like Husserl's, not only because of human failure, but because theoretical thinking as such proved incapable of discovering even the phenomenon of the given. Only the latter has maintained itself and *must*

continue to maintain itself under constant negation of its basic antinomy, as long as the autonomy of rationality will not lower the flag.

Yet Husserl had been fundamentally correct in his attempt to call attention, if he believed definitively, to subjectivity. Although this attempt had to break with the pendulum movement of practical, religious, dialectics, it meant to point to the only direction in which multiplicity could be involved in unity. Husserl, by the path he chose, could not succeed in achieving this unity. Beyond the crucial nature of the problem of intersubjectivity, his dialectical thinking also failed to achieve it.

Only one choice now remains: either to abandon contemplation once and for all and throw oneself into a radical pragmatism, where necessary with an equally pragmatic grasp of a modern conception of supernaturalism Or, in deliberate contemplation, to break just as definitively with all dialectics and let this contemplation take its course via human selfhood *as freedom*, which cannot be reduced to any existence, cogito or the like. What must be known on this path can primarily not be any Gegenstand, but the *direction of* this freedom.

The direction of freedom, behold our agreement with K. Jaspers. Without attachment to rational belief, behold our opposition to his endeavour.

We cannot predetermine what will meet our path within the *given* creatureliness. We cannot, like Jaspers, and with him more generally the philosophy of existence, give Consciousness in general free rein in the practice of science. We see, with him, limits like Chiffren and do not count, like modern logicism, on 'in itself' verifiable [177] origins in any Gegenstand. However, we firmly reject the internally closed axiom systems etc. as sufficient means to *approximate* a (functioning) reality.

The possibility cannot be ruled out that similar methods can play a useful role, taking into account the a priori recognisable boundary marks, but what is decisive for the value of this service is neither its inner closedness nor its practical effect, but the *content* of the hypotheses, from which its activity starts.

In this content, from beginning to end, the thread leading to the furthest source from which "hypotheses" originate will be visible to the eye of a sincere transcendental critic. And there the 'criterion' becomes known which has been used for the demarcation of knowing and not-knowing, as we discussed above. If it was that of theoretical rationality, it is unreliable, since it escapes final criticism.

### **Law of Liberty.**

The *direction* of freedom. Having withdrawn from every autonomy of rationality – nevertheless bound by *given* rationality – the Christian asks himself on which he may practically and theoretically commit himself.

Practically first, because we saw that theoretical thinking remains only a (in its own way practical) processing of distinctions perceived by acting (experiencing). Theoretically next, when, at the service of practice, a theoretical vocation falls to him.

He has had *to* commit himself because he had to *go forward*, even when he knows, later on, to correct himself, The first thing he knows for sure as a Christian is that no *autonomous* insight can give any guarantee.

[178]

When the fruits of autonomous thinking have taken root in the coherence of life, he will not always quickly recognise them as such. This is also why he will not, because no autonomous thinking can go beyond what was *given* in truth and thus, albeit wrongly ordered and applied, has brought realities to light.

Never, however, can the manifestation and so-called reality simply lay claim to 'truth'. To do so, it must be set *in the direction* of truth, it must show *the sign* of the given truth.

And this sign, we may have noted sufficiently, falls within no 'thinking-of-being', in old or new, in philosophy-believing or logic-believing vein.

When such "thinking-of-being", within the scheme and supernatural-natural duality with theologising philosophising attached to it, has taken the form of promulgating creation ordinances, the Christian has to be just as wary as with the a-létheia of modern philosophy of being or with the sweetly flowing semi-theological semantics about the term "truth in Holy Scripture".

After all, even in the use of these terms themselves, everything depends on the direction in which they are used. Especially at a time like ours, when so much attention is being paid to linguistic sense and supposed univocality, vigilance towards 'autonomous' purity is called for. For the purity itself obviously springs from the same dialectic of origin as the mental climate in which it was born.

A correct discernment of *the* truth will therefore be all the more difficult, since its confirmation is obtained only in the long struggle of life of mankind, [179] indeed within the time horizon it shows itself only for faith. Which faith is in the lead in the discussion about the meaning of truth for all areas of life, finally also for the theoretical including "theology" cum annexis?

The Christian who, even as far as his religious discernment itself is concerned, has for so long been subjected to a God-co-containing law of his own thinking, most deceptively compelling by appearances to the contrary, will not easily be able, often even dare, to take the direction of *freedom*. And yet only on this path do the signs of creation make themselves known.

They *are* signs of God's faithfulness, but not to be seen along the path of any theooria, nor serving as a beacon to secure human cultural activity.

It is here that the Christian will have to make a decisive, under certain aspect perhaps especially difficult for him, choice. *Against every* hold in this world. However, he will *have to* make it, now that the tradition of Western wisdom, right down to its late-humanist turns, is about to abandon him, and the principle of the great Reformation seems to be led historically into crisis by means of and ecclesiastical adaptive doctrine.

The question then arises as to what the consequences of a philosophy meant as scriptural will be today. We know the position of ancient scholasticism and have occasionally criticised modern contradictory or participatory concepts. We now feel that we must oppose in the same sharp way that we oppose anything that can be categorised in any nuance under the heading of 'common grace'. However, the question of the basis of all this criticism repeats itself.

The efforts of the Christian philosopher should [180] constantly remain focused on actualising to the utmost the potential of transcendental criticism. Finally, however, as we saw, the final decision on the 'yardstick' must be made and the consequences of that decision must be drawn in a positive sense.

For us, it is about the revelation of God in his creation with the complete exclusion of any dualistic template. After settling with every form of religious dialectic as a dynamism of origin, the question inevitably arises as to how this dynamism of origin is active as an origin in creation and how we can catch sight of it - consequently the reality of creation. After all, it already appeared to be it, which first made any conception of dialectic as origin possible. And in every idea of origin we saw the human being's faith operating primarily and as enforced.

The first question now is: to what *should* man's faith be directed? Thus stated, it cuts off in advance the subjectivism that is definitively impossible here. We recall our appreciation of Karl Jaspers on this point; we could not follow his good intention on account of the precisely insoluble tension in the basic motive driving him between subjective freedom and universal rationality.

In others, bowing to the *exclusively* 'rational' standard of philosophical discussion has evoked the familiar false tensions of being thrown and forced into freedom.

For their part, Christians have struggled with the fundamental tension, lived as an antinomy, between the originally good creation and the undeniable disharmony in the development of temporal existence. We will not return to the attempts that have been made to [181] smooth out this antinomy on the basis of various supernatural-natural schemata. We can only consider that this religious dualism, in whatever form, owes its origin fundamentally to the felt need to rationally reconcile the sovereignty of God (in whose image man is created) with reason as the highest standard of knowledge. The dialectical 'criticism' and theology or philosophy that fights such 'rationalism' can no longer mislead us in this respect, since we know that it is not the subjective actuality that functions in its systematics, but the place of the philosopher or theologian in function itself, that indicates the true origin, which can no longer be questioned. Everything depends on whether *he* is prepared to leave the spectator's bench in order to place himself, and with that everything he has to say in the sector of scientific thinking, *under* the law of freedom.

The *law of liberty*. But are we not dealing here with a final antinomy as *asylum ignorantiae* with regard to the fundamental problem? Surrounded with a scriptural glow?

However: raising such a question immediately places us back on the side of the border from which we had started our unsuccessful attempts at a rational solution. Confession of the

sovereignty of God cannot be reconciled with such a choice of position. The consequences of Christian philosophising end in a completely one-sided listening.

For we know that we find ourselves facing pretensions of pseudo-revelation, of *last* words. And pseudo-revelation, having been contested in its creaturely (philosophical, theological) place by creaturely (transcendental-critical) means, can be adequately addressed only from Revelation.

[182] The revelation we are dealing with and within which the battle for free Origin is conducted in the manner described, is the revelation of creation, the only one understandable from man's side. However: the revelation of *disturbed* creation.

That, speaking of this, we are not primarily concerned with nature (though disturbed by its own nature), we presume to be familiar. The integral disharmony manifests itself in the Babylonian dispersion of human cultural work. In spite of the immutable law of differentiation and integration, which is necessary for the preservation of life, and even with the help of the space it opens up, man does not know where to turn in his "serving as a day labourer". The imposition, today, of pragmatic-positivist methodology provides its own ironic demonstration at this point. Unity of common denominator, unity of linguistic interpretation, raised as demands from self-unfulfilling illusions, betray the situation of self-alienation brought about by an unparalleled implementation of the Western-humanist drive for control.

Law of freedom in a disturbed creation, what does this mean amid and in the face of the 'origin dialectics' propelled by the Dynamis of Origin?

### **Modern historicism.**

If it is necessary to break with every dialectical basic motive, not excluding that of general and special grace, the 20th century Christian, amidst the acceleration of the integration process, is faced with the question of *what* the revelation of creation wants to reveal. A question, then, that asks directly against the tendency of the century. Instead of scattering [183] self-reflection, instead of mastery listening, instead of faith of scientific revelation the faith of revelation of the *Word*.

In the creation revelation, the Word reveals itself. It is neither the God of philosophers nor that of theologians. If for His part this Word *wants to* be their God, then it offers itself to them in *His* way. And this is not that of the Western tradition of thought.

The law of the Western tradition of thought in irrationalist 'Reason' form clasped Jaspers' transcendence-in-freedom. His extreme attempt to justify both together philosophically could not succeed. This attempt, which cannot be detached from the discussion with Jaspers' theological colleague, constitutes the historical-systematic conclusion in the development of Western philosophical theologia naturalis.

A critical question arises at this boundary: What is the principled distinction between theologia naturalis and biblical creation theology? This question is originally a *philosophical* one. But today it is *put to* theology in an entirely different form. The latter at least tries to answer it, apparently by making the gap between man in creation and the idea of revelation

ever wider and deeper, wider and deeper than it even was in adversarial or existentialist theology until now. The reality of creation is completely surrendered to the spirit of pragmatism and from there, breaking with every deceptive tradition, man must make of his relationship to God, insofar as it still interests him, what he can.

In any case, what is revealed in this attitude is that without speaking in the revelation of God *in creation* hic et nunc, man, of whatever age, *cannot* understand God's voice.

[184]

Hic et nunc, i.e. in a creation unfolding from its structures with hitherto unprecedented speed. Very fast, very concrete, very lost. The echoes from the poles of religious dialectics of origin echo each other in frightening ways.

Is there anything left to accept from an Origin that once looked upon its own work as 'very good', from Him being among us full of grace and truth, from the promise of the great reunion?

But is there anything to be expected from the remnants of the redialectic in pragmatism special science (to say nothing of contemporary philosophy that has become its servant) or from the human word of theology on *the Word*?

Whether one wants to acknowledge it or not - and by definition one cannot - our much-discussed stand *has* collapsed. There is only one more question to ask, that of the gaoler at Philippi.

But then it is a cry from creation; a cry, through man's mouth, *from* creation. The West, which for the first thousand years after Philippi has been at the forefront of catching and transmitting that cry and receiving and making the answer understood, has to watch.

It is about the call of, and the voiced response *in*, creation.

Yes, in creation and not through a theology distanced (legitimately *according to* its structure) from its sister sciences. Not through a separate revelation alongside or above that of creation, but through the service of creation from its root integrally.

Every nature-super-nature dualism *must* fall. This demand is therefore so severe because it inexorably demands the total abdication of *all* theoretical thinking, philosophical, theological, orthodox or liberal, rationalist or irrationalist, [185] and silences every dialectic of origin. To the furthest disguises of this dialectic, he silences this thinking and returns it to its structural place. That distinguished structural place is place of honour in place of slave service to pragmatism.

Creation sighs and cries, and through its service comes the answer. The answer of the Word. Later, philosophy and theology may also serve this Word in their own place and distance. But it is creation that receives and arranges in man, *as* man and no less, the first ministry.

For the Christian of Western culture, who has often thought to understand intellectually ('der kleine Theologe') before the revelation of creation has been sufficiently experienced, a difficult question, often repressed, remains, as noted, even when the rationalist or adversarial

double scheme is rejected. It is this: how can God's revelation be understood from His good creation, which has meanwhile *been* corrupted? When it comes to creation revelation, does honesty before God not leave death and hopelessness the last word? Where can something of God's footstep be heard? Can *He* be recognised in what man has sometimes called 'law' or creation order?

Moreover, among these creative orders there is one that seems eminently suited to distorting our understanding. We met it in particular when we discussed the temporal nature of creation and the responsible action of man as he lives on the basis of his "natural substratum". We talked about the succession of time in the modal sense, but discovered that it can only be understood from the transcendental dimension of time. In doing so, in considering existentialist philosophy, we came across the important figure of the existential praesens. It turned out to have been absolutised by the philosophy of existence in its 'historically' *modal* sense, i.e. historicised. The meaning of this historicisation, however, goes far beyond its 'modal' conjugation and enters into the orbit of all historicism, which proclaims in its basic denominator the *concrete-subjective* side of creature, as opposed to the sovereign norms from above *that determine its meaning*, as the only source of being and knowledge of meaning.

Like every denominator and philosophical philosophy based on autonomous thinking, that of historicism finds its semblance of truth and the reason for its substantialisation in the 'universality in its own circle' of the historical development of 'culture' as a responsible vocation imposed on man.

This responsibility presents man with a *choice*. Within the philosophy of existence, this choice is of dialectical character, namely posed in the religious-dialectical tension of freedom and freedom-reasoning ratio. In appearance, freedom in 'existential' form is removed from all reasoning, but we saw that this finds its strict limits in the 'rational' conception of the system.

In truth, choice is universally modally *determined*. The idea that its historical aspect could make an exception to this, to the point of complete absolutization, can only find a semblance of grounding in the fact that *in* this aspect man appears *as the* responsible shaper and unlocker of the 'given' creature. However, he always "chooses" from certain modal points of view, which indicate the path *in which* the meaning of each choice is qualified. If the guiding point of view is the historical aspect of reality itself, [187] then we find ourselves in the sphere of the exercise of power as such. If that aspect is absolutised, beyond the technical control of nature, only the dialectic of rational arbitrariness remains, which nevertheless continues to confront the sovereign determination of the meaning of reality.

Even the dialectic itself, in which the religious absolutisation of 'choice' remains bound, proves the falsity of this independence. We saw that the dynamis of creation drives every delusion and originality of dialectic into an antinomy that can no longer be dialectically reconciled. Only here lies the cause of the eclipse of the creaturely sense for the man of modern culture. For it is *his* opting for his own autonomy of reason in the process of formation and opening up, in the pragmatic thinking preparation and organisation of his exercise of

power, that closes off his view into the horizon of creation and causes him to miss his destination.

The practical pragmatism of the last half of the twentieth century cannot care about this horizon in terms of origin and principle. Its religious creed is that of the natural scientific method, its practice is power, and qualified as power.

This qualification bears modal-historical character and, after the three preceding ones from our and the past century, provides a final form of *historicism*. In the moment of power-to-power, modern pragmatism reveals its irrationalist component and uses the most rigorously implemented rationalising methods in its service. With this, the final crisis of humanist religion has broken out into orbit and its dialectic of origin has exposed its own fundamental character.

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The darkening of the creaturely horizon has thus progressed as far as possible. Whoever thinks, as a Christian, that he can accept the compromise and the "functional" way of looking at things on a path of scientific search for truth, indeed that he can expect God to meet him thereon, can only continue to get caught up in hopeless dialectics.

And now we must ask: can this darkness be broken by a power spell from the Word of Truth?

Let us be warned by the Jaspers-Barth discussion. Jaspers' Chiffren, whose content but sense can never be 'Gegenstand', aim, albeit in dialectical brokenness in vain, to show man the way to *transcendent freedom through* temporal reality. To do so, man must *recognise* them existentially. After all, they address him to the inner limits of his being there.

### **Experience of creation.**

Indeed: it is about *freedom*. We only recognise that this is what it is all about at the inner limits of our being. For there we are referred to by the propulsion of the dynamics of origin in the modalities of temporality. There is an important element of correctness in Heidegger's thesis concerning non-authentic existence in 'Sein-und-Zeit'. By this is meant existence, which transcends 'signs'. For us, we have no need to examine Jaspers' Chiffren and its categories; what matters is what he meant by it: the recognition signals of the transcendental direction of this temporary life on the modal trajectories, to which we are *bound*. And it is about the recognition. Not the recognition of the 'object' that appears as a signal [189] but the signification itself of freedom as the destination of creation. This signification only takes place on the transcendental line, which repeatedly connects all modal praesentia.

Without this present *experience in* creation, *there is no* experience of its truth. And without experience there is no knowing. No knowing of creation, that is, none of what it reveals. Then there is also no recognition of the Word concerning creation, that the Word is *in* creation. And what would one then want to reason about created being and order of creation, if not a priori the revelatory nature as such of this by experience? But what is 'experiencing' creation? It is experiencing the signs *as* signs and to this end they must be *made into* signs. In all that it

is, creation 'speaks', but its speaking must be understood every time again when the called human being brings it into manifestation.

Jaspers' chiffern are in their chiffer quality seized by the 'Philosophische Glaube', the 'Fundamental operation'. Jaspers' philosophical thinking, as true humanist thinking, has oriented itself to Christianity to a considerable extent. That his beliefs sought to be a freedom faith is consistent with this. It cannot arrive at its hoped-for destination within the dialectical framework of autonomous rationality; thus the meaning of Chiffern is negated. And now it is a matter of continuing to follow this *sense* without falling into what Jaspers thinks he has to reproach Christian faith - but in fact Christian theology - with, i.e. *vergegenständlichen der vrijheid schenkenende transcendence*.

We do not want to repeat what [190] is to be understood by *Gegenstand* and *vergegenständlichen*. The core of this historically multifaceted concept lies in its meaning of theoretical-thinking activity, as it can be traced back to the Western philosophical tradition of the 'being-of-thinking'.

Whoever, by analogy, speaks of faith-'*Gegenstand*' does not know what he is saying. The confusion is primarily attributable to theologism which, within the sphere of influence of Western-rational pseudo-revelation, has thought to grasp the creaturely subject-object relations in its very different sense primarily under the basic heading of 'knowing' and 'being'.

Where 'believing' in the praegnant sense is concerned, the critical meeting point lies in the struggle for the priority of the transcendental temporal direction. Jaspers' being religiously bound within the humanist dialectic of origin prevented him from advancing to the *positive* sense of faith. In the upward pursuit of 'transcendence', in which Jaspers brought his humanist desire for freedom along a creativistic trajectory, he was irrevocably thwarted by the 'decay' of his faith into the dialectical antithesis of 'Reason'.

His entire argument about 'Fundamental operation' and 'Basic knowledge' demonstrates the bitter irony in this state of affairs, since the 'vernünftige' 'Wissen', based on the 'Consciousness in general', demands a *Gegenstand*, which 'faith'? (Jaspers does not tire of arguing the latter) cannot use.

In rejecting any belief '*Gegenstand*', [191] Jaspers is right. Surrender has not only nothing to do with any '*Gegenstand*', but nothing to do with any subject-object relation.<sup>35</sup> It is one-sided and absolute. Any religious dialectic that detracts from this absoluteness is - *in the sense of* disqualifying belief - unbelief. The freedom that "existence" "grants" to itself in its surrender does not tolerate a dialectic of rationality.

It does not tolerate it in either old-rational or modern-existential form, and certainly not within a nature-supernatural dualism, which contracts in a hidden way with modern 'truth'

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<sup>35</sup> If, for a moment, one were to seek to translate our intention into the terminology of the dualism we reject as primordial, one would have to say: faith is only about the relation of all subjects to Him, to Whom no "objectivity" can ever be ascribed, since He *is* the absolutely unique *Sovereign* of creation and of all its internal relations.

methodology and philosophy of existence, and which again seeks to cast a 'hermeneutic' anchor for itself through the intervention of theology.

### **Rejection of subject-object duality as tacitly accepted ground.**

If creation is *revelation* and as such must be followed, if it is disturbed through man's fault and man is *not* prepared to follow, *how* is there any chance of understanding its 'sign'?

In the human *experience* of creation, in the 'pre-theoretical' discernment that accompanies it, the sign presents itself. Woe to him who now wants to make its understanding dependent on a prior interpretation from a theoretical distance. That knowledge of a developed theory can support the pre-theoretical discernment is beyond dispute, but only *after* this discernment has found its *direction*.

[192] Thus we are definitively, in the 'existential praesens', faced with the question of the order of creation and the creature subject to it. How can this creature, how can man experientially discern, know, follow? If he wants to put "knowing", in the traditional sense of *theoria*, first, he simultaneously denies that it is *he* who knows. His *living* discernment takes the false direction from there. If he is prepared to follow, then he discovers that his knowing discernment is not primarily to do with a given and acceptable order, but that this order is only an instrument of revelation in the personal relationship of the Giver of revelation to its recipient, and that it can only be understood if the *heart* of the recipient is open to the divine heart speaking to him. In this relationship of revelation, the jealousy of supreme love is present, which is silent by the admission of human 'reason' at the level of this sacred maintenance. The alternative of rationalism and irrationalism finds no place here. Has the creature recognised the instrument?

The question is meaningless both for old and new scholastic theologism and for ecclesiastical culturism and pragmatism. The fashion of 'empowerment' is not compatible with the in truth *intimate* nature of revelation.

This intimacy, meanwhile, has nothing to do with mysticism, which in truth is born out of an attitude to life that is in the very sense secularised. After all, secularisation is *apostasy* to the absorption of the created. *In this respect*, how and in what direction man interprets this creation is secondary. What he possibly makes 'divine' can be derived from nothing other than creation placed in his own material or spiritualising, c.q. theosophical, service, [193] primitive or in culture. The intimacy of God's revelation similarly resists any 'mediation' by a dialectic of concealment and revelation as the final piece of saecularisation mythology. It is one of the two: either the heart of the people has become heavy and its ear closed, or it leaps for joy at hearing the voice of the Bridegroom. The sovereign Meaning-Giver's freedom of choice, which cannot be 'touched' by philosophy or theology, cannot be brought under any heading whatsoever with the 'befallen' of a theological dialectic of origin

The understanding of revelation bears *transcendental* character throughout. There is nothing in opposition to it but only apostasy. This transcendental structure is a unity. Not only can it not be interrupted by a duality of nature and super-nature or by that of (by now

distinguishable) normative and natural modalities, nor can it be separated into a duality of Word and creation revelation.

Such dualism, introduced by the old scholastics ignorantly from a "thinking-of-being", by the modern contradictory with the help of an existentialising humanist idea of freedom, is today taught within neo-Calvinism from culturist circles and diligently pursued in various degrees. One thinks one can point to the Reformation's plea for the emancipation of life from the shackles of clericalism as the basis for this.

However, the basis of these currents can only be sought in the tendency, which has already asserted itself within the Christian circle since before the 'church fathers', under the impetus of the basic motive of nature and super-nature. As we saw, this can only be traced back to the religious need to assign the "last word" to the autonomy of reason. [194] After the Calvinist Reformation - insofar as it was possible within the once-formed religious community of its time - had tried to close this split under the supremacy of the sovereignty of revelation, it now seeks, on the tracks of the universally penetrated humanist religious dialectic, a new motivation for 'emancipation'. We ask: emancipation from what?

Of church patronage? But the 'church' is placed partly at the centre of cultural earthly interest.

Of clericalism? More than ever, the clergy is overstepping its area of competence and dangerously meddling in questions outside its remit, to the applause of 'culturism'.

Of theology? Of the old-scholastic certainly, of the modern dialectical here and there. But for that matter, without theology one does not know one's way around hermeneutical undertakings and interpretations.

Of the idea of 'antithesis'? Has it ever been understood other than as human opposition within an earthly-temporal arena, using terminologies borrowed from 'supernature'?

The continuous transcendental character of revelation nowhere leaves a resting point where man can prepare himself for the integral decision, the answer to be given. It only prepares this decision in him and forces him to make the choice.

It compels *every* human being *universally* and in this, besides being transcendental in nature, it is also *integral*. It is the one creative order that determines all creative orders. The *created* human being, called to understand it in his image of being God, cannot distance himself from it. His preparation and final decision take place within it.

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The Word, who called the creature into being and dwelt among us full of grace and truth, continues his journey with us in the created world.

With this confession, we strike both any fundamental dualism and the element, which Jaspers sees standing between his own and Christian faith. No less meanwhile the theology of 'befallen' and the 'Demythologising' that takes its starting point in the hermeneutics of the 'understanding of Being' (Heidegger-Bultmann). Against all these, we place full emphasis on the completely 'linear' character of 'the time of God', which cannot have anything to do with

any speculation on a concept of eternity. However: this time is the time *of God*, which includes us in a *full* sense, and *there is no* other time. It is the modalities of this time on which Our past, present and future are plotted from God's side, drawn together for us every time in the true, transcendental 'existential praesens'. And it is the Master, Who stands on this transcendental line and invites us in each praesens to follow - along the creaturely modal lines. This following (or omission) is realised in the transcendental structure of all our acts and deeds, *on* the substrate of nature and in mutual coexistence under various forms. Herein lies the root of the only possible scriptural 'anthropology'.

It should nevertheless be clear to Jaspers, whose conception of the Chiffren we particularly value and with whose view on the impossibility of a 'Gegenstand' for believing, that the faith of *following* the given revelation cannot be compared to any 'Corporality'. The Master, who *or* the transcendental timeline invites to follow *through* time, fulfils neither the place of an empty [196] concept of transcendence, as Barth has reproached Jaspers, nor the 'diesseitige' need for any 'Corporality', as Jaspers ripostes. The word from 2 Cor. 5 : 16, following 3 : 17, is clear enough for this purpose. For this following does not concern two areas connected by any rational dialectic (c.q. theo-logical), but is the one result of one invitation, made in creation and through the service of creation, which receives its integral *norm* from this service itself.

Instead of any 'leibhaftige' Gegenstand we meet here the fundamental dynamis of creation. The dispute about Corporality or Gegenstandslosigkeit between the philosophy of Jaspers and Barth's theology betrays in both the choice of the archimedean point within the abstracted theoretical Gegenstandsrelation. We saw Jaspers' 'transcendence' projected from there as an *idea* of religious-dialectical meaning fulfilment, rejected by Barth on an equal basis and replaced by that of paradoxical descendance.

Only the disclosure of this archimedean point allows the given fundamental dynamis to take full effect and opens up the trajectory of freedom.

Throughout, we have shown that, in the midst of the fullness of life, the sector of theoretical thinking, which has acquired such decisive significance in the development of Western civilisation, is driven by a fundamental and central driving force that transcends this thinking. Reformational philosophy has placed this connection between religious motive and thinking at the centre of its research, while placing full emphasis on the distinction and limits between the proposition of faith and actualisation through philosophy in scientific work. Thereby, taking into account the degree of maturity in reformational thought, she opposed supernaturalism and nature-dualism and not only indicated within creation the transcendental lines along which thought had to move from and to its presuppositions, but also drew these lines together on the true idea of the fulfilment of meaning through the Mediator of God and thus on its Origin in the professed Creator.

The systems of theology and philosophy that have developed on the Western European continent since the period between the two great wars have emphasised the "*subjectivity*" as the starting point for understanding what *is as such*, as opposed to the comprehensive "*ontologies*", and this subjectivity as existential *actuality*.

We have repeatedly tried to make clear that the original idea of these philosophies and theologies always remains dialectically separated between existential freedom of origin and rational universality, which they cannot abandon for its own sake. The 'last word' is by definition pronounced with general validity and, as Kierkegaard foresaw, remains internally antinomian to the pretence of the last responsible freedom.

Nevertheless, this last and sharpest elaboration and philosophical self-reflection has signalled the crisis to every externally conceived "ontology" and Kierkegaard's central message has, partly through its intermediary, warned the theologising and philosophising Christian to keep under sharp control the connecting line between his theorising thought and the origin from which it says it starts and wants to continue in concrete terms.

It is for this reason that we have already placed considerable emphasis on the significance [198] of what we have called the 'existential praesens'. Indeed, the theoretical extension in breadth and depth, in systematising analysis and synthesis, of that which the pre-theoretical discernment of life practice presents to theory, takes place in the intentional acts of thought.

If we have to keep reproaching the philosophers of existence who, thus responding as far as possible to Kierkegaard's intentions, have tried in various ways, either explicitly or implicitly, to publish the 'critique de la raison dialectique' (Jaspers, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre), for how the consequence of philosophy's claim to universality eluded them, how much greater is not the danger threatening *Christian* philosophising and theologising intended as such. Equally important for all is the almost impossible requirement for abstract theoretical thinking to finally leave the "spectator's stand" and accept being included in the fundamental dynamics. However, what one reproached to rationalising and ontologising predecessors in theology and philosophy, one could not leave behind oneself without risking again the authority of one's own philosophical or theological word. It was always the element of (possibly-paradoxical) 'rationality' that was not to be surrendered to the critical adventure.

For critical philosophy of existence, the stakes were the furthest-focused humanist idea of freedom. It capitulated and had to capitulate in the face of its religious-dialectical counterpart. What, however, are the stakes for scriptural philosophical, theological, scientific thinking?

It is *the same* as that of the Christian life *in total*.

[199] At all costs, the Christian must refuse to enter into the scientific discussion on a foundation of a theoretical subject-object relationship, in whatever form it may be presented, that bears Christian and supposedly autonomous thinking together. We hope to have demonstrated the impossibility of this in the discussion with Jaspers. The attempt to introduce any biblical thought element into a discussion on such a basis, as neo-Calvinist culturism - incidentally in the line of the old Protestant scholasticism - aims to do, means today, more than ever, complete surrender to intellectual dialectics. Within a supposedly Christian cultural endeavour, this is to be expected no differently.

All the more Reformational philosophy has to be wary here.

The penetration of the fundamental religious motif of Scripture cannot be expected as long as one focuses one's attention in the abstract on the structure of the subject-object relationship in theoretical thinking - which, moreover, is no more than a 'sub'-structure within one of the specific structures - in order to possibly start the transcendental critique from there. A truly Christian and a non-Christian life, including Christian and non-Christian thinking, have *nothing in common* but *creation-structure* and fall. The life *and* thought of all human beings have *everything in common* in the *act structure* in which all life, and thus also theoretical thought, is carried out. The theoretical thought act not only derives its cognate objects from the acts and actions carried out in the fullness of *life*, but is joined with and in the same way as these in the dynamic temporal structure, which the *two* dimensions we are discussing show as the trajectory of movement of the creature always contained in unlocking.

One can, as we hic et nunc, make this statement. [200] It may be an abstract-gratuitous statement and once again deliver us helplessly to a critique like that of Jaspers. If it is to have any real value, we will have to follow the transcendental direction of time with him, but bypassing 'Basic knowledge' and 'Fundamental operation'. Passing 'Fundamental operation' and others means the 'daring' of leaving the field, where the 'Consciousness in general' in its different variations sets the law, the denunciation of the basic condition of *autonomous* commonality, not of respect for the givenness of the human community and the *creaturely* normality of its distinctive consciousness.

It means in the practice of life on all sides the denunciation of faith in temporary 'effect' and the corresponding 'verification tests'. It means the enclosure not just of a theoretical, but first of all of *every* basic dialectic by the fundamental dynamics of creation.

As soon as a dialectic of 'autonomous reason', in whatever form and at whatever stage, wants to free itself from the encirclement of this dynamic, it does not re-establish a dialectical relationship with the latter, but reveals the fundamental and irreconcilable *antithesis* between the original basis of creation and everything that has given effect to the primal daemonic apple mentioned in Genesis 3:5.

Even in this attempt, the putative dialectics of origin *remain* bound within creaturely subjection to the dynamis of creation, which continues to show itself in the hopelessness of polar tensions.

This hopelessness is the opposite of the supposed security put forward by a Christian 'secularising' culture. Nor is it itself again one of two poles within the [201] given creature, as a Protestant scholasticism might have imagined. What it does represent, through the scientific cult of the West, is the hopelessness of a temporary life, whose transcendental dimension people have tried to fix at the picket lines of horizontal dialectics. It has seen Western man repeatedly jerk from his shackles by alternately shifting the tension to one of the two poles, seeing him resign himself to apparent freedom, to insolubility, to pragmatism. And when the fulfilment of Nietzsche's prophecies sometimes seems threateningly close at hand, then what he has called 'ewige Wiederkehr' will first show its inevitability from the grip of the idol, to whom that man has dared to entrust himself by exclusion. Even then, those

who are devoted to him with heller hearts will rather leave everything than give up this idol. Of the saecularised cultural Christian, only caricature will remain.

As the whole of our exposition has been aimed at the conception of limits and we wanted to make this clear from the start, we now deliberately return to it. We have reached the limits of philosophical discussion and are once again faced with the question of *freedom*.

This freedom was the stake of Jaspers' reflection and he did not seek it integrally on the lanes of tragedy or irreconcilable bitterness, as the philosophy of existence seemed to do in its first period of development, nor did he surrender it to the dialectical compromise of the second period. However, he could not religiously break the last spell, that of 'Reason'.

We cannot, equally religiously, accept its law. It belongs to *the functions* of the *originally* free life which, as soon as it chooses one of its functions as its [202] boundary, eo ipso becomes *unfree*. Man is destined for freedom by his transcendental orientation and owes his bondage to nothing but self-election, turning away from 'transcendence' and lacking true self-knowledge. To become free, he will therefore have to find again the transcendental direction of the original dynamics of creation. This will not succeed along theoretical trajectories. Whoever tries this, thereby elevates the theoretical act of thinking to cultic act and ends up back in the hopeless dialectic of origin. Its seductive last stature as a progression of 'interpretation' or interpretation, which seems to be able to reconcile positivism and existentialism, even if desired by enclosing a similarly theologically 'protected' supernature, cannot deceive in this respect. It culminates in a dialectical interpretive historicism.

### **The 'risk' in the problem of radical self-reflection**

Liberation, even of the thought-act, is to be expected from nothing other than integral and radical *self-reflection*, Radical, i.e. beyond any functional reflection. But with that, the transcendental limits of temporal existence have been reached and thus at the same time those of the possibility of 'adaequate' expression in words.

Can the human person 'functioning' in temporal life reflect 'radically' on himself? Precisely with a view to clearly bringing the limits into view, we must – although we renounce any illusion about finding adequate means of expression – nevertheless know what we *want to* express. No positivistic reasoning can close its ears to what is meant by this, as if it were entering the area that falls outside the scientific meaning. [203] After all, nothing less than the pretension of this reasoning itself is at stake.

If, nevertheless, as we noted at the beginning of this writing, this pretence seeks to have the scope of the scientific yardstick determined by this yardstick itself, then the boundary question arises as to whether the *meaning* of scientific thought is itself of scientific origin, i.e. can be originally promulgated by scientific thought. Neither of the two answers to be given to this question can be of scientific origin.

Here, in fact, no less than the question of self-reflection has already presented itself, which one has tried to deal with in a logically functional way, thereby unconsciously declaring that in the *actualisation* of its theoretical thinking, human subjectivity has been demarcated within its logical-analytical function. However, the very giving of this answer goes beyond the logical

*function* involved and is projected by man from his full *self-reflection*. It now has its consequence in acts and omissions in the loading of all 'hypotheses' with which the 'positive investigation' of reality begins.

Meanwhile, what do we ourselves intend to express when we speak approximatively of 'radical' self-reflection?

We are here in immediate contact with what we have called the origin dynamic of creation and in which its 'radix', the radix therefore also of all our individual existence, is given.

If it could be decided within our possibilities of expression, albeit with the help of a 'Basic knowlegde', we would not be in touch with that 'root', from which, after all, also the 'Reason' itself [204] first functions. No 'rational', but 'radical', freedom is at issue here. Real self-reflection carries a 'risk' that is in truth *beyond reason*.

This risk is the residual acceptance of the *given* creature, i.e. self-acceptance. But with this self-acceptance, the risk is at the same time driven to its peak tension, since from the given freedom there is now no more escape in the counter-tension of a religious-dialectical opposite.

If thus from man's side the speaking of the truly first (last) word is excluded, then this word can only be expected from the side from which man knows himself to be given to himself - restless.

And when, after 'science', even no philosophical Glaube proves able to put him in the right direction for this, he will have to venture with the Word that brought him into *existence*, that *called* the creature into being. For only here will the radical dynamis, which no longer permits dialectics, be found.

The tension between the revelation and its receiver pushes it to the inescapable extreme. It cannot be observed from a noetic stand, itself enclosed by the revelatory creatureliness, and then be described. No ontology, however, is competent for description. No existence, which wants to philosophise at the same time, will be able to stand up to it. No 'positive science', whose meaning and authority have been removed from the supposedly tension-free field of modal abstraction and thrown into the crucible of tense thought actuality, can turn away from it in senseless hubris.

In particular, against this dynamic-creatural tension, the nature-supernatural motif in its various variations (substructure-superstructure, [205] contradictory dialectics, general and special grace, idem revelation) cannot justify itself. This distinction, after all, has been proclaimed from the spectator's stand and prosecuted 'noétically' in its parts. In one way or another, successively criticised above, it was each time an expression of the 'being-of-thinking' and consequently suggested a possible *knowledge* of the 'word-revelation', if not separate from or in paradoxical-dialectical relation to the knowledge of creation-revelation, then at least only set in motion by means of its function of sub- or counter-construction. The actual situation, highlighted by the 'Demythologising' theories, turned out to be the other way round, as the noetic seat was only stored in the 'nature' level and maintained the connection upwards through analogy and ambtshypostasis.

The knowledge of revelation does not make its way through the channels of what intellectual Western man is accustomed to understand by 'knowing'. On the contrary, it comes to us in the acts and deeds we are obliged to perform according to our own creative structure. Getting to know "life" is not a more or less neutral preliminary stage on which we develop a certain autonomy. It means the speech of the Creator, who awakens in man and humanity the listening to what He *actually* has to say, and who wants to make us understand the central dynamics *of* the called creature. Every action, every act on the part of the creature *is a* response to the revelation, structurally, fundamentally, by "definition", A laborious, deeply apostate, erring and leading astray response is it; a response, however, because it is normed by a very specific - requested - response and circumscribed in its sense (or sense of apostasy).

These acts and deeds all exhibit its, already [206] more often mentioned, modality of distinction, which, however, functions only within the totality of act or deed, i.e. makes us differentiate. It was, as we saw, this differentiation that is further objectified and elaborated in and through the theoretical thought act. *The decisive factor* for the profit or loss which this last work brings us is therefore not the systematic elaboration to which it must structurally serve, but the *direction* first taken by the practical act with its inherent differentiation and then preserved in the completion of the thought act.

The tension between the revelation and its recipient on the trajectory of the integral dynamics of origin manifests itself in his choice of the *direction* his outer or inner actions will take and in which, whether he realises it or not, his *life as a creature* is at stake. *If* he knows about revelation, his existence *must be at stake*. The question is *whether* he *sees* it, or practically wants to turn away from self-reflection and, if called upon to practise theory, move to the speakers' and spectators' gallery. A separate emphasis on 'supernature' will in the first case be vain, in the second case empty.

In the necessity to choose his integral direction in life, the tension between the revelation and its receiver drives the latter, however much, into the radical self-reflection, which will inevitably appear from his actions. The tension seizes him in the 'existential praesens', where he is unable, on the modal timelines, to outline the awesome 'kairos' of transcendental dynamics of origin.

When talking *about* revelation and the radical *self-revelation* associated with it, an impending impasse seems difficult to avoid.

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If it has been stated first and foremost that 'thinking and speaking about ...' arises from, depends on, the radical dynamics of creation, is it then at the deepest level possible to include in thought and word this radix and the self-reflection that correlates with it, what is more: forced by it? Is not the logic and semantic neo-positivism and others right, saying that here we are at the limits of conceptual and expressive possibilities, indeed at the limits of all methodical plasticity. *Within* the *sense* of this objection meeting it, we do not hesitate with our affirmative answer. The difficulty, however, lies in that 'sense'.

For it *cannot*, in this case, in the first place be limited to certain areas of meaning, beyond which there would then possibly be room left to ask questions outside of 'pure science'. After all, it is the latter itself that then decides on sense and the criterion for the exchange of ideas *on* sense.

But, secondly, it is indeed not possible, in the sense intended by the positivist directions, to conduct the exchange of ideas without prior consideration of the question of its criterion, since a subjectivity of thought that is in fact closed within its modal-logical function cannot deal with realities outside this function.

Human thought, in its theoretical analysis, can only find a provisional resting point in that which at first appears to lend itself to a residual abstraction ('more geometrico') or which seems to show an analogy sufficient for the organisation of methods. It goes without saying that the more the meaning of the areas considered becomes distant from that of the areas studied by the natural sciences, the more reality withdraws from this semblance of possibility.

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That this reality should therefore be brought under the denominator of the methodically attainable, or should be excluded from scientific discussion, is a conclusion that can only be drawn by the person who, for his part, has previously brought subjectivity, practising science, under the denominator of 'logical-analytical positivisation' and has thereby removed this reality from its *given* meaning.

If, however, the functions of reality referred to here are not accessible to a method of 'pure scientific practice' without losing its proper sense, i.e. its own functioning, how much less so than the radix, from which alone all sense can be searched for, and the reflection on that root, with which this search [209] begins. That this method, for its part, has *had to* answer the question of the integral meaning of reality, we hope to have sufficiently demonstrated.

Meanwhile, the question of whether by any other way of thinking man is able to think (to speak thinkingly) of his *self-revelation* and the creaturely revelation given in its radix, we need neither submit to a 'purely scientific' investigation nor involve it within the 'phenomenological space' of 'existence' and 'world', to know in any case, that *every* dialectic of thinking and being leaves us in the lurch here. No 'philosophische Glaube' even with its, remembering 'transcendence', Chiffren could show us the way.

How then can we address the term 'revelation', still in the biblical sense of revelation by the Creator, in word and thought? <sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> The desire to maintain a distinction between knowledge and appreciation cum annexis in such a context, which in the case of followers of positivism repeatedly appears surreptitiously, may be set aside as a philosophical anachronism. Likewise, the phenomenological meaning of the term 'given' is left aside.

<sup>37</sup> We find ourselves here in the vicinity of what Paul Ricoeur put forward in his preface to the collected essays of the late Swiss Christian philosopher Pierre Thévenaz (Pierre Th, *Homme et sa Raison I*, pg. 23 ff.), when, after pointing out that Thévenaz desires a philosophical conversion from an absolute reason 'in' God to a human reason véédr God, he remarks: "La question se pose de savoir si et comment le 'devant Dieu' fait encore partie de cette réflexion philosophique en tant que

Indeed, we can only do this *in* the choice, to which self-reflection in the radix, i.e. the fundamental creation dynamic, brings us. In this case, that choice means a positive stance. The negative silence on this point of a philosophising that calls itself 'purely scientific' is also, as we saw, a consequence of the choice in this radix, but its path leads, via the now fundamentally limiting 'self-reflection', in the opposite direction.

The positive choice is *acceptance der given* integral motive power of creation.

*Integral* motive power opposes any *origin* dialectic. In this case, therefore, with as much force against that of the *nature-supernatural* motif as against any other.

And the critical question is again that of the point, behind which there is no going back. Regarding the [210] motif just mentioned, this point was that of the theological thinking-of-creation, which separated Gospel and creation or, expressed differently, enclosed the former by the idea of the latter.

By the intervention of all the paths which history, the practice of life, philosophy and theology together, has traced, the Christian intellectual spirit has found access to the 'gallery' from which, for centuries, the twilight has been laid over the presence of God, although it has not been able to darken it. A dialectical theology which, in various ways, tried to fight against it with the help of the philosophy of existence that had emerged, could not succeed in this for the same reason as its philosophical teacher. The critique always remained a 'critique of reason'. For theology - as of course for philosophy - its rank as a science was at stake.

The latter retrieval is reserved for no scientific thinking of any kind. On the contrary, whereas this thinking only objectifies and analyses in more detail the distinctions, which the 'pre-theoretical' distinction reveals, this applies in a truly radical sense with regard to the integral, i.e. the first (last), reality.

The question is, however, in what sense this radical differentiation may be seen. For it remains a discernment from this our temporary existence and in any case bound to the universal sense of the discerning consciousness, which in its origin functions only in (inner or outer) action.

What matters, then, is how our actions with the differentiation contained in them are directed towards the radix of our existence, and the direct answer can of course only be that this taking direction towards the root [211] of our existence cannot take place otherwise than

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philosophique. Le croyant confesse sa responsabilité de philosophe devant Dieu; mais le philosophe sait-il qu'il est devant Dieu?" ["The question arises as to whether and how 'before God' is still part of this philosophical reflection as philosophical. The believer confesses his responsibility as a philosopher before God; but does the philosopher know that he is before God?"] A little further on, in support of his hesitation for this question, Ricoeur quotes a word from Thévenaz himself: "..... il n'est nullement exclu que dans le cadre de la foi chrétienne une philosophie soit possible et même requise, et que comme toute philosophie elle ait à parler aussi de Dieu" ["..... it is by no means excluded that within the framework of the Christian faith a philosophy is possible and even required, and that like all philosophy it also has to speak of God"]. However, neither seems to have penetrated to the truly critical bottom.

from the root itself, with which the question returns, how we can then think and speak about it.

To this end, we have to return to what was just said about the basic choice made at the root of our existence - which itself is the fundamental dynamic of the given reality. The making of this choice, as we saw, cannot be avoided and always *precedes* everything that results from it.

This 'before' can never be seen in the sense of one of the temporal modalities, but only in the transcendental dimension of temporal existence, where it introduces the actual direction to be given to the dynamics of access.

This choice is not 'existential' as a choice of origin in the sense of the philosophy of existence, any more than the existential praeses of the time of choice can be understood from its historicist conception. For the truly radical choice, in its 'existential' deciding, *is not* 'original' as making *sense*. It is subjective in an *absolute* and here radical sense, i.e. *normed by the true Origin* and judged *by It* as positive or negative with respect to Its truth, from which the sense *is given* integrally and in all its differentiations.

This statement on our part interprets a choice like any choice of origin. We thereby find ourselves within the immediate correlation of giving *sense* and *accepting* (or rejecting) (the given) sense, through 'radical' *self-reflection*, from which, furthermore, every choice and thus also the one towards our philosophising flows.

Within this *direct* correlation in the root, no antinomy such as we have pointed out within pragmatist positivism, the philosophy of existence and theologism can be admitted. It is therefore a matter of knowing what we are dealing with in our choice of origin; in other words, which one we consider to be the norm of its meaning.

That we, like everyone else, are bound to words and trains of thought when we want to express ourselves contemplatively about them, is only *an aspect* of this reality, which cannot represent it in any way in semantics and methodology. Even our necessary self-control during this expression falls outside any modal scope, since the latter results from the retention of the root to be controlled.

Our reflection, our persistence and the control of it fall, entirely in the same way, outside any philosophical control even from other than positivist or related standpoints.

They are beyond the reach of any dialectic of interpretation, whether theologically guided or not, which always wants to provide its own solid ground for control by forgetting its own origins.

Yet this choice and reflection also fall outside any preconceived check of 'pre-theoretical' distinction. Apart from the contestability of the term 'theoretical', which as such, against its users' own intentions, seems to betray the mirror of theoretical thinking; apart from the historical formation of the 'theoretical' by theoretical thinking, the action-experiencing knowledge of reality is as dependent on the radical choice as the whole of our life. And we

extend this without delay to, or rather include in this the discernment of *faith*, which as an 'aspect' of choice is at the same time spontaneously present in it.

But with that we have arrived at the limits of our own distinctive speech. The radical choice for or against the 'radical' norm is made from our life, which can only be approached in its *temporal* aspects. Yet this life must thus exhibit a boundary aspect, which imposes on man in his temporal existence the radical choice and self-reflection in the transcendental dimension of time.

If, as here, we go on speaking about it (no matter what), the choice has been *made* - in a transcendental sense - and the whole of people's speaking about it shows the consequences of this choice.

## Chapter V

### THE BASIC MOTIVE OF FREEDOM.

#### **Choice, groundmotive.**

It is this creaturely order of things, which compels the greatest care in mutual approach, which itself is bound to the discussed order. Communication in 'transcendental criticism' is a matter of concern. We welcome Jaspers' extreme condition of love, but must consistently keep our eyes open to the fact that its practice also depends on the prior transcendental opening up.

What then should the choice be in the normed space-of-decision of the radix of our existence, and how does it start its manifestation in time?

The answer to the question shows, as I said, the choice made.

Breaking with every rational dialectic as origin, we are left with no seat to take in the search for answer. After all, we are included in the full *dynamis*, which *radically* moves our existence from the Origin. It has chosen time as its path of movement, time in the integral sense, as explained earlier. We are bound to that time when making the *radical* choice. We grasp for it in a 'temporary' surrender that can no longer be surpassed nor reflected. It can only be called '*faith*' within the horizon of time. As explained several times: whoever thinks he can replace belief by thinking as a final decision has overlooked his own *surrender to* that choice. But neither is it possible to point to a sphere outside time ('heart' or 'religion') where man could withdraw from the continuous dynamics of time [215] to consider and make his choices, to consider his faith. Those who think they can sustain this only lapse into abstraction and its antithesis of mysticism.

This does not mean that there are any objections to the use of the *terms* heart or religion, on the contrary. But what matters is their real *content*, and this cannot be other than the involvement of the whole creature and of every human being personally in the divine dynamism of creation from which the creature lives and moves. The need for further theological or philosophical interpretation of this statement would be justified if it were intended to function merely as a guiding *idea*, which we have rejected. For it would then mean little more than the hypostasis and the same abstraction as we have just rejected.

This brings us to the important subject of the 'groundmotive', to which in fact the whole of our treatise is geared. We have always addressed it according to its *normative* side as a dynamic interpretation of meaning and according to that of the *subjective* response of creation as confirmation or denial of this in practice and theory. In the latter case, we found a dialectic of inner-creaturely character substituted for it with all its consequences.

The discussion of the subject as such, however, now brings us face to face with all the difficulties we outlined in connection with the treatment of the choice of ground. What name are we to give to this fundamental force of creation, which compels rebellious man to answer

in deed and word, which determines the meaning of his acceptance and rejection, of his knowing and his ignorance?

The name we give can only express what [216] this dynamis *is* in truth. But how can we express this, when all our actions and speech are determined precisely by this dynamis in its meaning? How do we find the first-last word, which man, especially Western man, has appropriated and falsified over the centuries, as if his decision held the origins in his hands? How can we, set as we are on the track of time, while in order to choose direction we must definitely know where the Origin is pointing us? How can we, now that diverting to 'the stands' has proven impossible for us?

We cannot express anything here, unless in the dynamics of creation itself the Word has entered, has set it in motion, has addressed us and driven us to speak.

It *has* addressed us. It is not we who, with M. Heidegger, have to be attentive in order to let 'Being' come into its own, whereby, despite the deliberate appearance to the contrary, the initiative belongs to the rational listener. We are addressed daily in and by creation, through whose structures we exist and to whose structures we, by opening them up, are subject. And with the help of those structures, we, living, suffering, working within them, are invited to surrender, in a preparatory and final way.

Of such invitation we would understand nothing without – continuous – preparation. Continuous, that is: throughout our lives. Preparatory, that is: *by having to* live. Having to live in labour and harvest, suffering and happiness, ups and downs.

The preparation can remain without its intended positive result because we have moved away, because peoples and generations *have* moved away. Nonetheless, in a way that cannot be controlled by man, it continues to progress according to the 'kairoi' of the harvest time of creation. [217] However, it reaches a summit, the summit of its final calling, of *showing* the way.

Regardless of what a person does or does not do, wandering along the modal timelines, the invitation comes to him in the transcendental dimension of the 'existential present', contingent and permanent. Every time he, *listening*, raises his head in the direction of the opening, there is a calling and an answer. If he claims not to hear it, then that has nothing to do with an 'es kann ihm widerfahren' ['it can happen to him'], which would also include 'es kann nicht ...' ['it cannot ...'], but it is a consequence of remaining internally turned away.

However, it is about knowing, what to listen to.

To listen to the truly first-last word, before which all action, all science, all theology and philosophy recede, since they, in their actions true or false, *exist* by the grace of that word alone. It is the word of the Origin, the origin-Word.

Thus, the fundamental choice for the fundamental dynamis, for the true Origin, has been expressed for the first time. It cannot be tested or demonstrated, since this can only take place in its consequence and through its initiative. No rational deliberation can be brought

together with it in equal dialectics, because this would mean another fundamental choice, which, even as a false choice, could only be born thanks to the true ground.

Does this not get us into dangerous lanes that cut off any communication within the intellectual world?

But the dispute is precisely about the boundaries and competences of the 'intellectual world' including that of theology. These limits too are determined from the [218] Origin, which reserves sovereignty in and for its 'first-last word' towards the creature. Transcendental criticism has thus come to its end point. Reformational philosophy will take on the reproach of a breach of communication, although it will *continue to take* Jaspers' serious 'angesichts' itself seriously up to the point reached. This point, however, is not merely the nadir of a philosophical, perhaps a theological discussion. It is, in *reality*, the nadir of creation itself, if you like: the point of the truly existential crisis. The choice at this point cannot be taught by theology, because it is directed from there.

The choice is choice for or against the Word that created and has dwelt among us full of grace and truth. This is what the creation continuously prepares to teach us, but what we definitively hear only from, through and by the creating and inaugurated Word Himself. For it is He Who called into being and moves forward, drives forward to opening and choice. Whom all creation, rebellious, confused, depraved, *must* follow until the last enemy is destroyed.

### **Meaning, risk, antithesis**

If so, *where* do we stand at the root of creation, at the archimedean point of truth, from which I am moved and towards which I therefore have to take direction? Fundamentally, what is the moving force that emanates from there and to which I have only to entrust myself in order to see and follow the destiny of creation? Finally, this surrender also involves the name I want to give to this fundamental motive.

In contrast to the basic dialectics designated by Reformational philosophy in the philosophies of the world, we know the name of the basic scriptural motif: creation, fall, redemption, which contains not a dialectic but a fundamental antithesis. The question that arises is *what* fundamental character this antithesis has and *where* it presents itself radically. Is the basic motive pulled together in it or, on the contrary, is it encompassed and supported by creation? Which would then be the *driving force* of creation? The answer to this question, which is becoming urgent today, has far-reaching consequences in terms of the requirement for and the possibility of deepest communication among men and of its nature, but no less so in terms of what the Christian has to expect from his work in creation, including his science.

In the answer to be sought here and which is decisive for the spiritual position of the Reformation today, the choice of ground is deepened to its depth. From the scholastic standpoint, one has therefore sought to maintain a constant distance to this answer. The "thinking-of-being" seemed to leave the way open for this via a theological thinking of creation. The confession of the "radical" depravity of creation that went beyond high-scholasticism was accepted in principle *before* the gallery. Did it also reach the gallery itself?

What is at stake here has nothing to do with greater or lesser sincerity, but with a scriptural 'critical' sense. The critics of 'reason' around us have all had to maintain their rational stand despite the far-reaching narrowing of the critical sense. As a philosopher, the existentialist could not allow himself to be absorbed in the flow of dynamics, because the guiding thread of 'hermeneutics' could not ultimately be attached to the existence designated by him [220], but only behind it in its *generally valid* 'cogito'. The 'risk' still found its rational emergency signal.

Does the Christian find somewhere an anchor point, where he can stand to speak "about" the revelation of God, a stand that *realistically* would not be included in the *flow* of creation, of revelation consuming him or saving him beyond his control? When he reaches out in the complete loss of his life demanded by the Gospel, what does his faith expect? If it continues to function, furtively, as a supernatural gift to the intellect, theology can lay a ground for focusing on it. Then it can think, a word about creation separate from Jesus of Nazareth (Acts 22 :8), Who was crucified and we with Him. Then she can make Him, John 1 theologically dissolving into factors, figure within her idea of creation. To this end, with the help of textual exegeses, it can try to invoke God's first sovereignty, only to play its tradition into the hands of a theocratism or - worse - culturism that, courtesy of this heritage, will proclaim a theological ethic of 'saecularisation'. What remains is the rupture in the one revelation of God, which the Calvinist Reformation, in particular, had wanted to heal, but was not given the time to do so in the heat of the battle and by the scholasticism that rapidly resumed its positions afterwards.

Yet this is no less than the new birth, which directs the old creation to its destiny, much more: which points out its destiny *in* that new birth.

Does an intellect equipped with 'supernatural' enlightenment (whether it calls itself that is irrelevant, it is its behaviour that matters) want to come between this and the idea [221] of the originally well-created cosmos as such? The Creator, Who by His revelation wants to speak to us savingly (John 5: 34), *cannot be* made the author of sin. But: *when did* the world made by the Word know the Word, when did even His own accept Him? Only a 'thinking-of-being' can think it has ground under its feet here; it remains only the old ground of Parmenides' 'choice'.

Radically antithetical to every wisdom of men is the testimony of the Word itself from John 3: 10ff, which wanted to open our eyes once and for all to the anchor point of wisdom, which wants to *understand* the revelation of God. The dynamis of creation is the power of the resurrection from the dead, placed by the Gospel in the centre of all revelation, bearing *in* creation the consequences proclaimed and completed by the Word of Truth itself, the consequence of *absolute* 'risk'.

*Here* lies the point of the radical choice of self-reflection, because here lies its *test*. In making this choice, there is no room for any dialectic and no, were it 'paradoxical', synthesis. Here only the *antithesis* remains, accepted or rejected in faith, not within creation, but *against* "this world".

This antithesis is the antithesis of *freedom* versus bondage to 'this world' in all its exponents. It frees from the slavery of intellect and reason by returning them to their proper function. However, it also necessarily frees from subjection to all 'culture' built on 'rational' expectation. It can only recognise man's cultural vocation within the frame of the revelation of the Gospel, which shows creation its meaning and destiny.

[222]

Thus creation presents itself to us as the, one, revelation of God, revelation of his freedom which is ours. Yet it is freedom of the radical *antithesis*, namely that of the cross. The freedom that the cross proclaims and gives is that of having come to do the Father's will. *His* commandment is eternal life. Eternal life progresses losing 'this' life in its deep, religious, meaning. The destiny, nay the revelation, of creation and saecularising 'culture' are mutually exclusive. The advent of anti-Christian power will in its time make every attempt at synthesis jump.

Against the dialectics of this world with its 'last words', first and foremost against the nature-supernatural dialectics, the fundamental dynamis of creation - which even rebellious enterprise first makes possible - will one day rise up in all its force. Then the folly of every presupposition and necessary 'Demythologising' will also become apparent, which, after all, has sought to speak of ground, history and meaning from the myth of reason.

The time of expectation, however, is long, by human standards. And the attempts on the Christian side to make an "own contribution" have had their day. Only one contribution is possible, varied according to the creative structure of the domains of life, but always the same in its antithetical choice of position and always risky in its participation.

Will it be tenable, this taking a stand in the midst of an overwhelming creation disclosure, in which from the polar tensions of all imagined origin dialectics is testified against the only Origin? Where is the promise of His coming...?

We have not and will not [223] counter this call with a theological ontology! We have called for the only self-reflection. Which in creation is my, this temporal existence beyond expectation? Which is my expectation of its fulfilment, i.e. my understanding of its meaning?

### **The revelation of freedom.**

Now, returning to our beginning, we may ask: What is the *sign* of creation? Which are the 'Chiffern' of freedom, which it shows me?

We recall the sense of Chiffern with Jaspers, as they manifest themselves in our horizontal plane of life and knowledge and are lifted into transcendental understanding by the 'Fundamental operation'.

We remember his prohibition of seeing the 'Basic knowlegde' as a Chiffern, since it is there that the Chiffern receive their fulfilment. And his reference of the 'Corporality' put first by Christians to the realm of possible Chiffern.

Driven by the impulse of 'freedom', Jaspers' thinking rises to the sphere of transcendence, just as in his second period Heidegger shows a parallel in the exhortation to listen to the voice and actions of Being. We thought we detected therein the dialectical counter-impulse of the humanist urge to control, which capitulated Heidegger's own philosophy of freedom under the mask and profound contradialectics. Something similar can be observed about Sartre's turn, although along entirely different trajectories, whereas Merleau-Ponty had sought a compromise from the outset.

The field has since been preserved by the pragmatist tendency towards life with modern positivism incorporated in it.

The so-called contemporary Christianity of the last [224] half of the twentieth century has broadly aligned itself with this pragmatism and has allowed itself to be incorporated into it as a kind of earthly interpreter of supernatural values, in which organised churches seem to be leading the way. In turn, the reasoning customary in this process shows a religious analogy to that which, with the philosophers just mentioned, had to veil the capitulation of the humanist motif of freedom. Here too, within the religious framework of the nature-super-nature motif, there is more of an exponent of polar tension within the basic humanist motif that dominates 'Christianity' than of a Christian 'answer' to 'this age'.

On Jaspers' part, there was no capitulation and he, for his part, seriously sought an encounter with the Christian faith. Therefore, in modesty, we have tried to address it seriously.

What links us to him is the full expression of this temporal reality in the transcendental act of faith and, on the other hand, the conviction that this reality cannot be understood without the critique of transcendental freedom (*genitivus subjectivus*).

How his philosophical paths and ours, as a consequence of the humanist-religious dialectic of origin, must diverge decisively, indeed finally take opposite directions, we have shown in detail, while constantly maintaining the discussion context.

And now we, for our part (without entering into an assessment of his more or less concrete examples), may say that the signs that Jaspers intends to point out, what is more: everything that calls our attention to itself in the earthly life of person, community or mankind, want to make us search for the *Word* that called creation into being, with the sole [225] intention of making us know the power of *liberation* that He alone *has given*.

Jaspers' 'signs' must be rationally verifiable, yet acquire their transcendental character first through faith. Reason spans sign and faith. The signs of *creation* show all aspects of reality, including that of conscious discernment. The latter, however, receives its 'verification' exclusively from the restless surrender in faith of liberation.

The signs of creation are all drawn together in the one all explanatory sign, which the humbled Lord presented to his enemies, referring them to their 'law' in Jonah's prophecy.

It is not without the most profound reason that *this* sign is held out to them. Thus Jonah once faced the Ninevites, who will be on the King's side in the judgment. Jonah was *spiritually* trained to his doubly prophetic task by what he then had behind him. The one who now

prophesies at the intersection of the strategic lines of God and Satan will soon *fulfil* the sign that was brought upon Jonah before he himself could be a sign. And *this* sign, which is the fulfilment itself, will *not be* understood by the wicked of church and world. No other sign will be given to them in the meantime. No other sign will explain the signs of creation.

That everything that can be rationally investigated and, in the course of this investigation, imposes its limits on it, points towards unsearchable freedom, has been rightly highlighted by Jaspers. In the crisis of humanism, his philosophy has in its way become a sign against the currents, which have deliberately blinded their own eye 'positively' or have capitulated to it inwardly 'humanist'. The 'Chiffer' of the 'Logos des Seins' was set apart by Jaspers between the two poles determining it [226] and thus clarified. For him she stood on the path of freedom, which is pointed out only in the 'Act of Philosophising'. The latter, however, proved just as comprehensible only from the two poles of the basic dialectic, in which not the unity of philosophising, but the inseparable cleavage of the - religious - dialectic underlying it proved to have the last word. In a philosophical analogy, we have encountered the fundamental antinomies that deny every existentially subjectivising philosophy in the philosopher speaking with 'objective' universality, as well as the 'positivist' objectivist in its impossibility of an 'objective' delineation of the meaning of scientific thinking, the seizure of the last powers.

With equal sharpness, however, we have pointed out the antinomies of both an 'ontologising' and a dialectical theology, which bind the word of revelation in the theological 'Gegenstand' - albeit most recently in the name of freedom. Jaspers' struggle against the conception of 'Corporality' therefore turned out to be, pardon the pun, 'gegenstandslos'.

For this 'Corporality' has gone down in the sign of Jonah (John 12:24, 20:17) and no sacrament intends to take its place as Chiffer. The 'Leiblichkeit', which Jaspers seems to have in mind, can no longer be spoken of in philosophy or theology, since, willingly or unwillingly, they can only speak from *there*. No less than the fundamental dynamis of creation, the Word of God, is at issue here.

Jaspers rightly affirms for himself, that the Chiffren can only be understood along the path pointed out by the 'Act of Philosophising'. The Chiffern of the revelation of creation for its part can only be discovered through the sign [227] of Jonah. This sign is the path of communion with the sufferings of Him who "leiblich" once dwelt among us. Has dwelled in the history of human existence, not needing offers of help and 'Demythologising'-attempts, which for its poor 'hermeneutics' cannot find an anchor point to attach the 'Leitfaden'. Has lived in sharing the disharmony of the intermodal opening up, but in the perseverance of his faith himself definitively opening the transcendental direction.

There is an anchor point. But in no theology, however orthodox or soberingly existential. There is one anchor point, though that in itself is dynamic, w/ *ground-motif*. Ground-motif of the revelation God has given in his creation, which is the revelation of *his* beloved Son, thereby the revelation of *freedom*.

**The limits of time.**

If it is really the revelation of freedom, then it is impossible that it could be captured in the categories of an ontological metaphysics or in those of existential-philosophical risk, etc.

Whoever wants 'history' to begin with man's awareness of his 'freedom' to choose between 'good' and 'evil', which transcends the bounds of nature, is just as much committing mythological theology as whoever makes God the author of evil by making Him open this choice to man. Barth's 'impossible possibility' speaks as much outside the sense encompassing us as Leibniz's optimal choice out of all the 'possible' worlds.

The forced freedom (thrown into the situation of choice) of the philosophy of existence sees its professed integral *origin position* as freedom bound [228] under the *logically* ruled (negative) figure of 'absurdity', through which it is brought to dissolution as a choice of origin. Consequently, the element of (overt or concealed) absurdity could not be equally maintained in the so-called second (capitulating) period of that philosophy.

The positivist philosophies of life and worldview are at most inclined to attribute some function to a "concept" of freedom, but think from a completely indeterminate and fundamentally unreflected *assumption* of freedom, which is the antinomian mirror image of that of the just-mentioned philosophy of existence (autonomy of logic, bound within logical autonomy).

It is either one or the other: freedom *is* normative or it stands under a norm.

That it stands under a norm in every modal sense goes without saying. It was shown above by the radically irreconcilable antinomies, which were and always are evoked, when a thinking striving for origin-autonomy gets stuck in the consequences of the continuity of the chosen basic denominators. The modality of (logical) distinction has no competence to order or determine the functions of the modalities, either for itself or for the others. The attempt to do so can only be attributed to the blurring of meaning that occurs when *man*, believing himself to be *autonomous*, seizes upon the tool forged in the Western religious tradition to exercise his pretended powers of attack or inner defence.

However, in rejecting original autonomy of man, what statement can be made about the [229] relation of norm and freedom in the *root* of the given reality?

To this end, we must refer, on the one hand, to what has been said before about the position of *time* and its two dimensions under a scriptural point of view, in particular with a view to the critique regarding the figure of the 'existentiële praesens'.

The freedom that we can only have in mind can never be captured under any modal denominator (i.e. the historical one); but it does assert itself in all modalities.

It asserts itself there because it is transcendental and radically *given* as the fundamental force that moves creation and is *normative* for it. It cannot be dialectically related to any modality, such as the logical, if only in its most universal ('rational') sense, since it *is in truth* the root and dynamis of all modal givens.

Consequently, it cannot be approached from any subject-object relation (not even in Jaspers' way), because all subject-object relations first arise through its dynamics and cannot show

any ('horizontal') modal, but only transcendental orientation. Whoever places these relations according to the pattern of the theoretical Gegenstandsrelation at the origin of his philosophising, finds no more way open to the true origin and remains wandering in the mutual dialectic of abstractions.<sup>38</sup>

It is to this normative and prescriptive freedom that every horizon of temporal life, including that of science, invites us. Whoever closes off that horizon within the possibilities of scientific methods of interpretation will no longer find the path of freedom on a par with whoever thinks he has found a perspective approaching an 'an sich'. Whoever, [230] he thinks in the opposite direction, chooses human subjectivity as the anchor point of autonomous freedom, will find himself confronted with the antinomies of philosophical generality, as repeatedly demonstrated above.

It is therefore not, as suggested from a modernised nature-supernaturalism, a 'receding' of scientific horizons that would make us insecure. In reality, this literary expression represents little more than the failure of methods, which had been relied on as much in good faith as wrongly. What we are really dealing with is the coming into view of boundaries whose *definitive* character *cannot* be recognised by sovereign thinking.

Meanwhile, one is not mistaken. The humanist dogmatic ideal of science has come to an end. The power of thought has retreated into the modest continuity and theoretical methodical dialectic. The power of science, too, has had to give way to the overpowering control drive of *practical* pragmatism and place itself in its service. It is no longer about knowing reality as such, but about making its possibilities work. Whereas science has been given a distinct role from the outside, inwardly it will take on the official role of modesty, constantly refraining from *definitive* limits.

We have spoken of her as a cult of Western human self-deification. Until it has been knocked off its feet by a more effective myth, it will continue to occupy its place. It will even cling to it with such tenacity that under circumstances it will not want to leave any room for an internal fight against its 'achievements' by honest scientific means.

However, it is gradually losing the position of honour it held for four centuries in the final crisis of humanist religion and is in danger of becoming the ancilla of a pluralist power practice, partly due to positivist 'philosophy'. It will be an unsuccessful attempt, from continental traditions, slow to the subjective idea of freedom and possibly Christianising, to resist this pressure along philosophical dialectical lines.

The discussed boundaries that come into view are really the boundaries of *time*. Of time, within which our entire experience, and thus our thinking, is bound. The attempt to evade these limits to the extreme in a dominant way of thinking, possibly letting them 'recede' and nevertheless continuing to pursue them dialectically, results from its one-sided modal interpretation. Man thinks he discerns these limits in the natural sides of reality only insofar as they seem to determine his coming into and going out of 'time'. He therefore thinks he can

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<sup>38</sup> In this connection, see also as a representative of the horizontalist dialectic of freedom: G. Gusdorf, *Signification humaine de la liberté* (1962).

withdraw his thinking, which brings this limitation to consciousness, from such transience and, insofar as he has not positivistically banned such reflection, he can dismantle it with a historical framework of progressive, cyclical or dialectical structure. The result of this attempt *remains* the dialectic, in its previously discussed complicated and varied form under the impetus of the religious basic motif. Between its poles, 'time' also remains broken up and is interpreted, including its 'limits', by thinking 'impermanent' in a teleological perspective.

Since, however, 'temporal' reality does not allow itself to be closed off under one or more of the basic denominators of the alternating [232] dialectics, but manifests its dynamic totality in human actions, the limits of its trajectory of movement can also only be traced from there. Instead of being external, these limits thus turn out to be internal; they mean to point out to man his modally normed and intermodally bounded possibilities. *Within* these possibilities, they set no limits to his *freedom* and leave his horizon open in all directions. The translations of nature's "possibilities" cannot as such bind the freedom of either man or humanity, but this can in no way encourage Western man in his dialectical arbitrariness. This dialectic, as we saw, makes the veil of antinomy fall irrevocably before the now dark horizon, which leads all methodical groping into a circle of error no longer noticed.

However, we have stated from the outset that the true character of the inner antinomian dialectic can only be understood under the standard of the original creaturely dynamis. With regard to time and its limits, this means that this insight can only be gained from the transcendental dimension of time. There, all modalities, each in 'its order', appear to be included in a movement, which knows no limits, along an unclosed trajectory of time and with an 'eternally' open horizon. In this perspective, there is no room for dialectically involving and thus falsifying boundaries, nor for provocative or frightening 'giving way' to horizons. This lure and this obsession, respectively, can only appear in the field of control of the 'theoretical relationship of state', whether one feels compromised by this title or not.

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### **The direction of dynamis and fundamental adventure**

Time proved to be the trajectory of the opening up of creation, and this in human actions and deeds, including those of intentional 'thinking', with nature 'serving' in all this and all that gives human coexistence its forms.

The questions which our choice of position raises, intellectually only modally expressed but never intellectually determined, we have dealt with in response to Karl Jaspers' deeply gripping research and do not wish to reconsider.

On the one hand, we said, in speaking of the freedom that norms, we had to point to the condition of the trajectory of time, along which we move, even acting scientifically, and which does not allow us to misunderstand its limits in one sense or another.

On the other hand, however, an investigation awaits that can only follow, as it can only take this same course, but which now has to deal with that along which direction is taken.

Taking direction is meant in a normative sense. Creaturally, this can only mean at the same time that one is *bound* to this direction *and* that one should take it. Being bound does not mean for man, insofar as he goes beyond 'nature', a natural law or anything similar to it. What it does mean is that, if he deviates, he sees himself thrown back in a negative, antinormative direction, which therefore closes off his efforts. Those who think they are replacing the origins of freedom with autonomous rationality as the fulfilment of meaning are dependent on dialectical movement and will openly accept it as their origin, possibly under cover of sacred trust. All that he will undertake, in and with the help of increasingly inevitable science, will bear this [234] sign, with as its historical horizon - he may 'recede' as long as he can - the mutual measurement of forces on the substrate of inexorable nature. And this, even though within the cult of science no more effective prophecy seemed possible than that of the logical positivism cum annexis, from which the third generation of existential reflection is for the time being no longer able to save itself.

Being bound and belonging cannot, creaturely speaking, therefore diverge from each other. The divergence arises from the rebellion, which has historically drawn its deep furrows in cultural outcrops. They are ploughed in so deeply that whoever, with his face turned towards the truth, devotes himself to this cultivation, finds himself faced with a seemingly hopeless beginning. However, this should not be surprising, since creation in its entirety does not and cannot show any other picture. Right from the start, under human leadership, it *has* taken the negative direction.

In philosophy, for those who want to read it, the cards of this state of affairs are laid on the table. The dialectic speaking in it is the dialectic of this world which, thrown back and forth between the alternating poles, has been *allowed* to continue its inward 'conversation' until now.

Jaspers' philosophy is therefore already in itself a 'Chiffer'. Its 'Fundamental operation' is the attempt to reach beyond the basic dialectic, which obscures the truth, without wanting to let go of it. With all the more dogged perseverance, others have returned to it. For the Christian, the question now arises: what can be done?

However, this question is basically no different from that [235] of all spheres of life, times and circumstances, It can only be answered from one point and that is from the true origin of the dynamics of creation. For this remains intact and continues to hold its direction. It is only by its grace that the pretensions of 'dialectics' have progress and temporary effect.

However, one must know what one chooses. No dialectic of thinking and being (or theological or Christian philosophical thinking and being of creation), of freedom and determinate methods, of science and indefinite trust in God, can be maintained here. Any hope of fathoming an an-sich, in whatever sense, of finding a path of approach by means of venture in mutual solidarity must be given up. The 'horizontal' direction offers nothing but a 'modal' view; the subject-object relations must be put in their place in the transcendental direction of time and the method-basic denominators must be resolved into their simple factors.

Only in this way will there be room for the transcendental view.

In truth, however, this means that the transcendental view is *first* and therefore demands the first place.

Time and again, the Christian side refers to theology when stirring this key question. The basic motive of being and thinking has so dominated the Western scientific discussion from the root, that one cannot state and presuppose for oneself or for one's interlocutor other than against this background.

Once, however, in all recognition of the influence of centuries-old theoretical thinking on our practical discernment, a limit is reached in this. When the meaning of this actuality of *thought*, and thus the meaning of [236] *discussion*, in the midst of and on an equal footing with all other actuality, comes into question, theologising too must aprioritically account for its place and legitimate influence. *This* thinking, too, is subject to the forces from the root and, if it does not follow the course of opening up, will entangle itself in the dialectic (i.e. in no case necessarily, even first: dialectical theology).

An answer must therefore be given – in every respect a-theoretically – to the question where the dynamics of creation are directed. The answer to this question will determine what one thinks one can and should do within the sectors of creation that has developed and from where one should start.

It should be clear that these answers can no longer be found by thinking, although there will be much to think about.

Actually, we have already given or implied the first required answer several times. And just as it cannot be discovered by thinking, neither can what results from it be tested for hopeful or disappointing aspects according to the standards of Western thinking. No cultural optimism or pessimism can be called into question, since the culture itself, which is subject to standards, has proved unable to provide a benchmark.

One painful point does remain, however, which makes us feel deeply how no human word of our own can have authority here. It is that of the more discussed 'solidarity'. On a human and philosophical level so much deeper than a mid-twentieth-century Christianity, Jaspers has brought it forward throughout his oeuvre; we have tried to do some justice to it.

The solidarity *is* there, in being placed on the same [237] path of creation, in the same driving dynamics, under the same invitation, with the same rejection on our part, in the common consequences for all, in the impossibility of warding them off or reversing them, in the hopelessness of a completely new beginning, in the persistence of the mutually correlated urge for life and ditto fear, in the horizontal boundedness of the alternating basic denominators, the definitive obscuring of the modal horizons for the old and new theories, for the life insight of ancient and modern people.

Solidarity *is* there, in guilt, suffering and confusion. What should we - together - start with her? There is no room for one-sided hubris or knowing better.

But one thing is certain. Whoever tries to find a way from within this coherence, with a pitch to the presence of God - were it under consideration of the integrally orthodox result of Western theology - will not find a beginning of exit.

One will have to dare the a-theoretical answer, risk the clamp of imposed adventure, to the bottom. To live *and think from there*.

Does it have to be formulated, does the starting point have to be pointed out once more in a theoretical writing in order to argue about it? Should *the* Freedom that is the Origin of creation and cannot be captured in any 'dialectic' be put into words?

Barth reproached Jaspers for the 'Gegenstandslosigkeit' of his idea of transcendence, Jaspers for the 'Corporality' of his idea of God. It is the sphere of theoretical thinking that makes room for such reproaches. This space does not exist around the Origin, beyond which in truth there is no going back and Who in the transcendental [238] time dimension keeps the dynamics of creation going - through faith - until the fruit has ripened in the Kingdom of God. Only from here can we see the meaning of the words granted to us, of the "signs" of disclosure. And they come to their fulfilment, thereby to their silence, on the wonderful path of the consummation of creation revelation: "Therefore from now on we know no one according to the flesh; and if we also knew Christ according to the flesh, yet now we know Him no more in this way".